

The Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia: A Minority at Risk?

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This article deals with the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, and the attitudes and policies of the Cambodian authorities towards that minority. Patterns of Vietnamese migration to and from Cambodia are studied with the aim of identifying the dynamics behind them. As anti-Vietnamese sentiments have been regularly displayed by the Cambodian élite and in the policies of the Cambodian authorities, the roots and effects of these attitudes are explored. The anti-Vietnamese discourse in Cambodia shows that the perceptions of Vietnam as a neighbouring state influences the attitudes towards the Vietnamese minority. Discriminatory policies implemented by the Cambodian authorities and attacks instigated by such policies had led to the virtual elimination of the Vietnamese minority in the 1970s, when some 420,000 Vietnamese were expelled or fled to Vietnam. Seen in this perspective, the repeated politically motivated attacks on ethnic Vietnamese in recent years present a real threat to the Vietnamese community at large.

Introduction

Armed attacks against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia¹ have occurred on a fairly regular basis over the last few years. Such attacks represent an extreme and obvious expression of anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodian society. This study will analyse anti-Vietnamese sentiment with the aim of identifying its roots and tracing its evolution as well as studying the effects on the domestic situation in Cambodia. As relations between

Cambodia and Vietnam are highly relevant to the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese minority in Cambodia they will be given considerable attention in the study.

The focus will be on the contemporary period, that is, during the United Nations' peacekeeping operation in 1992 and 1993, and at the beginning of 1994. However, historical background will also be provided as it is of great relevance for an understanding of the current situation.

This study follows the patterns of Vietnamese migration to and from Cambodia, and the political context in which that migration has taken place. Consequently, the study is structured chronologically, beginning with the pre-colonial period and ending with present-day Cambodia. The concluding section seeks to explain the policies of the different Cambodian administrations towards the Vietnamese minority in the post-independence period, that is, after 1953, in the context of the country's overall domestic evolution, and its foreign relations, particularly with different administrations in Vietnam.

Pre-colonial Cambodia²

The study of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia in the pre-colonial period presents a special problem since, from the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries, Vietnam's territory witnessed a slow southward expansion at the expense of Cambodia and, thus, the Vietnamese who were settling in those regions gradually came under the formal administrative and political control of Vietnam. In the context of the present study, only Vietnamese living in those regions forming present-day Cambodian territory will be given attention.

Formal contacts between Vietnam and Cambodia date back to the early seventeenth century. Around that time, the first Vietnamese settlers began moving into the region of the Mekong delta which was then Cambodian territory. These early formal contacts followed the slow southward movement of the Vietnamese at the expense of the kingdom of Champa. The Vietnamese settlers were soon joined by Chinese settlers who began migrating into the Mekong delta in the late seventeenth century. The second half of that century also saw the first two Vietnamese military interventions in Cambodia, in the late 1650s and mid-1670s. Both interventions followed requests by members of the Cambodian royal family for military support in struggles within the Cambodian royalty. The first formal annexation of Cambodian territory by Vietnam took place in 1698 and by the end of the eighteenth century Vietnam had expanded southwards to the shores of the Gulf of Thailand. The expansion was facilitated by Cambodia's internal weakness as a result of the continued struggles

within the royal family. It should also be noted that Chinese settlers played an important role in expanding Vietnamese control over the Mekong delta region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

During the first half of the next century, Vietnam's influence over Cambodia was further enhanced, leading to *de facto* administrative control over the central and eastern parts of the country in the 1830s and early 1840s. Vietnamese rule led to a large-scale anti-Vietnamese rebellion in 1840–41. It should be noted that an earlier anti-Vietnamese rebellion occurred along the common border in 1820. During this period, Vietnam gained the upper hand over Thailand in the competition for influence in Cambodia, a competition dating back to the seventeenth century. However, Thailand never completely lost its influence as the western and north-western parts of Cambodia remained under Thai control or influence up to the arrival of the French in the 1860s. The internal struggles within the Cambodian royal family between those seeking support from Thailand and from Vietnam respectively ended with victory for the pro-Thai faction in the 1840s. Thus, Thailand's influence was restored in the whole country to the detriment of the Vietnamese.

Vietnamese influence and temporary control during the first half of the nineteenth century over territory which is now Cambodian led to an increase in Vietnamese migration to these areas. The Vietnamese authorities encouraged their people to settle in Cambodia; Chinese migration was also encouraged. The existence of a Vietnamese minority in that period within the borders of present-day Cambodia can thus be confirmed, but the size of the community is not known. It seems that the Vietnamese living in the urban areas of Cambodia were primarily engaged in commercial activities and in handicraft. The rural Vietnamese were to a large part involved in the fishing sector on the Tonle Sap and along the rivers, and to a lesser degree in silk production. Only a small minority owned land, primarily in eastern Cambodia, and were involved in agricultural production.

French Domination, 1864–1953

The French protectorate over Cambodia was formally established in 1864, following French expansion into the southern part of Vietnam, which came under French control in the late 1850s under the name of Cochinchina. Cambodia formed one of five parts of French Indochina. The other parts were the colony of Cochinchina and the protectorates of Annam, Tonkin and Laos. This difference in status of the five components of French Indochina worked to the advantage of Cochinchina since it was a colony. The French invested more capital in Cochinchina and the

delimitation of the border between Cochinchina and Cambodia was generally effected to the advantage of the French colony. The period of French domination over Cambodia ended with the formal granting of independence to Cambodia in 1953.³

The French encouraged Vietnamese migration to Cambodia primarily within three sectors of the society. The first of these was the rubber plantations established by the French where the Vietnamese were brought in as manpower to work on the plantations. The second was the colonial administration in which the French showed a preference for ethnic Vietnamese; one reason for this was that more Vietnamese than Khmer spoke the French language. It cannot be ruled out that it served French interests to use the Vietnamese in a sort of colonial divide-and-rule policy in Cambodia, as the newly arrived Vietnamese were not linked to the power relations within traditional Cambodian society. It could also be expected that the Vietnamese administrators and civil servants would show their allegiance to the French rather than to Cambodians, thus making them more useful to the French. As the French administration gradually eroded the power of the existing Cambodian structures and enhanced French political and administrative influence, the Cambodians became increasingly marginalized in terms of real power, and the predominance of the ethnic Vietnamese in the French administration became more obvious. The third sector was in private service, primarily in Phnom Penh, to which the French encouraged the migration of Vietnamese artisans such as carpenters, mechanics and plumbers.⁴

As in the pre-colonial era, some Vietnamese were involved in agricultural production in the eastern parts of Cambodia. A number of sources claim that the total number of Vietnamese involved, for example, in rice farming increased during the French period. It is not clear whether the French encouraged such migration. It is also not clear whether or not the migrants actually owned the land they were farming.⁵

The French policy of encouraging Vietnamese migration to Cambodia led to an increase in the number of ethnic Vietnamese in the country.⁶ According to the official census of 1874, there were about 5,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. The census of 1921 put the figure at 150,000, making up 5.8 per cent of the total population. In 1951 the number of Vietnamese in Cambodia was estimated at 230,000 to 250,000. All this suggests a sharp increase in the number of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia during the period of French domination.⁷

Anti-Vietnamese sentiment within the upper classes of Cambodian society surfaced in the 1930s when the royal family began to openly articulate such sentiments.⁸ The Cambodian newspaper *Nagara Watta*, established in 1936, whose founders were closely linked to the Institut

Bouddique in Phnom Penh, gradually adopted an anti-Vietnamese stand and objected to the Vietnamese dominance of the civil service. In the aftermath of World War II, one feature of Cambodian nationalism was the official sponsoring of antipathy towards the Vietnamese.⁹

The Sihanouk Years, 1953–70

Prince Sihanouk dominated Cambodian politics from independence from France in 1953 until his removal from power in March 1970. In terms of the policies implemented towards the ethnic Vietnamese during these years, three laws adopted in the mid-1950s are of importance. First, on 27 September 1954 a law on the requirements and procedures for naturalization of aliens was promulgated. This law stated that any alien of “good character and morals” who had been residing in Cambodia for at least five years, two years if born in Cambodia or married to a Cambodian, could apply for naturalization. The law also required the applicant to have “sufficient” knowledge of the Khmer language. However, an amendment in 1959 changed the requirement to being able to speak the language “fluently” and to exhibit a “sufficient assimilation” of Khmer manners, customs, and traditions. Secondly, on 30 November 1954 a law on nationality was promulgated. Article 22 of that law stipulated that anyone with at least one Cambodian parent was to be regarded as a Cambodian citizen, as was anyone born in Cambodia with at least one parent also born in the country. This Article applied to all children born after 13 November 1954. Thirdly, on 19 March 1956 an Immigration Act was promulgated. Article 26 of this Act stipulated that all foreign nationals would be prohibited from engaging in eighteen specified occupations: 1) customs agent, 2) boat consignee or shipping agent, 3) intelligence agent or private police, 4) immigration or emigration agent, 5) director of an employment agency, 6) licensed general dealer, 7) arms and munitions merchant, 8) maker or dealer of private radio sets or parts of these sets, 9) printer, 10) hairdresser for men, either employer or employee, 11) second-hand dealer or money-lender, 12) river or coastal ships’ pilot, 13) jeweller or goldsmith, either employer or employee, 14) chauffeur of automobiles, taxis, and transport vehicles, 15) long-shoreman, 16) woodcutter, 17) grain merchant, and 18) salt dealer.¹⁰

The official Cambodian census of 1962 showed that there were 217,774 Vietnamese nationals in Cambodia, out of which 51,452 resided in Phnom Penh. These figures do not represent the total number of ethnic Vietnamese in the country, as the census was based on the nationality of the inhabitants. The most reliable estimate of the number of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia at the beginning of 1970 puts the figure at approximately 450,000 persons.¹¹

In the 1962 census, the figures for the Vietnamese population showed that all over the country and in all age categories there was a surplus of females. Two factors help to explain this gender imbalance among the Vietnamese. First, during the military conflicts in Vietnam migration was primarily made up of women. Secondly, the census underestimated the size of the Vietnamese minority in general and, in particular, the number of Vietnamese men who had taken up Cambodian citizenship in order to keep or find employment.¹²

Ethnic Vietnamese living in the urban areas of Cambodia were mainly active in the processing of wood products, in mechanical and electrical services, as tailors, as owners of jewellery shops, in secretarial services, as hairdressers, and in the private services sector. Several of these professions were among the eighteen prohibited to foreign nationals and, consequently, it can be expected that a number of ethnic Vietnamese felt compelled to apply for Cambodian citizenship in order not to risk the closing down of their business or the loss of their employment. The predominance of ethnic Vietnamese in the civil service had declined since independence as the Cambodian authorities preferred to employ ethnic Khmers. In the rural areas, ethnic Vietnamese continued to be heavily involved in the fishing sector. Many were still labourers in rubber plantations but they did not dominate this sector as emphatically as they did during the colonial era. Another group was involved in agricultural production, primarily in the provinces of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng in eastern and southeastern Cambodia. As in the colonial period, it is not clear to what extent these Vietnamese owned the land they were farming. With the promulgation on 20 February 1958 of a law banning aliens from owning urban and rural land and buildings, only ethnic Vietnamese with Cambodian citizenship could legally own farmland.¹³

Although ethnic Vietnamese born in the country after 13 November 1954 or born out of mixed Khmer-Vietnamese families automatically qualified for Cambodian citizenship, the majority had to apply for naturalization in accordance with the law passed in 1954 and amended in 1959. Such a process of naturalization was fully legal but there was still political opposition to it. At the 15th National Congress held on 1–2 July 1963 a unanimous vote recommended that naturalization be refused in principle to all Vietnamese on the grounds that they could not be fully assimilated. The Congress also recommended that a committee of inquiry be established with powers to revoke Cambodian citizenship granted to aliens who did not “respect our customs”. This recommendation applied to all naturalized aliens, but the discussions at the Congress showed that it was primarily aimed at the ethnic Vietnamese.¹⁴

Expressions of anti-Vietnamese feelings during the 1960s cannot be

dissociated from Cambodia's relations with the two Vietnamese states. In 1963, Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations with the Republic of Vietnam (RV) as a protest against the anti-Buddhist policies and discriminatory measures of the Vietnamese authorities against the Khmer minority in the country.¹⁵ Border problems also existed between Cambodia and the RV. An additional source of friction was that armed personnel from the National Liberation Front (NLF), struggling against the government of the RV and supported by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), used parts of eastern Cambodia as sanctuaries and transportation links. Overall, Cambodia had better relations with the NLF and the DRV than with the RV. Nevertheless, the NLF's and the DRV's military presence in eastern Cambodia became an issue of increased concern for the Cambodian authorities in the late 1960s. Right-wing politicians and senior members of the Cambodian armed forces were particularly concerned about this foreign military presence on Cambodian soil.¹⁶ This led to increased suspicion about the allegiance of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia, and in the late 1960s the Cambodian authorities began accusing ethnic Vietnamese of conducting subversive activities and of lending support to the foreign forces operating in the country. Ethnic Vietnamese were also the target of round-ups and some were arrested by the Cambodian authorities.¹⁷

The Khmer Republic, 1970–75

In early 1970, Prince Sihanouk's grip on power began to erode, culminating with his official removal from the position as Head of State on 18 March, following a vote by the National Assembly. Lon Nol was retained as Prime Minister with Siritak Sri Matak as his assistant. This political evolution had a serious impact on the domestic situation in Cambodia, or Khmer Republic as the country was renamed, and on its relations with the different Vietnamese actors.¹⁸

The removal of Prince Sihanouk took place in the midst of a propaganda campaign against the Vietnamese. In fact, the attacks on Sihanouk were primarily centred around his alleged pro-Vietnamese stand. The verbal propaganda against the Vietnamese community soon turned into physical abuse and attacks all over Cambodia. Vietnamese houses, boats, property, and religious shrines were attacked. The offices and residences in Phnom Penh of the diplomatic representatives of the DRV and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, formed in the RV by the NLF, were sacked. The violence against the ethnic Vietnamese escalated when elements of the armed forces and the police joined in the attacks and killings, which caused the deaths of thousands of ethnic Vietnamese.¹⁹

Far from protecting the Vietnamese, the new Cambodian authorities introduced a number of discriminatory measures. The Vietnamese were subjected to a curfew, only being allowed to move around between 7 and 11 a.m., thereby making it impossible for them to attend schools and work. Vietnamese fishermen had their fishing licences withdrawn. Public and private organizations as well as persons living in state-owned houses were banned from employing Vietnamese staff. Furthermore, the authorities "recommended" that the Vietnamese language no longer be used in public.²⁰

The RV authorities intervened officially, and a growing awareness on the part of the Cambodian authorities of the negative international repercussions of the attacks on the Vietnamese, prompted a change of attitude. The authorities called on the people to "actively protect" the Vietnamese in the spirit of maintaining cordial links between the Cambodian and Vietnamese people. An agreement was reached between the RV and the Cambodian government on the issue of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia on 27 May 1970.²¹

Despite the new signals, ethnic Vietnamese continued to flee from their homes and sought refuge in eighteen camps set up in certain towns, primarily in Phnom Penh, to cope with the flow of internal refugees. By May 1970, the number of people in the camps had reached its peak of 90,000. From May to August, these refugees were "repatriated" to the RV. On 13 August, the last camp was closed down in Phnom Penh. However, the exodus of ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia continued and by the end of September 1970 a total of 197,378 Vietnamese had officially left for the RV. According to the RV authorities, 28 per cent of the "repatriated" claimed to be Cambodian citizens. In fact, the RV authorities estimated that 300,000 ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia prior to the exodus had Cambodian citizenship. In March 1971, the RV officially estimated that approximately 250,000 ethnic Vietnamese had been "repatriated" from Cambodia.²²

The ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia had been caught in an upsurge of officially sponsored anti-Vietnamese sentiments which linked them to the presence of DRV and NLF troops in Cambodia. Already before Prince Sihanouk was removed from power the transport of arms through Cambodian territory to the DRV-NLF troops had been stopped. The Cambodian authorities tried to force the DRV-NLF troops out of eastern Cambodia but suffered a near total defeat in two military offensives carried out in late 1970 and in 1971. In 1970, Cambodia was firmly dragged into the Vietnam War with American and RV military incursions. The Cambodian government managed to remain in power up to 17 April 1975 despite the military challenge of internal opposition that brought Prince Sihanouk

into a coalition with the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in the self-proclaimed Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC). The Cambodian government survived as a result of American material and military support, such as air strikes against RGNUC-controlled areas, which was particularly evident during the first half of 1973. The RGNUC could rely on support from the DRV-NLF troops up to the end of 1972 when they withdrew from Cambodia. By then, the RGNUC was strong enough to continue their struggle with only material support from its foreign allies, China and the DRV.²³

Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–79²⁴

After capturing Phnom Penh, and with the downfall of the Khmer Republic, the CPK took over political power in the country, although officially the RGNUC led by Prince Sihanouk as Head of State remained in power until April 1976. The CPK stayed in control until its overthrow by Vietnam's military intervention launched on 25 December 1978. An estimated 100,000 Vietnamese troops backed by 20,000 troops of the resistance organization, the Kampuchean National Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), entered Cambodia. They swiftly overcame the resistance of the Cambodian troops and on 7 January 1979 Phnom Penh was captured after only two weeks of fighting.

The deterioration of bilateral relations which precipitated the Vietnamese invasion shows that Vietnam had gradually become Cambodia's prime foreign enemy. There were other indications of the anti-Vietnamese policies of the Cambodian authorities. One example was the treatment of the ethnic Vietnamese who still remained in the country after 1975. Following the large-scale exodus in the early 1970s, the ethnic Vietnamese remaining in Cambodia were estimated at about 200,000 by the mid-1970s. Many of them were expelled from Cambodia after the change of government in 1975. In 1978, Vietnam requested assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to cope with 341,400 refugees who had arrived from Cambodia since 1975. Among these refugees were 170,300 ethnic Vietnamese. Thus, out of the 450,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia in early 1970, 250,000 left in 1970–71, and 170,300 left after 1975. These two exodus, involving approximately 420,000 refugees, left behind some 30,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, many of whom died of starvation, disease or executions between 1975 and 1978. This meant that the Vietnamese minority had all but completely disappeared from Cambodia by the end of 1978.²⁵

Another expression of the anti-Vietnamese stand of the Cambodian government was a campaign aimed at eliminating what was perceived

to be pro-Vietnamese elements within the CPK. The internal opposition within the CPK was seen as instigated by Vietnam through pro-Vietnamese elements. An undisclosed but considerable number of party members and their relatives disappeared or were executed on the basis that they were plotting against the leadership and working as Vietnamese agents.²⁶

The People's Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia,²⁷ 1979–92

Following the fall of Phnom Penh in early January 1979, a People's Revolutionary Council was set up by the KNUFNS, with the assistance of Vietnam, to act as a provisional government. The new Cambodian administration later gave the country the name People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The PRK/State of Cambodia (SOC) period lasted *de facto* until the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992.

The PRK/SOC period in modern Cambodian history has been subject to much controversy, both in international politics and in scholarly literature, and one of the major issues of dispute is the degree of Vietnamese influence from 1979 to the early 1990s.

Vietnam's massive and direct military and political influence was undeniable in the early years of the PRK but as Vietnam began to withdraw its troops and gradually diminish its direct political tutelage over the new administration in Cambodia, during the second half of the 1980s, the picture became more complex.

The new order installed in Cambodia came about with extensive Vietnamese assistance and people who had sought refuge in Vietnam in 1975–78 began to return to Cambodia. This process involved not only ethnic Khmers but also ethnic Vietnamese, leading to the re-emergence of a Vietnamese minority in Cambodia, which became the source of widespread international concern. The ethnic Vietnamese migrating to Cambodia were all seen as part of a process of Vietnamization of the country.²⁸ Whether they were returnees who had been forced out of Cambodia during the 1970s or new migrants, they were all perceived to be part of a larger Vietnamese scheme to gain influence and even to colonize Cambodia. Evidence of the extent of international concern was the inclusion of the following paragraph in the adopted resolution on the agenda item "The situation in Kampuchea" at the 38th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1983:

Seriously concerned about reported demographic changes being imposed in Kampuchea by foreign occupation forces,²⁹

The resolutions adopted at the 39th to 44th sessions (1984–89) of the U.N. General Assembly also included paragraphs on demographic changes in Cambodia.³⁰

The ethnic Vietnamese settling down in Cambodia became one of the major issues in the discourse of the Cambodian groups opposed to the PRK/SOC and to the Vietnamese influence in the country. The Ambassador to the United Nations from Democratic Kampuchea (DK)³¹ gave estimates of the number of Vietnamese settlers in a statement to the General Assembly on the agenda item, “The situation in Kampuchea”, at sessions 34 to 36 (1979–81). In 1979, he claimed that there were some 300,000 Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia and the same figure was mentioned in 1980, whereas in 1981 he claimed that there were 500,000.³² At the 38th session in 1982, the President of the newly formed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK),³³ Prince Norodom Sihanouk, made a statement on the same agenda item but he did not give any estimates on the number of settlers. Nevertheless, the issue was brought up.³⁴ During the General Assembly’s consideration of the situation in Cambodia in 1984 Prince Sihanouk spoke of 600,000 Vietnamese settlers, and on the same occasion the representative from Malaysia referred to a CGDK claim of 640,000 settlers.³⁵ In 1986, in the same forum, Prince Sihanouk claimed that 700,000 Vietnamese had settled in Cambodia and that Vietnam’s objective was to increase the number to two million over a four-to-five-year period.³⁶ In 1988, Mr Son Sann, Prime Minister within the CGDK, spoke to the General Assembly and claimed that the number of settlers had increased to between 800,000 and one million. In 1989, he read a statement on behalf of Prince Sihanouk in which it was claimed that there were about one million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. The statement clarified that the CGDK regarded these settlers as part of Vietnam’s aim at colonizing Cambodia and that they belonged to “clandestine” organizations conducting political and military activities in Cambodia. Furthermore, it was claimed that “a great” number had been granted Cambodian citizenship by the SOC. Finally, the CGDK demanded that all Vietnamese “elements”, that is, both armed personnel and settlers, be withdrawn from Cambodia.³⁷

After relating the claims put forward by the CGDK, it is necessary to turn to the position taken by the PRK on the issue of Vietnamese migration to Cambodia. The official policies of the PRK towards “Vietnamese residents” were outlined in a publication of September 1983 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁸ The PRK estimated that by mid-1983 there were about 56,000 “Vietnamese residents” in Cambodia and they had returned after the PRK had authorized them to do so.³⁹ The PRK administered these Vietnamese in accordance with the following guidelines. On 7 May 1982, the Central Committee of the ruling Kampuchean Revolutionary

People's Party issued Directive 142 on "ensuring adequate" living conditions and on "providing" jobs to the Vietnamese. On 13 September, the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee issued a circular giving guidelines on the implementation of the Directive. On 9 October 1982, the Council of Ministers issued Directive 38 on the organization and administration of Vietnamese living in Cambodia.⁴⁰ The main focus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' publication was Directive 38. Articles 1, 2 and 4 were reproduced and read as follows:

With regard to former Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea who were victims of pogroms and massacres under the former regimes and who, thanks to popular protection, were able to survive or escape to Vietnam and who have now returned to Kampuchea, the local authorities and populations shall give them assistance and create conditions for them to quickly settle down to normal life.

With regard to Vietnamese people who have come to Kampuchea since liberation and are engaged in occupations which contribute to the rehabilitation and development of the economy such as farming, fishing, salt-making, handicraft . . . and who maintain good relations with the people, the local authorities shall create conditions for them to stay in the country and work.

With regard to Vietnamese people who with the assistance of friends or relatives wish to move to Kampuchea to live and work or to be reunited with their families, they shall have to request authorization from the competent Kampuchean and Vietnamese organs.⁴¹

The publication also stated that according to the 1981 constitution "foreign residents" in Cambodia had to abide by the laws of the country and "shall enjoy" the protection of the State. In that spirit, Directive 38 stipulated in Article 6 "the strengthening of control measures, good supervision of points of entry and strict prohibition of illegal frontier crossings".⁴²

The official policy of the PRK towards the Vietnamese sought to regulate the Vietnamese migration to Cambodia but not to prevent it. It is also obvious that the regulations aimed at giving the Cambodian authorities the necessary power to control Vietnamese migration. It is notable that the ethnic Vietnamese residing in Cambodia were all regarded as "foreign residents" by the Cambodian authorities notwithstanding the possibility that some of them could have held Cambodian citizenship before they were forced to leave the country in the 1970s.⁴³

There is a considerable discrepancy between the PRK's claim of 56,000 ethnic Vietnamese settlers in 1983 and the CGDK's claim of 640,000 settlers in 1984. A look at the scholarly literature does not bring out any clear assessment of the figures nor any information on the actual size of the Vietnamese community in Cambodia. Some researchers have simply

quoted the CGDK claims or sought to justify these claims.⁴⁴ Other researchers have made more modest estimates than the CGDK but higher than the PRK figure of 1983. According to such estimates, the number of settlers would have been in the range of 300,000 to 450,000, that is, below or at about the same size as that before the two exodus of the 1970s.⁴⁵

Vietnam's presence and influence in the PRK/SOC facilitated the migration to Cambodia in two major ways. First, due to Cambodia's dependency on and close relations with Vietnam, the ethnic Vietnamese were treated well by the Cambodian authorities and it was evident that the PRK/SOC would not embark on any anti-Vietnamese campaign. Secondly, the Vietnamese military presence up to late September 1989 gave the ethnic Vietnamese a sense of protection against potential attacks by CGDK forces.

It is not possible to assess the extent to which the migration of ethnic Vietnamese to Cambodia was encouraged by the Vietnamese authorities but some observations can be made. The Vietnamese authorities do not seem to have actively attempted to halt the influx, which can be seen as condoning the migration. Among the estimated 420,000 Vietnamese who had been forced to leave Cambodia during the 1970s there would have been some who had a genuine desire to return. Some of the migrants who were newcomers were reportedly looking for better economic opportunities in Cambodia. In short, the Vietnamese migrating to Cambodia had their reasons for doing so and the Vietnamese authorities did not actively oppose the migration.⁴⁶

The Peacekeeping Period and Beyond, 1992–94

The United Nations carried out its peacekeeping operation in Cambodia from March 1992, when UNTAC was formally established, to September 1993 when UNTAC's mandate expired with the adoption of a new Cambodian constitution by the Constituent Assembly, formed after the general elections in late May 1993.⁴⁷ During this peacekeeping operation, several upsurges in anti-Vietnamese political statements and in armed attacks occurred.

From late June 1992, anti-Vietnamese sentiments seemed to be on the increase, with representatives of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) being the most vocal. However, representatives of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) expressed similar sentiments. As it seems, the intention was to put pressure on UNTAC to take action and to solve what these parties perceived to be a "Vietnamese problem". From early July, the PDK began using the presence of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia in its criticism of the United Nations by claiming that UNTAC was neglecting an allegedly massive illegal migration of Vietnamese. The PDK claimed

that 700,000 Vietnamese had obtained Cambodian identity cards.⁴⁸ The anti-Vietnamese feelings seem to have been further reinforced by an influx of Vietnamese into Cambodia attracted by the economic liberalization and by the arrival of thousands of well-paid UNTAC personnel and other foreigners.⁴⁹ The PDK continued its strong anti-Vietnamese political rhetoric throughout the period of the peacekeeping operation and this posture continues to prevail.

The political rhetoric was not the only example of anti-Vietnamese activities in Cambodia in mid-1992. Already in April and May of that year two armed attacks against ethnic Vietnamese in the province of Kompong Chhnang had caused seven deaths. These attacks were attributed to the PDK.⁵⁰ Another attack on 21 July in the province of Kampot caused the death of eight ethnic Vietnamese. The July killings were condemned by representatives of the SOC, by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and by Vietnam. Representatives of the SOC refuted allegations that its armed personnel had been involved in the killings and the PDK did likewise.⁵¹

The issue of who would be allowed to vote in the Cambodian general elections preoccupied the four Cambodian parties represented in the Supreme National Council (SNC).⁵² On 5 August, the SNC adopted an electoral law drafted by UNTAC. The electoral law enfranchised any 18-year-old person born in Cambodia with at least one parent born in the country or, in the case of those born overseas, with a parent born in Cambodia whose mother or father was also born in the country (that is, the grandparents also born in Cambodia).⁵³ This constituted a revision of the provisions of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia which stated that any 18-year-old born in Cambodia or the child of a person born in Cambodia would be eligible to vote.⁵⁴ The PDK opposed this electoral law primarily because it would allow ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia to vote.⁵⁵ The intention of the law was to disenfranchise new Vietnamese settlers but not ethnic Vietnamese who had lived in the country in the pre-1970 period.

Despite the adoption of the electoral law, the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) and the KPNLF continued to push for revisions. At a working session of the SNC of 10 December 1992, they proposed two changes. First, they wanted to enfranchise the so-called "Khmer Krom" residents in Cambodia, that is, ethnic Khmers born in, or with a parent born in, southern Vietnam. Secondly, they wanted to allow Cambodians living overseas to register as voters at locations outside Cambodia. The electoral law stated that registration had to be made in Cambodia proper. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, after careful consideration in view of the support expressed for the two proposals by Prince Sihanouk, decided to instruct his Special Representative not to approve the proposed revisions.⁵⁶

In the meantime, armed attacks against ethnic Vietnamese in the province of Koh Kong caused twelve deaths in October, with Mr Yasushi Akashi, the head of UNTAC, denouncing the killings. Furthermore, UNTAC's investigations indicated that units of the armed forces of the PDK, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), had carried out the attacks. Representatives of the NADK rejected the accusations. Vietnam officially condemned the killings.⁵⁷ Three other attacks on ethnic Vietnamese were reported in October and November. They were carried out in Sihanoukville and involved kidnapping, murder and destruction of property. Two attacks were reported in December. On 16 December, three ethnic Vietnamese were killed in the province of Stung Treng, and on 27 December an attack in the province of Kompong Chhnang caused the death of fourteen persons, among them twelve ethnic Vietnamese.⁵⁸ The Vietnamese Foreign Minister condemned the killings of 27 December in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the head of UNTAC and the SNC.⁵⁹ In response, Prince Norodom Sihanouk strongly condemned "the act of terrorism against honest Vietnamese nationals".⁶⁰ UNTAC investigations into the 16 December killings established that they had been carried out by NADK soldiers and, according to witnesses, NADK soldiers also carried out the 27 December killings. In a report by the Secretary-General dated 13 February 1993, it was noted that responsibility for the killings of "Vietnamese-speaking" persons had "generally been attributed" to elements of the NADK.⁶¹

During the first two months of 1993 no killings of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia were reported. The situation was dramatically reversed during the month of March. It all started with an announcement by UNTAC, on 1 March, that it had discovered three Vietnamese men who had served with the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and whom UNTAC therefore regarded as "foreign forces". UNTAC requested Vietnam to take the three persons back as Vietnamese "nationals". All three men were in possession of identity cards issued by the SOC and two of them were still serving in the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF), that is, the armed forces of the SOC.⁶² Vietnam refused to take the three men back, claiming that they were civilians and Cambodian "citizens", married to Cambodian women. Vietnam also publicly rejected UNTAC's stand on the matter and reiterated that it had never sent any troops back to Cambodia after the final withdrawal of their troops in September 1989.⁶³ The Security Council reacted to UNTAC's announcement by adopting a resolution on 8 March which included the following preamble paragraph:

Expressing strong concern at recent reports by UNTAC of a small number of foreign military personnel serving with the armed forces

of the SOC in violation of the Paris Agreements; calling on all parties to cooperate fully with UNTAC investigations of reports of foreign forces within the territory under their control; and emphasizing the importance of the immediate removal of all foreign forces, advisors of military personnel from Cambodia.⁶⁴

Vietnam responded to the resolution by reiterating the essence of its standpoint with regard to UNTAC's announcement of 1 March.⁶⁵ The SOC also stated that the three ethnic Vietnamese men were not to be regarded as "foreign forces".⁶⁶

During the month of March, several attacks were carried out against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. On 10 March, in a village in Siem Reap province an attack caused the death of thirty-three ethnic Vietnamese. Two of the attackers were killed and the investigation carried out by UNTAC concluded that they were members of an NADK unit.⁶⁷ The PDK refuted UNTAC's accusations concerning its involvement in the killings.⁶⁸ Vietnam officially condemned the massacre and called on UNTAC to protect ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Vietnam also linked the attack to UNTAC's claim that it had found three Vietnamese men who were regarded as "foreign forces" and to the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 8 March.⁶⁹ Two more attacks on ethnic Vietnamese were reported by UNTAC during the month of March. First, on 24 March, three fishing boats were attacked in the province of Kompong Chhnang, killing eight persons. Secondly, on 29 March at least four "premises" in Phnom Penh frequented by "Vietnamese-speaking" persons were attacked with hand grenades, causing two dead and at least twenty wounded. These attacks led to a large number of ethnic Vietnamese fleeing Cambodia in late March, and by 28 April a total of 21,659 persons had entered Vietnam through the UNTAC checkpoints. Judging by this UNTAC-controlled movement, the number of persons crossing the border had by then been "considerably reduced".⁷⁰

The upsurge in armed attacks against ethnic Vietnamese and the refugee situation caused by these attacks were of great concern to UNTAC. On 29 March, Mr Dennis McNamara, head of UNTAC's human rights component, was quoted as saying that "the violence against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia may well be chargeable under the genocide convention", and he viewed the attacks as politically motivated.⁷¹ At an SNC meeting on 10 April, Mr Yasushi Akashi reportedly directed severe criticism at the PDK over a number of issues, such as attacks on UNTAC, on Cambodians, and on ethnic Vietnamese.⁷² The security of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia was also on the agenda during the U.N. Secretary-General's visit to Vietnam on 11 and 12 April, where he stated that UNTAC would

“do its utmost to ensure the protection of the ethnic Vietnamese community in Cambodia”.⁷³

Armed attacks on ethnic Vietnamese continued in April and May. From the beginning of April up to mid-May 1993, UNTAC recorded 110 Cambodians, including ethnic Vietnamese, dead and 179 wounded due to violence.⁷⁴ In a report on 15 May the Secretary-General identified the following four broad categories of violence in Cambodia:

(a) killings of Cambodians, including those of Vietnamese ancestry, by the forces of PDK, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), in an effort to disrupt the election and, evidently to pressure those of Vietnamese ancestry to leave Cambodia; (b) attacks and harassment by SOC elements aimed at intimidating other political parties, primarily FUNCINPEC; (c) attacks on UNTAC personnel; and (d) random violence associated with banditry and lawlessness.⁷⁵

Following the general elections in Cambodia on 23–28 May most attention was devoted to the reactions of the Cambodian political parties to the outcome of the elections and to efforts aimed at reaching a common understanding between the four parties represented in the Constituent Assembly.⁷⁶ However, armed attacks on ethnic Vietnamese continued, and on 2 June nine Vietnamese fishermen were abducted by a group of armed men at sea off the coast, near Sihanoukville. The following day, the dead bodies of four of the Vietnamese were discovered at sea. Vietnam reacted through a note sent by its Embassy in Phnom Penh to the SNC, UNTAC, and the SOC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The PDK, as a response to allegations pointing to its involvement in the attack, denied any involvement.

Attacks against ethnic Vietnamese seem to have continued also into July 1993 as the Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Penh sent yet another note to the SNC, UNTAC and the Foreign Ministry of the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC).⁷⁸ According to the note, twenty ethnic Vietnamese had been killed in attacks carried out by the PDK on 6, 8 and 10 July.⁷⁹ On 1 August, a representative of Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on the Cambodian authorities and on international organizations to take “practical measures” to assist ethnic Vietnamese who had sought refuge in the border areas between Cambodia and Vietnam to escape from the “Khmer Rouge’s terrorism and killings”. Vietnam wanted the PNGC to “receive them and create favourable conditions” so as to allow them to return to normal life within Cambodia.⁸⁰ On 12 August, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communiqué concerning another armed attack against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia on 10 August, which had caused the death of six persons. Vietnam accused

the PDK of carrying out the armed attack and strongly condemned the killings. Preliminary investigations made by UNTAC into these killings indicated that the NADK was responsible.⁸¹

From mid-August 1993 up to the beginning of April 1994 no armed attacks against ethnic Vietnamese warranted an official protest from Hanoi. Then, on 9 April 1994 thirteen ethnic Vietnamese were killed and twenty-seven wounded in Kandal province, prompting the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to condemn the killings and to urge King Sihanouk and the Royal National Government of Cambodia (RNGC)⁸² to take “prompt and effective measures” to ensure the safety of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Incidentally, the killings occurred about a week after a visit by Vietnam’s Prime Minister to Cambodia.⁸³

This fairly long period without lethal attacks on ethnic Vietnamese saw several high-level meetings between Cambodian and Vietnamese leaders. The first meeting was the visit to Hanoi by Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, then co-chairmen of the PNC, in late August 1993. In February 1994, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister visited Cambodia for talks with his Cambodian counterpart and in early March, the Chairman of the Cambodian National Assembly, Chea Sim, led a delegation to Vietnam and held meetings with his Vietnamese counterpart and with Vietnam’s President and Prime Minister, as well as with the Secretary-General of the Communist Party. In late March, the Cambodian co-Minister of Defence visited Vietnam. Finally, Vietnam’s Prime Minister visited Cambodia in early April. The ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia was one of the topics discussed at these high-level meetings, another issue being border disputes.⁸⁴ According to the “Cambodian-Vietnamese joint communiqué”, issued at the end of the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s visit to Cambodia, the two sides agreed to set up a working group to discuss and solve the border disputes and another to “discuss and solve the issue of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia based on the respect for Cambodia’s law and international law and customs”. The communiqué also stated that the ethnic Vietnamese would be treated as other “foreign nationals”.⁸⁵

Despite these high-level meetings and the decisions to set up the working groups, the accusations by King Sihanouk in May that Vietnam had been “nibbling away” Cambodian territory by moving the border demarcation marks highlighted tension persisting between the two parties over the disputed land border. Vietnam’s response was to deny the accusations and to state its readiness to resolve the border problems by peaceful means through negotiations. Following King Sihanouk’s accusations, anti-Vietnamese protests were reported to have taken place in Phnom Penh.⁸⁶

The PDK has continued to pursue its anti-Vietnamese campaign directed both at Vietnam as a country and at the Vietnamese minority in

Cambodia. In the mainstream of Cambodian politics, that is, among the parties represented in the National Assembly, anti-Vietnamese feelings exist but are generally expressed in a less extreme way than the PDK's position. A closer look at the new Cambodian constitution shows that it does not contain any provisions for human rights protection nor any duties and privileges for foreign nationals living in Cambodia. The constitution deals with the rights and duties of "Cambodian citizens" without making any reference to the ethnicity of such citizens. Thus, the constitution in itself does not exclude any ethnic group from being Cambodian citizens. However, in late September 1993 it was reported that during debates in the National Assembly on who was to be regarded as "Cambodian", members of the Assembly broadened the definition to include ethnic Chams and Chinese but excluded the ethnic Vietnamese. Thus, the status and rights of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia continue to be controversial.⁸⁸

Cambodian Attitudes and Policies Towards the Ethnic Vietnamese

The situation of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia cannot be studied in a distinctly domestic context separated from Cambodia's relations with Vietnam. Consequently, the observations made in the following will have to bring out the interaction between the domestic and international context in order to show the complexity which shapes Cambodia's attitudes and policies towards the ethnic Vietnamese.

Attacks on ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia during and after the peacekeeping period can be linked to the anti-Vietnamese rhetoric of the PDK. Anti-Vietnamese sentiments were also expressed during the electoral campaign by representatives of the BLDP and FUNCINPEC, and this contributed to further fuelling of such opinions among the population in general.⁸⁹ Thus, the controversy regarding the status and rights of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodian society today can basically be attributed to anti-Vietnamese sentiments among Cambodian politicians. These are in no way new features in Cambodian domestic politics. Since independence in 1953 the policies towards the ethnic Vietnamese have been more or less discriminatory. Only the PRK/SOC period was characterized by clearly non-discriminatory policies. The extreme policies implemented during the Khmer Republic and the DK years led to massacres of ethnic Vietnamese and the exodus of some 420,000 persons to Vietnam leading to a *de facto* elimination of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. Seen from the perspective of such dramatic effects of anti-Vietnamese policies in the 1970s, the repeated armed attacks on ethnic Vietnamese in recent years present a real threat to the Vietnamese community at large.

The anti-Vietnamese stand displayed by generations of Cambodian politicians seem to transcend ideological differences since royalists, conservatives, liberals and communists have been or are displaying anti-Vietnamese sentiments.

Anti-Vietnamese sentiments directed against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia seem to be linked to and are a part of a more general antipathy towards Vietnam. This antipathy has its roots in the perception of the historical relations between the two countries among Cambodian politicians. The memory of Vietnam's expansion southward into the Mekong delta, at the expense of Cambodia, during pre-colonial times, is kept alive in the political discourse. The repeated Vietnamese interference in Cambodia during the three Indochinese conflicts has reinforced anti-Vietnamese feelings among different groups within the Cambodian élite, and it is not surprising that such experiences shape the current Cambodian perceptions of Vietnam. With regard to pre-colonial evolution, it is questionable whether it was the loss of territory as such or the fact that the territories were lost to Vietnam that was seen as a national calamity. After all, in the pre-colonial era Cambodia lost much larger areas to Thailand than to Vietnam. It is worth recalling that during its days of glory, the Khmer Empire expanded into what is today eastern Thailand. The trauma caused by the loss of territories to Vietnam must be seen in the context of the internal conflicts within the Cambodian royalty in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, with different groups seeking support from Thailand and from Vietnam respectively. This conflict ended with victory for the pro-Thai section of the royalty. The descendants of the royal family have been and are still involved in the running of the country and their perception of history is clearly anti-Vietnamese. The combination of history and the experiences of Vietnamese interference shapes the perceptions not only of Vietnam as such but also, to a great extent, the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia.⁹⁰

A disturbing pattern of behaviour has emerged within Cambodian society. First, the Cambodian authorities officially display their dissatisfaction over the state of relations with Vietnam, and then popular anti-Vietnamese sentiments are manifested in the form of demonstrations and/or attacks on ethnic Vietnamese.

It seems to be widespread within the Cambodian élite to regard ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia as agents of Hanoi and some sort of fifth column. This attitude influences public debate, as expressed in the media, and the educational system. In short, it permeates Cambodian society and reinforces anti-Vietnamese sentiments.

To make things worse, the ethnic Vietnamese are routinely accused of refusing to integrate into Cambodian society. Traditionally, there has

been more Sino-Khmer than Viet-Khmer intermarriages. From the Cambodian viewpoint, this is an indication that the Vietnamese refuse to fully integrate into Cambodian society. However, in view of the widespread anti-Vietnamese feelings in Cambodia there must be reluctance among the Khmers to marry ethnic Vietnamese, which in turn reinforces the non-integration of the Vietnamese.

An additional source of negative sentiment against the ethnic Vietnamese is the fact that modern history shows that Vietnamese migrated to Cambodia primarily during periods of strong foreign influence in the country, when migration was, if not always encouraged, at least tolerated. This was the case in the pre-colonial era and it continued during the period of French domination. More recently, the same happened during the PRK/SOC years with extensive Vietnamese influence. Even during the peace-keeping period, it can be argued that migration took place when Cambodia was under strong "foreign" influence. The only period with substantial migration but no strong foreign influence was during the Sihanouk years, 1953–70. This pattern of Vietnamese migration when Cambodia was under strong foreign influence contributes to the perception of the Vietnamese as aliens and to an identification of the Vietnamese community with foreign interests and influence in Cambodia. The link between foreign influence and Vietnamese migration has not passed unnoticed by those opposing the presence of the ethnic Vietnamese and this has provided an additional factor used in anti-Vietnamese propaganda.

As noted earlier, anti-Vietnamese sentiments are widespread among members of the Cambodian élite, as expressed in the political debate and media. It seems that such sentiments are not limited to this social strata, as evidenced by attacks on ethnic Vietnamese by ordinary people in many areas of the country in 1970. However, anti-Vietnamese statements made by the Cambodian authorities and politicians should not be seen as responding to pressure from below, since the events in 1970 were instigated by the anti-Vietnamese rhetoric of the authorities.

Several studies suggest that anti-Vietnamese sentiments have traditionally been stronger in urban than in rural areas.⁹² It is of course difficult to make generalizations but these findings should be taken seriously. One explanation for the differences along the urban and rural divide could be that the propagation of anti-Vietnamese opinions was more thorough in the urban areas. In this context, it can be argued that as the spread of information becomes more sophisticated and reaches out to an increasing number of Cambodians, there is a risk that anti-Vietnamese propaganda reinforces prejudices against the ethnic Vietnamese on a nation-wide scale.

So far, the attention has been focused on how the anti-Vietnamese rhetoric of Cambodian politicians at large reinforce and even exacerbate

negative sentiments among the population of the country. What then could have been the effect of the positive perceptions of Vietnam propagated by the PRK/SOC. It most certainly had an effect on the younger generation since they had not lived through earlier anti-Vietnamese periods, but the overall effect on the older generation is more complex. Two factors make it difficult to firmly argue that anti-Vietnamese feelings were significantly reduced during the PRK/SOC period. First, the extensive, albeit gradually reduced, presence of Vietnamese advisers and military personnel for more than a decade could have made them increasingly unpopular among the population. Secondly, the continuous anti-Vietnamese campaign of the parties in the CGDK could have appealed to Cambodians in PRK/SOC-controlled areas. The effects of these two factors are difficult to assess but they have to be taken into account when discussing what impact the more pro-Vietnamese policies of the PRK/SOC had on the perceptions of Vietnam and of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodian society.

Relations between Cambodia and Vietnam are of great relevance for the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Strained bilateral relations can, as exemplified by recent history, have very negative repercussions on the ethnic Vietnamese. Indeed, even during periods with fairly good relations and when efforts were made to resolve outstanding issues of dispute, there seemed to be room for inflammatory statements from high-ranking Cambodians, which could spark manifestations of anti-Vietnamese feelings from the public. This is exemplified by King Sihanouk's recent accusations against Vietnam and ensuing anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Phnom Penh. It can therefore be argued that for the well-being of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, relations between the two countries have to be very good. The bilateral relations have yet to reach that stage but efforts at governmental and parliamentary levels in early 1994 have been encouraging.

The ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia have been an issue on the agenda at high-level meetings between the two countries. Vietnam's policy has been to ensure that ethnic Vietnamese are not being discriminated against in Cambodia, and assurances to that effect have been forthcoming from the Cambodian side. Nevertheless, to give the ethnic Vietnamese full security and protection would be impossible as the Cambodian authorities cannot fully guarantee the safety of the population at large. With mutual understanding pertaining to the non-discrimination of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, it should at least be possible for the two countries to fully cooperate in ensuring that no illegal migration takes place across the border.

Significantly enough, Vietnam and Cambodia have agreed on the notion that the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia are all to be regarded as Vietnamese citizens. This bilateral understanding does not provide a full

answer to all aspects of the issue. First, political parties opposing the PRK/SOC have alleged that a large number of ethnic Vietnamese had been given Cambodian identification papers and were thus naturalized Cambodians. The present understanding between the two governments suggests that this process has been reversed so as to regard those persons as Vietnamese citizens again. Or could it be that the accusations of the CGDK were unfounded, or did the naturalization process involve only a negligible number of persons? Secondly, an undisclosed but considerable number of ethnic Vietnamese who lived in Cambodia in the pre-1970s were Cambodian citizens. The present agreement between the two countries presumes that none or a small number of them have returned to Cambodia. If, on the other hand, a large number of them have returned, the two countries will have to resolve the issue of how to handle their status and their Cambodian citizenship.

Prescription

To conclude this study, some possible courses of action for the Cambodian authorities in dealing with the ethnic Vietnamese will be outlined. In order to prevent upsurges in popular resentment against ethnic Vietnamese, the Cambodian authorities must take an unequivocal stand in favour of accepting the Vietnamese community as a part of Cambodian society. Cambodia is a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society with indigenous minorities and immigrant minorities and it is therefore essential that the Cambodian authorities firmly endorse the notion that all minorities are part of Cambodian society. It is also important that the Cambodian political parties that took part in the democratic process leading up to the general elections in May 1993, refrain from anti-Vietnamese rhetoric aimed at ethnic Vietnamese in the country. It is also essential that when criticizing Vietnam they do not link the Vietnamese minority to the Vietnamese state. In view of Cambodia's need to rehabilitate its economy, all quarters of the population must be mobilized in a co-ordinated effort. Anti-Vietnamese rhetoric would have the opposite effect of pitting Khmers against ethnic Vietnamese, thus dividing Cambodian society. Since the Cambodian élite has been instrumental in creating and reinforcing anti-Vietnamese attitudes and sentiments, it would only be fitting that it should change its posture for the sake of Cambodia's long-term internal stability.

NOTES

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1. The term Cambodia will be used throughout the study, unless there is a need to differentiate between different Cambodian governments or political parties.
2. A number of studies deal with different aspects of the relations between Cambodia and Vietnam in the pre-colonial period. The following sources have been consulted in the context of the present study. As a general study on Cambodia which covers relations with Vietnam during the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, see David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, second edition (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 81–82, 88–89, 94–97, 100, and 113–36. On the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia in the nineteenth century, see Wolfgang Vollman, “Notes sur les relations inter-ethniques au Cambodge du XIXe siècle”, *Asie du Sud-Est et Monde Insulindien* 4, no. 2 (1973): 194–96; and Maurice Comte, “Rapports de classes et relations inter-ethniques dans le Cambodge précolonial à propos de Notes sur les relations inter-ethniques au Cambodge du XIXe siècle”, *ibid.*, 7, no. 1 (1976): 68–73. On Vietnam’s southward movement, see Michael Cotter, “Towards a Social History of the Vietnamese Southward Movement”, *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 9, no. 1 (March 1968): 12–24; Phung Van Dan, “La formation territoriale du Viet Nam”, *Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique*, no. 4 (1963): 247–94; Phung Van Dan, “La formation territoriale du Viet Nam (suite)”, *ibid.*, no. 2 (1964): 127–77; and Thai Van Kiem, “La Plaine aux Cerfs et la Princesse de Jade (Études historico-géographiques de l’établissement des pionniers vietnamiens au Sud-Viêt Nam au début du XVIIe siècle)”, *Bulletin de la Société des Études Indochinoises, Nouvelle série*, Vol. 34, no. 4 (1959): 379–93. On the role of the Chinese in the Vietnamese expansion into the Mekong delta, see Paul Boudet, “La conquête de la Cochinchine par les Nguyen et le rôle des émigrés chinois”, *Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient* 42 (1942): 115–32. On the two Vietnamese interventions in Cambodia during the second half of the seventeenth century, see Mak Phoeun and Po Dharma, “La première intervention militaire vietnamienne au Cambodge (1658–1659)”, *ibid.*, 73 (1984): 285–318; Mak Phoeun and Po Dharma; “La deuxième intervention militaire vietnamienne au Cambodge (1673–1678)”, *ibid.*, 77 (1988): 229–62; and Phung Van Dan, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–41.
3. For an analysis of the overall evolution in Cambodia during the period of French domination, see Chandler, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–90. The changes made by the French to the borders between what is today Vietnam and Cambodia have been analysed in two major studies. The first is by a Cambodian researcher, Sarin Chhak, *Les frontières du Cambodge. Tome I Les frontières du Cambodge avec les anciens pays de la Fédération Indochinoise: le Laos et le Vietnam (Cochinchine et Annam)* (Paris: Librairie Dalloz and Centre d’Études des Pays d’Extrême-Orient Asie du Sud-Est, 1966), pp. 26–50 and 61–208. The second is by a Vietnamese researcher, Tran Van Minh; “Les frontières du Cambodge et du Vietnam”, *Revue Juridique et Politique, Indépendance et Coopération* 32, no. 2 (June 1978): 647–73; and Tran Van Minh, “Les frontières du Cambodge et du Vietnam. Deuxième partie: les frontières maritimes”, *ibid.*, 33, no. 1 (March 1979): 37–66. Apart from giving ample and detailed information about the delimitation of the borders, Sarin Chhak generally refers to them as being to the disadvantage of Cambodia. Tran Van Minh speaks about the “reintegration” of “Darlac” into the territory of Annam but with regard to the borders between Cambodia and Cochinchina he does not make any such comments. In this context, it should be noted that France brought about the return from Siam (that is, Thailand) of large areas of former Cambodian territory in the first decade of the twentieth century, notably the present-day provinces of Battambang, Oddar Mean Chey and Siem Reap. See Lawrence Palmer Briggs, “The Treaty of March 23, 1907 Between France and Siam and the Return of Battambang and Angkor to Cambodia”, *Far Eastern Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (August 1946): 446–53.

4. Different aspects and interpretations of the French policies of encouraging Vietnamese migration to Cambodia can be found in Chandler, *op. cit.*, pp. 136, 152 and 160–61; Comte, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72; Jean Delvert, *Le Cambodge, Que sais-je?*, No. 2080 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983): 50; Chou Meng Tarr, "The Vietnamese minority in Cambodia", *Race & Class* 34, no. 2 (October–December 1992): 34–35; and William E. Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1967), pp. 33–34.
5. Two sources refer to the migration of Vietnamese farmers during the colonial period: Willmott, *op. cit.*, p. 33; and, Delvert, *op. cit.*, p. 50. Delvert claims that the French encouraged such migration whereas Willmott does not pass any judgement.
6. Chandler, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
7. Comte, *op. cit.*, p. 68. Comte provides an estimate of the number of ethnic Vietnamese in the mid-1870s based on the figure from 1921 and on the presumption that not more than 4 to 5 per cent of the Cambodian population, estimated at 1.4 million, were ethnic Vietnamese at that time, which means that there would have been some 60,000 to 70,000 ethnic Vietnamese. Comte refutes as inflated an estimate for 1874 which had put the number of ethnic Vietnamese at 100,000. The estimates for 1951 are derived from Delvert, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
8. Chou, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
9. Chandler, *op. cit.*, pp. 163 and 171.
10. Willmott, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 79–81.
11. Jacques Migozzi, *Cambodge faits et problèmes de population* (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973), pp. 41–44.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 45; and Willmott, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34 and 81.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 35 and 79–81. Press comments on the 15th National Congress display similar anti-Vietnamese feelings and confirm the anti-Vietnamese stand of the Congress on the issue of naturalization. See Charles Goldblum, "Les relations inter-ethniques au Cambodge dans la presse Phnom-pennoise de langue française (1963–1970)", *Asie du Sud-Est et Monde Insulindien* 5, no. 3 (1974): 40–41. Inter-marriage between Vietnamese and Khmers was much less than between Chinese and Khmers. See Migozzi, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–46.
15. Goldblum, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
16. Chandler, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–4; and Peter A. Poole, *The Expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia: Action and Response by the Governments of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and the United States*, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 17 (Athens, Ohio: Southeast Asia Programme, Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1970), pp. 5–7.
17. Joseph Pouvaty, "L'exode des vietnamiens du Cambodge en 1970", *Mondes Asiatiques*, no. 7 (Automne 1976): 339–40.
18. Chandler, *op. cit.*, p. 204; and, Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–19.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 26; Chandler, *op. cit.*, p. 205; Goldblum, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–30 and 44–51; Pouvaty, *op. cit.*, pp. 340–42; and Chou, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
20. Pouvaty, *op. cit.*, p. 342.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 342 and 348–49.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 342–47. Pouvaty expresses some reservations regarding the Vietnamese figure of 300,000 ethnic Vietnamese with Cambodian citizenship, which he found to be on the high side. He also notes that the Cambodian authorities "seemed" to have encouraged Cambodian citizens of Vietnamese ethnicity to leave the country (*Ibid.*, p. 343).

23. Chandler, op. cit., pp. 206–208; and Poole, op. cit., pp. 27–29 and 38–56.
24. The parts of this section dealing with relations between Cambodia and Vietnam are derived from Ramses Amer, *The United Nations and Foreign Military Interventions. A Comparative Study of the Application of the Charter*, second edition, Report No. 33 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1994), pp. 38–40. For an overview of the accusations put forward by the two countries against each other, see *ibid.*, pp. 195–201.
25. J.R. Pouvatchy, *The Vietnamisation of Cambodia*, ISIS Seminar Paper (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies [ISIS] Malaysia, 1986), p. 9 (hereafter cited as *The Vietnamisation*); Chou, op. cit., p. 33; Michael Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982* (Sydney and Boston: Allen & Unwin and South End Press, 1984), p. 296 (hereafter cited as *Cambodia*); and Michael Vickery, *Kampuchea. Politics, Economics and Society* (London and Boulder: Frances Pinter Publishers and Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), pp. 2 and 165 (hereafter cited as *Kampuchea*). The number of refugees in Vietnam in 1978 is taken from *The Boat People: An "Age" Investigation with Bruce Grant* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 98.
26. Chandler, op. cit., pp. 216–19; Chou, op. cit., pp. 38–39; Vickery, *Cambodia*, pp. 131–52; and Vickery, *Kampuchea*, pp. 32–35.
27. On 30 April 1989, the PRK officially changed its name to the State of Cambodia.
28. For details pertaining to the alleged "Vietnamization" of Cambodia during the PRK/SOC period, see, for example, Marie Alexandrine Martin, "Le processus de vietnamisation au Cambodge", *Politique Internationale*, No. 24 (Été 1984): 177–91 (hereafter cited as "Le processus"); *idem*, *Le mal Cambodgien. Histoire d'une société traditionnelle face à ses leaders politiques 1946–1987* (Paris: Hachette, 1989), pp. 206–27; Pouvatchy, *The Vietnamisation*; and "The Vietnamisation of Kampuchea. A New Model of Colonialism", *Indochina Report*, Pre-Publication Issue (October 1984) (hereafter cited as *The Vietnamisation of Kampuchea*).
29. Resolution 38/3, 27 October 1983.
30. Resolutions 39/5, 30 October 1984; 40/7, 5 November 1985; 41/6, 21 October 1986, 42/3, 14 October 1987; 43/19, 3 November 1988; and 44/22, 16 November 1989. In Resolution 44/22 the wording had been changed to "as a result of foreign occupation".
31. The overthrown government in Cambodia, that is, the DK, was allowed to continue to represent Cambodia in the General Assembly from 1979 and throughout the 1980s. For details, see Amer, op. cit., pp. 89–108.
32. A/34/PV.62, 12 November 1979, p. 1204; A/35/PV.36, 15 October 1980, p. 725; and A/36/PV.36, 9 October 1981, p. 722.
33. The CGDK was formed on 22 June 1982 in Kuala Lumpur. It was a coalition between the three anti-Vietnamese Khmer organizations; DK (that is, the Khmer Rouge), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under the leadership of Son Sann, and the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indpendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) under the leadership of Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. The DK is also known as the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK).
34. A/37/PV.44, 26 October 1982, pp. 764–66.
35. A/39/PV.40, 1 November 1984 (Provisional), par. 4–5 and 22.
36. A/41/PV.42, 22 October 1986 (Provisional), par. 46.
37. A/43/PV.42, 4 November 1988 (Provisional), par. 17; and A/44/PV.56, 22 November 1989 (Provisional), par. 16–17.
38. *Policy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea with regard to Vietnamese residents* (Phnom Penh: Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1983).
39. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
43. Chou Meng Tarr refers to certain provisions of the “existing” constitution which permitted Vietnamese who had married “Cambodians” or were related to Vietnamese who lived in Cambodia prior to 1975 to be “treated” as Cambodian residents (Chou, *op. cit.*, p. 42).
44. Martin, *Le processus*, pp. 180–84; Pouvatthy, *The Vietnamisation*, pp. 3–4; and “The Vietnamisation of Kampuchea”, pp. 11–16.
45. Chandler, *op. cit.*, p. 233 and 267, footnote 11; Murray Hiebert, *Cambodia and Vietnam: Costs of the Alliance*, Indochina Issues, No. 46 (May 1984): 2–5; Chou, *op. cit.*, p. 40; and Vickery, *Kampuchea*, pp. 165–67.
46. For discussions on these issues, see Hiebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–5; Chou, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–41; Vickery, *Cambodia*, pp. 296; and Vickery, *Kampuchea*, pp. 165–67. Chou “suspects” that the border controls introduced along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border in the late 1980s were partly motivated by opposition to more Vietnamese coming to Cambodia (Chou, *op. cit.*, p. 40).
47. For an overview and assessment of the United Nations’ peacekeeping operation and the post-electoral evolution up to late July 1993, see Ramses Amer, “The United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia: Overview and Assessment”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 15, no. 2 (September 1993): 211–31. For a brief overview and comment on the process of withdrawal of UNTAC and the political evolution in Cambodia up to the end of 1993, see Ramses Amer, “Cambodia. United Nations’ Changing Role”, *Pacific Research* 7, no. 1 (February 1994): 18–19 (hereafter cited as “Cambodia”).
48. For example, Ieng Muli, a senior official in the KPNLF, did so in an interview on 25 June 1992 (British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part Three, Far East/1421/B/3–4, 1 July 1992) (hereafter cited as BBC/FE). On 3 July Son Sann, President of the KPNLF, elaborated on the same theme (BBC/FE/1427/B/2–3, 8 July 1992). The PDK position and the detailed allegations were outlined in a letter by Khieu Samphan, Chairman of the PDK, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 9 July 1992 (BBC/1431/B/5–7, 13 July 1992). In another letter the same month Khieu Samphan claimed that the number of Vietnamese settlers had reached nearly two million (BBC/FE/1440/B/3, 23 July 1992). The same claim was put forward at the SNC meeting of 23 July (BBC/FE/1444/B/1, 28 July 1992). On this issue, see also Nayan Chanda, “Wounds of history. Surging resentment of Vietnamese could spark pogroms”, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter cited as *FEER*), 30 July 1992, pp. 14–16.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
50. Nayan Chanda, “Dark days at Kok Kandal”, *FEER*, 30 July 1992, pp. 14–15.
51. BBC/FE/1445/A2/1, 29 July 1992; 1447/A2/1–2, 31 July 1992; 1450/A2/1, 4 August 1992; 1452/A1/2, 6 August 1992; and 1460/B/1–2, 15 August 1992.
52. At a meeting held in Jakarta on 9 and 10 September 1990. The four warring Cambodian parties decided to create an SNC with twelve members, six from the SOC and two from each of the other three parties — FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF, and the PDK.
53. BBC/FE/1464/B/1, 20 August 1992.
54. A/46/608-S/23177, 30 October 1991, p. 40.
55. BBC/FE/1460/B/2.
56. S/25124, 25 January 1993, pp. 7–8. At a meeting of the SNC on 8 December Son Sann was reported to have demanded that the “Khmer Krom” living in Vietnam be allowed to participate in the Cambodian elections. Vietnam officially rejected the idea by stating

- that the elections "do not concern Cambodians having Vietnamese nationality who are currently living in Vietnam" (BBC/FE/1565/A2/5-6, 16 December 1992).
57. S/24800, 15 November 1992, p. 4; S/25124, p. 21; BBC/FE/1517/A1/6, 21 October 1992; and 1519/B/1, 23 October 1992.
 58. S/25124, p. 21. A fourth attack was also reported to have been carried out in the Vietnamese province of Song Be on 2 November (Ibid., p. 21). According to Vietnamese sources, the attack, carried out by three armed Cambodian men, involved the killing of three men and one woman and the rape of two women. Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the SNC and UNTAC to demand an immediate investigation into the matter. According to the Vietnamese, UNTAC carried out an investigation but was unable to tell which Cambodian "faction" the attackers belonged to. The relevant United Nations source gave no information about the investigation (Ibid., p. 21; BBC/FE/1552/A2/2, 1 December 1992; and, 1567/A1/6, 18 December 1992).
 59. BBC/FE/1578/A2/4, 5 January 1993.
 60. BBC/FE/1582/A1/5, 9 January 1993.
 61. S/25124, p. 21; and, S/25289, 13 February 1993, p. 3.
 62. S/25719, 3 May 1993, pp. 10-11; and BBC/FE/1626/i, 2 March 1993. A further four Vietnamese men were later identified as "foreign forces" by UNTAC (S/25719, p. 10).
 63. BBC/FE/1630/A1/2, 6 March 1993.
 64. Resolution 810 (1993), 8 March 1993.
 65. BBC/FE/1634/A1/2, 11 March 1993.
 66. BBC/FE/1635/B/1-2, 12 March 1993.
 67. S/25719, pp. 22-23.
 68. BBC/FE/1649/B/2, 29 March 1993.
 69. BBC/FE/1638/A2/1, 13 March 1993; and 1638/A2/6-7, 16 March 1993. The connection between the disclosure of the three Vietnamese men as "foreign forces" and the massacre was also made by external observers. See, for example, "Killing Fields II. Legitimising the Khmer Rouge", *FEER*, 25 March 1993, p. 5; and Nate Thayer, "Marital Races: UN search for Vietnamese forces fuels "ethnic cleansing", *FEER*, 25 March 1993, p. 30.
 70. S/25719, p. 23; Nayan Chanda and Nate Thayer, "Rivers of Blood. Khmer Rouge step up drive against Vietnamese", 8 April 1993, p. 22; and Nate Thayer, "Wretched of the Earth", *FEER*, 15 April 1993, p. 21. For Vietnam's response to these killings and the refugee crisis, see, for example, BBC/FE/1649/A1/1-2, 29 March 1992; and, 1665/A2/3, 17 April 1993.
 71. BBC/FE/1653/A1/1, 2 April 1993.
 72. BBC/FE/1660/B/2-3, 12 April 1993.
 73. S/25719, p. 23. See also BBC/FE/1662/A1/5, 14 April 1993.
 74. S/25784, 15 May 1993, p. 2.
 75. Ibid., p. 3.
 76. The four parties are: The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) which was the ruling party within the SOC, FUNCINPEC, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) which is one of two major parties from the former KPNLF, and the Mouvement de Liberation National du Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) which is a smaller royalist party. The 120 seats in the Constituent Assembly/National Assembly are divided as follows: FUNCINPEC has fifty-eight seats, the CPP fifty-one, the BLDP ten, and MOULINAKA one seat (S/2593, 10 June 1993, pp. 2-5; and, *Cambodian Elections Results*, United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1389, June 1993).
 77. BBC/FE/1707/C1/3-4, 5 June 1994.
 78. The PNGC was a coalition government comprising representatives from the four

- parties represented in the Constituent Assembly — the BLDP, the CPP, FUNCINPEC and MOULINAKA (S/26090, 16 July 1993, p. 2)
79. BBC/FE/1744/A2/4, 19 July 1993.
 80. BBC/FE/1759/A2/3, 5 August 1993; S/26360, 26 August 1993, p. 2; and, Rodney Tasker, "Uninvited Guest. Khmer Rouge role overshadows new government", *FEER*, 26 August 1993, p. 13.
 81. BBC/FE/1767/A1/3, 14 August 1993.
 82. King Norodom Sihanouk was brought back to the throne through the provisions of the new Cambodian constitution which was adopted on 21 September 1993 (S/26529, 5 October 1993, pp. 1–2). The RNGC is made up of the same four parties as the PNGC and was officially brought into office by a vote in the National Assembly on 29 October ("New Parliament", *FEER*, 11 November 1993, p. 15).
 83. BBC/FE/1962/B/16, 4 April 1994; 1969/B/7, 12 April 1994; and, 1970/B/2, 13 April 1994.
 84. BBC/FE/1777/A1/2, 26 August, 1993; 1779/B/1–2, 28 August 1993; 1781/B/5, 31 August 1993; 1939/B/10–11, 7 March 1994; 1962/B/16; 1963/B/1–3 and 6, 5 April 1994; Murray Hiebert, "First Steps. Cambodian premiers' visit breaks the ice with Vietnam", *FEER*, 9 September 1993, p. 13; "Lingering Issues", *FEER*, 3 March 1994, p. 13. "Cambodia, Vietnam setting up groups to settle border disputes", *Strait Times* (Singapore), 4 April 1994, p. 9.
 85. *Ibid.*, p. 9; and, BBC/FE/1963/B/1–3.
 86. King Sihanouk's accusations were put forward in an interview with Nayan Chanda of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in May 1994 ("The Centre Cannot Hold. Sihanouk fears for the future of his country", *FEER*, 19 May 1994, p. 20). For Vietnam's position and anti-Vietnamese manifestations, see "Hanoi denies any ambitions on Khmer territory", *Strait Times*, 18 May 1994, p. 7; "Vietnam ready to negotiate border problems with Cambodia", *Agence France Presse*, Hanoi, 13 May 1994; and, "Vietnam denies King Sihanouk's border accusations", *ibid.*, Hanoi, 17 May 1994. On this issue, see also Ramses Amer, "Challenge of the Khmer Rouge", *Trends*, No. 46 (June 1994), p. IV (Supplement to *Business Times* (Singapore), Weekend Edition, 25–26 June 1994).
 87. For the full text of the "Constitution of the kingdom of Cambodia", see BBC/FE/1822/S1/1–9, 18 October 1993.
 88. Amer, *Cambodia*, pp. 18–19; and Lindsay Murdoch, "Concentrating the Mind", *FEER*, 30 September 1993, p. 11.
 89. Some examples have been given in the previous section. On this matter, see also, Zachary Abuza, "The Future of the Khmer Rouge: Internal and External Variables", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 15, no. 4 (March 1994): 447.
 90. In this context, it can be noted that David P. Chandler has argued that if Cambodia's demographic centre of gravity had remained in the north-western part of the country, near Angkor, which would have been beyond the reach of the Vietnamese but more accessible to Thailand, then, "perhaps" little of the animosity towards Vietnam and the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia would have arisen (David P. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History", *Pacific Affairs* 53, no. 3 [Fall 1983]: 411).
 91. Migozzi, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–46.
 92. Comte, *op. cit.*, p. 69, footnote 49; Goldblum, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–34; and Chou, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–39.