RISING CHINA

and New Chinese Migrants in Southeast Asia

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Edited by
Leo Suryadinata and Benjamin Loh

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Introduction: Rising China and New Chinese Migrants in Southeast Asia

Leo Suryadinata and Benjamin Loh

Since the period of rapid development in the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, the world is experiencing a new wave of Chinese migration. Loosely defined as Chinese people who are outside of China to conduct business, work, study or join their family overseas, these new Chinese migrants—also known as *xin yimin* 新移民—have had a profound impact on their host countries. Their influence on local societies, economies and politics has been complicated by Beijing's dynamic policy towards the Chinese overseas in general and towards the *xin yimin* in particular.

Before we proceed further, it is important for us to put Chinese migrants in a proper historical context.

A Brief Outline of Chinese Migration[1]

The earliest contact between China and Southeast Asia can be traced back to the Han dynasty. However, significant migration to this region started during the Song dynasty of the twelfth century. The first period was from the Song dynasty in the twelfth century until the first half of the sixteenth century of the Ming dynasty. It lasted for about 400 years. During this period, the feudal economy in China was at its peak and the number of Chinese abroad also increased. This coincided with the period that Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho 郑和) embarked upon his seven expeditions to the West Ocean (later known as Nanyang 南洋). Groups of Chinese merchants

and sailors ventured overseas and some of them remained in various sites from their voyages. Those who stayed long married local women; the number of the Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia during this period was between 150,000 and 200,000.

The second period started in the second half of the sixteenth century when there was a sea embargo for the ethnic Chinese until the eruption of the Opium Wars. This period lasted about 300 years. During this period, China experienced the rise of capitalistic elements, and the West began to colonize Southeast Asia. More Chinese left China for Southeast Asia. According to one study, there were about a million Chinese in Southeast Asia. The majority lived in urban areas and retained their Chinese heritage and cultural identity.

The third period started in 1840 and ended in 1949 when the PRC was established. It lasted for 109 years. This was the period when China became a "half feudal and half colonial" society. There was poverty and high unemployment in China. The number of poor Chinese increased and many were forced to come to Southeast Asia as labourers. This was also the period when Chinese nationalism emerged among the Chinese overseas. During this period, fresh groups of migrants poured into Southeast Asia, and their numbers increased exponentially. In 1930, for instance, there were about 3.7 million Chinese in Southeast Asia.

The fourth period began in 1949 and continues to the present. The establishment of the PRC temporarily arrested the exodus of the Chinese from the mainland to Southeast Asia. Independent Southeast Asia restricted the new Chinese migrants as the nation-building process began in the region. China's economic development was still behind Southeast Asia and especially the West at this time. Chinese mass migration reoccurred when China started to introduce their open door policy, which ushered high economic growth into the1980s. While the migration was more to the West rather than to Southeast Asia, the new Chinese migration in Southeast Asia is still significant in this fourth iteration of Chinese migration.

Beyond "Settling" and "Sojourning"

When we examine the history of Chinese migration from the Song dynasty—which coincided with an increase in Chinese maritime activity and trade in Southeast Asia and up to the Indian Ocean—until today, we can identify a few factors that may explain the reasons for Chinese migrations over this long period of time. There was the presence of push factors from

China, including political upheaval, overpopulation and poverty. On the other hand, there was a pull factor in Southeast Asia: local development provided economic and other opportunities for Chinese migrants. Even after the establishment of the PRC, some of the push and pull factors that we mentioned continued to be present. However, the patterns of migration after the rise of China in the 1990s are quite different from the early migration, and we will return to this point later.

A question can be posed here on whether the Chinese have the concept of migration or immigration in the sense of 'planning to settle in other countries permanently'. Such an understanding will need to be grounded in China's historical reality, or context, of the nature of its movements of people. For instance, Professor Wang Gungwu argued that such a concept did not exist in traditional China. The term *yimin*, which is often used to mean 'migration' or 'immigration' today, in fact refers to "the action of the state to move people from one area to another within the territory of China",[2] and it was often mobilized to strengthen defences on the border or to respond to natural disasters. A large part of Imperial Chinese history (and even earlier) also attributed movements of people to the system of the feudal economy (*fengjian jingji zhidu* 封建经济制度), which saw emperors offering official ranks and land to vassals and allowing them to establish a state on the land.[3]

The original Chinese term that is equivalent to the Western concept of 'immigration' is *qiaoju* 侨居, which can be roughly translated as 'sojourning'.[4] In this conception, the Chinese did not intend to settle overseas but to return to the homeland once they had made enough money, or other secondary motivations such as the gaining of knowledge, experience and/or connections. However, we would maintain that the first-generation Chinese might have such an intention but, in reality, many did not return to China. For subsequent generations, especially for those who were offspring of inter-marriages, their chances of 'returning' to their ancestral land became even more remote as they are no longer 'pure' Chinese in their cultural and ethnic identity. The Minh Huong in Vietnam,[5] the Lukchin in Thailand,[6] the (Chinese) Mestizo in the Philippines,[7] and the Peranakan Chinese in the Malay Archipelago[8] are cases in point. Even during the Great Depression of the 1930s, many of the migrant Chinese—who were often called 'birds of season'—in reality stayed on and did not return to mainland China.

The dualistic binary of 'settling' and 'sojourning' have preoccupied much writing on migration in general, and not only on Chinese migration.

While the notion of settling down for the migrant Chinese in general, and first-generation Chinese in particular, took place as nation-states emerged after the end of World War II, the original intention not to settle down does not solely apply to the ethnic Chinese but also to other Asian 'immigrants'. The Indians, for instance, were also temporary 'migrants', and it was only later that they decided to settle down. In this sense, the ethnic Chinese are not unique.

Southeast Asian governments that were newly established wanted to integrate the ethnic Chinese populations by introducing nation-building policies. Some are more rigid than others. Usually, ethnic Chinese were able to retain their cultural identity through four Chinese cultural pillars; namely, Chinese organizations, Chinese mass media, Chinese-medium schools and 'Chinese' religions. Some countries imposed restrictions on these ethnic Chinese institutions, but others eventually eradicated them. The extreme 'complete assimilation' policy was introduced in the Khmer Rouge's Kampuchea and Suharto's Indonesia.

Southeast Asian Chinese in general over the last century have been subjected to integrationist policies and to a certain extent have been 'Southeast-Asianized'. This process was helped by the restrictions on new Chinese migration to Southeast Asian states before the rise of China. However, with the end of the Cold War, economic globalization and the rise of China, we witness the recurrence of mass new Chinese migration.

New Chinese Migration and Its Characteristics

The modernization reform and open-door policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s succeeded in transforming China into an industrialized country within a short few decades. China has become the world's factory, which has needed to look for huge markets for its products. It also requires raw materials, and it exports surplus capital and surplus manpower. 'To go out' (走出去) has become China's new policy. This also coincides with Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI; earlier known as One Belt One Road).[9] Chinese companies have been encouraged to go overseas. Many mainland Chinese also wanted to migrate overseas for a better economic future. All of these serve as the push factors. The outside world, including Southeast Asia, which is rich with natural resources, needs cheap Chinese products and Chinese investments. Developing countries need Chinese technology. Both developed and developing countries also require Chinese students who are now able to pay their fees to receive

tertiary education. All of these serve as pull factors for new Chinese migrants.

These new Chinese migrants include businessmen, professionals, technical workers, teachers, students and those who badly need to have jobs. One major characteristic that was absent in the past is the export of Chinese labourers accompanying large overseas projects. This is because in the past most Western countries did not have enough manpower to be exported to work on overseas projects, especially manual work.

Unlike in the last century and earlier, the focus of Chinese migration is no longer on the 'underdeveloped' Southeast Asia but on the 'developed' West, which includes the United States, Canada, the European Union (including the United Kingdom) and Australia. Approximately eighty per cent of new migrants went to these developed countries, and only about twenty per cent came to Southeast Asia. Moreover, the origins of new migrants are not only from the southern provinces of China but also from the whole of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong.[10]

These migrants are also more educated than earlier migrants. Many are also much wealthier than the previous migrants. Last but not least, unlike the old migrants, who tended to settle down and be assimilated, these new migrants are more mobile and are 'rootless'.[11] The last point is worth elaborating on.

In the past, the pattern of Chinese migrants was either 'returning to original roots' (Luoye guigen, 落叶归根), or 'taking local roots' (Luodi shenggen 落地生根). The new Chinese migrants are a different kettle of fish. They are in a different era and are more mobile and hence they have different sets of mentality. Zhuang Guotu of Xiamen University describes this new phenomenon: they are neither *luoye guigen* nor *luodi shenggen* but searching for a better place all the time.[12] The new migrants tend to have the pattern of 'without roots'—they remain as transnational migrants without any strong commitments to the land they reside in. There is no more full integration or assimilation into local society. Are the new Chinese migrants really completely different from their forefathers in Southeast Asia? This is one of the points we would like to investigate.

Contents of the Book and General Overview

Our book that is in your hands now is on rising China and new Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. It is based on two ISEAS projects that were sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung under the Regional Programme

Political Dialogue Asia. The first project was on new Chinese migrants in mainland Southeast Asia, while the second one covered the whole of Southeast Asia. The papers from these two projects are categorized into four parts in this volume: 1. General overviews; 2. China's soft power, new migrants and local Chinese; 3. New Chinese migrants and local communities; and 4. New Chinese migrants and local economy.

Part One provides an overview of the thematic priorities of the edited volume. The first chapter, written by Leo Suryadinata, addresses the issue of rising China and its new policy towards the Chinese overseas. It argues that Beijing is abandoning *luodi shenggen* and adopting a *luoye guigen* policy, and this policy change coincides with a new wave of *xin yimin* that is branching out to Southeast Asia and the world. The new policy is a call to the Chinese overseas—regardless of citizenship—to orient towards China and to serve (or consider) Beijing's interests. *Huaqiao* and *huaren*, especially people in business, were called upon to help China support the Beijing Olympics, the Belt and Road Initiative, and to return and develop closer links with China. Leo Suryadinata notes that responses from the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have largely been muted, as they have been localized and their identities are shaped by local politics. The chapter concludes that while ties are constantly being built between China and countries in Southeast Asia, China's new policy can problematize ethnic Chinese identities in Southeast Asia, produce ethnic tensions that can undermine domestic political and economic stability, and make it more challenging for new Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia to integrate into local society.

The second chapter, by Terence Chong, studies the 'satellite Chinese' who had their formative years in China and came to the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries from the 2000s onwards. Chong argues that these new satellite Chinese must be understood against the flow of Chinese economic aid through infrastructure development projects that have caused concern over scant benefits for CLMV countries in the extraction of their raw materials and the worry that China's unrestricted lending will undermine international efforts to fight corruption in these countries. While China's economic aid has been accompanied by a policy of non-interference in the affairs of these countries, Chong argues that it has been a crucial political lubricant to ease the flow of sometimes unwanted Chinese labour and presence into the aid-receiving countries. This chapter

concludes with observations on how the satellite Chinese and the flow of Chinese capital have impacted host countries in a variety of ways, including rising property prices and the cost of living, village displacement and environmental degradation, and anxieties over Chinese identity.

China's Soft Power and Local Communities

Part Two deals with China's soft power in Southeast Asia, new Chinese migrants and local communities. It begins with the chapter written by Neo Peng Fu that discusses the presence of the over forty Confucius Institutes in Southeast Asia as a recent phenomenon that has expanded the function and social dynamics of Mandarin teaching in the region. While previously established Chinese schools—such as national or independent schools—catered primarily for ethnic Chinese students, the chapter notes that these Confucius Institutes have been providing language training, teacher training and vocational training for Southeast Asians regardless of ethnicity. The chapter offers detailed examples of the partnerships between local and Chinese universities, overseen by the Confucius Institute headquarters in China, to meet the rising demand for Chinese language classes. The chapter acknowledges that these institutes enhance China's predominance in Southeast Asia by nurturing a pool of Mandarin speakers who will facilitate China's entry into the region. And while the initiative has received some negative attention from several countries, the chapter highlights the positive contributions of these Confucius Institutes such as offering scholarships as an opportunity to pursue further studies overseas, a privilege still beyond the reach of many in the region.

The next chapter by, Vannarith Chheang, explores Cambodian views on China and the Chinese language. The chapter argues that language has been a key tool of China's soft power in the country. Based on his survey conducted on Cambodians who have learned the Chinese language through the Confucius Institutes, the chapter found that the driving forces of learning Chinese were familial relations, personal interest, and the usefulness of the language for employment and business opportunities. The survey respondents' perceptions of new Chinese migration were both positive and negative. Contribution to the local economy and prospects for economic investments were motivating factors. However, there are also negative local perceptions of new Chinese migrants, which include ignorance and lack of interest in Cambodian culture, and concern over the

adverse social and environmental impacts that Chinese investments bring through the gambling industry and the resource-extractive sector. The chapter also shares other results from the survey regarding respondents' perceptions towards the Chinese government and the state of bilateral relations between China and Cambodia.

The establishment of the first Xiamen University overseas campus receives Peter Chang's attention in his chapter on the exemplars of China's expanding soft power in Malaysia and its impacts on the Chinese overseas. It notes that the establishment of Confucius Institutes in Malaysia is much more symbolic of the relationship between Malaysia and China than the promotion of the Chinese language, especially as the country already has an existing vernacular Chinese school system. In particular, the establishment of Xiamen University in Malaysia represents not just China's endeavour in opening up to the world (for example, by accepting international students in its universities) but, more importantly, stepping out to the world by shaping young minds beyond its national borders. The chapter also maintains that Xiamen University should not be understood as a conduit for China's soft power, but as a two-way bridge that strengthens China–Malaysia relations. This could be evinced from the development of Malaysia-oriented courses in Xiamen University, such as the Malaysia Studies Programme that allows Chinese students at Xiamen University Malaysia to learn more about Malaysia. Apart from promoting bilateral ties between China and Malaysia, the chapter also suggests that Xiamen University has potential to strengthen multilateral ties between China, Malaysia and the West, given the rising exposure to higher education in the West among Chinese Malaysian students.

The last chapter in Part Two is on "China Dream and Singapore Heart" written by Ho Yi Kai, which focuses on the setting up and the work of the China Cultural Centre (CCC) in Singapore and the locally established Singapore Chinese Cultural Centre (SCCC). The chapter discusses how the introduction of the two centres into the island state has raised broader questions surrounding 'Singaporean Chinese identity' in relation to 'Chinese identity'. Nevertheless, the chapter notes that the former was meant to reflect the 'China Dream', which meant promoting China's soft power, while the latter reflected 'Singapore Heart', which aimed to build local Chinese culture and cultivate bonds between Chinese and non-Chinese in Singapore. Comparing the activities of these two centres, the chapter observes that while there were some similarities between the work of the

two centres, there were more differences because the centres had different objectives. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that rather than seeing the CCC and the SCCC in competition, these centres exist in complementation as they are significant in catalysing critical questions about *xin yimin* and Chinese identity in Singapore.

New Chinese Migrants and Local Communities

Let us look at Part Three, which deals with New Chinese Migrants and local communities. It starts with the chapter on 'new' and 'old' Chinese communities in Laos jointly written by Bien Chiang and Jean Chihyin Cheng. The chapter argues that the Chinese in the Lao PDR can be divided into two broad categories: those whose families came before the end of World War II and have Laos citizenship (old Chinese); and those who came after the 1990s under the 'Open and Reform' policy and who are mostly Chinese nationals (new Chinese). They are different from the old migrants in life experience, education, business mentality, citizenship and social life. The chapter observes that there is a general perception that the first generation of immigrants usually arrive without the backing of China and are generally better integrated into the local community, which is commonly the case for Chinese arriving in insular Southeast Asian countries in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. This is in contrast to the late comers, who focus more on moneymaking and paying less attention to the need to integrate. This chapter argues that, while it is true that the new Chinese community has little interest in participating in the social production and reproduction of the old Chinese community through ritual practices, the Chinese government has taken a keen interest in the syllabus, administration and operations of Chinese schools in Laos. It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which the Chinese government would prevail in its United Front strategy over education in Laos, and under what circumstances the old Laotian Chinese communities would assert their interests over this traditional Chinese institution.

The second chapter in Part Three is on "*Xin yimin* in the Philippines: Challenges and Opportunities" by Teresita Ang-See. The chapter examines the issue of the influx of new Chinese migrants to the Philippines, which has received negative attention over the last two decades. While improvements in relations between Beijing and Manila brought much welcome increase in investments and infrastructure development, the presidency of Rodrigo

Duterte also saw the influx of Philippine offshore gaming operation (POGO) workers. The chapter argues that the substantial increase in the number of POGO and blue-collar workers in construction and small-time retail-trade businessmen has produced negative sentiments and some negative impacts. The chapter also examines the new norm of social networking and connecting with government agencies by Chinese businessmen and investors, who established different organizations for these purposes. Many hometown associations likewise organized new chambers of commerce in response to China's directive to organize such formations under the Belt and Road Initiative. Teresita Ang-See suggests that the coexistence of these new organizations with the well-established local Chinese associations has created dualism in Philippine Chinese society.

The third chapter in Part Three is Danny Wong's essay on the political economy of transnational new Chinese migrants who arrived in Malaysia following the rise of China and global migration. The chapter explores the various types of new Chinese migrants and argues that most of these migrants do not stay long in Malaysia and, hence, do not intend to integrate into local society. They set up their own organizations and businesses, and the Malaysian government particularly welcomes the Uighur and Hui Chinese, who are Muslims. Like many Chinese new migrants in Southeast Asia, there are also groups of new migrants who are involved in illegal activities. The chapter examines the issue of crime syndicates created by these migrants in Malaysia, which caused concern to the government and which has smeared the reputation of new Chinese migrants.

The fourth chapter is by Leo Suryadinata on the new Chinese migrants who came to Indonesia since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Some came as investors but the majority arrived as migrant workers, mainly working for Chinese companies. According to official figures, in Indonesia alone there are about 35,000 such migrant workers, but many believe that the actual number is much larger. More than 1,000 mainland Chinese companies operate in Indonesia today; some are state-linked enterprises, while others are owned by individuals. About fifty per cent of these companies are located in Java, while the rest can be found in the outer islands. They are mainly in the construction, mining and electronics sectors. The chapter also observes that mainland Chinese students studying in Indonesia have been a source of labour supply for these Chinese companies. The added advantage of these graduates lies in them being familiar with the local environment and in their ability to speak Indonesian.

The relationship between *xin yimin* and Chinese Indonesians are generally not close, especially since the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians have lost an active command of Mandarin. The chapter argues that there is, therefore, a new Chinese migrant community emerging in Indonesia that may come into conflict with Chinese Indonesians who consider these new migrants as competitors. *Xin yimin* may also become an issue for the indigenous population who see them as foreign exploiters.

The last chapter in Part Three is on the elites' perceptions of new Chinese migrants in Indonesia written by Johanes Herlijanto. During President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's term from 2004 to 2014, Indonesia saw enhanced bilateral relations with China, the signing of strategic partnerships, an increase in Chinese economic investments, and also an increase in cultural exchange through the setting up of Confucius Institutes. The chapter notes that negative attitudes towards the new Chinese migrants began after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, which saw an increase in the number of migrants who worked for Chinese companies. These new migrants were perceived as competitors for Indonesian workers. The chapter points out that Indonesian elites harboured suspicions that the new migrants were military personnel seeking to infiltrate Indonesia. Additionally, there were concerns about potential demographic changes with the rise in the number of new migrants. The chapter further argues that the stance of the government has taken on reassurance overtones—that the new Chinese migrants were not a threat to the Indonesian economy or sovereignty. Johanes Herlijanto concludes with an analysis of the perception of new Chinese migrants among Indonesian elites (and the public to an extent) which has become far more negative during President Joko Widodo's term compared to President Yudhoyono's term.

New Chinese Migrants and the Local Economy

Part Four deals with the participation and issues of New Chinese migrants in local economic activities. It focuses on China's close neighbours such as the CLMV countries which see increasing people-to-people exchanges and flows across its shared borders and due to their geographical proximity. It begins with a chapter written by Nguyen Van Chinh on Vietnam–China economic ties and the *xin yimin*. The chapter argues that the restoration of China–Vietnam ties and improvements in economic relations since 1991 have contributed to the large number of new Chinese migrants in

Vietnam. In addition to the business conditions created through China's capital flow of investment, trade and economic aid, Vietnam and Southeast Asia have become ideal destinations for the *xin yimin* as they are able to take advantage of the ready social networks created by the local ethnic Chinese. These new migrants are mainly in the following three categories: contract labourers, traders, and Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioners. Over time, the profile and motivations of new Chinese immigrants have become more diverse and complex. Nguyen Van Chinh argues that while Vietnam has benefitted from the presence of these migrants, their presence has also generated socio-economic problems for, and pressures on, the local economy. The chapter concludes that the Vietnamese government has been reluctant to deal with the migrant problem harshly as it fears this would harm the Vietnamese economy.

The next chapter, by Danielle Tan, examines the history of Chinese business activities in the landlocked Lao PDR and its current developments. Ethnic Chinese communities almost disappeared after the communist forces seized power in Laos in 1975, but they survived due to the thriving caravan trade between Yunnan, China and mainland Southeast Asia. The Greater Mekong Subregion programme, launched by the Asian Development Bank, revitalized these historical trade routes and resulted in thousands of new Chinese migrants pouring on to the new roads of Laos, channelled through the North–South Economic Corridor linking Kunming to Bangkok. While many consider contemporary Laos as a Chinese "shadow state", this chapter argues that China's growing presence is far from eroding the power of the Lao communist regime. Instead, Chinese engagement has allowed the Lao state to cope with the challenges of globalization *and* to maintain its power at the same time. The chapter also highlights Chinese engagement in Laos throughout history by emphasizing recurrent patterns of intermediation. It describes how Chinese networks have become key partners of the Lao state's development policies. However, rising uncertainties over the neighbouring communist ally's economic potential may push China to revise its development strategy in Laos.

Pinkaew Laungaramsri's chapter on "Casino Capitalism, Chinese Special Economic Zone and the making of Neoliberal Border in Northern Laos" examines the case of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GT SEZ) to elucidate the politics of development in post-Socialist Laos. It analyses the collaboration between the Lao state and Chinese developers

to transform the agricultural borderland of Ton Phueng into a new Chinese urban zone using casino capitalism and other shadow economies as the key economic engine. The chapter argues that foreign intervention as carried out by transnational casino capitalists and authorized by the Lao state represents another peculiar mode of government-driven and authoritarian form of neoliberalism. To facilitate economic development, the chapter argues that the Lao state has lent its sovereignty to foreign business counterparts. Chinese enterprises have claimed that they have created employment opportunities, enhanced economic competitiveness, and advanced labour skills to raise the living standards of border communities. However, this chapter shows that such rhetoric legitimizes the appropriation of local resources with unfair compensation while allowing developers to shun their responsibility to local groups.

The next chapter, written by Michiel Verver, examines Old and New Chinese Business in Cambodia's Capital. The chapter argues that China's influence over economic and political affairs in Cambodia is undisputed. China is the biggest investor in Cambodia. Recent Chinese investments and migrants have reinforced Cambodia's established politico-economic order, which is characterized by ethnic Chinese economic dominance as well as a divide between the business-state elite and the general population. Through field work and secondary data, the chapter explores the relationship between the local business community in Phnom Penh—which is historically dominated by old Chinese immigrants and their descendants—and new Chinese migration, business and investments. This chapter also provides a history of the business activities and societal position of old Chinese migrants in Cambodia, while the ensuing empirical sections examine how new Chinese migration and capital have affected the business endeavours of the old Chinese. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the implications of new Chinese migration for Phnom Penh's ethnic Chinese and Cambodian society.

The final chapter is on "Entrepreneurial Excursion: Short-Hop Chinese Migration at the Peripheries of Myanmar" by Andrew Ong. This chapter looks away from the Chinese influx to Myanmar's big cities and turns its attention to entrepreneurial excursions, a lesser-known short-hop migration of Chinese citizens to autonomous zones at the peripheries of Myanmar. Such movement, the chapter argues, is characterized by three migratory factors: low barriers to entry, ambivalence about the permanence of stay, and the prospects for further movement onward into lower Myanmar. The

chapter lays out four different waves of Chinese migration into Myanmar, along with the historical complexities of the Chinese communities in Myanmar. The short-hop Chinese migration is one subgroup of this wider milieu. The chapter briefly describes the different autonomous zones then explores the nature of this short-hop migration—the ease of movement due to alternative legal regimes, the benefits of remaining close to the Chinese border through a 'short-hop', and the networks that give rise to potential further movement into Myanmar. Finally, the chapter concludes with the implications of this form of *xin yimin* to Myanmar, primarily the ambivalent role that their opportunism has in either fragmenting or consolidating Myanmar's national sovereignty and impacting its nation-building processes.

Concluding Remarks

New Chinese migration is a recent development and it has just entered an initial phase. An overarching theme and conclusion across the chapters in this volume is that China policy towards Chinese migrants changes from period to period, and it is still too early for us to see if Beijing will continue to pursue the policy of *luoye guigen* or will return to *luodi shenggen*. The various chapter contributions also show that the profile, motivations and outlook of *xin yimin* have become more diverse, while local reactions to these new migrants have become less accommodating with increasing nationalism.

While Chinese migration is unlikely to cease with the escalation of the rivalry between China and the United States, the new Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia might face new challenges. Perhaps many of them can no longer afford to be transnational. They may have to adjust to the international political developments in order to live in peace and comfort. The relationship between new Chinese migrants and ethnic Chinese who have settled down in Southeast Asia is expected to widen even further, resulting in greater economic and cultural tensions between these two groups and affecting the nation-building process. It can also make it more challenging for new Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia to integrate locally.

The new Chinese migration is still progressing, and China's emerging policy towards Chinese migrants will require us to continue to study and seek a fuller understanding of the socio-dynamics and political economy

of a rising China and the impacts of new Chinese migration. However, the one constant is that Beijing's policy trajectory has always taken a long-term view. When it comes to strengthening its influence, China has proved that it is both patient and persistent.

Notes

1. The periodization of Chinese migration history is based on the outline given by Chen Bisheng (陈碧笙), *Shijie Huaqiao huaren jianshi* (世界华侨华人简史), Xiamen: Xianmendaxue chubanshe (厦门：厦门大学出版社, 1991, pp. 19–21. However, the details are developed by Leo Suryadinata. See his "Chinese Migration in Southeast Asia: Past and Present", *CHC Bulletin* (华裔馆通讯) 9 (May 2007): 1–2.
2. Wang Gungwu, "Sojourning: The Chinese Experience", in *Don't Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese*, by Wang Gungwu (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2001), p. 56.
3. Feng Tianyu (冯天瑜), "Society of Imperial Power: Reinterpreting China's "Feudal Society", *Journal of Chinese Humanities* 1 (2015): 25–50.
4. Wang Gungwu, *Don't Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2001), pp. 54–57.
5. Jian Anzhi (简安志), You 'mingxiang' dao 'mingxiang' kan 17 shiji yuenan 'mingxiang/mingxiang' de luodi shenggen", ("由'明香'到'明乡'看17世纪越南'明香/明乡'的落地生根"), Taiwan dongnanya yanjiu 2012 niandu yantaohui lunwen (台湾东南亚研究 2012 年度研讨会论文), Jinan Daxue (暨南大学), 2–3 May 2012.
6. See Kenneth P. Landon, "The Chinese in Thailand: A Report in the International Research Series of the Institute of Pacific Relations", issued under the auspices of the Secretariat, first published in 1941, reissued by Russel & Russell, 1973, p. 26; Richard Coughlin, *Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1961), p. 86.
7. Edgar Wickberg, "The Chinese in Philippine History", *Asia* 18 (Spring 1970): 1–13.
8. Leo Suryadinata, ed., *Peranakan Chinese in the Era of Globalization* (Singapore: CHC and Baba House, 2010), pp. 41–49.
9. For a brief discussion on BRI and Chinese overseas, see Leo Suryadinata, *The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond* (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017), pp. 167–81.
10. Wang Gungwu, "New Migrants: How New? Why New?", *Asian Culture* 26 (June 2002): 1–12.

11. Wang Gungwu argues that the concept of 'assimilation' for these new migrants is no longer relevant as they are very mobile. Ibid.
12. Zhuang Guotu (庄国土), Zhongguo xin yimin yu dongnanya huaren wenhua (中国新移民与东南亚华人文化), *CHC Bulletin* (华裔馆通讯), 9 (May 2007): 10.