

the United States and Iraq during the latter's war with Iran, and the many possible avenues (however narrow) for a negotiated solution are all well exposed. How much further Campbell can go than "problem-izing" the unambiguous claims of the victors is, however, open to question (as he himself notes). On the issues of negotiation, for example, Campbell's analysis must assume not just that a negotiated solution was possible, but more importantly, that it would have been ethically defensible. This may be the case, but a careful analysis of possible outcomes would be required to sustain the point. On the other hand, his critical analysis of the various elisions and closures of the debate (from policy-makers to the media) is an excellent model for the sort of "second wave" critique that could have informed the entire volume.

Overall, the book makes only a modest contribution to the growing debate on the nature of world politics in the post-Cold War world — by my count it is the fourth Australian-oriented book of this genre. All of the contributors had previously published works on the Gulf War, and most contributions are amplifications, extensions or condensations of earlier writings. The volume would have made a stronger "second wave" contribution if its editor could have convinced the authors to go beyond or rethink their earlier analysis, or to raise in a genuinely "critical" (however defined) fashion some interesting broader analytical issues that the Gulf War raised. It may not, as James Richardson points out, be a "defining moment" of the post-Cold War order, but the Gulf War experience can be used to illuminate the International Relations landscape more clearly.

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***Asia-Pacific: A View on its Role in the New World Order.* By M.S. Dobbs-Higginson. Hong Kong: Longman Asia Limited, 1993. 422 pp.**

Understanding the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific, Michael Dobbs-Higginson writes, requires a knowledge of the region's "discipline and focus", of its culture and philosophy, and of its newly evolving middle classes' "people-power". And a lack of understanding of these characteristics (rather than of the region's politics, science, and economics)

has created misunderstanding and barriers not only between East and West but also among the peoples of the Asia-Pacific themselves.

Of the handful of writers who have so far taken up the challenge of trying to bring coherence, understanding, and insight to the broad sweep of the Asia-Pacific's extraordinary transformation since World War II, none has succeeded as well as Dobbs-Higginson. Nor, perhaps, has any been better qualified to do so. The Rhodesian-born businessman began his personal odyssey through the countries and cultures of the Asia-Pacific as a twenty-year-old student in a Buddhist monastery in Japan more than three decades ago. And his journeying reflects the value of an independent, inquiring mind, and a penchant for not accepting a belief or maxim before metaphorically tasting, touching and kicking it.

The volume addresses three interrelated matters: first, taking up some four-fifths of the contents, a perceptive overview of the region and lively portraits of individual countries; secondly, a powerful, though not entirely persuasive argument and "blueprint" for an Asia-Pacific forum; and thirdly, and least compelling — though not necessarily least important — a brief preliminary inquiry into what the author describes as the "diminishing moral value system in the new world order", with its consequent "vacuum of purpose and direction" among much of the contemporary, trade-focused, capitalistic world.

Dobbs-Higginson defines the Asia-Pacific as "those countries encompassed in the triangular region, from India down to New Zealand and up to China and Japan". The volume's strength lies especially in the quality of the country analyses. In a score of sharply focused chapters ranging from a few pages on Brunei ("an efficient oddity"), Burma/Myanmar ("a tragic exercise in futility"), and Papua New Guinea ("a leap from the Stone Age into the twentieth century") to 29 pages on India ("counterbalancing the Greater China threat"), 37 pages on the People's Republic of China ("balancing on the knife edge of order and chaos"), and 54 pages on Japan ("in search of understanding and a new role for itself"), the author reveals the worth of his lengthy, "hands-on" Asia-Pacific experience as a student, businessman and investment banker. To each analysis, he brings a prudent mix of history, culture, and contemporary policy issues and trends. Although completed in March 1993, the country analyses remain germane, and alone should ensure a healthy shelf-life for the volume, among both Westerners and Asians wanting a clearer insight into a region that is reshaping the world.

The author defines the Asia-Pacific both with reference to the region's "internal changes over the centuries, and particularly since World War II", as well as in terms of the way the region was "most likely to adapt to recent extraordinary developments" in the rest of the world. By the

latter, he refers to the effective demise of communism, the end of super-power rivalry, and the emergence of trading communities, centred on the Americas and the European Community, "to fill at least a material part of the power vacuum caused by the Cold War's end". The dynamic for a third such community, centred on the Asia-Pacific, the author argues, arises from protectionist tendencies of the two Western trading communities and, as countries in the East become increasingly isolated, their consequent need to depend upon one another in order to survive. "Yet together these Eastern countries could command great strength and be a force for the continuance of trade, thus providing a genuine counterweight to the West — a balance the world requires".

The author's vision of a "trade-driven, regionalising world" partly reflects an acknowledged debt to Lester Thurow's *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe and America* (1992). Thurow argued that the GATT-Bretton Woods trading system had come to "the normal end of a very successful life". But in the absence of a dominant political power that could force everyone to agree to new rules of the game, as the United States had been able to in the 1940s, the new rules would be written informally by the European Community, as the largest, wealthiest market. And Europe would opt for a system of "managed trade" and "quasi trading blocks". In contrast to the 1930s, the new trading "blocks" would not try to reduce or eliminate trade, but seek to manage it to the advantage of their member states. For Thurow, free trade *within* regions, and managed trade *between* regions "may well be the long-run route to freer world trade". Jumping from national economies to a world economy in one step could be "too big a leap to make".

Dobbs-Higginson reinforces Thurow's vision by stressing both the isolationist tendencies of a post-Cold War America, and the Catch-22 situation of a West that had matured, taken on debt, and aged, in confronting the challenge of an Asia that, in contrast, was becoming younger, and studying, saving, and investing more in order to build for tomorrow. And he dismisses (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) APEC as a "red herring", and "meaningless soapbox", as it "encompassed countries on both sides of the Pacific which had fundamental conflicts of interest in terms of their future economic and political goals". Similarly, he rejects notions of "open regionalism" as nonsensical and naive. In this, he seemingly agrees with Thurow who argues that economic gains not shared with outsiders "are the glue necessary to politically weld together a set of disparate countries". The larger the gap between insiders and outsiders, the more powerful the glue. But like nuclear deterrence in the past, Dobbs-Higginson argues, fear of retaliation would constrain "trading communities" in the extent to which they widened the insider-outsider gap.

At this stage of its development, the author sees the Asia-Pacific as two subregions: one, from India to Indonesia and up to China and Japan; the other, the countries he refers to as "Australasia" (Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea). His central argument that all the countries of the region have "more and more in common" applied to the Asian subregion; in contrast, Australasia did not have all that much in common with Asia. Yet these countries had no alternative but to "look north" for their long-term future. Accordingly, Dobbs-Higginson argues that Malaysia's Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, was on the right track in proposing the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), but erred in not including India and Australasia in his proposal. The Asia-Pacific, in particular Japan, needed India as a balance to the weight of China; India, in the necessary pursuit of an outward-looking economic policy, would be forced to look towards the Asia-Pacific rather than the West. And squeezed from east and west by the larger powers of Europe and North America, Asia and Australia could "co-operate diplomatically and work steadily towards stability in the region". For its part, Japan had a crucial role to play as co-leader, rather than "the leader", in bringing the Asia-Pacific together, as also did ASEAN as the geographical "swing factor" between Japan and China on the one hand, and the Indian subcontinent and Australasia, on the other.

Reflecting an acknowledged influence of Buddhist philosophy on his disposition and thinking, "discipline", "focus", and "balance" are among Dobbs-Higginson's favourite words. "I see the world primarily in terms of whether or not it is in balance — both in the macro sense (of a country, a region, and the world itself) and in the micro sense (of the local community and the individual person)", he writes. But he has in mind much more than balance between strong and weak, or the successful and unsuccessful in a material or physical sense. The superpower ideological conflict, he argues, provided a broad, fundamental "moral framework", and its absence had left a "moral vacuum", and the lack of a much needed clear and focused sense of purpose and direction.

Economic association or competition based on self-interest, on an individual, local, national, or global scale, would not satisfy the basic human need to identify with a value system transcending the individual's own immediate material interests. Nor would the answer be found by retreating into "tribal" communities, each with its own value system, however comforting in the short term. But the Asia-Pacific peoples could contribute to a "solution" by creating a clear regional identity and a

“higher common purpose” within the co-operative framework of an Asia-Pacific community forum.

The volume’s most significant contribution to Asia-Pacific studies is the persuasive case it makes for discarding the “old orthodoxy” that the Asia-Pacific will always be divided. In effect, Dobbs-Higginson turns Gerald Segal’s *Rethinking the Pacific* (1990) on its head. Segal argues that “thinking of the Pacific as a separate region has never made much sense and will make increasingly less sense, despite all the talk of the coming Pacific Century”. For Segal, who focused on the so-called “Pacific Rim”, globalization was dividing the region economically, politically, and culturally even while “the opposite and sometimes simultaneous trend of entrenchment of divisions between certain parts of the Pacific, again on cultural/ideological as well as military and economic lines”, was taking place. In contrast, for Dobbs-Higginson, “the divisive forces which pertained in the past are no longer relevant. In fact, as a result of the recent tumultuous changes in the world, many of these forces will now become unifying factors”. Dobbs-Higginson does not deny the region’s diversity, nor suggest that it “is an economic community waiting to happen; a natural confederation longing to launch itself on an unsuspecting world”. His case rests on perceived long-term trends that, he believes, give the Asia-Pacific countries no option but to come together to “solve their common problems *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world”. In short, the Asia-Pacific countries cannot avoid the same “tortuous road” that the European Community and America’s NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) are travelling. And he offers sound reasons why they could be more successful than the West.

The volume reinforces concerns about the danger of using Western-derived economic, political, and strategic theory to understand the contemporary Asia-Pacific. By approaching the region on its own terms, Dobbs-Higginson exposes important strands of coherence and order amid the Asia-Pacific’s “chaos” (for example, unity and direction within the diversity of religions), as well as an underlying sense of focus and purpose that eluded Segal’s flawed academic approach. Similarly, despite criticism of their own analyses, “revisionists” such as Chalmers Johnson, James Fallows, Clyde Prestowitz, and others, are right to challenge the adequacy of neoclassical economic theory and practice to explain East Asia’s success. Western analyses that see the strategic outlook for the region in terms similar to eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe also lack credibility. Nor are these minor matters; the costs of Asia-Pacific policy based on flawed analyses could be dire.

That said, any ambitious work of this kind will be open to many criticisms, not least because the jury could remain out on the shape of the new world order (or disorder) for some time to come. For instance, the volume's vision of a tripolar world of quasi trading blocs remains one among several possible futures. After all, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is now in place, although it has yet to establish itself as an effective force for global liberalization. Regional trade deals abound, but so far their impact has remained relatively benign, and they could even be assisting global liberalization. NAFTA, AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), and the Australia-New Zealand CER are reducing external barriers as they lower their intra-regional barriers. Regional blocs in Latin America and Africa that have not done so have tended to fail. Moreover, the extent to which APEC might embody "irreconcilable" trans-Pacific conflicts of interest will depend upon ongoing assessments in Tokyo, Washington, and elsewhere, of the way in which global change is affecting national interests. Modern history suggests that among great powers none has shown greater capacity to adapt to change than Japan and the United States. It would be premature to conclude that these powers will fail in the present time to do whatever might be necessary to protect and preserve their mutual interest in the stability and prosperity of the world's most economically dynamic region.

Even so, the challenges of the late twentieth century world are of a different order than in the past. In particular, two general trends are relevant to the author's concern with what he calls the "moral vacuum" and lack of purposeful leadership in the post-Cold War world. First, in responding to the nineteenth century threat of Western domination, non-Western societies are not only modernizing rapidly, and, in the process, moving the world towards a post-Western phase of history; they are also increasingly rejecting Western models of modernization, challenging Western claims to a universal political vision, and reasserting their own distinctive cultural identities. Secondly, while technology has continued to "shrink" the world, far from encouraging a unity of outlook among world societies, the effect has been more to create a sense of congestion, or latter-day "traffic problem", giving rise to new sources of tension based on differences in size, economic development, ideological persuasion, and civilization styles. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policy reforms these trends are demanding, impose heavy burdens upon states, not least intellectually and psychologically, especially among Western societies. The fate and shape of a new world order could depend heavily on how well the main players in the Asia-Pacific, especially the United States, Japan, and China, manage their domestic

reforms, and intellectual and psychological adjustments. Thus, the volume rightly draws attention to the import of “discipline and focus”, culture and philosophy, and “people-power”.

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***The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General***, with the original Tagalog text and translated into English by Paula Carolina Malay. By **Santiago V. Alvarez**. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992. 476 pp.

This book narrates a chapter in the struggle of an Asian people to overthrow a European conqueror that ruled them for more than three hundred years. It registers the negations and affirmations of the revolution that transformed events and personalities into a subject worthy of remembering.

At the background of this struggle is the attempt by Spain earlier to conquer the Filipinos. Magellan, the leader of the expedition in 1521, failed in this and paid for it with his life at the hands of native chief Lapulapu in the battle of Mactan. Subsequent expeditionary conquests succeeded, however, during the last years of that century, and the Spaniards thereupon dominated strategic areas of the archipelago through the tactic of divide-and-rule. This enabled them to establish a foothold in Asia for the spread of the Catholic faith and the galleon trade in spices, and Oriental and Latin American goods. The conquerors enjoyed the fruits of domination at the expense of the freedom and honour of the conquered.

The human and social costs of oppression were tremendous. Filipinos paid for these with their lives and liberties, the destruction of their indigenous cultures and traditions, their forcible conversion to Christianity, the subjection of men to military conscription and of women to Spanish lasciviousness. Spain exploited its subjects through land rent, unjust taxation, and *corvée* labour. They were regarded as a lower species of human being, brutalized by friars and officials to make them unthinking vassals of the Crown and Papacy.

The people resented this, but held their anger in brief interregnums of peace. However, when opportune moments came they rose in