Epilogue

As this work has brought to the fore, Indonesia's War of Independence (1945–49) was long in the making and was not only "made in Japan". As rationalised by Indonesian Marxists especially, its roots or "lineages" went back to the *zaman penjajahan Belanda*, or era of high Dutch colonialism, not excepting distant social memories of the earlier VOC invasion of the archipelago and the struggles of disparate peoples to preserve their autonomy. Nevertheless, it was the more recent past that weighed most heavily, such as the thwarted dreams of the nationalists, communists and organized Muslims, culminating in the repressions that both preceded and followed the failed 1926–27 rebellions, including the *zaman pergolakan jang maha hebat*, or the age of great upheaval of the Japanese occupation, to evoke Dr Amir's slogan. As demonstrated in an opening chapter, Dutch surveillance and incarceration such as took place in Boven Digul not only affected the cream of the native elite but also imposed a high degree of trauma on the collective body politic. We should not be surprised then that at the moment of Merdeka in August 1945—however conflicted it was—there would be no turning back from this shared experience under colonialism as an extraordinary closure of ranks from among the political class, and even the masses, would spearhead Indonesia's postwar struggle for independence.

To be sure, given its ethnic and religious diversity and composition, Indonesia was an "unlikely" nation, and this is true and obvious to anyone who has travelled through "Nusantara" or, indeed, has taken a bus trip across Jakarta. Still, the notion of nation came to be embraced

by larger and larger cohorts of peoples of different ethnicities, sharing different interfaith traditions, although Islamic identity remained dominant. This we have seen in the creation of political groups and associations that mushroomed in the opening decades of the twentieth century, some with names like Yong Java, Yong Sumatra or Sarekat Ambon. As with the foundation of Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah and other Islamic parties and associations, Islam was also a unifying force, especially on Java and Sumatra. But nowhere did the ideology of anti-colonialism gain such traction than in the salons of secular nationalists that emerged after the Bolshevik Revolution. Arising from two vectors but with practically equal force, these were the pro-Communists, who found their inspiration from Dutch Marxists in such settings as Surabaya and Semarang, and the "bourgeois nationalists", or those Indonesians that came up through the Dutch school system. I have also observed the complex ways in which the communists and the national communists grafted Islam into their political thinking and strategies. This is not surprising because, as Muslims, they were part of a wider *ummat*, and for this generation the advent of Sarekat Islam was magnetic. For some, their journeys out of their homeland—reaching such places as Amsterdam, Berlin or Moscow—were emancipatory, especially where they advanced their education and/or expanded their horizons. But for others who stayed at home, such as Soekarno, they could not but be influenced by the returnee nationalists and the winds of change so epitomized by this *bergerak* age, which the printing press appeared to symbolize. Yet, in the run-up to the 1926–27 rebellions, and even continuing after the repression that followed, and carried by the zeitgeist of the age, it is surprising to discover the extraordinary agency of everyday Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Sumatrans and others in creating and joining in debating clubs, student circles, religious fraternities, trade unions, or political parties in ways that appeared to differ from the past.

As I have acknowledged in this work, the genius of the *pergerakan* movement was for it to take on board the various integuments or markers of the modern nation-state—namely, territory, language, common identity, and, for many, organized religion. For the colonial state, perversely, its oppression of nationalist sentiment—leading to the mass arrests of 1926–27 and the internment of nationalists and communists alike—helped to create a fraternity of mutual interest among the rising counter-elite that returned from schooling in Holland (and Moscow). Communists and non-communists were practically united throughout the former NEI "from Sabang to Merauke". They were

also united over language, favouring Malay over Javanese, Sundanese or Sumatran dialects. While fiercely contested, the concept of a secular state would override claims for a Darul Islam. The notion of identity around "Indonesia Raya" also emerged in the minds of some, finding roots of the nation in the classical empires of old. It might also be concluded that the Japanese gave this identity a major fillip by endorsing the flag and anthem. More controversially, as was the case in Burma, the Japanese bequeathed an embryonic armed force, which was ragged at first but which became increasingly potent as it institutionalized, becoming a fearsome instrument of state power.

It is true, as Ruth McVey has stated, that for many in Indonesia, communism represented an *ilmu* (lit. knowledge), through the possession of which, people could overcome their "colonial condition". I have sought in this volume to explain how Marxist-Leninist categories were absorbed and translated during the early decades of the last century, before the years of repression, and again in the throes of the National Revolution (1945–49). As with McVey, I have also tracked the way that Indonesians studying in the Netherlands and Moscow grasped Marxist categories and adopted Leninist dictums of "imperialist Europe's claim to be the true possessor of the science of modernity". But elite-level discourse was one thing—getting the message of liberation across to the *rakyat* or common folk in a fundamentally oral society was another. McVey likens this transmission to the traditional *guru-murid* (teacher-student) system for transmitting spiritual knowledge (and this would have been the model for the Sarekat Merah in Islamic *pondok* and *pesantren*). It would also apply to the young Semaun, who had just stepped out of his *pondok* education before his communist "baptism"; he announced himself to an interested public as a moral person by going on to write a didactic prison novel. The *guru-murid* approach also attracted Tan Malaka, the privileged student of a Dutch education who established his own network of schools. For McVey, Indonesian Marxism resonated with "more traditional groups seeking spiritual renewal" who bided their time "gathering strength" against the day when freedom would dawn.[1]

While that evocation would fit the Tan Malakaist national-communism approach, for the PKI-Moscow, Lenin and class constitution mattered. But Java was not China, nor was it Vietnam, where a welter of traditionalism around Confucian mores and religious sects entered into a fierce conflict of culture with reformists and radical nationalists that carried on through the war years under Japanese manipulation only to be captured by the communist-dominated Viet

Minh, itself a radical symbiosis between nationalism and Leninism. Other differences of course held through the revolutionary period, with the Viet Minh establishing its legitimacy in the north through the strength of arms and planning, whereas Indonesian nationalists at the moment of the Japanese capitulation were simply not a united fighting force when it mattered.[2]

Yet, consistent with the overarching thesis of this book, the salience of the schism in the Indonesian communist movement between pro-Moscow loyalists and national communists—reaching back to the 1920s and surviving even the Japanese occupation—cannot be ignored if a complete picture of the National Revolution is to emerge. As described across many chapters, the lineages of Indonesian Marxism in the National Revolution had their roots in the pioneer actions of Dutch communists on Java who had been influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution. As this study has confirmed, at the heart of the schism lay contrasting visions of revolutionary tactics, especially on the part of the communists and national communists, including the question of alliance between leftists and "bourgeois" nationalist forces, and even the concept and definition of state and national ideology. Something fatally ignored by the PKI-Moscow but better understood by the Tan Malakaists was the question of engagement with Islamic forces in an Islamic majority society. Variously guided by doctrinaire Marxism (the PKI-Moscow) and/or laced with Marxist slogans (the Tan Malakaists) or conforming to radical Islamic goals, as this book has demonstrated, this was a toxic mix of ideologies brought to bear in the struggle to defend the Republic and to win international legitimacy. As we have seen, even as a "national" revolution, it was met with counter-revolutionary violence on the part of Dutch forces that had socially damaging outcomes which set back development by decades.

Returning to the point made in the Introduction that, compared to other wars of national liberation, a more autonomous left wing emerged in Indonesia where individuals could move between categories of nationalist, socialist and communist. This could suggest that ideology played a less important role in the Indonesian National Revolution relative to Russia, China or Vietnam, and this appears to have been the case. It could also suggest that a tradition of religious and political eclecticism was easily captured by competing political parties under charismatic leaders. Certainly, as this book has demonstrated, Tan Malaka was masterly in winning over a fiercely anti-colonial demographic outside of strict party allegiance. Neither had Soekarno entirely eschewed Marxism either, and recall that this book opened

with his speech of 24 April 1947 referencing Lenin. Nevertheless, it was also true that sectarianism raised its head among both Leftists and Islamists during the National Revolution, further raising the stakes for a diplomatic solution as well as presenting an enduring challenge to the Republic in subsequent years.

Left-Wing Legacies

Another concern of this book has been to profile the life histories of the core leaders of the anti-colonial nationalist current from its early days, especially as they personified the movements that they helped to ignite, sometimes with great hubris. Certain of those among them met inglorious fates, such as Amir Sjarifoeddin, Musso, Sardjono, and the promoter of Darul Islam, Kartosuwiryo. But others survived the Japanese occupation and the National Revolution (or almost, in the case of Tan Malaka). On the left side of politics, the survivors included Semaun, Iwa Koesoema Soemantri, Darsono, Alimin, Adam Malik (albeit being co-opted), Djamaluddin Tamin, Roestam Effendi and Tan Ling Djie. Their legacies are no less considerable, even if history treats them differentially.

Semaun's life following his early break with comrades in Moscow remains obscure, but, according to a Dutch report, he spent the war years in Great Britain before being handed over to the Soviet authorities at the end of the war. He then took up a position in Russia teaching foreign cadres in a university in Moscow.[3] He may also have had an interlude in Tajikistan. Upon his return to Indonesia in 1953—evidently arranged by his old comrade, Soemantri—he took up residence in Jakarta, where, from 1959, he served on two government advisory boards. Declining an invitation to address a PKI congress, he confirmed his break with the party by identifying with the Partai Murba camp before he passed away in 1971. Soemantri was also affiliated with Partai Murba. Although he had been caught up in the 3 July affair, he went on to hold senior ministerial positions into the mid-1950s, and he went on to teach economics at Universitas Padjadjaran in Bandung. He died in Jakarta in 1971.[4]

Having been expelled from the Comintern (as he wished), Darsono drifted back to the Netherlands sometime in 1935 and only returned to Indonesia in 1950. Until 1960 he was an advisor at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, living out the rest of his life in Jakarta (and occasionally offering interviews). After he passed away in 1976, he was honoured with burial in a hero's cemetery (an honour bestowed by Soeharto).[5] Still, I cannot agree with McVey that Darsono pushed

the PKI towards a "doctrinaire, internationalist" position isolated from other Indonesians because this is precisely the Stalinist line then pushed by Musso and Alimin.[6] After all, Darsono broke from the party over his ideological disagreements and other disappointments.

Alimin represented a transitional figure between the old PKI-Moscow and the revived post-Madiun PKI. As revealed by an OSS report of 1952, he addressed a celebration of the thirty-second anniversary of the founding of the PKI on 23 May of that year. The venue for the occasion was the Jakarta City Hall. Alimin offered the keynote speech, calling on his audience to reject US aid and any kind of foreign influence. He closed with a rousing "Long live Stalin, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and Soekarno." It was up to the young D.N. Aidit to explain why Soekarno was added to this list. Flags or portraits of Musso, Stalin, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung were prominent at the event. Parallel celebrations were conducted in Semarang, Solo and Bandung. At Solo, police removed portraits of Musso. At Bandung, Soedisman regaled the audience with a potted history of the PKI and also revealed that membership of the party had grown rapidly to reach a hundred thousand.[7] With the new guard PKI leadership centred on Aidit, who took over as chairman of the central committee, Alimin was increasingly sidelined. Upon Alimin's death, on 26 June 1964, Soekarno bestowed on him the title of national hero, based on Presidential Decree No. 163. As mentioned above, he was buried in the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery.

While Tan Malaka's "national communism" outside of the Stalinist tradition came to be acknowledged inside Indonesia in the revolutionary period—indeed, I have shown him to be in the forefront of the revolutionary struggle—his leftist tradition was hostile to the capitalist underpinnings of the beneficiaries of the Republican governments, relegating him to the margins of history under the New Order government of General Soeharto. Curiously, perhaps, it was the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno, who went out of his way to defend Tan Malaka and Partai Murba. By 1956, as Soekarno began to abandon liberal democratic institutions in favour of an authoritarian and personalistic "Guided Democracy", he increasingly looked back to the 1945 generation of youth leaders as nationalist icons, including Chaerul Saleh. Murba reciprocated. For example, during an address to the Fifth Congress of Partai Murba in Bandung in December 1960, Soekarno described Partai Murba as "a revolutionary nationalist party of consequence" and a party that concerned itself with social questions. On this occasion, Soekarno revealed that he had been acquainted with Tan Malaka, that he had

read all his writings ("Saya batja semua ia punya tulisan2"), and that he had discussed them with him for hours.[8]

While not explicitly stated, these writings undoubtedly included Malaka's exposition on Republican statecraft. I have titled this book *Towards the Indonesian Republic* for good reason. The proclamation of the Indonesian Republic on 17 August 1945 is deeply ingrained in modern Indonesian historiography, but there was no inevitability that an independent Indonesia would emerge with a republican form of government given the welter of competing groups, ideals and existing political systems such as I have examined. As I have argued in this book, before it could be taken on board, the concept of an Indonesian republic as an ideational construct had to be grasped, intellectualized and fitted into a local idiom. It also had to be socialized among the elite contenders for power as much as the population. Its origins owe much to the political exegesis contained in the writings of Tan Malaka going back to his "textbook" *Naar de 'Republiek Indonesia'*, and especially his formulations on a republic emerging from the convention of a national consultative council. His small torrent of literary productions carried on practically until his death. It is perhaps not coincidental that in 1963 Tan Malaka was awarded the title of "National Hero" by Soekarno. For Soekarno, Tan Malaka was both a nationalist and a socialist.[9]

Still, Malaka's legacy hardly carried much weight in the Indonesian political arena during the short period of constitutional democracy. In contesting the 1955 elections—in which the PNI, the PKI and the Islamic parties Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama came out on top—Partai Murba gained just 0.5 per cent of the popular vote and Partai Acoma achieved only 0.2 per cent.[10] Although a cadre party attracting intellectuals and other loyalists, Partai Murba (but not Acoma) nevertheless survived into the early New Order period and even beyond, and there were continued attempts to revive the party; Adam Malik, one of its early champions, served as foreign minister (1966–77) and vice president (1978–83) under the Indonesian New Order of General Soeharto.

After Adam Malik was elected in 1973 to the prestigious position of president of the United Nations General Assembly, he was visited in Jakarta in June 1974 by the then twenty-six-year-old José Ramos-Horta, representing the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, and a future president of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2007–12; 2022–current). At a time when the TNI's subversion of the then half-island Portuguese colony had already commenced, he was seeking assurances that Indonesia would not invade so as to allow an orderly decolonization process. We can imagine how Malik would have recalled his days as a radical *pemuda* in succouring Indonesian

independence from the hands of the Japanese, and both Malik and Ramos-Horta were former journalists and "freedom fighters". To Ramos-Horta's delight, he received a typed letter that read, inter alia,

> The independence of every country is the right of every nation with no exception for the people of Timor.... The Government as well as the people of Indonesia have no intentions to increase or expand their territory, or to occupy other territories other than what is stipulated in their Constitution.[11]

A short time after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, which commenced in December 1975, Malik made a lightning visit to the former Portuguese colony, including the remote prison island of Ataúro, ostensibly to endorse the incorporation of East Timor as the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia.[12] Pitifully, as Ramos-Horta later rationalized, Malik was captive to the military.

There is no evidence that Djamaluddin Tamin participated in party politics or sought office. Later in his life he carried on as a custodian of the Pustaka Murba archives.[13] Unlike Bondan, who gained a wide Australian audience and, thanks to his wife's biography, a post-war reputation, Tamin bequeathed very few signed letters or articles, at least prior to his return to Indonesia. Even the few political tracts he penned back in Java in the 1950s and 1960s are guarded and lacking in autobiographical detail. He was thus unlike Tan Malaka, who courted publicity (at least while in prison). Passing away in Jakarta in 1977 at the age of seventy-six surrounded by a large family, Tamin was prudent, fitting his earlier role as a clandestine agent in his Singapore and Bangkok days.

Shortly after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, Roestam Effendi left Partai Murba and, moving to Jakarta, went into business. He subsequently devoted himself to literary work and religion. In the political field, he served as an advisor to the chairperson of Masyumi, with its mass Islamic base, which went on to become a major political force in the 1950s and 1960s. After Soeharto seized power and began his purge of the left in September–October 1965, Effendi destroyed manuscripts, notes and documentation for "security reasons".[14] Effendi passed away in 1979. Tamin, no doubt, also took evasive action (the date of his demise, however, appears absent from the history books).[15]

The Military Legacy

As time has passed, memories of the National Revolution have faded as the active generation has passed away. It is a fact that the cataclysmic events of 1966–67 leading to the eclipse of Soekarno, the PNI and the communist party and the emergence of the military-backed New

Order drew a line across society. The massacres of the late 1960s were so enormous in scale and the number of people arrested and/or interned on island prison camps (Buru) were so high as to draw uncomfortable parallels with colonial Dutch or fascist-militarist Japan in the methods and outcomes. Once again, shrouded in official walls of silence, it took some bravery even to write a memoir, not to mention the skill to portray the events in literature as Pramoedya did with his "Buru Quartet" of novels penned during his long period of internal exile in the Maluku Islands (1969-1979).

Like father (transported to Australia) like son, the former child Digulist Ramidjo stayed with the communist cause in the early 1950s to serve as an editorial assistant for *Bintang Merah*, the PKI broadsheet, alongside such party heavyweights as Aidit, Njoto and Lukman. Although punctuated by a four-year sojourn in Japan in the early 1960s as a student at Waseda University followed by a career in banking back in Jakarta, his time would come in 1970. Then, under the Soeharto New Order regime, he was wrenched from his abode in Jakarta by anti-communist vigilantes and thrown into exile in Buru. There, he describes how he was not only "crushed" but also tortured, including the application of debilitating electric shocks (his book offers hand-drawn illustrations of the machines and their handlers).[16] Returning to Jakarta after his release, and putting his Japanese-language skills to some use, he carried on earning a living by offering knife-sharpening services to sashimi-eating clients—namely, Japanese housewives of the capital city's expatriate business elite.[17]

Like Pramoedya, Ramidjo could make comparisons:

> Digul tidak seperti [Pulau Buru]. Tidak ada pagar kawat berduri. Tidak ada penjagaan ketat seperti tahanan orba Pulau Buru. Tidak ada penjara. Belanda tidak sekejam Soeharto dan masih punya rasa perikemanusiaan.
>
> Digul was not like Buru Island. There was no barbed wire. There was no strict guard like Buru Island's New Order prisoners. There was no prison. The Dutch were not as cruel as [President] Soeharto and still had a sense of humanity [a reference to metropolitan Holland's Liberal Policy as it applied in its colonies].[18]

As Sugiyama demonstrates, the end of the Soeharto New Order allowed new inquiries into the Madiun Affair to be undertaken by revisiting past memes, including her interview with one of the few surviving eyewitnesses, an individual named Soemarsono (b. 1921), and also bringing into play questions of memory (and spin) in oral

history.[19] There are many other events touching on Indonesia's war for independence that merit revisiting, such as the Battle for Surabaya, Dutch war crimes trials of the Japanese, war crimes by Dutch forces, summary executions of enemies on the part of the TNI and militia, and other proxy violence against ethnic minorities. But with its roll call of official heroes and official publications heavily weighted in school curricula and in the official calendar, and with resistance on the part of military guardians to even open their archives, historians often have little to go on (and these were the difficulties faced by the East Timor Truth Commission).[20]

Dutch Justice

As Borch explains in his pioneering book on Dutch war crimes investigations and the trials of Japanese between September 1946 and December 1949, Dutch colonial authorities convicted 1,038 Japanese (including Koreans and Formosans) and a handful of Europeans, Eurasians, Chinese and Indonesians for war-related offences. They also prosecuted a small number of Dutch citizens for collaborating with the Japanese occupiers. Of the 1,038 accused, 55 were acquitted, 236 were subjected to the death penalty, 28 were sentenced to life imprisonment, and 705 received shorter sentences. All told, 450 "temporary courts-martial" were convened in twelve locations in the archipelago: Ambon, Balikpapan, Bandjarmasin, Jakarta, Jayapura (then known as Hollandia), Makassar, Medan, Morotai, Pontianak, Tanjung Pinang and Kupang. The book also explains how, on 27 December 1949 (just days before the Netherlands abandoned its sovereignty claims), some six hundred Japanese war criminals still serving prison sentences in Indonesia were transferred to Japan, where they were to serve out their terms of imprisonment, although they gained their complete freedom in 1958 under an American occupation policy of clemency.[21]

The war crimes committed by the Japanese included mass murder, murder, torture, mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees, and forced prostitution, and the trials involved some novel prosecutions in military legal history. These included the prosecution of several Japanese soldiers who joined the Indonesians in opposing the Allies for the war crime of violating the terms of the armistice. Dutch investigators also condemned the collective operation of the Kempeitai and Tokkeitai (naval police), meaning that virtually every man who served in either group had effectively participated in a war crime by his membership. Although forced prostitution as a war crime was long acknowledged in international legal circles, the NEI temporary courts

martial represented the first instance of the offence being prosecuted by a military tribunal. This referred to the conscription of European women and girls into brothels maintained for Japanese soldiers, although the investigations neglected local victims. The Dutch war crime investigators also examined the cases of 100,000 Europeans civilians and some Eurasians who had been interned by the Japanese based on ethnicity and race, along with 42,000 prisoners of war. One out of every six of these died in captivity.[22]

Dutch Apologies

As Michael Vatikiotis has pointed out, on a visit to Indonesia in 2020, the Dutch king, Willem-Alexander, offered a "direct and unreserved apology" for the "violent excesses" committed by his country's four-year struggle to reimpose colonial rule in Indonesia after World War II, noting "with full awareness that the pain and sorrow of the affected families will be felt for generations". Vatikiotis contends that such comments should in turn stimulate accountability for historical atrocities perpetrated in other former colonies of European and Asian powers. Moreover, they should also prompt soul searching in Indonesia and fellow postcolonial nations about human rights abuses since independence.[23]

According to legal specialist Suzannah Linton, "decades of impunity" followed until a landmark judgment in 2011—namely, in *Wisah binti Silan and others v The State of the Netherlands* (Judgement) (District Court of The Hague 2011)—brought some degree of accountability.[24] This was a legal action taken by relatives of Indonesian victims of an attack on 9 December 1947 by Dutch troops on the village of Rawagadeh in West Java that led to the execution of hundreds of male villagers. A UN Security Council fact-finding committee condemned the actions of the Dutch Army in a 1948 report, finding them to be "deliberate and ruthless", but the Dutch long claimed a statute of limitations for this crime. Ruling in favour of the claimants, the court took into consideration that this was not forgotten history and that still-living survivors had witnessed the executions.[25]

A quantity of press reporting has attended such investigations and announcements.[26] As Vatikiotis mentions, an apology for the 1945–49 violence was first made in 2013 by the Dutch ambassador to relatives of victims of a series of mass killings during counter-insurgency operations in South Sulawesi in 1946–47. Then, in 2016, the Dutch parliament launched a wider inquiry into the campaign to suppress Indonesian independence between 1945 and 1949. According to the interpretation

of Vatikiotis, while King Willem-Alexander's words were welcomed by Indonesian president Joko Widodo, the king's "contrite tone" also implicitly pointed to Indonesia's record of state violence towards its citizens. Vatikiotis is referring to the deaths of more than a million citizens in the 1965–67 period at the hands of the TNI as well as by such Muslim organizations as Nahdlatul Ulama, which mobilized militia groups to hunt down suspected communists. Efforts to promote accountability and establish a process of reconciliation have been blocked until today.

Japanese Abnegation

If we are to talk of Japanese abnegation of its three-and-a-half-year occupation of the Dutch colony, then it mostly fits a neo-nationalist view of Japan as a benign liberator of Southeast Asian nations from European colonialism. Standard Japanese high school texts barely provide the context of the Pacific War, much less any detail. Still, certain of the "Waseda school" scholars have made the excesses of the occupation known to the reading public, such as the mass recruitment of *romusha* and with the death toll in the hundreds of thousands.[27] From the late 1990s, the military recruitment of *ianfu* was brought into the discussion (although it did not survive in current textbook revisions). Simply put, the events surrounding the proclamation of independence in Indonesia, the Allied role in this, Japan's surrender, the war of independence, and Dutch war crimes trials remain remote to most Japanese today, with the exception of a few academic specialists in this field.[28] Still, Japanese business links with Indonesia quickly revived after the war in large part because of wartime reparation projects. Following repatriation to Japan in 1947, Admiral Maeda was decommissioned from the navy and returned to civilian life. He passed away on 13 December 1977, but not before receiving official honours from the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August that year. As with several of the old Indonesian hands from among the Japanese Imperial military establishment, Maeda revived his business links with Indonesia after the war.[29]

At a point when the long-vexed issue of war reparations appeared to be behind the two nations, in January 1962, Emperor Emeritus Akihito and Empress Emerita Michiko paid their first visit to Indonesia as crown prince and crown princess. With Soekarno then president, the visit came just six months before the Indonesian airborne invasion of West Papua. It was also two years prior to Soekarno launching his now famous "Tahun Vivere Pericoloso" (the year of living dangerously) Independence Day speech, inter alia trumpeting his anti-Western turn.

Returning in October 1991, reigning Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko were received by President Soeharto at a point when business links between the two nations were strong (but with no official discussions about the past).

More recently, between 17 and 23 June 2023, Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako were received by President Joko Widodo (a tour that saw the emperor paying respects to the Sultan of Yogyakarta and visiting the iconic Borobudur site). In this latter case, some Japanese media, such as the *Mainichi*, anticipated a meaningful statement on history that would echo the visit by Emperor Akihito at a time when "great interest was focused on how to deal with the history of the war".[30] Such optimism, however, discounts the way that the Indonesian hosts micromanage official Japanese visits, seeking validation of a national history narrative. On 20 June, as planned, the imperial couple were escorted to the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery. The Kalibata site not only memorializes revolutionary-era heroes—including prominent military and civilian officials—but also individuals associated with Indonesia's invasion of West Papua and East Timor. Visits to Kalibata are a standard for arriving Japanese dignitaries, including ambassadors, prime ministers, and royals all the way back to Emperor Akihito. They pay homage to the graves of a group of former Imperial Army men—deserters—who are honoured for siding with the Republic. The spirits of the dead *romusha*, Dutch, Eurasian and ethnic minority victims, victims of economic plunder, and even slain Japanese targeted for refusing to surrender their weapons in line with Allied protocol are not evoked here.[31] Needless to say, the "made-in-Japan" proclamation of independence dated in line with the Japanese Imperial calendar is not interrogated (as it certainly was by the victorious Allies). In the event, Emperor Naruhito was dissuaded by his Indonesian hosts from making a speech even though one had been prepared. Still, he made a sound bite audible on Japanese television news on the evening of 20 June in carefully chosen words for a domestic audience:

> There was a difficult time in the relationship between Japan and Indonesia. It's important to not forget about the people who lost their lives, to deepen our understanding of the history, and to nurture a peace-loving spirit.[32]

Nevertheless, none of this is to say that we should ignore the importance of the Indonesian National Revolution in the broader sweep of twentieth-century history and especially in the dismantling of colonial empires. As Damien Kingsbury notes, the Indonesian struggle was among the first of the successful anti-colonial movements, even serving

as a model to several other countries (allowing of course vast differences as to outcomes and settings). Moreover, because the Indonesian struggle was often couched in Marxist terms—as was the case with many other anti-colonial struggles coming at the outset of the Cold War—such a position frequently brought such movements and states into conflict with the United States. Still, as Kingsbury remarks, the skill of the Indonesian leadership in blending nationalism with conservative Islam meant that Indonesia did not fall "neatly" into the communist camp. Rather, Indonesia—along with India, Burma, China and some other countries—emerged as a champion of non-alignment in foreign policy. The potency of the Indonesian approach undoubtedly climaxed in the historic Bandung Conference hosted by Indonesia in April 1955, serving as a forerunner to the Non-Aligned Movement, standing between capitalism and communism.[33] To be sure, Soekarno's leftward turn not only put him on a collision course with the Netherlands over West New Guinea but also with the United States, which, acting through the CIA, backed Outer Island rebellions. With Soekarno himself ousted in a Western-backed military coup in 1965–66 in another bloodletting against the pro-Communists and putting an end to the army and PKI-backed Konfrontasi with the West over Malaysia, the political system would be reset for the next thirty-two years. What I am saying here is that the long history of struggle from the outset of the twentieth century on the part of disparate peoples of the Indonesian archipelago that led to the proclamation of an Indonesian Republic and its defence from 1945 to 1949 was of Sisyphean proportions—or, as received locally—equalled the triumph of Arjuna over adversaries in the Mahabharata epic.

Notes

1. McVey, "Teaching Modernity", p. 6.
2. See Gunn, *Rice Wars*, chaps. 7 and 8.
3. NEFIS/CMI-publicaties nrs. 71–80. 3975 NEFIS/CMI-publicaties nrs. 71–80, AAS, no. 3975, NA
4. Having served as minister of social affairs and labour in the first Indonesian Cabinet, led by Soekarno, in 1953 he was appointed minister of defence under Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo. In 1961 he served as minister of higher education and science, and the following year he was minister of state under Soekarno.
5. The detail is mentioned in Jenkins, *Young Soeharto*, p. xii. Jenkins also met with Darsono and Semaun in Jakarta, and his book offers a striking colour photograph taken in 1970 of both of them.

6. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 165.
7. M. Earl Cochran, Foreign Service Dispatch, Embassy, Djakarta, 4 June 1952 to State Department AI 982 NARA USA, Record Group 263 Strategic Services Unit War Department formerly Office of Strategic Services. Box 120 I, AI, no. 982, NA.
8. Soekarno, *Bung Karno tentang Partai Murba*.
9. Ibid. Not all on the Left agreed. In a 1958 publication, then chairman of the PKI, D.N. Aidit, dismissed Tan Malaka's role in the November 1926 – February 1927 revolts, blaming their failure on a vacillating party leadership, poor coordination, and the lack of resolute action once the revolt had broken out. Moreover, he claimed, Tan Malaka and his clique "openly adopted Trotskyite practices" by setting up PARI, and so making the work of the PKI more difficult in the face of Dutch repression. See D.N. Aidit, "The Birth and Growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia", in *The Selected Works of D.N. Aidit*, vol. 1 (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1959), p. 283.
10. Feith, *The Indonesian Elections*, p. 58.
11. See Ramos-Horta, *Funu*, p. 43.
12. The irony surrounding the Malik visit to an East Timor island that would be transformed into an Indonesian "Digul" should not be lost. See Gonçalves, "A ilha-prisão de Ataúro".
13. Jarvis, "Introduction", in *From Jail to Jail*, by Tan Malaka, p. xix.
14. Morriën, *Biografisch Woordenboek*.
15. As revealed by an Indonesian media investigation conducted in 2023 in his birthplace in Koto Gadang, Kabupaten Agam, West Sumatra, he fathered eight children with his wife Tutzahalin. See Rahmat Irfan Denas, "Djamaluddin Tamim".
16. Ramidjo, *Kisah-Kisah dari Tanah Merah*, p. 117.
17. Ibid., p. 159.
18. Ibid., p. 12.
19. Sugiyama, "Remembering and Forgetting", pp. 19–41. To be sure, the post-Soeharto democratic space has given way to new national history textbooks. See Amrin Imran, Mestika Zed and Paini Mukhlis, *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah 6: Perang dan Revolusi* (Jakarta: Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2012). Coming under the general editorship of the Cornell University–educated Taufik Abdullah, this encyclopaedic series comes in various editions and imprints.
20. I mention this commission as I worked on its premises in East Timor as a consultant in July–August 2003, gaining some deep insights into military rule in this former Indonesian-occupied "province".
21. Borch, *Military Trials*, p. 1. See also Cribb, "Avoiding Clemency", pp. 151–70.
22. Borch, *Military Trials*, pp. 1, 36. See Solis, "Book Review: Military Trials". As Suzannah Linton commented in a review of Borch's book, simultaneous with the Dutch efforts to try the Japanese for wartime

atrocities, it was ironic that they were then committing much of the same against Indonesians fighting for independence. See Linton, "Book Reviews: Military Trials". This is true and, as we have seen, by the time of the formal transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 (if not long before), the Dutch had truly lost their legitimacy in the court of world opinion. But Indonesian independence on its own terms, including the unitary state principle, also begged the question as to what kind of nation-state it would be with respect to entire ethnicities, such as Ambonese, Papuans, Acehnese and, in the recent past, East Timorese.

23. Vatikiotis, "Dutch King's Visit".
24. Linton, "Book Reviews: Military Trials".
25. Volder and de Brouwer, "The Impacts of Litigation".
26. See, for example, McBeth, "Dutch Finally Admit 'Shameful Acts'".
27. For an informed discussion on Japanese war recollection and textbook portrayals, see Goto, *Tensions of Empire*, pp. 266–71.
28. Writing as one who taught Southeast Asian History in a Japanese national university for some twenty years, I can agree with Goto's assessment that authoritative counternarratives appear only to be relegated to "dusty academic journals". See Goto, *Tensions of Empire*, p. 291.
29. Poulgrain, "Delaying the 'Discovery' of Oil".
30. Hiroyuki Takashima, "Japan Imperial Couple's Visit to Indonesia Has 2 Significant Aspects", *Mainichi,* 14 June 2023.
31. There are other cemeteries in Jakarta, including a Commonwealth War Cemetery inter alia honouring Indian soldiers who lost their lives fighting alongside Allied forces. For the general subject of memorialization of war dead and *pahlawan* (heroes) in Indonesia, including the broader context of the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery, see Schreiner, "'National Ancestors'".
32. NHK, "Japan's Emperor, Empress Visit Indonesia National Cemetery", 21 June 2023. As revealed by the NHK telecast, the imperial couple were also introduced to descendants of stay-behind soldiers.
33. Kingsbury, "Indonesia Independence Revolution", p. 406.