

accepted, it would not have allowed the military to hide behind the militias and to appear in the end as a remedy to police incompetence. Indeed, today, the military would not have the juridical arguments allowing them to claim their innocence since only with the introduction of martial law on 7 September did they become formally responsible for security.

None of the above leads Martin to regret his involvement in the process. He believes “that the achievement of self-determination for East Timor did great credit to the United Nations as an institution” (p. 14). Bearing in mind that the United Nations took twenty-four years to resolve the East Timor question, this claim might be controversial to some observers, especially among the activists of this cause. However, this and other critical views usually ignore the *realpolitik* considerations that occur in world politics.

The overall impression of this reviewer is that despite being a short book — there is much more to be said — Martin should consider the time he devoted to write it as well spent. Even though he does not bring to light unknown facts to an informed reader, he offers balanced and insightful views of the events in East Timor during 1999.

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***The Many Faces of Asian Security.* Edited by Sheldon W. Simon.** New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. 259pp.

Once again, Sheldon W. Simon and his colleagues at the National Bureau of Asian Research have brought together a diverse group of authors who provide a wide-ranging and generally perceptive review of recent developments in East Asian security from a number of different angles. The impressive mix of academics, policy analysts, and practitioners furnish a carefully considered and often insightful set of essays which address many of the major security issues that have faced East Asia in the last few years. There is always a danger, however, that in commenting on current trends, events will overtake the analysis. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States have clearly changed the way the world looks at security and have had a major impact on Asian international relations. Much of the analysis of this book remains highly relevant, but there are a few places where the

commentary has been side-swiped by the tragic events in New York and Washington.

In his introduction, Simon argues that the region is “searching for new principles of security” (p.1) in the face of a rapidly changing security environment. He deftly sets out the way in which the various chapters of the book illuminate this search in the context of the emergence of a new Asian security agenda. It has to be noted that the focus of the book is East Asia — Northeast and Southeast Asia — or what Simon calls the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the title of the book, readers should be aware that West Asia and South Asia are hardly mentioned. In the first chapter of the book, See Seng Tan, writing with Ralph A. Cossa, explores a fascinating tension in the theoretical work on East Asian security. Tan points out that the realist focus that has long characterized analysis of East Asian security is now being challenged by a constructivist turn. He appears to be arguing that, just as the English School of realism arose out of British and European practices with regard to international relations in general and security in particular, students of East Asian security should consider developing a distinctively East Asian approach to realism that is rooted in regional security practices. This is an approach that is well worth exploring and developing.

Simon’s detailed overview of the state of the armed forces of the original five ASEAN members — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand — as well as Japan in the wake of the Asian economic crisis raises a number of key questions. Importantly, he notes the increasing co-operation among intelligence agencies of the ASEAN members, the recent calls for a greater emphasis on ASEAN multilateral security, and the continuing need for U.S. forward military deployments in East Asia. Interestingly, in his chapter on technology and security in Asia, Paul Bracken suggests that the United States will find that maintaining a security presence in East Asia will be increasingly expensive as the armed forces of the region, especially those of China, deploy more technologically sophisticated weapons. The main message of his provocative chapter, that “the military geography of the region is changing” (p. 86), is persuasively set out.

In a chapter which presages the remaining analyses, Donald K. Emmerson looks at the issues which surround the broadening of the definition of security. Included under the rubric of security are an increasing array of threats to the state’s well-being. Intersecting this expanding notion of security is a relatively constant view of sovereignty which is jealously guarded, especially by the governments of Southeast Asia. As Emmerson correctly points out, this is clearly something that analysts need to take into account. Subsequent chapters all explore

significant aspects of the widening security agenda in East Asia. There is much of value in their analyses. Leif Rosenberger's examination of the economic dimension of security provides a good overview of recent economic events in the region, including the Asian crisis. In particular, his emphasis on the need for an assessment of the sequencing of economic reforms as economies are opened up strikes the right cautionary note. However, his tendency to see the Asian crisis as primarily the product of domestic problems is more likely to be challenged. Donald E. Weatherbee's careful recounting of the widespread environmental degradation in the region is a grim reminder that economic success, as much as poverty, creates potential security risks. Clark D. Neher provides an inventory of human rights abuses among key offenders in the region and examines the way in which the Asian crisis affected the drive towards democracy in Southeast Asia. His observation that America's push for greater democracy and respect for human rights — which tended to be overridden during the 1990s by economic interests in the case of China, and security interests in the case of Soeharto's Indonesia — has only been made more relevant by recent events. And John McFarlane's description of the activities of transnational criminal organizations and their impact on regional security makes a valuable contribution to the volume.

In their conclusion to the book, Richard H. Solomon and William M. Derennan underscore the American view that the continuing rivalry between China and Japan, and the triangular relationship among the United States, China, and Japan will continue to dominate the Asia-Pacific security agenda. They see China–Taiwan relations as the central issue. There is obviously much to be said for this analysis although, surprisingly, there is no mention of the increased willingness of the three Northeast Asian states — China, Japan and South Korea — to engage each other in discussions over more intensive economic co-operation. Nor is there any assessment of the importance of the emerging ASEAN Plus 3 (the ten ASEAN members and China, Japan and South Korea) co-operative arrangement which could provide a framework for discussions on a number of security issues, such as the South China Sea “Code of Conduct” or the tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In whatever way continued dialogue is achieved, the authors are quite correct in noting that no government in the region would like to see a return to the conflict-ridden times of only a few decades ago.

While the book makes a significant contribution to the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific region, its impact will be lessened somewhat by the fact that global security was changed dramatically by the events of 11 September 2001. The definition of security has, in

Emmerson's terms, once again been narrowed. The concern is very much national security in a globalized world, in which direct attacks are now, as they were during the Cold War, seen as the primary and most imminent challenge. Certainly, issues such as the promotion of democratization, respect for human rights, and problems with environmental degradation appear, at least for the moment, to have been put on the back-burner. Moreover, given the new, fairly draconian, anti-terrorist legislation adopted in such countries as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the West no longer has the moral authority to criticize perceived abuses of human rights and the lack of progress in democratization in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, West Asia is now very much on the U.S. radar screen and has to be factored into any discussion of the many faces of Asian security.

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***Twenty-First Century World Order and the Asia-Pacific: Value Change, Exigencies, and Power Realignment.* Edited by James C. Hsiung.** New York: Palgrave, 2001. 390pp.

This book aims to provide an alternative way of explaining inter-state behaviour and the resultant global order at the dawn of the new century. While acknowledging the basic premise of the Westphalian logic, the editor of the volume, James C. Hsiung, declares that countries like China have the potential to “contribute to the reshaping of the world’s systemic values, such as in the promotion of greater social justice internationally” (p. 8). Does this mean that between order and justice China takes the side of justice? What happens then to order? As a major power poised to become even more major, it cannot obviously leave that to chance. This is where one begins to wonder whether China, or for that matter Asian powers in general, could be all that different from their Western counterparts. One would have to say not exactly, and thus differ with the editor’s claims.

In the immediate aftermath of decolonization, some Asian leaders like Nehru naively imagined that the new states of Asia would not fall prey to power politics of the sort that was practised by European states. Their relations, he concluded, would be based on mutual respect and