Port Security and Preman Organizations in Indonesia

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SENIA FEBRICA

Port Security and Preman Organizations in Indonesia

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To Robert

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Foreword

As a scholar who has conducted over four decades of research in Indonesian politics, I can attest that the *preman* organizations are still part of the country's political and security fabric. In the run up to the next Indonesian presidential elections in 2024, blaring sirens and convoys of *preman* organization members in camouflage attire, out in support of certain candidates, will continue to be a constant reminder of the presence of these organizations in Indonesian politics.

The need for this book is obvious: to provide much needed insight on the use of non-state security providers by a developing non-Western democracy such as Indonesia. It sheds new light on the uncivil components of civil society that have been overlooked by most scholars of politics and international relations, activists, and diplomats who are not trained in the specificity of Indonesian political dynamics.

In the midst of the complexity of civilian-military relations in Indonesia, Dr Senia Febrica has written a book that explores the niche area of the involvement of *preman* organizations in Indonesian security. The book has mapped comprehensively the participation of *preman* organizations in securing ports, particularly small ports, which are important points of societal interaction and nodes of transportation that are often forgotten. It covers areas that border the three key sea lanes of communications in Southeast Asia that overlap with Indonesia's waters, including the Sunda Strait, the Strait of Malacca and the Sulawesi Sea. By doing so, it provides a new

and novel way to understand the complexity of the involvement of *preman* organizations in port and border security in Indonesia. This book effectively combines observation, document and newspaper analysis, and interviews with various stakeholders, including those who are leaders and active members of *preman* organizations.

Fundamentally, what I really like about this book is its ability to tell the stories that address the implications of the involvement of *preman* organizations in Indonesia's political and security sectors, which are certainly not trouble free. The book describes how "incidental" conflicts between *preman* organizations with government authorities such as the police or societal groups such as fishermen represent just a fraction of the price the Indonesian government and society pay for the involvement of *preman* organizations in the country's politics and security. As Indonesian democracy is maturing, this book has helped us to identify fruitful lines for further inquiry, including what role *preman* organizations have in exacerbating electoral violence, or the role of these organizations in port security in other parts of Indonesia. Recognizing the implications of the use of *preman* organizations is needed to enable Indonesia to transition to a fully functioning democracy.

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Abbreviations

AMJ	Aliansi Masyarakat Jakarta
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMP-EAGA	Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
BIN	Badan Intelijen Negara
BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
BP BATAM	Badan Pengusahaan Batam
BULOG	Badan Urusan Logistik
CSO	civil society organization
FBR	Forum Betawi Rempug
FKDM	Forum Kewaspadaan Dini Masyarakat
FKPPI	Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Purnawirawan dan Putra Putri TNI Polri
FORKABI	Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi
FPI	Front Pembela Islam
GMF	Global Maritime Fulcrum
IPK	Ikatan Pemuda Karya
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security
IUU	illegal, unreported and unregulated
KODIM	Komando Distrik Militer
KOPASSUS	Komando Pasukan Khusus
KOTI	Komando Inti
MABES POLRI	Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia
MABES TNI	Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia
MCS	monitoring, controlling and surveillance
MITA	Mitra Utama
MKGR	Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong
OKP	Organisasi Kepemudaan
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka
PDIP	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
PEMDA	Pemerintah Daerah
PERPAT	Persatuan Pemuda Tempatan
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia
PMC	private military company
PP	Pemuda Pancasila
PPM	Pemuda Panca Marga
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
PSA	port security advisory
RUU	Rancangan Undang-Undang
SATPOL PP	Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja
SIJORI	Singapore-Johor-Riau
SLOC	sea lanes of communications
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
UPC	urban poor community
UU	Undang-Undang

Introduction

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, comprising 17,480 islands and with a maritime territory measuring close to six million square kilometres (Indonesian Ministry of Defence 2008, p. 145). Cross-border maritime activities have long shaped Indonesia's economic, social and political development. As an archipelagic country with 95,181 kilometres of coastline, Indonesia's national borders are primarily located at sea (Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2006, p. 58; Ford and Lyons 2013, p. 215). This book focuses on the importance of the notion of ports as borders (Sciascia 2013, pp. 164, 171). Ports signify a state's boundary where people and goods can exit or enter a country legally (Sciascia 2013, pp. 163–87).

Over ninety per cent of Indonesia's national and international trade is conducted across the country's vast maritime borders. It has a total of 141 international ports across the archipelago, which connect the country to the world economy. Despite the importance of port security for Indonesia, for a long time ports have been characterized as permeable and undefended areas. This situation changed after 9/11. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, and the Bali bombings in 2002, which claimed the lives of 202 people, including 88 Australians, the Indonesian authorities began to reassess the security of its seaports and coastal areas (*Jakarta Post*, 7 August 2003).

FIGURE 1
Map of Indonesia



In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Indonesia also faced mounting international pressure to improve the security of its ports. The security of Indonesian waters and ports is crucial for the international community because of their strategic geographical positions. Indonesia is located at the crossroads of busy maritime traffic between Europe and the Far East, between Australia and Asia, and between the Persian Gulf and Japan (Coutrier 1988, p 186). Three major sea lanes in Southeast Asia—the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait—overlap with Indonesia's maritime jurisdiction (Djalal 2009, p. 63). In February 2008, the US Coast Guard issued port security advisories (PSAs) to Indonesian ports in view of unsatisfactory and inconsistent procedures for security checks prior to entering port facilities; an easily manipulated identity card system; low compliance in providing International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) training, drills and exercises at port facilities; and insufficient knowledge of related parties regarding their tasks and function in the implementation of the ISPS Code (Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Laut 2010, p. 2). The issuance of PSAs meant that any vessels calling at one of the affected Indonesian ports would be obliged to go through extensive security procedures before being granted permission to enter US ports.

In a bid to improve port security in the archipelago, outsourcing border control to *preman* organizations has become one of the main features of Indonesian government policy. There are around thirty organized paramilitary groups, with an estimated membership of

700,000 people. Most of them are identified as modernist Islamic groups (Nordholt 2002, p. 51, cited in Sindre 2005, p. 69). Some of these groups are attached to political parties, like Gerakan Pemuda Kabah, which is loosely affiliated with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) (Hadiz 2003, p. 603). Others are linked to religious organizations; for instance, Pemuda Ansor is affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama. A small number of these groups are characterized as independent gangster organizations (commonly referred to in Indonesia as *preman* organizations) that in the past gained support during Suharto's New Order regime, such as Pemuda Pancasila and Ikatan Pemuda Karya (Hadiz 2003, p. 603).

This book will examine the contradictions and implications of the use of *preman* organizations in Indonesia's efforts to establish a truly democratic civil society. The use of *preman* organizations is not trouble free. Several concerns have been raised regarding conflicts between different *preman* organizations and between these organizations and the state's security apparatus. In recent years, acts of destruction and attacks have been carried out by *preman* organizations against other groups and against the state's security forces, and these organizations have also been involved in smuggling activities. Such activities have created an increasingly insecure environment and in some instances have halted export-import activities at Indonesian ports (*Berita Sore*, 12 August 2011; *Sumut Pos*, 13 April 2013; Sciascia 2013, pp. 164–71). This book will draw attention to this unresolved tension within Indonesian society that could hinder the country's transition into a fully functioning democracy. Against this backdrop, the book aims to answer the following questions: Does the use of *preman* organizations represent a change of direction or a continuation in Indonesia's security practices? And what are the tensions between state and non-state organizations in securing the country's maritime borders?

Understanding the involvement of *preman* organizations in Indonesia's port security is important for two reasons. First, efforts to improve port security in the archipelago is not only a matter of national security for Indonesia. The security of Indonesian ports is important to the international community because the country occupies an important position in global maritime transportation. Situated between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and with maritime areas covering the three sea lanes of communications (SLOC) of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Strait of Lombok and the Sunda Strait, Indonesia exercises responsibility for a large percentage

of the world's shipping trade. Almost half of the world's traded goods and oil passes through these three key Indonesian straits (Carana 2004, p 14; US Department of Homeland Security, 20 September 2005). In one year, it is estimated that over three million ships pass through Indonesian waters.[1] This makes Indonesia's role in securing maritime borders of great significance.

Second, understanding ongoing processes and challenges of democracy in Indonesia is deemed important to ensure the sustainability of the democratic system in this emerging economy. Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, with a total population of over 220 million people, and it is strategically located at the crossroads of busy maritime traffic between Europe and East Asia, between Australia and Asia, and between the Middle East and East Asia. For twenty-four years, Indonesia has been in transition from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic political system and society. But despite more than two decades of democratization, and the security-sector reform that accompanied it, *preman* organizations continue to play an important role in providing security alongside the state's security forces. Organizations with Islamic platforms, such as Pemuda Alawiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Ikatan Pemuda Nahdatul Ulama, Pemuda Muslimin and Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, and those with a nationalist outlook, such as Pemuda Pancasila and Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan, are actively involved in securing vital sites and major political events, including national legislative and presidential elections and local government elections.

This book compares the involvement of *preman* organizations in securing Indonesian ports situated in the three key sea lanes of communication. These include ports in Jakarta (close to the Sunda Strait), North Sulawesi (near the Lombok Strait and the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea) and the Riau Islands (adjacent to the Strait of Malacca).

Jakarta, North Sulawesi and the Riau Islands host ports that are assigned as the country's international gateways and several smaller ports. Jakarta is serviced by the largest port in Indonesia, Tanjung Priok Port, and the two smaller ports of Marunda and Muara Baru. Tanjung Priok Port alone is responsible for managing over 27 per cent of Indonesia's exports, worth around US$46.9 billion, and over 39 per cent of the country's imports, with a total value of US$56.1 billion (Badan Pusat Statistik 2020a; 2020b, pp. 36–39).

North Sulawesi is home to the major container port of Bitung and at least fifteen smaller ports, including Bitung Ferry Port, Manado Port and twelve new ports: Amurang Port in South Minahasa, nine

ports in Sangihe regency (Tahuna, Petta, Bukide, Kalama, Lipang, Kahakitang, Kawaluso, Matutuang and Kawio) and two ports in Sitaro regency (Sawang and Buhias). Bitung Port is a key gateway for the eastern part of Indonesia and a designated port for the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia- Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). Transport of people and goods through ports in North Sulawesi is crucial not only to support Indonesia's economy but also to improve regional maritime linkages and accelerate economic development in one of Southeast Asia's poorest sub-regions.

The cities of Batam and Tanjung Pinang in the Riau Islands are strategically located close to the Straits of Singapore and Malacca. Both cities have a substantial number of ports. Batam is serviced by a large international cargo port, Batu Ampar, and eight smaller ports, including Batam International Ferry Terminal, Batu Ampar Ferry Terminal, Harbour Bay Ferry Terminal, Kabil Marine and Oil Base Port, Telaga Punggur Domestic Port, Nongsa Pura Ferry Port, Sekupang Ferry Terminal, and Waterfront City Teluk Senimba Ferry Terminal. Batu Ampar Port plays an important role in the distribution and consolidation of cargo in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore sub-regional growth triangle (Singapore-Johor-Riau, or SIJORI) (Sutomo and Alisyahbana 2013, p. 796). It manages a large quantity of domestic and international ocean freight (Sutomo and Alisyahbana 2013, p. 796). Tanjung Pinang, the capital city of the Riau Islands, is home to six ports: Sri Bintan, Sripayung Batu, Dompak, Pelantar Dua, Tanjung Merbau and Sungai Jang.[2]

Locating Indonesia in the Literature on Non-state Security Providers

This book offers a comprehensive account of the involvement of non-state security providers in securing ports and coastal areas in Indonesia. Traditionally, the state is perceived as the source of legitimate security authority. This traditional notion of authority derives from a Weberian conception of the state. To quote Weber, "A State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Avant 2005, p. 1). The end of the twentieth century saw a growing number of challenges to this traditional locus of authority. Hall and Biersteker argue that because of globalization, and various forms of international governance, numerous non-state actors have increasingly taken authoritative roles in the international system.

These non-state actors exercise their influence over important areas, including markets, morals and illicit activities (Hall and Biersteker 2002, p. 4). These developments have intensified the involvement of private actors in providing security and controlling the instruments of violence (ibid.).

Scholars from the global society school of thought argue that the process of globalization has challenged the authority of states. These authors argue that market integration and the development of finance, communication and technology have transformed state frontiers (Baylis 2008, p. 236; Friedman and Kaplan 2002, p. 64). Kaplan points out that greater interconnection brought about by globalization raises instability, particularly in underdeveloped states that cannot cope with the growing instability (Friedman and Kaplan 2002, p. 65). Such a process may lead to the fragmentation of nation states. In the context of globalization, the growing involvement of non-state security providers in a "new war" has been seen as a prominent feature. Kaldor explains that globalization has changed the social relations between public and private authority. She argues that, in the "new war", the war is fought by state and non-state actors, including insurgent groups, criminal organizations, paramilitary forces and private security contractors (Kaldor 2007, pp. 158, 162, 166). The involvement of private authorities in the provision of security has undermined the state's monopoly of violence.

Neorealism takes a different view from scholars on globalization regarding the use of private authorities in security. For neorealists, globalization does pose a challenge to states; however, the authority of states has demonstrated a great deal of resilience towards globalization (Waltz 2000, p. 53). Waltz points out that private authorities do not push states away from the centre stage of international politics (Waltz 1986, p. 98). This is primarily because states tend to "respond efficiently to changing international conditions" (ibid., p. 331; Grieco 1988, pp. 487–88; Waltz 1979, p. 105; Elman 1996, p. 43). States can transform their capacity and adapt to changes. More importantly, Waltz argues that the authority of states does not wither and fade away, because they also protect themselves in various ways (Waltz 2000, p. 51). The distinct institutions and traditions of different states may feed into different strategies that they choose to protect themselves and promote their interests (ibid.).

In contrast to both proponents of the global society and the neorealist argument regarding the privatization of security, this book argues that, although the state remains an important actor

in the realm of security, the challenges posed by globalization and the emergence of private authority have affected the way a state delivers its security functions. The manner in which a state conducts its security and military tasks in response to a major challenge to globalization such as global terrorism is shaped by institutionalized local practice and domestic political dynamics within that state. Strategies that states use to protect and promote their interests sometimes cannot be seen as the result of a single decision by the head of state or a senior official but should be seen as a continual mode of action where the decision has been made by bureaucratic machinery and functionaries (Walker 2006; see also Doty 2007). The inclusion of private authorities as part of strategies to protect state interests is not trouble free, because it poses a direct challenge for the government to exercise its effective monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.

In examining domestic sources of the privatization of security strategies, it will be useful to incorporate some insights from Gourevitch's work on domestic and international interactions. According to Gourevitch, the study of domestic and international political interaction suggests that ideas, understanding and discourse all have a political sociology of understanding, referring to groups who advocate or oppose them, institutions that support or obstruct them, or cultural commitments that promote or block their adoption (Gourevitch 2002, pp. 318–19). Discussion of a state policy, therefore, would "require considerable research into the actions of individuals and groups within society and their dialogue with counterparts elsewhere" (ibid., p. 318). For Gourevitch, regime type and coalition pattern are the properties of a political system most frequently used in explaining government policy (Gourevitch 1978, pp. 900–905). Regime type reveals the institutional structure and the machinery as well as the process and procedures of decision making (ibid., p. 883). Coalition pattern is defined as the type or combination of dominant elite (property owner, political elite, army or labour union) (ibid., pp. 900–905). The coalition pattern evokes the social forces and the political relationship among them. Awareness of domestic and international contexts is crucial in analysing the use of *preman* organizations for port security in Indonesia.

This book argues that institutionalized local practice and domestic political dynamics within the state are defining relations between state and private authorities in the provision of security. At the international level, the global war against terrorism has created

pressure for Indonesia to improve its security measures in dealing with terrorism. Following the 9/11 attacks and the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia has improved the security of its major export and import ports and participated in various international measures to ensure its continuous participation in the international maritime trading system (Febrica 2017b). At the same time, in a bid to improve national counterterrorism efforts at small ports and in coastal areas located in remote or outlying islands, *preman* organizations began to play a greater role in security. The engagement of *preman* organizations in security became more apparent as they began to participate in providing intelligence information, to take part in anti-radicalization efforts and to help the government to guard ports and border regions. At the domestic level, security practices in developing countries such as Indonesia are different from those in democratic developed countries. Many poor developing countries have a tendency to be weak in terms of domestic, interdependent and Westphalian state capacity. These states are sovereign only in a legal sense (Paul, Ikenberry and Hall 2003, p. 354). Among those states that can be easily observed, it will be immediately evident that an erosion of state capacity is arguably the most defining characteristic produced by the process of political transition. In Indonesia, the combination of the decline of state capacity, the fact of there being many uninhabited outlying islands throughout the archipelago, and an underequipped law enforcement force contribute to undermining the capacity of the authorities to control the various networks of private authority that operate across the country's porous borders (see Ayoob 1984, p. 48). This situation renders Indonesia vulnerable to the problem of smuggling of goods, contraband and people. In the past twenty years, the sequence of violence in Indonesia has culminated in an intricate interconnection between the incapacity of the state to deliver some of its basic services and the involvement of *preman* organizations to fill the gap.

The burgeoning literature on the involvement of non-state security providers can be categorized into two groups. The first group tends to focus on the participation of private military companies (PMCs) in conflict areas in the Middle East and Africa. These works explain the historical development and international factors underpinning the privatization of conflict, the existing trend of the use of PMCs and the risks related to the use of PMCs (see Adams 2003; Shearer 1998; Davis 2000; Sullivan 2002). Works that touch upon maritime security explain the role of PMCs in counter-piracy operations in

East Africa and the Indian Ocean (Spearin 2010, pp. 56–71; Richard 2010, pp. 41–64; Hansen 2008, pp. 585–98; Liss 2008; Chalk 2012; Stevenson 2010, pp. 27–38; Møller 2009; Bueger, Stockbruegger and Werthes 2011, pp. 356–81; Ross and Ben-David 2009, pp. 55–70; Scheffler 2010; Bellamy 2011, pp. 78–83; Chapsos and Holtom 2015, pp, 1–4; Ono 2013, pp. 1–4; Buzatu and Buckland 2015, pp. 1–97; Brown 2012, pp. 1–23). Although Indonesia is one of the countries bordering the Indian Ocean, the literature pays little attention to the activities of non-state organizations in Indonesia.

The second group of literature examines the involvement of *preman* organizations in Indonesia's security sector. The specific literature on Indonesia is largely descriptive. It focuses on the political constellation of the country during and after the New Order era, which opened avenues for the engagement of non-state organizations in the country's security domain (Simpson 2013, pp. 10–13; Ryter 1998, pp. 45–73; Hadiz 2003, pp. 591–611; Freek and Lindblad 2002; Barker 1998, pp. 7–42; Sindre 2005; Anderson 2001; Van Klinken and Barker 2009; Headman 2008). The explanations suggested by the literature on Indonesia's outsourcing of security functions can be grouped into three categories: historical and cultural roots, the future relations between military organizations and civil society, and the political and security practices in post-reform Indonesia.

The argument for historical and cultural roots describes the presence of historical and cultural antecedents that have shaped Indonesia's policy to use *preman* organizations to secure its territory (Ryter 1998, pp. 45–73; Robinson 2001, pp. 271–318; Barker 1998, pp. 7–42; Simpson 2013, pp. 10–13; Roosa 2003, pp. 315–23; Collins 2002, pp. 582–604; Khanh and Indorf 1982, pp. 3–25; Silverstein 1982, pp. 278–91; Ahram 2011, pp. 531–56). Scholars that propose this argument explain that the origin of the growth of *preman* organizations in Indonesia can be traced to pre-colonial times, the long interactions with Portuguese and Dutch colonial authorities, the legacy of revolutions following the Japanese occupation of 1942–45, and Suharto's New Order security practices (Ahram 2011, pp. 533, 540; Silverstein 1982, p. 282; Simpson 2013, pp. 10–11; Robinson 2001, pp. 279–91; Ryter 1998, pp. 48–54; Barker 1998, p. 12).

Scholars arguing for the influence of Indonesia's pre-colonial cultural models cite ideas such as the sexual potency associated with the *jago*, the link between criminality and authority in the story of Ken Arok the robber king and the role of local enforcers in colonial Java as having shaped the persistent presence of *preman*

organizations in modern Indonesia (Ryter 1998, p. 48; Robinson 2001, p. 313). Portuguese and Dutch colonial authorities throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the occupying Japanese forces during World War II (1942–45) recruited local civilians to meet their security demands. This practice was sustained, particularly during the period of Suharto's New Order (1965–98). The Suharto regime directed *preman* organizations in 1965–66 to kill over half a million alleged supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party and mobilized such organizations between the 1970s and the 1990s for counter-insurgency operations in certain troubled regions, including East Timor, West Papua and Aceh (Ahram 2011, p. 541; Roosa 2003, pp. 317–18; Barker 1998, p. 12). Arguably, the use of semi-official forces had been deemed useful for the Portuguese, Dutch and Indonesian authorities as it was a cheaper option than maintaining a large standing army, and it could provide room for deniability for acts of violence that breached legal and moral norms (Robinson 2001, p. 315; Khanh and Indorf 1982, pp. 17–18; Ahram 2011, p. 532; Roosa 2003, p. 321; see also Collier 1999, p. 12). More importantly, scholarly works point out that the outsourcing of security functions to non-state actors helped to portray a situation whereby local citizens were fighting against each other and the state authorities served largely as neutral arbiters seeking to maintain peace and order (Robinson 2001, p. 315). The literature provides great detail on the use of *preman* organizations as a state instrument of violence from the colonial to the late Suharto era. Nevertheless, it falls short in explaining the continued practice of the use of *preman* organizations to enhance the country's maritime security.

The literature that focuses on civil-military relations draws attention to the process of security sector reform in developing countries, including Indonesia (Lee 2000, pp. 692–706; Smith 2001, pp. 5–20; Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002, pp. 175–201; Collier 1999, pp. 1–23). This literature acknowledges that the narrow definition of the conventional Western security actors—such as armed forces and police—does not capture the diversity of non-state security actors in the developing world (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002, pp. 178–79). Lee, Smith, Collier, Hendrickson and Karkoszka explained that security sector elements in the non-developed world, including Indonesia, may include paramilitary forces, private bodyguard units, private security companies, and militias associated with political parties. The existing literature puts forward a liberal vision of security reform where reform agendas will be expected to succeed when

civilian authority is ascendant and the military's role in politics is diminished (Lee 2000, pp. 695, 699–700, 703; Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002, pp. 180, 182; Smith 2001, pp. 11–12). There is a general acceptance that civil society organizations as important agents for change can apply pressure and inform reform agendas (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002, p. 180; Lee 2000, pp. 701–2). The continued use of *preman* organizations in Indonesia to provide local defence at key sites such as ports, however, shows the opposite of a liberal vision of security reform. Concerned primarily with power relations between civil and military institutions, the existing works have overlooked that legal non-state organizations can continue to promote the status quo rather than reform security practices, and at the same time generate revenue for themselves.

The third line of argument found in the descriptive literature studies the continuity and change of political and security practice in post-reform Indonesia (Hadiz 2003, pp. 591–611; Sindre 2005, pp. 1–99; Sidel 2004, pp. 51–74; Hadiz 2004, pp. 615–36; Bertrand 2004, pp. 325–44; Brown and Wilson 2007, pp. 367–403; Barter 2013, pp. 75–92; Hadiz 2008, pp. 1–14; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007, pp. 773–94; Aspinall 2013, p. 48; Kristiansen and Trijono 2005, pp. 236–54; Ufen 2006, pp. 1–35; Weatherbee 2004, pp. 179–91; Cribb 2000, pp. 183–202; Heryanto and Hadiz 2005, pp. 251–75). The burgeoning literature on post-authoritarian Indonesia argues that, despite the reconfiguration of politics in the archipelago after Suharto's authoritarian regime, fewer democratic forces are still largely at play at the national and local levels. They claim that paramilitary and gangster groups used as instruments in intra-elite struggles and often associated with political parties or mass organizations have flourished and have become increasingly important players in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005, pp. 252, 256; Cribb 2000, p. 197; Weatherbee 2004, p. 190; Ufen 2006, pp. 26–27; Kristiansen and Trijono 2005, pp. 236, 247–48; Aspinall 2013, pp. 42, 48; Hadiz 2008, p. 8; Barter 2013, pp. 83, 88; Brown and Wilson 2007, pp. 375–76; Bertrand 2004, pp. 338–40; Wilson 2006, pp. 266–89; Hadiz 2004, p. 626; Sidel 2004, p. 64; Sindre 2005, pp. 1–2; Hadiz 2003, pp. 597–98).

These *preman* organizations on one hand offer "substitutes for many of the functions provided by the state", including in the security realm (Kaldor 2003, p 9, cited in Aspinall 2013, p 42). However, as Aspinall (2013, p. 48), Kristiansen and Trijono (2005, pp. 249–50), Brown and Wilson (2007, pp. 370, 386–88), and Sidel (2004, p. 64)

point out, the activities of these organizations can increase insecurity in society because of competition among them over territory and resources.

Most of the scholarly works that discuss the activities of *preman* organizations in post-authoritarian Indonesia do not explicitly examine the role of these organizations in securing maritime borders. The work of Sciascia is an exception. Sciascia has examined a range of diverse for-profit actors such as private security firms and members of Pemuda Pancasila in providing security in the Port of Belawan, Medan. His work offers a detailed account of the relations between public and private security actors in Belawan Port. Sciascia, however, uses only one case study—the Port of Belawan—and focuses mainly on a single *preman* organization, Pemuda Pancasila. This limits the capacity to generalize his findings to other parts of Indonesia and constrains the ability to capture the complexity of interactions between various types of *preman* organizations—such as ethnic-based organization like Forum Betawi Rempug, nationalist organizations like Ikatan Pemuda Karya and religious organizations such as Pemuda Ansor—both between each other and with the government authorities.

This survey of existing works on *preman* organizations shows that the literature does not explain the underlying reasons for Indonesia's decision to involve *preman* organizations in port security, nor does it depict the dynamics and tensions between state and non-state security providers in securing the country's maritime borders. The existing literature is, nonetheless, a valuable resource for this book because it provides a detailed account of the development of *preman* organizations in Indonesia both before and after the political reform began in 1998. The existing literature on Indonesia's *preman* organizations therefore serves as a point of departure.

The Significance of Indonesia in the Study of Civil Society

The study of the participation of *preman* organizations in Indonesia's port security informs analytical and empirical debates for the study of civil society. In May 1998, the resignation of Indonesia's second president, Suharto, ended the state's authoritarian political system that had lasted for more than thirty years (Liddle 1999, p. 39). As a consequence, the years after 1998 witnessed a growing number of civil society organizations (CSOs), both in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia. As of 2017, there were sixteen thousand CSOs

registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs, a government ministry designated to register and supervise these organizations (McDonald and Wilson 2017, p. 248).

After 1998, CSOs have played a crucial role in informing Indonesia's security policies. A group of CSOs, which includes Kontras, Elsam, ProPatria and Lembaga Studi Pertahanan dan Studi Strategis Indonesia, has established the Civil Society Network for Security Sector Reform. These CSOs have been active in promoting a reform agenda in Indonesia's security sector, reformulating and proposing a range of legislation in the security sector, and encouraging transparency and monitoring of the implementation of state security policies (Maakarim 2009, cited in Bhakti 2009, p. iv). The success of the advocacy work of these CSOs could be seen in the array of new legislation passed by the House of Representatives and approved by the president within a few years of Indonesia beginning its reform process. These include Law No. 2/2002 on the Indonesian Police (Undang-Undang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia), Law No. 3/2002 on State Defence (Undang-Undang Pertahanan Negara) and Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces (Undang-Undang Tentara Nasional Indonesia). CSOs have actively proposed several legislative drafts that are deemed important in improving the country's security policies, including in the area of counterterrorism. These include a draft of the State Intelligence Law (Rancangan Undang-Undang [RUU] Intelijen) and a draft of the Assistance of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law (RUU Perbantuan Tentara Nasional Indonesia), designed to regulate how and when the armed forces could assist the police in dealing with terrorism (Bhakti 2009; *Tempo*, 25 July 2016). RUU Intelijen was ratified by the parliament in October 2011 (*Berita Satu*, 11 October 2011). But, despite pressure from civil society in Indonesia, RUU Perbantuan Tentara Nasional Indonesia has not been passed. In order to govern the involvement of the military in domestic security spheres, the Indonesian military (TNI) has signed at least forty-one memoranda of understanding (MoU) with various government agencies, such as the police (Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia, 5 October 2020; *Kompas*, 2 February 2018). The Indonesian government is finalizing the draft of the Presidential Decree on the TNI's Tasks in Overcoming Terrorism (Rancangan Perpres Tugas TNI dalam Mengatasi Aksi Terorisme) (*Kompas*, 13 May 2020; Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional, 15 December 2021). These practices have been criticized by civil society as setbacks for

Indonesian military reform. Civil society deems that any military participation in counterterrorism should be governed by law rather than MoUs or presidential decrees (Bantuan Hukum, 3 August 2018; Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia, 5 October 2020).

Given the rise of civil society influence in Indonesia's political and security affairs, the majority of works on CSOs in Indonesia tend to focus on the resurgence of CSOs and their role in the democratic transformation of the country (Ibrahim 2011; Hening 2014; Hefner 1993, pp. 1–35; Pohl 2006, pp. 389–409; Antlöv, Brinkerhoff and Rapp 2010, pp. 417–39; Nyman 2006). Others examine the trans-border nature of CSOs and their role in the promotion of democracy and human rights not only in Indonesia but also in neighbouring Southeast Asian countries (Howell and Lind 2009, pp. 1279–96; Mietzner 2012, pp. 209–29; Bhakti 2009; Gomez and Ramcharan 2012, pp. 27–43; Gilson 2011; Rahim and Pietsch 2015, pp. 139–42; Gerard 2014, pp. 1–23; Chachavalpongpun 2012; Quayle 2012, pp. 199–222; Gerard 2013, pp. 1–16; Chong 2012, pp. 35–44; Acharya 2003, pp. 375–90; Allison and Taylor 2017, pp. 1–18). There is a small but growing body of scholarly work that focuses on the rise of un-civil organizations after 1998 (Beittinger-Lee 2009; Bakker 2016, pp. 249–77; Nugroho and Syarief 2012; Mudayat, Arif, Narendra and Irawanto 2009). These studies argue that not all CSOs in post-authoritarian Indonesia are characterized as tolerant and liberal (Beittinger-Lee 2009, p. 158; Bakker 2016, pp. 249–77; Nugroho and Syarief 2012; Mudayat, Arif, Narendra and Irawanto 2009). Their mode of operation does not echo the Western European civil society principles of the non-use of violence and being not for profit. Diamond defines these principles of civil society as

> the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere.… Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. Thus, it excludes individual and family life, inward looking group activity…, the profit making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the state… (Diamond 1996, p. 228, cited in Weiss 2008)

Democratization has encouraged the growth of "un-civil" elements within Indonesian society. Some of these CSOs are willing to use

violence and intimidation to achieve their economic, social and political goals. These *preman* organizations gained access to government funding and on various occasions have collaborated closely with government authorities in the security sector. The existing works that touch upon the un-civil elements within Indonesian society, however, do not offer much insight on the involvement of CSOs in port security in Indonesia. By focusing on the involvement of *preman* organizations to secure Indonesian ports and outlying islands, this book provides a fresh perspective in studying state-civil society relations and the participation of non-governmental actors in the provision of security outside of the European/Western democratic setting.

Notes on Methods

My data gathering focused on the history and the engagement of militarized NGOs in securing ports and border areas. I relied on qualitative and quantitative types of information from primary and secondary sources.

As part of my data gathering, I conducted two periods of fieldwork in 2015 and 2016 in Jakarta, North Sulawesi and the Riau Islands to gather both quantitative and qualitative data related to Indonesia's outsourcing of port security. During these two periods of fieldwork, I carried out eighty-four interviews. Interviews were conducted with Indonesian officials, representatives of CSOs, industry representatives, national and local parliamentarians, academics and leaders as well as members of *preman* organizations based in Jakarta, Bitung, Manado, Batam and Tanjung Pinang.

I interviewed active duty and retired Indonesian officials who are well informed on the use of *preman* organizations in port and border security from the following government institutions: the navy; the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs; the police; the National Defence Board; the Directorate General of Sea Transportation; the Port Authority; and representatives of local governments. I identified officials in these institutions through my previous research on Indonesian maritime security, their writings, newspaper articles, discussions with other interviewees and consultations with academics based in Jakarta, Manado and Tanjung Pinang.

During study in the field, in-depth interviews were conducted to seek the views of public and private stakeholders involved in the use of *preman* organizations in security. All the interviews that I

carried out in Indonesia were arranged through the American Studies Center, Universitas Indonesia. As part of my data collection process, the host institution also sent letters of request to key Indonesian bureaucratic institutions in the field of port and border security. I did not use a strict sampling frame to select interviewees in Jakarta. In practice, to trace suitable interview subjects, a snowball sampling procedure was useful to help me to select further interviewees (Bryman 2004, p. 334). As I started the interview process, some of my interviewees put me in contact with other individuals, including officials, business representatives, security experts and representatives of *preman* organizations involved in the security field.

At the beginning of each interview, I provided a brief description of my research to the interviewee. Interview proceedings were recorded with a digital recorder if the interviewees deemed this was acceptable. Several interviewees asked not to be recorded and I respected their requests. To have proceeded to record the interviews would have entailed breaching their trust and could possibly have endangered my interview subjects and myself.

I am aware that there are three issues that could arise from the use of interview data for this research. First, not all interviewees can be assumed to be equally important (Dexter 1970, p. 6). Only a few interviewees were involved in the decision-making process or had access to closed meetings and therefore could explain how government decisions were formulated (ibid., pp. 6–7, 130). Most interviewees that provided insightful answers were either the current or former leaders of government agencies or the relevant leaders of *preman* organizations. One way to give weight to interviewee statements is to "place each item of material in light of the character structure and social position of the informant" (ibid., p. 148). Providing a detailed breakdown of each interviewee's professional position and role in relation to *preman* organizations would, however, breach ethical guidelines for reporting the data with anonymity, and in certain cases could endanger the career and safety of my interviewees (ibid., p. 148). Second, in numerous interviews I asked interviewees to recollect specific events, decisions or arrangements that happened in the past or "have developed over a long period of time" (ibid., p. 11). Under these circumstances, distortion of the interview report could take place if the interviewee could not recollect the precise details of what happened, and rather stated what they supposed had happened (ibid., p. 126). The data reported may also give a distorted account of what actually happened if interviewees unconsciously

explained the situation to suit their own perspective or consciously modified the facts (ibid., p. 126). Third, I am aware that data from an interview is restricted to what the interviewee was willing to share with me at that particular moment (ibid., p. 120). Under other circumstances, what the interviewee might have stated to me could be different (ibid., p. 120).

I used triangulation techniques in data collection to address concerns about validity and bias (see Arksey and Knight 1999, pp. 22–23). Interviews with officials, representatives of civil society, and leaders and members of *preman* organizations were cross-checked against each other (Dexter 1970, p. 15; Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 27). I compared statements made by an interviewee with the account provided by other interviewees (Dexter 1970, p. 127). I talked to officials and members of *preman* organizations from different ranks. Talking to officials from different government agencies at different stages of their careers has proved useful (Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 27). Senior government officials or former officials were able to explain the extent of conflict or cooperation between government agencies and *preman* organizations because they were consulted or involved in the decision-making process to recruit or halt the activities of these groups. Their statements could be corroborated with mid-career officials involved in arranging meetings, conducting joint security operations in the field and assessing registered militarized NGOs. I asked for further clarification through re-interviewing informants in person or by phone when there were discrepancies found in the cross-examination of interviewees' accounts (Dexter 1970, p. 128).

In order to validate interview data, I also combined interviews with document analysis to learn about the involvement of *preman* organizations in port security. The documents I gathered during fieldwork were helpful as sources of information and for cross-checking interview data (Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 17). I collected over fifty primary documents related to outsourcing border security. The government documents include transcripts of official speeches, annual ministry accountability reports, defence white papers, meeting reports, development blueprints, intra-departmental correspondence, political and security surveys, analysis of provincial economic potential, and parliamentary newsletters. Most of these materials are only available in the Indonesian language.

I also used statistics on defence expenditure, the expenditure of Indonesia's maritime agencies, government counterterrorism spending,

government allocation of funding to CSOs and the number of registered CSOs published by the national and local government. Some of these documents can be accessed online, while others are available from the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs and local government authorities. For documents that are not publicly available, this report has benefited from the generosity of some of my interviewees in granting me access.

The archives of newspapers, including the *Jakarta Post*, *Kompas*, *Tribun Manado*, *Manado Post*, *Tribun Batam* and *Batam Post*, were also valuable sources for this book. The analysis of newspaper articles has been useful to corroborate or contrast claims made by officials, parliamentarians and representatives of *preman* organizations.

Outline of the Book

Chapter 1 emphasizes the main question that this book seeks to address. It provides a detailed background for the chapters that follow. This chapter aims to achieve two objectives. First, this chapter explains the implications of the 9/11 attacks for Indonesia's port security. It shows how, despite Indonesia's long history and experience of terrorist incidents, only after 9/11 did governments around the world begin to highlight the possibility and significance of terrorist attacks in Indonesian waters and on maritime facilities. This chapter elaborates on Indonesia's efforts to improve the security of its ports and outlying islands following the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2008 issuance by the US Coast Guard of PSAs to most Indonesian ports. These include the involvement of *preman* organizations as one of the main features of Indonesian government policy in a bid to secure its ports and outlying islands in the archipelago. Second, this chapter intends to provide detailed background information on Indonesia's domestic political dynamics and the involvement of *preman* organizations in the process. It highlights the political practices that have changed and those that remain the same in post-authoritarian Indonesia. This chapter elaborates on the specifics of Indonesia's security and political practices that sustain the use of *preman* organizations in security. Drawing on documents and interview sources, this chapter identifies key actors and the institutional process of Indonesia's security policy-making.

Chapter 2 argues that although Pemuda Pancasila exercised a certain degree of control at ports in the past, at present, ethnic-based organizations play a more active role in port security in Jakarta. It

shows that the involvement of CSOs in port security is not trouble free. *Preman* organizations have provided protection for smuggling activities and been involved in violent conflicts with the provincial government and private security companies in port areas. This chapter provides a comprehensive explanation of the involvement of CSOs in port security in Jakarta and the challenges that this practice has brought. First, this chapter maps key *preman* organizations that exist in Jakarta and their involvement in securing ports and in security in general. Second, it explores interactions—both in terms of cooperation and conflict—that have taken place between different *preman* organizations, between government authorities and *preman* organizations, and between *preman* organizations and other non-state security providers. The chapter also provides an assessment of the illicit activities at ports in Jakarta and of the involvement of *preman* organizations in seeking to curb or sustain such activities.

Chapter 3 addresses the participation of *preman* organizations in securing ports and outlying islands in North Sulawesi. To begin with, this chapter familiarizes readers with the geographical landscape of North Sulawesi—an Indonesian province that shares maritime border with the Philippines in the north—and the challenges that it poses. The next part of this chapter identifies *preman* organizations that participate in securing ports and the outlying islands of this province, their affiliations, and the major security and political events that underpinned their establishment. The chapter also explains the development of partnerships between state authorities and *preman* organizations in this province. It highlights the collaboration of government agencies with *preman* organizations and explains the lack of conflict that features in their relations. This chapter finishes by examining the role of *preman* organizations in combating transnational crime in North Sulawesi. Analysis of *preman* organizations in North Sulawesi shows that the participation of these organizations in port security is largely welcomed by government authorities. The local media, parliamentarians, the local government and the state security apparatus describe in positive terms the role of *preman* organizations in dealing with trans-border illicit activities, particularly terrorism and human trafficking, in North Sulawesi.

Chapter 4 explains the role of *preman* organizations in two port cities in the Riau Islands: Batam and Tanjung Pinang. The first part of this chapter accounts for the dominant *preman* organizations operating in Batam and Tanjung Pinang. It explains the similarities and differences of CSO characteristics in the two cities. The chapter

then proceeds to explain various forms of cooperation between different government agencies and *preman* organizations to guard ports and outlying islands in areas surrounding Batam and Tanjung Pinang. It also analyses the reasons underpinning tensions and friction between *preman* organizations, the government and society. The final part of this chapter highlights the connection of *preman* organizations with illicit activities. The conclusion of this chapter points to the ambiguous role of *preman* organizations in port security. It argues that whilst *preman* organizations have played a role in securing ports and outlying islands, their involvement in illicit activities and their low-scale conflicts with government authorities and members of society has generated insecurity in port areas and beyond.

The concluding chapter brings together the threads of argument and the main findings presented in the core chapters. It reiterates the place this book has in the current literature and its contribution both to the literature on civil society and on non-state security providers. It then proceeds with a section for the identification of areas for future research.

Notes

1 This figure is an estimate generated from the data of vessels navigating Indonesian waters on 12 December 2013 at 08:30 GMT. As shown by the live marine traffic map (available at http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/), 1,735 vessels were plying Indonesian waters at this time. This number only includes ships that are fitted with Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders. According to IMO regulations (Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V), the AIS is only required to be fitted aboard ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages. This figure, therefore, does not include vessels below 300 gross tonnage involved in international shipping.

2 Interview with a senior government official and his staff, Tanjung Pinang, February 2016.