

which is essentially the audience this book addresses and remains the strong underlying theme of the book. Houseman's book begins with a useful analysis of the current government system with an assessment of the problems facing the post-Soeharto state. This is followed by a fascinating study of how classical political science theories can assist in an understanding of Indonesia that would be particularly valuable to both graduate and undergraduate students studying comparative politics. Also useful is a section on suggestions regarding where to find information on contemporary events in Indonesia as well as important tips on doing field research in Indonesia. For the United States, if preventing Indonesia from becoming communist was a critical objective in the 1960s, then just as important now in an era where transnational terrorism has become a global threat, is the need to engage what now significantly is the largest democracy in the Islamic world. Crucial in that regard is the development of a new generation of Indonesianists in the United States who can facilitate such engagement, and Houseman's book would undoubtedly play its role in this quest.

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***Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order.*** Edited by See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya. Armonk, New York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 264pp.

This well-crafted book, presented in two parts, deals with the tension between bilateral and multilateral approaches to security in the Asia-Pacific region. It is competently edited in uncomplicated prose and its chief value lies in the manner in which the editors have melded three conceptual and nine country case studies, while drawing important insights of their own. As in any edited volume, there will tend to an unevenness of quality and divergent viewpoints and analysis, and the job of editors to attain overall coherence is often an elusive task. To the great credit of the editors such unevenness has been kept at a minimum and the divergences and convergences of the various authors have provided fodder for Tan and Acharya's interesting problematizing of security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is also to the credit of the editors to have honestly admitted in footnote 18 of the Introduction that: "Owing to a lengthy production

process in the making of this book, our contributors have not been able to account for some of the recent changes in national and regional affairs" (p. 223).

It is indeed one of the occupational hazards of political scientists and security analysts that situations change so rapidly that what is analysed at any one time will within months become dated or even irrelevant. Generally speaking then, let me note here that the cases do bear the mark of essays written in 2002 when the papers were commissioned or actually written. Having said all of the above by way of a preamble, let me now get on with the review proper.

The editors state the thesis of the book unambiguously on page xii. The basic point seems to be that whether security arrangements are bilateral, multilateral and even unilateral is less significant than the fact that the end result is the outcome of security or regional order, viz.: "[B]ilateralism and unilateralism need not be inherently conflict causing. Rather, under certain conditions, they can be reconciled with multilateral approaches in ways that could ameliorate the security dilemma". Accordingly, the editors believe that the older concepts of collective security, collective defence and cooperative security have become unhelpful as new developments in the global and regional environment make them increasingly obsolete. Let me now turn to the authored chapters to see if there is indeed support and evidence for the editors' assertions.

Ralf Emmers writes in Chapter 1 that bilateral alliances with the U.S. have underpinned the security architecture in the region but that unilateralism may even undermine the value of such arrangements in the future. He suggests further that conventional alliances are incapable of dealing with transnational terrorism. William Tow in the next chapter takes a somewhat contrarian view, arguing that bilateralism, including a version he calls "enriched" bilateralism, will remain of paramount value but may be usefully merged with multilateral institutions to develop "convergent security" which could in his words "reconcile the imperfections of both bilateralism and multilateralism". The third conceptual chapter written by Ron Huisken is an Australian perspective as intimated by the author in the chapter heading. Huisken advocates a multilateral security approach leading eventually to an Asia-Pacific security system anchored in cooperative security, a position not favoured by the editors as noted earlier. It does appear that conceptually the jury is still out on traditional analytical categories of security, judging from these three essays alone.

Turning to the country studies, the chapter by Nan Li kicks off with a study of China's evolving conception of security from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping through to Jiang Zemin. In this rather

interesting but somewhat opaque case study, too complex to fully elaborate here, the author suggests that a new security concept has emerged for China, but as far as I can tell, it is one that has no particular inclination for bilateral or multilateral arrangements per se. Rather, it is premised in a pragmatic fashion on increasing China's strategic advantage and reducing its vulnerability. Moving on, Rizal Sukma, in Chapter 5, avers that Indonesia has always remained a strong proponent of cooperative security and the surge in terrorist attacks whether inside or outside the country has not changed this attitude. In my view it may well be that, given the multiple changes of leadership since *Reformasi*, major changes in strategy would be difficult to effect for a period.

The chapter by Yasuhiro Takeda makes the rather sanguine if interesting claim that “[T]he Japan-U.S. alliance has been transformed into a security regime with the public nature and idea of collective security in that the excluded member can enjoy some benefits outside the alliance” (p. 104). In other words, the bilateralism is only something nominal in the Japanese case. This contrasts considerably with South Korea where Shin-wha Lee argues that the ROK-U.S. alliance remains the bedrock of security given the North Korean presence, albeit in an environment of increasing disenchantment with bilateralism. This explains South Korea's recent inclination towards multilateralism such as that offered by the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The Malaysian chapter by J.N. Mak exposes an entrenched bilateralism (with U.S. and Australia, in particular) despite Malaysia's publicly professed preference for nonalignment and multilateralism. In contrast, in the Philippines, Renato de Castro suggests that the switch from bilateralism to multilateralism and then back again to bilateralism is a function of realism. This said, global terrorism could paradoxically also transform the security regime into a kind of multilateralism. The chapter on Singapore by Chin Kin Wah makes the point that balancing and realism underpin the relationship between bilateral and multilateral approaches to security in this small state while in the next chapter, Chulacheeb Chinwanno opines that Thailand has successfully pursued a combination of collective defence (with U.S. and China) and cooperative security with ASEAN through the ARF. In the last chapter, Satu Limaye writes of “recalibrations and not transformations” in the U.S. relationships with the Asia Pacific countries. It is the policy of the Bush administration no less to “develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region” (p. 220).

I have found the book and its twelve chapters and introduction to be an important foray into the types of security regimes that now overlap and overlay the Asia-Pacific region. This said, there clearly still

remain divergent tropes of analysis, advocacy and agency in bilateralism, multilateralism and unilateralism as they pertain to the region. It is also a little disappointing that the editors have not really addressed new issues that have emerged in the theoretical literature, such as whether realism or constructivism should form the basis for framing the analysis of security issues in this region. Alternatively, what are the generic differences, if any, between Asian and non-Asian approaches to security? All said, this is an important book and a must-read for specialists of security studies.

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