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BEYOND SECURITIZATION: GOVERNING NTS ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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1.1   Introduction

The Southeast Asian region provides a good test bed to examine how non-traditional security (NTS) issues have been governed. Over the past two decades, the region had experienced a number of crises that have had significant impact on the security agenda of states and the nature of multilateral security and development cooperation that have evolved within and beyond Southeast Asia. Among the most consequential crises that have occurred were the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the health emergencies caused by SARS epidemic in 2003 and H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2005, the catastrophic devastations brought on by large-scale natural disasters like Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, the multi-faceted impact of the transboundary haze in 2015 and the escalation of the Rohingya refugee issue in 2017. While these security problems are typically non-military in nature, they are referred to as NTS issues since they are found to gravely threaten the

survival and well-being of states and societies.[1] There is increasing and disquieting evidence that the impact of NTS issues like climate change and its attendant threats, forced migration, and emerging infectious diseases, among others, threatens the lives of countless vulnerable communities and risks the future progress upon which societies across the world depend on. To be sure, these kinds of issues have seriously challenged regional stability, peace and security. More importantly, these concerns have raised questions on how security is governed from the national, regional and even to the global level, and consequently brought to scrutiny the kinds of policies and institutions that have been developed to address them.

The impact of NTS has led a number of scholars in Southeast Asia and other subregions in Asia to examine why and how certain issues should be securitized, and analyse how they pose a threat to state and human security. Many of these studies have also proposed measures on how governments and regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could deal with NTS threats more effectively.[2] But beyond the academic institutions, it is also useful to note that since the early 2000s, NTS has started to find traction among the policy community in the region. Moreover, NTS has started to appear in the security lexicon of ASEAN. One of the early documents that reflects this is the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues adopted by ASEAN and China in 2002.[3]

More than ten years on, the NTS language is now widely used in the official documents in ASEAN and the broader East Asia. Beyond official pronouncements, progress can also be seen in the way the region has responded to NTS challenges, evidenced by a variety of regional arrangements that were established in ASEAN and with its dialogue partners. For example, in July 2005, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) to better respond to catastrophic natural disasters. In 2007, the ASEAN+3 Emerging Infectious Diseases Programme was initiated to enhance regional cooperation in dealing with emerging infectious diseases. An array of related agreements was reached to combat the chronic problem of transboundary haze, like the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, the 2003 ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative, and the 2005 ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy.[4]

In spite of the progress made in establishing relevant regional mechanisms and spending efforts at better policy planning and coordination to deal with NTS issues, the changing dynamics in managing these threats as well as the emergence of new NTS challenges have put more pressures on finding better ways to govern NTS. For instance, there are increasing demands to protect the marine environment against the effects of climate change and increasing use of the regional seas including maritime traffic. This has led to the adoption of the ASEAN-China Declaration for A Decade of Coastal and Marine Environmental Protection in the South China Sea in 2017 and the East Asia Summit Leaders' Statement on Combating Marine Plastic Debris in 2018. However, the unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been hampering regional coordination and cooperation. Meanwhile, the cross-cutting impact of other NTS threats are also becoming more apparent and increasingly affecting many vulnerable communities. For example, rising sea levels and increasing frequency of extreme weather events from climate change have aggravated food and water insecurities in parts of Asia. Health security is also seriously challenged by the expansion of slums in Asia's mega-cities. As a consequence of rising urbanization, new health problems arise as critical infrastructure for sewage and waste management are not adequately in place.

Against this background, the main objective of this book is to examine the current state of governance of NTS challenges confronting the ASEAN region. By presenting selected NTS issues such as climate change, food security, environmental protection, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, health security, nuclear security, and human trafficking and forced displacement, the book aims to identify some of the major gaps and challenges in the governance of these issues. Given the growing complexity of NTS issues, we argue that the governance of NTS issues becomes even more compelling. Going beyond securitization, governing NTS must now focus on building capacity and improving mechanisms that deal with NTS. Within the context of Southeast Asia, this further means deepening regional cooperation and strengthening regional institutions. All these are the critical agendas that call for action in ASEAN.

We begin this introductory chapter with a short overview of the development of NTS as a concept and an approach and draw the linkages between NTS and security governance. We examine these

linkages within the Southeast Asian context. The chapter concludes by highlighting some of the key findings of the case studies in this book and their implications on crafting the NTS agenda for action in ASEAN.

1.2   Non-Traditional Security in Asia

Revisiting NTS as a Concept and Approach

A question often asked with regard to non-traditional security is how this concept sits with the other familiar concepts of security in Asia like comprehensive security, cooperative security and human security. For a start, it is useful to note that for many post-colonial, developing states in Asia, the organizing concept of security has been comprehensive security. It is an expanded security concept that goes beyond the traditional preoccupation with military threats to national security to include political, economic and socio-cultural issues. Since the mid-1990s, however, there have been many scholars who have criticized the state-centric focus of comprehensive security contending that it was no longer reflective nor adequate to address the kinds of security challenges to states and societies brought on by a significantly changed international environment. It was during this period, when the concept of human security emerged that challenged the state-centric approach to security and laid an important foundation for the emergence of the NTS discourse.[5]

The human security concept pays particular attention to the security threats faced by individuals, communities and societies, which were often lost in the state-centric analysis of security. By recasting the security referent to individuals/communities instead of the state, and reframing the questions from "what is security" to "who is to be secured and from what?"—human security highlights the kinds of issues, insecurities and vulnerabilities faced by people from all walks of life, and sheds light on the nature of security practices that could be detrimental to ensuring human security for all. The human security approach also problematizes the role of the state as the only provider of security since there are times when the state and/or state action causes human insecurities. It is in safeguarding and guaranteeing human security where cooperative security approaches not only among state actors but also non-state actors become even more important.[6]

NTS shares the conceptual space of human security, in that it does not confine the remit of security to traditional, state-centric threats which are often military in nature. However, NTS does not privilege only individuals as the main security referent, but regards both referents—state and individuals—as not mutually exclusive. Both security referents need to feel secure since a state that is insecure will not be able to provide for the well-being and security of its people. NTS therefore recognizes the role of the state as the primary provider of human security while, at the same time, is mindful of how state apparatuses when misused can be a threat and/or detrimental to human security. Like human security, NTS helps to broaden and deepen the understanding of security and the role that actors, both state and non-state, can play in providing and ensuring security.[7]

NTS and the Process of Securitization

The development of NTS scholarship has drawn from the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School in understanding why and how certain issues become security threats to states and individuals/communities. The securization theory of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde points to the critical role of the speech act in framing an issue as an existential threat to a referent's survival and well-being. The purpose of the speech act is to convince an audience about an existential threat and construct an inter-subjective understanding within and among constituencies about the implications of a particular threat and to agree on the necessary policies and emergency measures needed to address it.[8] In the domestic domain, particularly liberal democracies, the general public's acceptance that an issue poses an existential threat to a referent object is an important criteria for a securitization process to succeed. This also includes getting the public's support for certain policies and measures to be adopted. Even in non-liberal states, the public's response to securitization matter especially when urgent policy responses to an existential threat requires not only rapid mobilization of resources but also introducing extraordinary measures like compulsory quarantine during an epidemic outbreak. Securitization constitutes a key step to gaining legitimacy and public support, which in turn become bases for maintaining public trust and accountability.

The nature and extent of securitization are also context specific, heavily influenced by the kind of political and security environment

at the national, regional and international levels. Quite often, the process(es) of securitization is easier to do for countries belonging to the same region that face common security threats. Geographic proximity and close socio-economic ties enable states and communities to present their case for securitizing a particular issue—environmental protection, population displacement, health emergency, etc., convince their constituencies and persuade the relevant authorities to take immediate action to respond to such a threat. The appropriation of the language of security, through the securitization process, therefore allows for designating an issue/or sets of issues as security challenges, elevating them to high politics and into the national and regional security agenda.

There have been abundant examples of countries in Southeast Asia and the wider region invoking the language of NTS at the national and regional levels. Many state leaders in ASEAN and East Asia declared the SARS epidemic as an issue of national and international security. At the height of its outbreak in 2003, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared that the situation in China remained "grave", and that "the health and security of the people, overall state of reform, development, and stability, and China's national interest and international image [were] at stake".[9] Similarly, then Chinese President Hu Jintao referred to environmental pollution, major natural disasters and pandemics as NTS issues in his address at the 2008 APEC summit in Peru after the Wenchuan earthquake earlier that year.[10] President Benigno Aquino declared a state of calamity after Typhoon Haiyan landed in the central Philippines on 7 November 2013 and left a trail of devastation resulting in huge human casualties and destruction of properties. In brief, the securitization of NTS issues has in effect laid the foundation for exploring pathways of improving security governance in the region.

Growing Complexity of NTS Challenges

As noted above, many NTS issues are often interlocking, with one being the cause or multiplier of another. Climate change, which is considered a threat multiplier, is a good example to illustrate this. In the 2018 Global Risks Report by the World Economic Forum, climate change was ranked highest in the list of global risks in terms of likelihood and impact. It is also noteworthy that failure of climate mitigation and adaptation is among the top five global risks. Further,

the latest report released in October 2018 by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), titled *Global Warming of 1.5°C*, has warned that our planet is on the way to the 1.5°C limit and that the sustained trend of global warming has shown no sign of relenting. Effects of climate change like the increase of the frequency of extreme weather events have serious implications for public health, water and food availability and the ecosystem. The impact of climate change on the environment such as desertification of land, drying up of rivers and bleaching of corals are extremely consequential to humanity but are proving difficult to reverse or repair. Rising sea levels threaten the future of states in low-lying areas, not to mention the very existence and identity of people living in these states. The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has warned that the interconnection of megatrends like food insecurity and water crises with climate change and people's movements are becoming more acute and creating situations where more people are displaced and more tensions and conflicts can emerge.

Aside from climate change, infectious diseases are a serious threat to global security. In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1308 which recognized the HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security. The resolution expressed concern that the spread of HIV/AIDS constituted a potential risk to the health of UN peacekeepers and the support personnel. The threat became more vivid recently with the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa between 2014 and 2015 that took away over 11,000 lives. These cases show that non-military issues of global concern can be as destructive as military conflicts.

Compounding the complexity of NTS issues is their transborder impact. A number of transboundary crises in recent years has shown that it is difficult to contain the impact of an NTS problem within national borders. For instance, transboundary haze has been a chronic problem that has affected several Southeast Asian countries. The recent major episode that occurred in 2013 saw the Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reading in Singapore reaching a record high of 401. The haze was caused by large-scale forest fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra in Indonesia and in some parts of Malaysia, often started by the unregulated slash and burn practices of farmers and worsened by dry weather conditions.[11] The same is true for cases of forced migration and violence-induced displacement. The recent exodus of Rohingya

people from the Rakhine state of Myanmar has increasingly become a regional concern as neighbouring countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand became destinations for refugees.[12] It is estimated that over 700,000 Rohingya has sought refuge in Bangladesh since violence drastically escalated in Rakhine in August 2017. Apart from the fact that the security of the refugees is seriously threatened, the receiving countries have had to face various challenges, like the financial burden of hosting them and the possible threats to social cohesion. For these kinds of complex problems with transborder impact, finding solutions is often beyond the capacity of any single government.

There is also the scale and magnitude of many NTS challenges, which further push the limits of state capacity to handle. Catastrophic disasters like Typhoon Haiyan are good examples. Haiyan is considered to be one of the most intense tropical cyclones on record. While the Philippine authorities had prepared in advance, they found themselves woefully under-resourced to respond to the cataclysmic impact of the disaster of such scale. Severely damaged infrastructure made it very difficult for aid workers to reach the affected areas and deliver timely humanitarian relief goods. Moreover, the country's military that had been expected to help provide transport and airlift facilities did not have adequate capacity. Similarly, when Indonesia was hit by several earthquakes in the second half of 2018 which occurred almost successively in a short span of time, the government found itself having to accept international aid and assistance against its strained capacity and limited resources.[13] In brief, transnationality and the scale of the impact of NTS have significantly altered the way these threats are addressed.

NTS Challenges Facing the Region

What are some of the critical NTS challenges that threaten the security of the ASEAN and the wider region? It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss all NTS problems in ASEAN. Instead, we highlight some key challenges to emphasize their importance to the peoples' security.

Top of the list is climate change that increases the frequency of natural disasters and have thus put significant stress on Southeast Asian countries. According to the statistics of UNESCAP, Southeast Asia is among the most severely-impacted regions in the world. Between

2000 and 2016, natural disasters caused the death of 362,000 people and affected over 250 million.[14] The Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam are the most affected states in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 caused casualties over 200,000, with Indonesia as the most affected. Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in 2008 resulted in 70,000 people dead or missing and affected over 1.5 million. In addition, natural disasters also caused serious economic losses. Typhoon Haiyan caused damages amounting to 3.72 per cent of the Philippines' GDP in 2013.[15] What is worrying is that the UN predicts that the risk of floods and droughts in Southeast Asia will increase significantly by 2030 as a result of climate change, leading to economic losses amounting to 3 per cent of the GDP of the Philippines, 2 per cent of Laos, and over 1.5 per cent of Cambodia.[16] Other NTS issues will also be exacerbated by climate change, like food security and health security. A representative of FAO pointed out that agricultural and fishery outputs in the Philippines will decrease by 25 per cent and 40 per cent. The percentage of malnutrition among children under five increased from 30.3 per cent in 2013 to 33.4 per cent in 2017.[17]

Environmental degradation both on land and below water presents another serious challenge to Southeast Asian countries. With a total population of over 600 million and having enjoyed rapid economic development for decades, the tension between economic growth and environmental sustainability has become more pronounced in recent years. The ASEAN Secretariat pointed out in 2006 that major environmental stresses in the region include deforestation for agriculture and excessive exploration of natural resources like water, timber and fishery.[18] The forest coverage of Indonesia dropped from 65.4 per cent in 1990 to 50.2 per cent in 2015, as a result of deforestation for plantation of palm oil, which is a key source of revenue for Indonesia.[19] Because many people still use the slash and burn practice to deforest, transboundary haze has been a major environmental threat that emanates primarily from Indonesia but had also seriously affected the neighbouring countries. Marine environmental pollution in the regional seas is another manifestation of environmental degradation in the region. It has been shown that China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam together produced over half of plastic waste in the world's oceans.[20] The threat of marine plastic waste is increasingly getting the attention of governments in the region.

Movement of people is another serious and difficult issue facing the region, particularly irregular migration like people smuggling and trafficking as well as forced displacement. In the latter, the Rohingya refugee crisis did not only raise security concerns for the affected people and the destination countries, but it also caused tensions in relations among member states of ASEAN. In September 2017, Malaysia decided to withdraw from the ASEAN Chairman's statement on the Rakhine situation since it disagreed with the omission of the Rohingyas in its content. Trafficking in persons is another major problem plaguing Southeast Asia. According to the United Nations, East Asia, including Southeast Asia, is a major source for human trafficking, with victims found in more than sixty countries across the globe.[21] Thailand and the Philippines were the key countries of origin for the trafficking flows to North America.[22] Within the region, domestic and intra-regional trafficking is also prevalent in ASEAN. For instance, 90 per cent of the four million migrants in Thailand in 2015 were from Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, and up to 23 per cent of these migrant workers could be classified as victims of trafficking.[23]

Southeast Asian countries are only too aware of the security implications of infectious diseases having experienced the outbreaks of a string of virulent diseases like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Zika virus disease since the early 2000s. China and Southeast Asian countries were at the forefront of the battle against SARS in 2003, reporting 7,760 of the world's total 8,096 cases.[24] South Korea saw in 2015 the biggest outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) out of Saudi Arabia where the disease was first diagnosed in 2012. 186 infections were diagnosed in the country during the outbreak, with 36 deaths associated with the disease.[25] Zika was the most recent infectious disease that has affected Southeast Asia with cases reported in regional countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Moreover, nearly 3.5 million people in Southeast Asia have been living with HIV/AIDS in 2015, with Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia representing the high burden countries from Southeast Asia.[26]

As noted above, the implications to security from these NTS threats often go beyond any single sector and national border. Unilateral responses are therefore inadequate, necessitating bilateral and multilateral actions. Moreover, as many Southeast Asian countries are developing countries with limited resources and capacity, technical and financial assistance are acutely needed to strengthen their capacity in dealing with

various NTS threats. In this regard, it becomes even more critical to examine how best to strengthen multilateral cooperation and coordination and explore how multiple actors from different sectors contribute to the governance of NTS.

1.3   Governance of NTS in Southeast Asia: Beyond Securitization

The region's experiences in dealing with NTS issues show that these issues can escalate and become more complex unless they are dealt with decisively and effectively. But given that NTS issues are inter-related and have cross-cutting effects, governance is not a straightforward process, to say the least. It can be multi-faceted too and can be viewed as an on-going set of processes, generating different types of responses in the different stages of managing or solving the problems.

Mindful of the intricacies of NTS governance, we present here a rather simplified way of understanding how these set of processes can unfold. This is by no means the only way to chart NTS governance. But we think it is useful to start with the process of securitization to understand why and how an issue is and has become NTS threat. We then track how policies are crafted and even re-crafted including after the process of desecuritization, and what mechanisms are established to address the challenges as they come. The institutionalization that follows are also meant to build and strengthen the capacities of affected states and communities to respond. This continuing process(es) is depicted in Figure 1.1 and discussed briefly below.

FIGURE 1.1
Process of NTS Governance

Securitization/Desecuritization and High-level Policy Response

While NTS governance may be similar to "normal" governance which includes the processes of agenda setting, negotiation, decision-making and implementation, what distinguishes it from others are the securitization/desecurization steps and the extra-ordinary policy responses taken at the highest level to address the issues which includes emergency measures.[27] As noted in the earlier section, securitization is a precondition for NTS threats to receive immediate attention and sufficient resources. It is based on consent and legitimacy rather than by force, which means that the securitizing actors, the audience and other stakeholders are able to agree that an issue in question is existentially threatening.[28]

High-level policy responses following securitization generally consists of rapid mobilization of resources and increasing capabilities, introducing emergency measures as needed, speedy implementation and monitoring. In cases where the impact of an NTS threat is transboundary and beyond the capacity of a single country affected, the responses unfold at multiple levels—national, bilateral, regional and international. For example, during major outbreaks of forest fires in Indonesia in the past, neighbouring countries responded immediately in deploying firefighters and dispatching helicopters at the request of the Indonesian government. After the onset of Typhoon Haiyan, the UN expeditiously deployed their emergency response team to the worst affected city, in less than a day, to help the government's massive search and rescue operations.

Securitization often makes for rapid policy responses including the introduction of extraordinary measures. During the outbreak of SARS in 2003, the WHO declared the epidemic a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). As a consequence, the WHO issued travel alerts to affected countries with major outbreaks, and publicly criticized China where the largest number of cases was reported for withholding information and issuing travel warnings.[29] Such actions would have been regarded as a transgression or interference in national health policies but this was tolerated by governments concerned due to the serious transboundary impacts and cross-sectoral repercussions of the epidemic. Amid the outbreak of the Ebola disease in West Africa in 2014 and 2015, the WHO decided that experimental drugs which had not yet been tested on humans can be used to treat Ebola

patients given the race against time to contain the disease. In ordinary cases, it is deemed unethical to use experimental drugs or treatment on patients without prior human tests.[30]

One would also note that the use of military force in dealing with certain NTS challenges is not uncommon. While deployment of foreign militaries to a sovereign state is often associated with external intervention, their deployment/involvement during times of emergencies are tacitly accepted by affected countries. For example, countries like the United States, China and the United Kingdom sent military personnel and equipment to countries that were hit by the Ebola outbreak in 2014 and 2015 to assist in the treatment and control of the disease. Given its strong capability in search and rescue as well as logistics and transport, the US military forces played a critical role in many post-disaster search and rescue and research operations in Asia, such as the Great East Japan earthquake in 2011 and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.[31] When parts of the Attapeu province in southern Laos were hit by severe floods in late July 2018 after a hydroelectric dam collapsed, China sent a fully equipped medical team from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to Laos, which arrived at the disaster site two days after the collapse. Given the sensitiveness of foreign military presence in a sovereign state, having strong military involvement is usually based on strong bilateral ties. The United States is able to speedily deploy its military forces in Japan and the Philippines during humanitarian emergencies since they are allies of the United States. Japan also hosts a US military base in its territory. In the case of Laos, the PLA rescue team could be speedily deployed because the two countries' militaries were having a joint humanitarian rescue and medical drill in Vientiane when the tragedy happened.

While extraordinary measures are accepted in times of emergencies however, they cannot and should not be continued when the threat level goes down. Continuing them often comes with negative and/or unintended consequences. For instance, the Chinese government imposed border control, quarantine of foreign visitors and trade restrictions in 2009 to prevent the spread of the H1N1 influenza. While such measures reduced the risk of the transmission in China, it affected its bilateral relations with some American countries that were affected by H1N1.[32] Military response by one state to an emergency situation in another sovereign state is sensitive and delicate due to the Westphalian sovereignty, so extreme caution is often necessary to avoid setting

precedents. It is therefore necessary to end the emergency status or desecuritize when ordinary measures are sufficient for governing the issue. Desecuritization, therefore, is to bring issues back to normal politics.

Institutionalization and Capacity Building

The governance of NTS issues, however, does not stop with desecuritization. As many NTS challenges now are more complex and often recur in different forms like the case of emerging infectious diseases, more efforts must be spent to improve governance through capacity building and institutionalization.[33] This also means designating and/or establishing national agencies to deal specifically with particular issues and become focal points for inter-agency coordination while putting in place clear procedures and policy instruments.[34]

We do see institutionalization already taking place in Asia. With the frequency of natural disasters in the region, many countries like Indonesia, Philippines and China have instituted national plans for disaster response and risk reduction. These national plans cover most aspects of disaster response, from financing to application of technologies, from information sharing to early warning, from coordination to accountability.[35] Mechanisms for communication and coordination are laid out in the national plans to guide the flow of information and coordinate activities of different actors. Such plans are supported by enacting domestic laws and regulations on relevant issue areas. The national plan for disaster response is just one example of a structured and even institutionalized national response to NTS issues. At the regional level, countries enter into various arrangements to demonstrate political will and commit resources for regional efforts. ASEAN member states signed AADMER in July 2005 and ratified it in December 2009. This was further strengthened by the "Declaration on One ASEAN One Response: ASEAN Responding to Disasters as One in the Region and Outside the Region" signed in Vientiane in September 2016. The two documents represent the aim of member states to improve the capacity of the region as a whole in responding to disasters and humanitarian emergencies by harnessing strengths from different sources. Supporting these regional efforts is the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) established in 2011 to facilitate

disaster relief efforts in the region. Institutionalization must go hand-in-hand with capacity building. Building capacity translates in many forms from raising awareness, increasing competence and technical expertise, knowledge sharing, and building financial resources. Lack of funding is usually a major constraint facing many developing countries in dealing with NTS challenges. Financing support therefore should also be strengthened. Japan has been funding the Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN project since 2012. The project aims to strengthen the capacity of regional countries in emergency logistics, which is an important component of disaster management.[36] The European Union (EU) reached an agreement with the AHA Centre in October 2018 to provide 10 million euro to support ASEAN's effort in disaster response.[37]

1.4   The State of NTS Governance in Southeast Asia

Having outlined the framework of NTS governance, we now highlight below some of the key observations and governance challenges based on the findings of the respective chapters of this book.

Climate Change

Climate change induces and compounds other non-traditional issues. Climate change has certainly increased the frequency of extreme weather events in Southeast Asia, which has caused greater numbers of people to be forcibly displaced and have put great pressures on carrying out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These challenges are discussed at length in Chapter 5 on complex disasters and Chapter 8 on forced migration. In addition to extreme weather events, studies have shown that even small changes in the climate like subtle increase of temperature can have important impacts on food security and the marine environment like decrease of crop yields and loss of coral reef. These effects are discussed in Chapter 3 on food security and Chapter 4 on marine environmental protection.

As one of the global hotspots for disaster risk, it is imperative for Southeast Asia to build its climate resilience through climate change adaptation. While there are a wide range of interventions that can contribute to climate change adaptation efforts in the region, there is a need to establish a centralized mechanism that can coordinate

different policies across different sectors. At present, approaches toward climate adaptation have been sporadic and done mainly at sectoral levels.

An important issue for climate change governance is the critical role of technology in building capacity for climate adaptation and mitigation. Given the different levels of economic development among ASEAN member states, ASEAN can look into collectively developing the region's own technological capability for climate mitigation and adaptation purposes. Crafting innovative financing mechanism should also be explored to reduce reliance on foreign aid and assistance in building up capacity for climate mitigation and adaptation.

Food Security

A key indicator of food security is eradicating hunger and malnutrition. Although Southeast Asia has started to see a reversal in addressing hunger which saw the number of hungry people decreasing from 101.7 million in 2005 to 60.5 million in 2014, this increased for the first time to 63.5 million by 2016. The rise in Southeast Asia's undernourishment figures has been mostly driven by a large increase in the number of undernourished in Indonesia, leading one to think that this increase in hunger may just be a "one-country" phenomenon, or a false alarm. However, other Southeast Asian countries are now seeing similar trends of slowing progress in addressing undernourishment, with a few countries having very slow progress of less than 1 per cent reduction in hunger over the recent years. These countries can potentially follow Indonesia's pattern, and eventually enter a period of increasing undernourishment as well.

A systemic trend observed across the region is a slowdown in cereal yield growth, which is alarming given spatial constraints to food production, and that cereals make up the majority of regional food consumption. This contributes to increasing food scarcity; higher food prices; and ultimately, more limited access to food. Governments, the private sector, academia and other sectors will therefore need to work together to address these challenges. A critical gap to fill will be in providing information on climate impacts on crop production and food security, that are downscaled to the national and subnational levels, and which can be translated into advice on policy and technological innovations to adopt. Generating relevant data, including financial analysis, will therefore be crucial steps in addressing challenges to food security.

Marine Environmental Protection

Protecting the marine environment is a key component of environmental security. This has in fact received increasing attention at regional and international levels, as evidenced by the inclusion of an ocean-related goal in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 14: Life below water) and the convening of the first Ocean Conference by the UN in 2017.

As discussed in the chapter on marine environment protection (MEP) which examines the state of marine environment in the South China Sea (SCS), the rate of degradation of the environment is at an alarming rate as a result of both human activities and climate change. The degradation has serious security implications for the littoral states and their population as the marine environment is important for food security, health security, economic security and environmental security. Degradation of the marine environment can worsen the situation in the SCS as the littoral states are competing for various marine resources that are depleting.

Marine environmental protection has been viewed as an important avenue for building mutual trust and confidence among the littoral states of the SCS. Measures to advance this agenda include establishing marine protected areas, strengthening relevant laws and regulations, engaging multiple stakeholders and encouraging scientific and technical collaboration. As ASEAN and China have been negotiating the Code of Conduct (COC) since 2013, more balanced attention should be given to both maritime disputes and the marine ecosystem as the latter is no less important for national and human securities in the region. In addition, ASEAN member states and China can initiate new collaborative efforts based on their Declaration for the Decade of Coastal and Marine Environmental Protection in the South China Sea (2017–2027). MEP should also incorporate into ASEAN member states' efforts to achieve Substainable Development Goals.

Complex Disasters

Since Southeast Asian leaders signed the AADMER in 2005, the region has prioritized developing national and regional disaster management capabilities to respond to disasters. However, the back-to-back disasters that occurred between July and August 2018 in Lombok Island, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia tested the response capacities of the national

government and the humanitarian community. The gap between regional and national disaster management capacity suggests that AADMER is largely seen and implemented as a regional project, with more limited impact on national disaster risk management frameworks. There is room for National Disaster Management Organisations (NDMOs) to consider how it can align national disaster management goals with regional ones and better leverage regional resources for national capacity building in technical and operational aspects of disaster management.

Local organizations could also benefit from more support—in the form of resources, media coverage and training as they strive to develop more robust policies and systems. Climate change adaptation initiatives also need to be better incorporated into disaster preparedness efforts. The huge economic losses stemming from the multiple disasters also necessitate a drastic re-evaluation of the way financial risk is managed in the region. Engagement with the private sector, particularly with insurers and reinsurers, should be a policy imperative.

Nuclear Security

Nuclear security has become a new concern for the region given the growing interests and possibility of using nuclear energy in Southeast Asia. Aside from nuclear energy, nuclear security matters given the use of radioactive materials across the region for medical and other purposes. The recent cases of missing radioactive materials in Southeast Asia in 2019 alone vividly highlight the significance of enhancing nuclear security in the region.

One evident gap in nuclear security governance in Southeast Asia is weak nuclear security culture, accentuating the significance of human factors, such as attitudes, awareness and behaviours. Given that not all Southeast Asian states are parties to important global nuclear conventions, including nuclear security treaties, it is essential for countries with nuclear activities and radioactive sources for non-power applications to ratify all treaties.

The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) has been driving regional cooperation on civilian nuclear capacity-building among ASEAN member states. The network has been conducting regular exchanges of best practices, capacity-building efforts, and assistance to member states to implement key international

agreements. Apart from regional bodies such as the ASEANTOM, nuclear security training and support centres of excellence (COEs) can potentially play a key role in establishing a regional nuclear security architecture. A collaborative network of COEs in Southeast Asia can complement the work of ASEANTOM in terms of sharing good practices, resources, expertise and information.

Trafficking in Persons

Despite the ratification of global and regional anti-trafficking frameworks and enactment of relevant national laws, human trafficking remains an endemic security problem in Southeast/East Asia, threatening states and societies. Two-thirds or 25 million of global trafficking victims were identified to be in the region. The lack of effective law enforcement efforts, as a primarily tool to implement states' robust legal frameworks, remains a challenge. Inadequate institutional resources, funding and training for frontline officers and law enforcers impede the investigation of human trafficking cases. Corruption and trafficking are also deeply intertwined in the region. The failure of governments to run after and prosecute complicit officials and law enforcers exacerbates the corruption-trafficking nexus in the region.

Drawing the crime of human trafficking out of the shadows of law is made difficult by (i) the ambiguous definition of human trafficking in persons in international law; and (ii) the disjuncture between human trafficking contexts in East Asia and what international anti-trafficking legal regimes seek to address. If the law is to be the bedrock of counter-trafficking measures in the region, human trafficking terminologies and definitions must be clearly defined and understood by law enforcers and responsive to the region's human trafficking context and emerging trends. Government agencies, while assuming primary responsibility, would need to deepen their cooperation with the civil society and humanitarian organizations that assist and provide support services for victims of trafficking in order to promote a victim-centred, trauma-informed approach to counter trafficking.

Displaced Persons

Globally there are three main drivers for displacement—disasters, development and conflict. Within Southeast Asia regional governance

has focused on disasters but there are recent attempts to extend this governance framework to conflict displacement. Disaster impacts have remained localized areas of vulnerability. The impacts of development on the displacement of people are harder to monitor with the main driver being rapid urbanization and large-scale infrastructure projects. But most significantly, conflict as a driver tends to lead to more protracted displacement both within countries and across international borders.

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have either offered sanctuary to populations displaced by conflict in neighbouring countries or been the source of internal conflict generating displacement for fellow ASEAN member states. While presently only the Philippines is a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, all have offered some form of sanctuary to displaced persons. Within the broader Asia and Pacific, the top four hosting countries are Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Bangladesh hosts 907,199 refugees and asylum-seekers the vast majority of which are Rohingya from Myanmar.

ASEAN has moved towards a networked regional grouping that demonstrates a greater potential to work collaboratively, across different levels of governance. The shift towards a network approach sees ASEAN member states working together to aid local communities. Through this approach fellow ASEAN member states provide surge capacity to national government agencies to provide its affected population with relief items. However, the absence of a regional humanitarian champion within ASEAN and the present dominance of a state-led approach to the regional humanitarian mechanism offer pause for thought and the need to moderate expectations. While state-led humanitarianism lends itself to disasters, the same cannot be said for conflict given that states themselves are parties directly involved in conflicts making it impossible at present for regional governance to offer anything more than short-term relief to those displaced at best.

Health Security

The threats of new and re-emerging infectious diseases and the speed of change in the burden of diseases have raised concerns about the ability of states in Southeast Asia to adequately and effectively deal with challenges to health security. People in the developing world, like Southeast Asia, suffer a disproportionate burden of infectious diseases compared to the rest of the world. Past experiences of Asian

countries show that regional approaches have been essential for effective response to epidemics like SARS, H5N1 and H1N1. Moreover, the focus of ASEAN health cooperation has seen a visible shift from pandemic preparedness to broader approach to health security as threats also arise from problems like Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR), non-communicable diseases and climate-related health issues.

Moving forward, greater efforts should be made both at the national and regional levels to strengthen public health systems. This means that at the ASEAN level, there should be more time and resources invested in helping build the capacity of public health systems of ASEAN countries that are in need of support. It should be noted that the success and the quality of governance of health security is largely dependent on efforts at the national level to build strong health systems and have the capacity and adequate resources to detect, prevent, and control the spread of infectious diseases. Strong national health systems continue to be the foundation of regional and global efforts to promote health and human security. The resources of non-state actors and the private sector should also be mobilized in order to provide quality health care and inclusive access to health provision.

1.5 Conclusion

Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the outbreak of SARS in 2003, NTS has been established as an important policy discourse and approach to security governance in Asia. While countries in the region have started to develop some capacity in addressing a variety of NTS issues over the years, the new dynamics of existing issues and emerging challenges further highlight the need for constant improvement in governance. Apart from setting priorities and adopting exceptional measures in times of crises, NTS governance needs to adopt a long-term approach that values institutionalization and capacity building. Moreover, given the transnationality of NTS, the thrust for stronger institutionalization and capacity building can no longer be limited at the national level. Efforts at enhancing regional multilateral cooperation and building strong regional institutions are essential if effective management of transnational NTS challenges were to be achieved.

We conclude this chapter by emphasizing three core themes that emerged from the case studies in this book. One of the themes that came out from all the chapters is the need to engage multiple actors

in the governance of NTS issues. Apart from government officials, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations have become critical actors in dealing with problems like trafficking in person, marine environmental protection, complex disaster management, and health security. They play important roles in education, awareness-raising, monitoring and assistance.

Similarly, the private sector has also become an indispensable partner. Private companies are great resources for technical expertise and innovation. They have also become an important partner in addressing financing gaps and generating creative approaches to build human capital through skills training and development.

Another theme is the need to push for effective enforcement of national and regional laws and regulations to deal with NTS challenges. Building robust legal frameworks and implementing them remain a challenge but can no longer be ignored if problems like human trafficking and other transnational crimes, environmental protection, health security and many others were to be addressed.

The last but certainly not least, is the need to seriously put more efforts in improving coordination across different sectors and at multiple levels in dealing with NTS challenges. This can be done in tandem with deepening regional multilateral cooperation and strengthening regional institutions to achieve the goals of ensuring human security for all.

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