

on human rights, civilian police functions, the rule of law, or the capacity of the news media to perform effectively, adequately debated. More discussion is also needed about what has happened to Australian policy in the South Pacific, in particular whether Canberra's pretensions to perform as the region's dominant middle power, will continue generating tensions between such "constructive commitment", as Canberra would term it, and that country's wider security interests. Over original proposals to develop a nuclear-weapons-free zone for the South Pacific, and in a 1990 controversy regarding the incineration of chemical weapons on Johnston atoll, smaller South Pacific island states saw Australia put its relations with the United States ahead of its commitment to South Pacific priorities. The discussion that Ross provides on both Papua New Guinea's continuing legitimacy and economic problems and the Bougainville conflict is informed and pertinent, but here also little is said about the Australian dimensions concerned.

The primary value of this study is its worth as an introductory overview of security in the South Pacific and as an initial research tool. While Ross provides cautious optimism about a continuation of pragmatic accommodation within constitutional rule to moderate the region's tensions, he would acknowledge that a stability that leaves the region's substantial agenda of social and economic needs unattended is likely to prove cosmetic.

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***Co-operating for Peace.* By Gareth Evans. Allen and Unwin, 1993. 224 pp.**

The world's primary global security organization, the United Nations, is facing challenges unimagined by its creators. At the same time, the United Nation's bureaucracy has grown to incredible proportions while the mission challenges are great. Against a rapidly changing international environment, featuring new and virulent forms of ethno-nationalism as well as the ever present eye of television, Australian Foreign Minister

Gareth Evans outlines his ideas on global security. With the recurring themes of preventative strategies, peace-building and co-operative security, *Cooperating for Peace* is Australia's contribution to the world debate created by Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report, *An Agenda for Peace*.

Gareth Evans and his team have undertaken an ambitious project. While accepting the fact that war will be a part of human existence for the foreseeable future, the book suggests that real improvements can be made through co-operative security measures.

The author identifies co-operative security as the way ahead for global security and notes that the United Nations is the primary international security organization. Numerous questions arise from this assertion. Given the author's exposure of the United Nations, its organization and need for reform, the most pressing questions the reader must address are these: does the United Nations have the tools to positively affect the international security environment through common security? Is common security the answer, at least in part, to relieving the world of some of its conflicts?

With the broadly perceived increase in conflict since the end of the Cold War, these are serious questions. Many successor states of former communist regimes (Tajikistan, Bosnia) and post-colonial states (Rwanda, Mozambique) have been left in disarray. Furthermore, it would appear that an increasing number of successor states (Russia) and post-colonial states (Sudan, Nigeria) have increasingly unstable militaries, a sure sign of further conflict yet to come.

The author describes co-operative security as a descriptive theme which embraces the whole content of collective security and common security. This description also includes some of the multi-dimensional flavour of comprehensive security. To use the author's own words, co-operative security is a "broad approach to security which is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either and which, above all, stresses the value of creating "habits of dialogue on a multilateral basis".

This definition of co-operative security is extremely broad. There is always a danger, of course, that a definition or argument that says everything runs the risk of eventually saying nothing. In this case, however, the author presents a sustainable argument that the end of

strategic competition between the United States and the USSR has left a fluid security environment. Concurrent with this is a rise of economic competition, but with remaining military rivalries. While the threat to global security through nuclear war has lessened, there is a wide array of security problems that have arisen in the post-Cold War era. No one country, not even the only remaining superpower, can be expected to handle all of these problems at once.

Therefore, either regional organizations or the only global security organization (the United Nations) must rise to the challenge. With such multi-faceted challenges in the international security environment, there needs to be a wide-ranging series of responses to these problems. The author's definition of co-operative security is extremely broad because it has to be so. Only a multi-dimensional response will suffice.

With such a wide variety of problems to face, the solutions themselves must have a broad foundation to rest upon. While regional organizations can no doubt take up many of the challenges, only an organization with a global view can be expected to act upon this ambitious agenda. The author clearly identifies the United Nations in this role. Is the United Nations up to the challenge?

Throughout the book, the author alludes to the problems the United Nations is facing in adapting to its present challenges. In general, there appear to be two main problem areas. First is that of information in its broadest sense. The author notes several times that U.N. mandates are often ineffective or unenforceable because of a lack of good information. The other main problem area is that of internal reform and reorganization of the United Nations itself. While the author makes several creative and useful suggestions for the former, the book does not seem to take a strong position on the latter.

Throughout the book, numerous references are made to information-based problems. Despite the advent of the "information age", the United Nations appears to be regularly lacking useful, accurate and timely information at all levels of operations. The Security Council is noted as a body that frequently passes resolutions that seem to be driven more by the latest television images. Lacking a steady input of reliable, regionally produced information on potential problem areas, the Security Council seems to have been reeling from crisis to crisis. Devoid of any sense of its own capabilities or intentions, or what criteria are involved when deciding on interventions, the United Nations has made some extremely poor decisions that have put its field personnel in impossible positions.

The discontent among U.K. military personnel deployed into conflict

areas is becoming obvious. For instance, numerous personnel at the U.N. headquarters in Zagreb Croatia began referring to U.N. Security Council resolutions as "New York Junk Bonds". They noted, both in sadness and frustration, that most of the resolutions looked good on paper, but they had no substance or backing. Consequently, they had no real value when you tried to cash them in.

The poor information flow is especially critical to U.N. field operations. Long experience has taught that in most cases, the United Nations has only two real "weapons" in peacekeeping operations. They are censure and negotiations. In order to be effective, leaders in the field need to have the most timely and accurate information to do their jobs. Without detailed, accurate information, field personnel from the rank of corporal to the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General) will be denied the ability to do their best work.

The author notes the United Nations' need for improved command and control as well as an enhanced intelligence capability. With missions like Bosnia, Croatia and Somalia demonstrating the complexity of U.N. missions, the problems associated with information and intelligence need greater examination. Nothing less than the United Nations' own credibility is being weakened by poor Security Council Resolutions and field commanders who frequently operate in an information void.

The topic of what needs to be reformed at the United Nations has already generated a near endless debate. The author makes several useful suggestions on restructuring the Secretariat and how this could better serve the Secretary General. He also makes several creative suggestions for improving the management of peace operations, humanitarian affairs, and other U.N. operations. What is lacking, however, is a clear statement on the well-known staffing problems at the United Nations. The author makes a weak statement, saying that a comprehensive management review could be invaluable in the reallocation of staff to areas which clearly require strengthening. This recommendation in particular is both understated and insufficient.

Working with U.N. staff in mission areas abroad is a uniquely educational experience. The United Nations employs some extraordinarily bright, pragmatic and energetic people who hail from a wide variety of nations and backgrounds. Unfortunately, there is another problem that the author and his team either did not or could not address. The brutal reality is that many U.K. staff are inefficient, corrupt, or just incapable of performing their tasks. The end result is that competent mission staff are severely overworked and demoralized, while the entire mission suffers.

With the United Nations suffering both financial and credibility crises at the same time, perhaps a linkage needs to be created between the issues. While the current U.N. Secretary General has done an extraordinary job of guiding the organization through the challenges hurled at it since the end of the Cold War, the next Secretary General faces further tasks. Perhaps the next Secretary General should be given the open support of the major financial contributing nations to remove some of the worst offenders and practices. Such removals and real reforms would serve the double purpose of saving money and increasing the efficiency of the headquarters and the various missions. They would also have the effect of removing the excuses of some nations who do not want to pay their dues because they feel that the money is not well spent.

The next Secretary General must be an individual who has strong anti-corruption credentials and commands the support of the major financial contributors. Without these, none of the other goals of the United Nations can be met.

Perhaps the United Nations' inefficiency could be tolerated during the more stable (and prosperous) Cold War years. With a relatively limited agenda and scope for action, various weaknesses could be accommodated while the missions were being carried out. With an increasingly complex security environment, what was once tolerable is rapidly becoming unacceptable.

The author makes a convincing case that the United Nations needs to work efficiently with the multi-dimensional ideas of co-operative security. While many of the ideas presented will be familiar to students of peacekeeping and related security studies, the conceptual clarity in the study is of great assistance in defining the problems for students of global security.

Individuals with U.N. experience may feel that the book's weakest point concerns the reform of the United Nations. Without a widespread clean-up of the staffing system of the organization, neither the financial problems nor the inefficiency that cripple it will cease. Without either of these obstacles removed, the United Nations is unlikely to reach the lofty goals set out for it by the author.

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