

The general prognosis for the region seems to be mixed. There is a rather pessimistic view of Indonesia, which is not surprising owing to the recent violence there. Dahm raises the issue of Acehnese separatism and the separatist rejection of the concept of Indonesia; Houben makes a plea for "more local participation of all groups in government and less top-down management by uninspired bureaucrats" (p. 47) if there is to be any hope of addressing the violence and conflicts in Ambon; Hedhues suggests that, on the evidence which she uses, the "hoped-for dialogue" between *pribumi* (indigenous) and non-*pribumi* has yet to begin (p. 60). Lulei, Engelbert, and Laohoua Cheutching raise serious issues of inequality, development, and local rights which still require solution for the ethnic minorities in Indochina. However, Esche appears to entertain some hope that the maintenance of a national framework in Myanmar will assist the process of negotiating ethnic aspirations and democratization there.

Overall, this *estschrift* on Professor Kubitscheck's behalf demonstrates that through the work of his colleagues and students, a lively research agenda in Germany has been sustained on the crucial issues of national self-determination, ethnic identity, social and economic equality, and human rights in Southeast Asia. Professor Kubitscheck can feel justly satisfied with his legacy and with the ample evidence of a continuing active academic and practical interest in Southeast Asia among scholars in the German-speaking world.

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***Asian Nationalism*. Edited by Michael Leifer.** London: Routledge, 2000. 203pp.

The ten chapters in this book are revised versions of papers presented in the first seminar series held at the newly established Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, during the 1997/1998 academic year. This is the first major publication from the Centre, and all the authors are sourced from within the school. Although the authors come from a variety of social science backgrounds, exactly half of the ten authors are international relations specialists. The disparate disciplinary backgrounds are manifested in the book by the different approaches to the study of nationalism. Not

surprisingly, the main strength of this book is the study of nationalism in the context of international relations.

The opening chapter by the well-known sociologist of nationalism, Anthony D. Smith, gives a synopsis of the various theories of nationalism and nation formation. The concluding chapter by John Mayall examines the forms and experiences of Asian nationalism, with particular emphasis on the international dimension. Three of the chapters on individual countries include one on nationalism in China, one on Taiwan, and a short chapter on Japan. South Asia is represented by a chapter each on India and Pakistan. Similarly, nationalism in Southeast Asia is covered by the chapters on Indonesia and the Philippines.

Smith's presentation of the various theories of nationalism provides an excellent reference frame for the rest of the book. Importantly, he notes the need to first delineate three key concepts in the study of nationalism: state, nation, and nationalism. "State" is defined as "sets of autonomous, public institutions with a legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory, and sovereignty to those outside its border" (p. 1). "Nation" is conceived in terms of a "population possessing an historic territory, shared myths and historical memories .... which are legitimized by the principles of nationalism", and nationalism as "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (p. 1). Smith asserts that much of the current conflict and turbulence in the world has to do with the fact that the state, nation, and nationalism do not coincide. After a terse exposition of the "primordial", "perennial", "socio-economic developmentalist", and "cultural constructionist" theories of nationalism, Smith elaborates on his own "historical ethno-symbolist" approach. In a nutshell, Smith's model stresses the "importance of historical clusters, or heritages, of myths, memories, values and symbols for cultural community formation and the vital role of ethnic ties and ethnic communities (ethnies) in providing a basis for the emergence and persistence of nations" (p. 12).

Michael Yahuda's otherwise promising contribution on the changing faces of Chinese nationalism is unfortunately compromised by his conflation of the concepts of "statehood" and "nationhood". This is problematic because he clearly states that he wants to focus on Chinese statehood in terms of Gellner's "national principle" of "seeking to make 'the cultural and the political unit congruent'" (p. 21). To make "the cultural and the political unit congruent" would suggest delimiting both statehood and nationhood. No doubt, his analysis was made more

difficult by the fact that Chinese debates over, and construction of, statehood and nationhood have also conflated the two concepts. This, in fact, raises an interesting conundrum; while, analytically, one can differentiate state from nation, the reality is that many a nationalist tends to conflate the two concepts.

With regard to the Chinese national identity, Michael Yahuda rightly points to its foundation in, and domination by, Han Chinese history and culture. Nevertheless, China, as in many parts of the developing world, is still mired in the problem of the state, nation, and nationalism not coinciding (as Smith points out). The situation is further complicated by the rapid socio-economic and political developments that China is undergoing. Not surprisingly, Chinese nationalism remains in a state of flux. Solomon Karmel's analysis of Tibet and Xinjiang provides an example of the problem of lack of coincidence of state, nation, and nationalism in the Chinese milieu. Clearly, the sinicized Chinese nation and nationalism have led to the marginalization, and periods of repression, of Tibetan and Uighur cultures and societies. Ought Tibet and Uighur be allowed to form their own nation-states? The reality now is that the Tibetans and Uighurs have become minorities in their own homeland because of the systematic policy of Han Chinese migration. Obviously, the international dimension plays an important role in keeping alive the Tibetan question. Karmel is probably right in that independence is most improbable now and the more reasonable solution is a "more liberal, autonomous and enlightened" policy (p. 28).

Christopher Hughes' chapter on Taiwan also demonstrates the role of the international dimension in keeping alive the dispute between China and Taiwan. In a way, the Taiwanese problem is not over the question of nationhood but, rather, over the nature and control of the state. After all, the Kuomintang's nationalist ideology traditionally perceived Taiwan as a province of China. In analogous terms, the Taiwan and China situation is comparable to the division of North and South Korea — and historically to the division of North and South Vietnam, and East and West Germany.

Meghnad Desai's chapter examines the complex relationships between communalism and secularism in the formation of Indian nationhood. Communalism is the key characteristic of Indian social stratification, and its impact on Indian nationalism and nationhood has been immense. The central communal divide in India is that between the Muslims and Hindus. It was this communal divide that led to the 1947 carving out of Pakistan for the Muslims from British India. In the nationalist struggle against the British, Nehru's secular brand of nationalism assumed dominance and thus led to the establishment of a

civic nation in India. Though the religious-minded Indian nationalists were defeated by Nehru, by the 1990s the enduring forces of communalism resulted in the victory of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), hence marking the triumphal return of a Hindu-inspired nationalism. Interestingly, Athar Hussain's chapter on Pakistan shows how the Islamic brand of nationalism that founded the Pakistani nationhood was also marred by communalism but this time along ethnic lines. The first sign of the communal force at work in Pakistan was the breaking away of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh; the driving force was the desire of the Bengalis for their own nation. Presently, Pakistan's nation-building continues to be affected by conflict between the five major communal groups — Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Pashtuns and Muhajirs — over an array of issues.

The late Michael Leifer's chapter on Indonesia looks at how the state uses nationalism. He argues that nationalism in Indonesia has been used in three different ways since independence. During the Soekarno period, a "romantic" nationalism was constructed. Although the romantic nationalism was defined with reference to external adversaries, its primary function was to "counter the disintegrative effect of centrifugal social forces based on ethnic sub-nationalism and military warlordism" (p. 161). In the New Order era, Soeharto not only rejected Soekarno's "romantic nationalism" but also downplayed the public expression of nationalism in the interests of regional co-operative security, and to accommodate economic development. Thus, during Soeharto's rule, nationalism was linked to economic development and modernization. More recently, since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, Professor Leifer argues that a supranationalism is in the process of unfolding itself. The chapter on the Philippines, by James Putzel, looks at how the Filipino élites manipulated the connections between nation, nationalism, and both political ideologies and practices.

John Mayall's concluding chapter attempts to compare and contrast the experience of Asian nationalism with other parts of the world, especially Europe. The chapter weaves the comparison along three themes: the meaning of national self-determination; attitudes towards secessionism and irredentism; and the relationship of nationalism to democracy and the protection of minorities.

Overall, this book provides a readable introduction to the complexities of nationalism in Asia. Since the majority of the contributions are from an international relations perspective, the book's strength lies in the study of the uses of nationalism by states in the context of international relations. However, the domestic factors which have shaped Asian nationalism, factors which Smith points out in his

opening chapter, are not given sufficient in-depth treatment, with the exception of the chapters on India and Pakistan.

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Editor's Note: It is with great sadness that Professor Michael Leifer passed away on 23 March 2001 (see "In Memoriam," p. iv).

***Exiting Indochina: U.S. Leadership of the Cambodia Settlement and Normalization with Vietnam.* By Richard H. Solomon.** Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000. 116pp.

If Cambodia's precarious "peace" were represented in a *mandala*, the reader might see concentric circles depicting the fratricidal factions of the Khmer state, *all* the major world powers, and the regional players — ASEAN, Australia and Japan. In this picture, the artifacts of Khmer culture and history must jostle with unexploded ordnance, land mines, and all the unfortunate legacies of a bitter war that continue to take a toll on human life and limb.

The enormity of Cambodia's misfortune invites such mythic imagery. Although Cambodia was often seen largely as a sideshow in the larger Indochina conflict, in important ways it became the ultimate barometer for the tragedy of war in the region. Nearly a decade has passed since the "peace" was made, yet a final reckoning for the "killing fields" still has not and may never come. At the time of writing, the United Nations is still negotiating with Cambodian authorities over setting up what essentially would be a war crimes tribunal. Prime Minister Hun Sen — erstwhile Khmer Rouge partisan and later renegade — has long sought to restrict the powers of any such future court by insisting on local judges. Despite the tendency to historical amnesia, however, Cambodia today is arguably a functional state. It has joined ASEAN, together with Vietnam and Laos, and the Khmer Rouge has virtually disintegrated. Thus, setting aside any distaste for Hun Sen's *coup d'état* in 1997, it could be argued that Cambodia has been substantially rehabilitated.

Historically, the years 1989–91 figured prominently in that rehabilitation. At that time, the Cold War's hastening thaw lent momentum to international mediation efforts then under way, resulting in a comprehensive settlement that eventually restored Cambodian nationhood. That story may be gleaned through various sources, but