

prisoners of war, the plight of the South Vietnamese prisoners was completely ignored by the United States, and their names were not included in lists of people that Washington submitted to Hanoi as those unaccounted for, and in whom the United States had an interest. It seems that they had been conveniently forgotten. Most of the prisoners were eventually released between 1979 and 1982, with the last being freed in 1987. Sadly, some ethnic Hmong agents, who had been inserted in 1962, and who had no home to return to, died in prison more than thirty years after their capture. To add insult to injury, some of the survivors of the ill-fated project who were released from prison camps in northern Vietnam long after the country had been reunified, are currently being rejected by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in their applications to emigrate to America. According to Tourison, the reason given is that the INS does not believe that these men spent a sufficiently long period of time in prison after 1975 to warrant resettlement; all imprisonment prior to the fall of Saigon is automatically discounted.

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An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence. By Yoichi Funabashi, Michel Oksenberg, and Heinrich Weiss. New York, Paris and Tokyo: The Trilateral Commission, May 1994. 84 pp.

This is an engaging book touching upon a topic of obvious interest, that is, the rise of China and its implications. Both China specialists and general readers will find much to enjoy and the book should be recommended.

The book is actually a report prepared for the Trilateral Commission (formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan and North America), based on the discussions at the Commission meeting in Tokyo in April 1994 after consultations with a group of prominent scholars, officials and China watchers from various countries. The choice of the three authors reflects a relatively balanced view of scholars from Western Europe, Japan and North America.

The report takes the view that China's trajectory to date suggests it will emerge as a complete and comprehensive power and this rise challenges the traditional concepts about rising power — that is, in the past, rising powers controlled their boundaries, had minimal social unrest, and had settled institutional arrangements. China's rise, especially in the years immediately after the Tiananmen incident of 1989, however, is occurring under conditions of uncertainty, social instability — a nation which is politically unsettled, culturally proud, economically dynamic, and territorially amorphous. These qualities have not co-existed in previous rising powers.

The report charts a course of strategy for the Trilateral countries in dealing with China's rise. It considers China's rise more an opportunity than a threat (p. 4), and recommends a wide range of economic, strategic, and political actions that would facilitate China's involvement in the world community. At the same time, it also warns the Trilateral countries not to harbour unrealistic hopes for China (p. 4).

This strategy entails from positions of strength, weaving China into webs of economic interdependence, engaging China in the global economy and in multilateral security arrangements, maintaining frequent extensive high-level dialogues with Chinese leaders, and recognizing the important roles that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector must play in integrating China into the world community. The positions of strength include a forward-deployed American military presence, vibrant Japanese-American and Korean-American military alliances, the continued prosperity and stability of Taiwan and the ASEAN states, and the development of regional and sub-regional organizations and processes in which China is involved.

In the chapter "China in Historical Perspective", the authors highlight "four misconceptions" in the understanding of China's past. First, Chinese culture is not simply a lineal descendant of the Han people who settled in the Yellow River and spread from there. It is an amalgam of the powerful Han culture (and many indigenous civilizations which the Han absorbed as they spread across China) and the foreign civilization which swept across China. Secondly, the deference that many rulers on the periphery exhibited was more symbolic than real and they were prepared to indulge the Chinese emperor as long as he did not interfere in their internal affairs and came to their assistance if they faced unmanageable opposition. Thirdly, merchants and artists were politically more influential than the national myth would have it. Fourthly, Chinese commerce with the outside world in the past was not confined to officially sanctioned trade as the myth suggested.

Considerable unreported commerce occurred with the connivance of local officials, especially along the coast. The authors point out that these four misconceptions of China's past have become part of popular Trilateral misconceptions about China.

In discussing "Mainland Domestic Politics", the authors outline continuities and discontinuities, certainties and uncertainties and warn (with the 1989 Tiananmen incident in mind) that the leaders of the Trilateral countries must not overreact and conclude that social unrest (one certainty in the authors' view) is an indication of government failure. The authors take the view that despite political uncertainty, Chinese economic prospects over the long-run appear bright.

In discussing the notion of "Greater China", the authors note that the international community must be careful not to exaggerate or distort the political importance of this economic dynamism and integration. "Greater China" is not likely to become a single political entity. The Trilateral countries do not confront the rise of a cohesive, coordinated, and conspiratorial entity. In a subtle reference to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the report warns that such sales must be carefully calibrated and not made for domestic economic or political purposes as they may have negative consequences.

In the chapter "The Chinese Economy: Regional and Global Dimensions", the report delves more deeply into the policy issues associated with China's economic growth and entry into the international economy, such as its exports, import strategy, technology transfer to China, direct investment, and the most-favoured-nation trading status with the United States, where the report recommends "a one-year renewal in expectation that China will continue to make progress in its adherence to internationally-accepted basic human rights" (p. 45). The report also discusses ways of integrating China into regional and world organizations such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

In the chapter "China's National Security", the report examines the military and security dimensions of China's emergence as a great power. What are China's security needs and aspirations? How will China's growing role as an arms supplier affect the international order? What positive contributions might China make in reshaping the regional and global order in the post-Cold War era?

The chapter on "The Effective and Good Governance of China", outlines how the Chinese think about governance and the implications of political reform. It notes that China is a distinctive yet complex civilization. It is therefore unreasonable to expect China to be governed

in the same fashion as Japan, North America, or Western Europe. It recommends that Trilateral countries approach China with a sense of respect and understanding of its political traditions, rather than disdain and seeking to transform those traditions to accord with Western values.

The concluding chapter summarizes and draws together various recommendations for the Trilateral countries. It recommends engaging, not containing, China, and puts emphasis on co-operative and multilateral action.

On the issue of economic integration, the report recommends encouraging China to become a member of GATT/WTO as rapidly as possible by agreeing to GATT rules. It also favours a loose linkage between economic ties and political reform, long-term investment and the building of APEC.

On security issues, the report recommends greater transparency, and building on regional and sub-regional security groups, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It also suggests a focus on non-proliferation, encouraging responsible military behaviour, avoiding provocative action towards China, maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and building military-to-military contacts.

On the global issue, the report recommends focusing on non-proliferation, using foreign aid to guide behaviour and promoting information/government exchanges.

On the issue of good governance in China, the report recommends adopting multilateral as well as bilateral approaches, working through international and non-governmental organizations, to encourage China to participate in institution-building and to engage in cultural and educational exchanges.

As this report is policy-oriented in nature, excessive attention is given to policy recommendations to the Trilateral countries on what they might do with a rising China. The report is best read as a summary of the views of not only the three authors but also, perhaps, a long list of prominent China specialists and foreign affairs officials of the Trilateral countries, as listed in the front of the report, who were consulted for the report.

The report covers a wide range of current issues about China that will be of interest to readers. Its policy recommendations are comprehensive and liberal, and the analysis is thoughtful. The authors certainly should be congratulated for this successful endeavour.

As the authors are also correctly aware, even if all the recommendations are carried out to the letter, there can be no guarantees

made about China's future. Indeed, the temptation most to be avoided is to slip into the belief that anyone outside China could determine its future. Any ganging up on China, instead of engaging China into an interdependent and mutually beneficial world, would most likely backfire.

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