

Emmerson's terms, once again been narrowed. The concern is very much national security in a globalized world, in which direct attacks are now, as they were during the Cold War, seen as the primary and most imminent challenge. Certainly, issues such as the promotion of democratization, respect for human rights, and problems with environmental degradation appear, at least for the moment, to have been put on the back-burner. Moreover, given the new, fairly draconian, anti-terrorist legislation adopted in such countries as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the West no longer has the moral authority to criticize perceived abuses of human rights and the lack of progress in democratization in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, West Asia is now very much on the U.S. radar screen and has to be factored into any discussion of the many faces of Asian security.

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***Twenty-First Century World Order and the Asia-Pacific: Value Change, Exigencies, and Power Realignment.* Edited by James C. Hsiung.** New York: Palgrave, 2001. 390pp.

This book aims to provide an alternative way of explaining inter-state behaviour and the resultant global order at the dawn of the new century. While acknowledging the basic premise of the Westphalian logic, the editor of the volume, James C. Hsiung, declares that countries like China have the potential to “contribute to the reshaping of the world’s systemic values, such as in the promotion of greater social justice internationally” (p. 8). Does this mean that between order and justice China takes the side of justice? What happens then to order? As a major power poised to become even more major, it cannot obviously leave that to chance. This is where one begins to wonder whether China, or for that matter Asian powers in general, could be all that different from their Western counterparts. One would have to say not exactly, and thus differ with the editor’s claims.

In the immediate aftermath of decolonization, some Asian leaders like Nehru naively imagined that the new states of Asia would not fall prey to power politics of the sort that was practised by European states. Their relations, he concluded, would be based on mutual respect and

peaceful co-operation. How soon he was proved wrong when India and China clashed on the Himalayan mountains in 1962 is too well known to bear repetition. That the newly independent states were as prone to the sins of their imperial masters became clear quite soon. Regional giants in most cases could not help but behave like giants, thus causing much agony to their smaller neighbours. Given this, to assume that China as an emerging superpower would do otherwise strains credulity. Furthermore, the editor invokes China's past as proof of its commitment to a different mode of external behaviour "based on the avoidance of brute power" and embracing the "power of suasion and exemplification" (p. 43). However, China has never made a secret of its pedagogical disposition, which was in full display when it taught a lesson to India in 1962 and to Vietnam in 1979. It certainly did not use the blackboard to impart those lessons. There is nothing unusual about such behaviour, however. What needs to be borne in mind is that the "Eastern Westphalia" is no different from the Western one, and what we are witnessing is a nascent greening of it. That is all.

Similarly, the claim that China never tried to export communism to other countries unlike the Soviet Union (p. 43) is also questionable. Those Southeast Asian states which were subject to communist insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s might find it difficult to endorse this view.

Having said all this, this book does have its merits. An attempt has been made to draw on Asian perspectives regarding globalization and regionalization and the consequent tension between the two in the context of changing power configurations in the Asia-Pacific region. The other sections of the book consider inter- and intra-regional ties as seen between Europe and Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Western hemisphere, and ASEAN regionalism.

Brian Bridges' depiction of ties between Europe and Asia ends on a note infused more with hope than conviction about the necessity for both regions to forge closer links and reach out to one another more seriously than they have done thus far. It is hard to quarrel with the author's observation that the relationship has been "a distant, irregular and lopsided one" (p.159). This is odd, considering the longstanding formal dialogue partnership that the European Union has enjoyed with ASEAN reaching back to the 1970s. Therefore, if nothing spectacular has happened in this relationship, it is precisely because there is very little that can draw the two sides closer. Obviously, their respective ties with the United States are far more salient to them than their own mutual relationship.

Greg Felker focuses on ASEAN's predicaments but feels confident that the Association will continue to remain a factor of consequence in

Asia's international relations. This is decidedly a more optimistic view since the member-states themselves entertain a less than rosy picture. To use the past as a guide to project the future is problematic primarily because ASEAN performed wonderfully in the diplomatic realm at a time of exceptional circumstances. The challenges ASEAN has been facing recently has left it somewhat breathless. Since the multiple regional crises of the second half of the 1990s, ASEAN's record has been less than spectacular, which has hurt its image and credibility. Over-reliance on "soft power in the form of the ASEAN Way's familial consultations and consensus-based diplomacy" (p. 243) to ensure its effectiveness has clearly proved inadequate. However, this does not mean that the regional association has no utility or that it will cease to exist. Going by the observation that the nearest thing to immortality on earth is a government agency, one can confidently say that the same holds true for inter-governmental organizations.

Comprehensive security has received competent treatment in this book. Its conceptualization in the first chapter by the editor in terms of economic, environmental, and human security (pp. 26-34) is unambiguous. The chapters that discuss comprehensive security in the context of specific countries, such as the United States, Japan and China, provide valuable insights.

Davis B. Bobrow's analysis of America's views on Asia-Pacific security is fascinating. The domestic-level determinants of American foreign policy behaviour are fused with elite-level factors to give a comprehensive picture of the policy universe. Factors such as elite ideas, national capabilities comprising the economic and military dimensions, self-images, and perceptions about the others (p. 257) are regarded as the key variables shaping U.S. foreign policy behaviour. Relying on Gallup and other polls, the author is able to present a vivid picture of American self-images and images of others.

The scope of American foreign policy in Asia, according to this analysis, is likely to expand in terms of drawing in more countries within its purview. American interest will, however, predominantly revolve around economic and military issues, and only minimal attention will be bestowed on ecological and other human security issues. This is not an encouraging prospect but it generally reflects empirical reality. The Bush Administration's unilateral decision to step out of the Kyoto protocol is corroboration enough.

In his chapter on Japanese views on comprehensive security, Suetō Sudo traces the origins of the concept and the continuous emphasis it has received from Japanese policy-makers. According to the author, the ASEAN Regional Forum, a joint ASEAN-Japan initiative, was a product of this broadened concept of security. The chapter ends on a

prescriptive note by suggesting a number of steps that might infuse more vigour into this project, thereby acknowledging that so far its impact has been minimal.

China's anxiety and its quest for security, as discussed by Richard Weixing Hu, is equally interesting. It alerts us to the prevailing unease among Chinese élites who recognize that comprehensive national power is no guarantee for comprehensive security. Beijing feels that it lacks the capacity to influence major powers and perceives that it has "very limited leverage over Washington" (p. 320). One of the main reasons for this perceived lack of influence and insecurity is the imbalance between "hard" and "soft" power, according to the author. The inevitable conclusion is: "China may have acquired more hard power to defend its national interest but it still lacks adequate soft power to manage favourable security relations..." (p.322), and unless it is blessed with both types of power its quest for security may remain elusive.

On the whole, this book ranges over many pertinent issues that are interesting in themselves but does not convince the reader that a significantly new global order, a product of the Asian genius, is about to emerge. Therefore, the brave conclusion that the "twenty-first century will be an era of peace and equity – and that the increasing global consciousness of this duality is, to put it mildly, related to the rising Asian participation in the life of the global village" (p. 371), seems somewhat overdrawn.

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***Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978–1998.* By James Mulvenon. Armonk, NY: M.S. Sharpe, 2001. 283pp.**

Few people know the Chinese military as well as James Mulvenon, and one immediately senses that one is in the hands of an experienced guide when one opens this book. And what a story it is! Mulvenon is interested in the evolution of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from a guerrilla force in the Maoist revolution to the wheeling, dealing business-savvy PLA of the 1980s, to the more professional military that appears to be taking shape in recent years. In particular, Mulvenon is interested in how the PLA is financed and what decisions about