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THE 2019 INDONESIAN ELECTIONS: A POLITICAL DÉJÀ VU?

Made Supriatma and Hui Yew-Foong

On 17 April 2019, Indonesians marched to the polls to elect their president and vice president directly for the fourth time since direct election of the highest offices of Indonesia was introduced in 2004. And for the first time, concurrently, Indonesians had to elect 575 members of the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), 136 members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), and 19,722 members of the regional legislatures (2,207 members of the provincial legislature and 17,515 members of the district/municipal legislatures) (BPS 2019, p. 26). While this combination of elections was a major historical undertaking, attention was more focused on the presidential election, not just because the presidential office holds significant executive powers, but also because the key contenders were the same as those for the last presidential election.

The incumbent, President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), had to face off against the same rival, former army general and founder of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia

Raya or Gerindra), Prabowo Subianto. Although the vice-presidential candidates were different—Jokowi picked Muslim cleric Ma'ruf Amin while Prabowo settled on the successful self-made businessman Sandiaga Uno—the political support bases did not differ significantly from the last contest five years before. In fact, we could make the case, based on the electoral outcome, that the polarization between the two camps of supporters—loosely framed as Islamic moderates-pluralists and Islamic conservatives—had intensified. No doubt, this is in large part due to the curious fact that the key players and dynamics of Indonesia's political major league had remained largely unchanged, such that the same pair of frontrunners had emerged again. It is in this vein that we may consider the 2019 elections as the Jokowi–Prabowo elections 2.0, and it is the objective of this volume to unravel the dynamics of the elections.

The aforementioned polarization, or the emergence of an ideological divide among voters, was already apparent during the first Jokowi–Prabowo presidential race in 2014. Jokowi had more sway among moderate Muslims and ethnic and religious minorities, who preferred a more pluralist Indonesia. In contrast, Prabowo garnered more votes from conservative Muslims, who desired a more extensive role for Islam in Indonesia's social and political life. This remains a working characterization for now, as the boundary between moderate and conservative Muslims is not easy to clearly define. While in the economy of political signs, Jokowi had come to be associated with Islamic moderates and pluralists and Prabowo with Islamic conservatives, how these signs structured the Indonesian body politic continued to be fluid, and part of the political contest was to navigate this fluidity successfully.

Maneuvers along these lines that could be considered the first salvo for the second Jokowi–Prabowo contest took place during the campaign for the governorship of Jakarta in 2016. The incumbent Chinese Christian governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok), was accused of blasphemy against Islam due to his comments over a Quranic verse in September 2016. This led to mass demonstrations against Ahok, the most prominent of which was the protest at Merdeka Square in Jakarta on 2 December 2016. In the run-off election held on 19 April 2017, Ahok lost to former education and culture minister

Anies Baswedan. A *kafir* commenting on the holy Quran was an act that crossed the line and made it necessary for Islam to be defended. On 9 May 2017, Ahok was found guilty of blasphemy against Islam and sentenced to two years in jail. Seen as an ally of Jokowi, Ahok's defeat and incarceration were considered political setbacks for what Jokowi stood for, and signs that conservative Islam could not be ignored as a political force.

Jokowi's association with Ahok, his alleged liaisons with communist (read atheist) China, and the banning of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in July 2017 fed rumours and assertions that Jokowi was anti-Islam. Thus, declaring Ma'ruf Amin, chairman of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) and one of the leaders of the 2 December 2016 mass protest, as his vice-presidential running mate in August 2018, though not an original choice, was nevertheless a convenient choice that boosted Jokowi's Islamic credentials. Prabowo, on the other hand, could shun the clerics and adopt a businessman, not least because the conservative Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) were already on his side.

Official campaigning started on 23 September 2018 and both sides went all out to reach the 192.8 million eligible voters. Needless to say, political rallies and social media were some of the main channels for reaching the electorate of the vast archipelagic nation, but the five televised debates between the candidates from January to April 2019 also garnered significant attention as the campaigns gained momentum (see "2019 Indonesian Elections Timeline", this volume).

Opinion polls conducted in March 2019 showed that the Jokowi–Ma'ruf Amin pair had a lead of 18–20 per cent over their opponents (Hui et al. 2019). On polling day, the elections went smoothly and no serious incidents were reported. Eventually, the General Elections Commission declared Jokowi–Ma'ruf Amin the winners on 21 May 2019 with 55.5 per cent of the votes. Compared to 2014, Jokowi had extended his lead over Prabowo to 11 per cent, an increase of 2.35 per cent. Moreover, if we apply broad strokes of interpretation, and consider Central Java, East Java, Kalimantan (except South Kalimantan) and eastern Indonesia as signifying support for moderate Islam-pluralism, and Sumatra, West Java, Banten, and parts of Sulawesi as signifying

conservative Islam, then we see that the ideological divide first seen in 2014 has intensified in 2019 (see Figure 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1
Support for Jokowi and Prabowo across provinces in 2014 and 2019



After the General Elections Commission announced the results of the presidential election, Prabowo's supporters led protests that ended up with riots in downtown Jakarta lasting two days (Supriatma 2019). As was the case in 2014, Prabowo challenged the results via the Constitutional Court, but once again, lost the court battle.

Where the parliamentary elections were concerned, the biggest winners were the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) with 19.33 per cent, Gerindra with 12.57 per cent and the Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar) with 12.31 per cent. These parties, together with six other parties that passed the threshold of four per cent to obtain seats in the national parliament, will continue to serve as gatekeepers of the

Indonesian political scene, since legislative powers and the power to nominate future presidential candidates remain in their hands.

While Indonesian politics is not only about the presidential election, the presidential election and its outcome do have significant ramifications for Indonesian politics. This volume seeks to unravel the multidimensional aspects of the 2019 elections. Although the spotlight may be given to the rematch between Jokowi and Prabowo, the volume will also reflect on the larger political ecology and latest developments in Indonesia's electoral politics. Part I of the volume will examine some of the larger themes that pervade the elections, such as the state of Indonesian democracy, the role of elite clique rule, the influence of data analytics and cyber-tactics in electoral strategies, and the impact of disinformation. Part II will highlight the roles of particular constituencies in the campaigns, including social or mass organizations (*ormas*), unions, women, and the ethnic Chinese minority. Part III will showcase regional dynamics, especially in Java, Madura and Sumatra. In the tradition of area studies, this volume harnesses insights from different disciplines to enrich our understanding of Indonesia's 2019 elections.

COMPARING 2014 AND 2019: ELITES, STAGNATION AND CYBER-POLITICS

There are several immediate observations we can make concerning the 2019 elections in comparison with the 2014 elections. Although we have suggested that the 2019 elections could be considered an extension of the 2014 elections, it would be more accurate to think of 2014 as a reference point for understanding 2019, so that we remain sensitive to the changes and not simply read 2019 as a replay of 2014. One main difference is that by 2019, Jokowi was running as the incumbent and part of the Indonesian political establishment, rather than as a new actor and rising star of Indonesia's political scene.[1]

In 2014, Jokowi was seen as a fresh face in Indonesian politics. He represented an alternative to the Jakarta establishment and the possibility for change. As an SME businessman without political lineage, Jokowi benefitted from the post-*Reformasi*[2] decentralization of Indonesia and became the first directly elected mayor of Solo (Surakarta) by defeating the incumbent at the polls. His success at running the Solo

municipality increased his national visibility and he was nominated to contest the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012, which he won, and again, by defeating the incumbent.[3] Jokowi's meteoric rise from outside the political establishment led to him being seen as a prospective reformer. He attracted activists who had longed for changes, changes that were yet to be fulfilled through the *Reformasi*.[4]

As an outsider to the Jakarta ruling clique, Jokowi did not pursue his presidential bid as a key leader of a political party.[5] He joined PDIP in 2004, a year before he ran for mayor in his hometown Surakarta. He campaigned through volunteer teams and did not rely too much on support from political parties and their campaign machinery. Even though he is formally a member of the PDIP, Jokowi is not seen as a representative of the party.[6]

Although Jokowi made a successful bid for the presidency through the popular vote in 2014, his political honeymoon was short-lived, and he had to face significant challenges. Among them was the coagulation of conservative Islamic elements, which led to the ousting of Ahok (mentioned earlier) and thereby the loss of influence from a close ally in the nation's capital. Conservative Islam became a position from which opposition to Jokowi was staged, eventually leading to support for Prabowo's second joust with Jokowi for the presidency in 2019.

While Prabowo was a frontrunner in consolidating his position with the support of Islamic hardliners and some retired generals, there were other challengers as well, such as then military chief-of-staff General Gatot Nurmantyo, who was baring his political ambitions even while he was still active in the military. Jokowi countered Gatot's political maneuvers[7] by aligning himself with the police.[8] As a result, Jokowi was criticized for using police powers to suppress opposition, and such use of police powers was seen as excessive and a violation of democratic norms.

The use of the instruments of government to crush political opposition and activists have generated criticism from pundits and scholars who argued that Indonesian democracy under Jokowi was undergoing a setback (Warburton and Aspinall 2019; Power and Warburton 2020; Aspinall et al. 2019), with some describing it as democratic stagnation or even regression (Diamond and Plattner 2015; Diamond 2020).[9] Noor (Chapter 2) highlights this concern with "democratic stagnation" in the context of the elections, especially in

terms of the roles played by political parties, state agencies responsible for elections, political education and civil society.

Yet, it is also true that such institutional regression, as observed by these analysts, has developed in tandem with the increasing division of society along religious and primordial lines, which in turn has hampered the ability of civil society to engage through more democratic norms (Mietzner 2020). Given the circumstances, it is fortunate that no institution or individual has been strong enough to capture the state, or for that matter, put post-1998 electoral reforms on a regressive path and bring back New Order electoral practices.

To put the regression thesis in context, we do have to recognize that Jokowi shot onto the political scene as an outlier that directly challenged the post-*Reformasi* oligarchic elite, which had been forced to work together in spite of how fractious Indonesian politics was in order to maximize their shared interests (Winters 2012; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Ford and Pepinsky 2014). Max Lane (Chapter 3) argues that Indonesian elites (which he calls *cliques*) have created unwritten "rules of the game", whereby they hold power collectively and rule over the masses. In the larger picture of this power matrix, Jokowi had been co-opted due to his ability to mobilize voters independently, although he did face opposition from certain sectors of the oligarchic elite. Ahok's defeat, through the mobilization of conservative Islamic forces by a faction of this elite, may be seen as the outcome of this opposition. Jokowi responded by using the police to weaken the opposition and silence critics, and forming his own clique within elite circles. Eventually, in his bid for re-election, Jokowi was no longer touted as a reformer that challenged elite politics, but became part of the establishment with the majority of political parties firmly behind him.

For 2019, the "rules of the game" had also changed with the advent and use of new technologies, such that Okamoto and Kameda (Chapter 4) argue that the 2019 presidential election was Indonesia's first "full-fledged cyber election". In a post-truth Indonesia, it is not only that disinformation abounds in the online election campaigns and campaign teams have to discern the real facts and voices of voters amidst the cyber noise, but new tools employing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to sift through big data and execute micro-targeting have become part of the political arsenal.

Indeed, much of politics now takes place online, but with offline implications. Temby (Chapter 5) examines how, in the aftermath of the elections, disinformation related to the outcome ("stolen election") and drawing on anti-Chinese and religious sentiments fuelled protests and riots on 21–23 May 2019. It seems then, that cyber-politics has taken on a life of its own, and will remain a tactical playing field for the future of Indonesian politics.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND BEYOND: *ORMAS*, UNIONS, WOMEN AND THE CHINESE

What is connecting the elites who want to be elected to public office and the masses who will elect them? This question brings to the fore one of the most important institutions linking the elite and masses, namely, political parties. As chapters in this volume will reveal, the salience of political parties varies across campaigns. The Jokowi camp, for example, used less party machineries than Prabowo, as Jokowi relied more on volunteers to gear up his campaign (Lay 2018; Suaedy 2014; Mietzner 2014). But even Prabowo's campaign was not fully engaging with parties within his coalition, except for Gerindra, the party he established and chaired.[10]

In the contest for legislative seats, candidates have to form their own campaign teams to reach out to voters. In most cases, legislative candidates fund their own campaigns. The 2019 legislative election was different from previous elections. Candidates had to compete, not only against candidates from other parties, but also from their own party.[11] Intra- and inter-party competition had made it more difficult to be elected, and hindered candidates from the same party from working together. As a consequence, legislative candidates had also become less reliant on party support and what mattered more was material resources for running campaigns.

A party stalwart may not get a nomination if she/he has no resources for campaigning, and it is common for parties to nominate outsiders as candidates for elections.[12] Such candidates usually join parties nearer to the nomination date.[13] While ideal candidates are usually those with high electability, such as public figures and celebrities, there are many cases where candidates with deep pockets can gain the party ticket. Thus, elections often involve financial transactions, where vote

buying or trading votes for material benefits is common in Indonesia (Muhtadi 2019). Political parties have come to be seen not so much as institutions based on ideology where cadres are educated and offered a path to political office, but more as organizations for extending the reach of the elite from the national to the local level (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; Mietzner 2013).

Aside from political parties, there are also organizations known as *ormas* (*organisasi kemasyarakatan* or mass/social organizations). Some *ormas* are affiliated with political parties but many are not, and just like political parties, they vary ideologically.[14] Although most *ormas* are officially non-political, they are nevertheless politically significant and politicians tend to solicit their support. One example is the women's organization affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) known as Fatayat,[15] which was partly responsible for Jokowi's landslide victories in Central and East Java (see Budi Irawanto, Chapter 12).

Ian Wilson (Chapter 6) offers a glimpse into how *ormas* as a constituency are playing a strategic political role at street level in Jakarta by trading influence for the benefit of the organization and their leaders. Wilson studies the case of Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR), which endorsed Prabowo in 2014 but shifted their support to Jokowi in 2019. This was due to the threat posed by their rival FPI, which had gained a leading position within the hardline Islamic community and among Prabowo's supporters. By aligning themselves with Jokowi, PP and FBR were seeking to strengthen their position as *ormas* and regain their spots in the political limelight.

Unions are another constituency that has been asserting its influence on electoral politics. After being suppressed during the New Order, union politics have been revived in recent years. Amalinda Savirani (Chapter 7) relates how union members were mobilized and tried to capture power at the local level in Bekasi, West Java. Although this was an industrial region where union influence was more pronounced, union nominees had limited success in both the elections for local executive leaders and legislatures. Part of the constraint comes from the challenge of articulating interests beyond unions to win voters in the same geographical region with different socio-economic and political concerns. Moreover, as nominees need to run on a party ticket to enter the electoral race, they also need to contend with the tension between party interests and union interests. In short, where political

representation is organized geographically, unions, in representing the interests of a cross-section of the population, will continue to find difficulty in securing their political footing.

Another cross-section of the electorate that has often been left out of the dialogue on Indonesian politics is women. Dyah Ayu Kartika (Chapter 8) fills this gap by discussing how women's groups across the political spectrum were negotiating the moderate-conservative Islam divide discussed earlier in this chapter. In particular, Kartika delves into social media and *majlis taklim* (Islamic study groups) as critical arenas for such negotiations, focusing on women-centred moral issues, and reflects on the prospects for Islamic feminism in Indonesia.

Leo Suryadinata (Chapter 9) considers the role of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesian politics. With the democratization of the political arena in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, Chinese Indonesians have been participating much more actively in politics, both formally as electoral candidates, and informally through civil society. While Chinese Indonesians have had some success in getting elected, they find that, as with the union representatives, they had to embrace much broader interests than that of a particular cross-section of the Indonesian population in order to remain relevant to their supporters.

REGIONAL DYNAMICS

As a vast archipelagic nation that had introduced extensive regional autonomy policies since 1999, such that regional politics can differ significantly, studies into electoral politics in Indonesia that consider only the aggregate without examining the fine grain of regional dynamics will miss the complex cultural political character of Indonesia. Indeed, candidates have to juggle this cultural political complexity with finesse in order to gain success at the polls. As the 2019 elections include not only the presidential election, but the election of legislative representatives at the national, provincial and district levels as well, we have to ask if these elections at different levels have an influence on each other? In particular, does the presidential election, which attracts the most attention and is the most divisive, have an effect on the other elections?

Four chapters in this volume give us the fine-grained picture from the regions. Irawanto (Chapter 10) introduces us to the battleground

of Central Java, the most homogenous province in Indonesia with 97.72 per cent Javanese (Arifin et al. 2015). Stakes were high as Prabowo established his campaign headquarters in Solo, Jokowi's home ground and PDIP's electoral stronghold. This blatant challenge, as Irawanto suggests, "awakened the sleeping bull" and galvanized the PDIP and Jokowi's supporters to campaign with gusto. These efforts, together with the support of NU, Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, and Ganjar Pranowo, Central Java's governor and Jokowi's ally, eventually gave Jokowi a landslide victory of 77.7 per cent of the votes in the province, an 11.02 per cent increase compared to 2014. At the same time, while the symbiotic relationship between Jokowi and the PDIP in Central Java had led to big wins for PDIP parliamentary candidates, other parties in Jokowi's coalition were not able to benefit as much from the so-called coat-tail effects as the province remains very much the electoral base of the PDIP.

The picture is significantly different in Madura, an island off the coast of East Java. Although the Madurese are known for being staunch supporters of the NU, which in turn was firmly behind Jokowi's candidature since one of its key leaders Ma'ruf Amin had been selected as Jokowi's vice-presidential candidate, Jokowi was still unable to bag the majority of votes in Madura. Ahmad Najib Burhani (Chapter 11) explains that this was due to the overwhelming influence of local leaders and *kiai* (religious teachers), such that the political stance of NU at the national level bore little relevance for the Madurese voters. Other factors that weighed in was the rising influence of the FPI in Madura, the growth of conservatism, and the sway held by big *pesantren* (Islamic schools). The Madura case demonstrates how local dynamics can run counter to and challenge national directives, and the deeply steeped role of religious patrons in influencing political behaviour.

Beyond Java, Sumatra offers glimpses into how the electoral contest unfolded in other key battlegrounds. North Sumatra, which has the highest concentration of Christians (31 per cent) among the ten provinces of Sumatra, set the stage for what Deasy Simandjuntak (Chapter 12) calls "religious binarism", resulting in Muslim districts on the east coast voting overwhelmingly for Prabowo, while the Christian districts on the west coast supported Jokowi. This "religious binarism" in turn plays out the moderate Islam-pluralist and conservative Islam dichotomy pervading the national electoral scene that we have highlighted earlier

in this chapter. Eventually, Jokowi won a majority in the province with 52.32 per cent of the votes, but this was lower than the 55.24 per cent share that he achieved in 2014. Where parliamentary elections were concerned, the debates were focused more on money politics issues. Nevertheless, Simandjuntak suggests that the mobilization of religious sentiments will continue to feature heavily in elections involving religiously heterogenous regions in Indonesia.

Made Supriatma's (Chapter 13) findings in South Sumatra and Lampung were similar. While identity politics and ideology were decisive factors for the presidential election, what mattered for the legislative elections were candidates' personal appeal and the material benefits they could share with voters. In other words, while the presidential election operates on a more abstract level for most voters, parliamentary elections signify more immediate material concerns and voters' approach tend to be more pragmatic.

AFTERWORD

This volume highlights both the broad strokes of prevailing themes in the 2019 Indonesian elections as well as portraits of how local electoral scenes unfold, sometimes in tandem with and sometimes counter to the prevailing narratives. This complexity, embedded in the cultural politics of Indonesia, gives us insights into the parameters that define Indonesian politics, and why it developed the way it did.

After the dust had settled where the elections were concerned, Jokowi invited Prabowo to join his cabinet in the heavyweight post of Defence Minister. Subsequently, Jokowi also invited Sandiaga Uno to assume the position of Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy. Both had obliged, and we have the unique picture, in Indonesia, of erstwhile political opponents serving in the same cabinet. It seems that the political bifurcation that had polarized Indonesia had merely served the positioning of candidates in the economy of signs. Or, conversely, the current rapprochement is merely a veneer stretched over deep cracks that will surface again in future political jousts.

One is tempted to see Indonesian politics as a perennial shadow play repeating scripted themes that the audience does not tire of. Jokowi, who had shot onto the political scene out of left field, is now part of the political establishment and few would still see him

as a reformer. In fact, with his son and son-in-law contesting and winning the seats of mayor in Solo and Medan respectively in the December 2020 regional elections, he is seen to have joined the elites in the practice of safeguarding their political legacies through dynastic politics (Wilson and Hui 2020).

However, such developments should not deter us from seeing what is possibly new in Indonesian politics. For one, post-*Reformasi* political decentralization and democratization had made it possible for someone without political lineage like Jokowi to challenge the elites and win the highest office in Indonesia, which would have been quite unthinkable previously. Moreover, as demonstrated in this volume, the online world and social media have disrupted political engagement to the extent that shadow play has to assume an online mode and be executed with greater sophistry in today's political contests. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted business and politics as usual, and the new political normal that will shape the 2024 elections, where a new generation of politicians will be vying for Indonesia's top offices, is still evolving.

Indonesian democracy is treading its own path, sometimes in ways similar to other democracies, and sometimes with its own unique character. Like some other democracies, democratic dynasties (Chandra 2016), such as those in India, whereby political parties are dominated by dynasts or clans, are being perpetuated in Indonesia. At the same time, we see polarization and elite unity coexisting in Indonesian politics—the elite polarizing the masses but at the same time working together to advance their interests. Thus, paradoxically, while polarization could potentially destabilize Indonesian politics, elites compromising among themselves and bringing about stability will continue to be a feature of the political scene.

NOTES

1. When running for president in 2014, Jokowi was supported by a minority of parties in the parliament. The so-called *Koalisi Indonesia Hebat*, supported by five political parties (PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura and PKPI), controlled 208 seats (37.1 per cent) in parliament. Meanwhile his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, brought together *Koalisi Merah Putih*, which consisted of six parties (Gerindra, Golkar, PPP, PAN, PKS, PBB) that controlled 353 seats

(62.9 per cent) in parliament. In 2019, however, President Jokowi built a huge coalition known as *Indonesia Maju*, which consisted of the majority of parties in parliament (PDIP, Golkar, PKB, Nasdem, PPP, PKPI, PBB, PSI, Perindo). Together, these parties controlled 338 parliamentary seats (60.3 per cent). Meanwhile, Prabowo was supported by the *Indonesia Adil Makmur* coalition, comprising of five political parties (Gerindra, Democrat, PAN, PKS, and Berkarya), which controlled 222 (39.7 per cent) seats in parliament.

2. The *Reformasi*, or Reform Movement, took place with the fall of Suharto in 1998, leading to the democratization of Indonesian politics and the implementation of policies related to regional autonomy.
3. On Jokowi's political career, see Bland (2020).
4. Many activists were attracted to Jokowi because he promoted a clean and efficient government. He also promised to solve major cases of human rights violations such as finding activists who had disappeared during 1996–97 before the fall of Suharto. However, this hope was dashed because, after coming to power, Jokowi inducted people suspected of being perpetrators of gross human rights violations, such as General Wiranto, into his administration.
5. Right after this election in 2014, groups of volunteers urged him to establish a political party, but he refused.
6. After being elected president in 2014, Megawati Sukarnoputri, PDIP chairwoman, called Jokowi a "party officer". However, Jokowi showed his independence from the PDIP when he governed, and it was clear that the influence of the party was secondary.
7. Gatot Nurmantyo had openly used his post to pursue his political ambitions. He built his political capital through speaking circuits to students in major universities in Indonesia. He specifically spoke about the "proxy wars" that were carried out by the world's great powers against Indonesia. The proxy war theory, which was more like a conspiracy theory, had raised Nurmantyo's political prospects. On Nurmantyo's political ambitions, see Wangge (2018).
8. Under Jokowi, the Indonesian police had received special privileges, which were not given by previous administrations. Their budget had burgeoned, and their generals were appointed to several strategic positions that in the past were usually filled by army generals. Their role in Indonesia's body politic had expanded through laws involving defamation and insults to the head of state, as well as the Law on Internet and Electronic Transactions (UU ITE). See Supriatma (2020).
9. In fact, Aspinall, Mietzner and Tomsa (2015) had observed that Indonesia was already experiencing democratic stagnation under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jokowi's immediate predecessor.

10. See Supriatma (Chapter 13).
11. Mietzner (2020, p. 191) argues that the use of an open proportional system increases the personalization of elections. In the absence of robust financing for political parties, which is deliberately conditioned by party elites, candidates have to bear the campaign costs themselves. It is not unusual for candidates to get their election funds from oligarchs or from corrupt practices. Thus, the role of political parties becomes weak. As Aspinall and Berenschot (2019, p. 7) note, the role of parties is often reduced to just a "toll keeper", selling nominations to candidates but not helping them much in campaigning or controlling their behaviour when elected and serving their term. What matters most is not political parties but patronage networks that connect the elites and the constituents.
12. The practice is not limited to legislative elections. Even in regional leader elections, the selection of a candidate involved outsiders who are willing to pay a "dowry" (*mahar*) to political parties. A candidate also has to pay *mahar* to each party in his coalition.
13. For example, Jokowi only became a member of PDIP less than a year before the Surakarta mayoral election in 2005.
14. See for example Ryter (2001) on Pemuda Pancasila; Wilson (2006) on Front Pembela Islam; Kingsley (2012) on Amphibi religious *ormas* in Lombok; and also Wilson (2015) on varieties of civilian organized violent organizations.
15. On Fatayat, see Arnez (2010).

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