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Japan's ASEAN Policy

In Search of Proactive Multilateralism

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Japan's ASEAN Policy

In Search of Proactive Multilateralism

by **Sueo Sudo**



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PREFACE

The central puzzle in the study of Japanese foreign policy has been why Japan has continued to play a passive role in international affairs, despite its impressive economic and political power. Challenging this central puzzle, the core argument of this study is to present an alternative path for the study of Japanese foreign policy. In fact, in recent years Japanese foreign policy has become less dependent on the United States, more strategic towards Asia, and more energetic towards international and regional institutions. One of the main features is multilateralism in Japanese foreign policy, as shown by Japan's active participation in the regional institutions. In pursuing multilateralism, Japan cooperated closely with the only durable regional body in Southeast Asia, to wit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Given the fact that East Asian regionalism has been driven by ASEAN, it is of utmost urgency to investigate the emerging partnership between Japan and ASEAN. My central thesis in this study is thus to put Japan's ASEAN policy into a proper perspective by asserting that Japan's new policy initiatives towards ASEAN are not reactive, nor are they exceptions in a broader framework of merely reactive foreign policy.

In writing this book, I have fortunately received enormous support and assistance from individuals and institutions. To begin with, I have received financial support from two institutions to carry out my book project. They are a three-year research subsidy by the Japanese government and Pache Research Subsidy of Nanzan University. Without these sources of financial assistance, it would not have been possible to undertake extensive field research in Japan and Southeast Asia. In undertaking my field research, I am especially indebted to the following institutions. In Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Asian Studies gave me a special opportunity to conduct my field research based in Bangkok. For this, I am grateful to Dr Khien Theeravit and Ms Saikew Thipakorn. In Singapore,

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABMI	Asian Bond Markets Initiative
ACMECS	Ayeyawady–Chao Phraya–Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
ACT	ASEAN Committee in Tokyo
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AEM	ASEAN Economic Ministers
AEM-METI	ASEAN-Japan Economic Ministers' Meeting
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICO	ASEAN Industrial Cooperation
AJCEP	ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Exchange Program
AJDF	ASEAN-Japan Development Fund
AMBDC	ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation
AMEICC	ASEAN Economic Ministers–MITI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee
AMRI	ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information
AMRO	APT Macroeconomic Research Office
ANRPC	Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries
APC	ASEAN Promotion Center
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
APTERR	ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASA	ASEAN Swap Arrangement
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN-Institute of Strategic and International Studies
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting

ASPAC	Asia-Pacific Council
BBC	brand-to-brand complementation
BIMP-EAGA	Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, East Asian Growth Area
CEPEA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia
CGIM	Credit Guarantee and Investment Mechanism
CLMV	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
CLV	Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
CMIM	Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
COCI	Committee on Culture and Information
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
EAC	East Asian Community
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAS	East Asia Summit
EAVG	East Asia Vision Group
EC	European Community
EMM	Economic Ministers' Meeting
ERIA	Economic Research Institute of ASEAN and East Asia
EU	European Union
EWEC	East-West Economic Corridor
FCDI	Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina
FDI	Foreign direct investments
FTAF	Financial Technical Assistance Fund
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GMS	Greater Mekong Sub-region
GSP	General Scheme of Preference
G8	Group of Eight
IAI	Initiative for ASEAN Integration
ICORC	International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia
IDEA	Initiative for Development in East Asia
IGGI	Inter-Government Group for Indonesia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization

IMT	International Monitoring Team
ISC	Information Sharing Center
JACEP	Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership
JAF	Japan-ASEAN Forum
JAFTAF	Japan-ASEAN Financial Technical Assistance Fund
JAIF	Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JCG	Japan Coastal Guard
JENESYS	Japan East-Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSEPA	Japan and Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
Keidanren	Federation of Economic Organizations
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Maphilindo	Malaya-Philippines-Indonesia
MCEDSEA	Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MJ-CI	Mekong-Japan Economic and Industrial Cooperation Initiative
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAID	New Asia Industrial Development Plan
ODA	official development assistance
PKO	peacekeeping operation
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conference
PTA	preferential trade agreement
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SEC	Southern Economic Corridor
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam

TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

INTRODUCTION

Japan's engagement with the outside world in general, and its Asian neighbours in particular, is characterized by large swings. After 250 years of seclusion, Japan opted to go "out of Asia and into the West" in the late nineteenth century. Then, after fighting fiercely with the United States, Japan opted to form a close alliance with its former adversary in 1945. Since opening to the world, Japan's Asian policy has tended to fluctuate from aggressive engagement to indifferent detachment, depending on the available strategic choices the national government faced at each critical moment in time. In fact, consummating the Meiji Restoration in 1868, modern Japan vigorously engaged in an aggrandizing foreign policy under the banner of "a rich nation and a strong army" (*Fukoku kyohei*). In that spirit, Japan entered the international system through a series of acquisitions of foreign territories — Taiwan, Korea, Manchukuo and Southeast Asia. As an extension of its expansionistic foreign policy many Japanese had unrealistically believed that a modernized Japan would be able to reign over the entire Asian region; that is, they shared the illusory hope for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

It is generally construed that the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during World War II was the result of last-minute improvisation rather than long-term military planning. Nevertheless, the Japanese fought ruthlessly in the region for their own interest, seeking the region's abundant raw materials. Consequently, as Takashi Inoguchi explains, Japan lost all its credentials in building rapport with Asian neighbours when it wanted to start again from the ashes at the end of the war. The negative consequences of the Japanese war against the West left very deep and wide-ranging scars on the nation. Japan's Asian policy was very difficult to envisage after its defeat in the war and the allied powers' occupation. Japan's Asian policy was merely a derivative of Japan's American policy

for a long time to come, even after it regained independence in 1952. In other words, Japan's Asian policy was long an antidote to its mainstream policy of a security alliance with the United States, free trade, and practice of the free market.¹

Seen from another angle, post-war Japanese foreign policy in a way displays a unique feature of its own, to wit, being dependent exclusively on the United States in its orientation. It was during the Yoshida Doctrine period (1950s and 1960s) that Japan's U.S.-dependent economic foreign policy flourished and induced Japan to become an economic giant. Japan's success also meant that Japan's pro-U.S. orientation could serve it well without the need to pursue an autonomous Asian policy or multilateralism. Understandably, during the Yoshida Doctrine period, Japan's Asian policy was largely devoid of meaningful interactions. In other words, although international relations in the Asian region was full of events, including reparation negotiations, the Bandung conference, normalizations with South Korea and China, and the Vietnam war, Japan's policy of separating politics from economics averted its involvement in regional affairs. Regionalism in Japanese foreign policy is thus a sensitive and delicate issue. For whatever the Japanese do, Asian leaders tend to refer to the memories of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Accordingly, to the Japanese, regionalism is really a concept by which "we measure our pain". The main purpose of this book is to explain how Japan has overcome the historically derived predicament and transformed its one-dimensional foreign policy.

THREE STREAMS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

In order to grasp fully the significance of Japan's regional policy, we need to understand three streams of Japanese foreign policy.² They are the mainstream, alternative stream and intermediate stream. The first stream is the mainstream of Japanese foreign policy, characterized by its exclusive emphasis on the alliance with the United States. Its origin was the advent of Yoshida Shigeru as the most influential conservative leader in 1948. At the onset of the Cold War, Japan's options were limited and Yoshida's decision was to rely on the hegemon of the day. As the term "Yoshida School" insinuates, the prominent conservative leader Shigeru Yoshida educated young bureaucrats to become mainstream leaders, including Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato who carried out the Yoshida Doctrine vigorously. Since

the mainstream presupposes a one-dimensional foreign policy, Southeast Asia is mainly regarded as only a supplier of raw materials.

The second is the alternative stream, which emerged when an anti-Yoshida group leader Nobusuke Kishi came to power and initiated his autonomous foreign policy, exemplified by his proposal for the Southeast Asian Development Fund in 1957. As the term “anti-Yoshida group” suggests, political leaders in this group tended to do whenever possible what the pro-Yoshida Doctrine group did not advocate, including the revision of the constitution and the invigoration of Asian diplomacy. In particular, the role of the Kishi faction in the Liberal Democratic Party was critically important in promoting an autonomous Asian policy and establishing an equal partnership with the United States.³

The third is the intermediate stream, which came to be recognized when Foreign Minister Takeo Miki proposed his diplomatic vision of the Asia-Pacific in 1967. Given the difficulty associated with the second stream’s Asia-only orientation, policymakers hesitated to embrace an Asia-only regionalism. Instead, they found a broader region of the Asia-Pacific to be more useful and acceptable to the United States. Although the concept of “open regionalism” is the key to the intermediate stream, this image of Japan is apparently built on an overemphasis of the trade aspect of regionalism; for, in the strictest sense of the term, no regional organization has so far enacted “openness” in terms of membership.⁴

Among the three, the second is the most underdeveloped and thus least explored in the study of Japanese foreign policy.⁵ The reasons for this lack in the literature are obviously the dominant role of the United States in Japanese foreign policy and political instability in Southeast Asia. Given the asymmetry of the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asian countries and the uncertainty associated with the enigmatic regional body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the study of Southeast Asia and ASEAN in Japan remains less attractive.

MULTILATERAL FOREIGN POLICY AND JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS

In this study, the thesis of Japan’s unique diplomatic style as outlined in the second stream described above, will be developed. In the words of Thomas Berger, “the long standing critique of the lack of Japanese ‘agency’ in international affairs, which argues that Japan is not an independent actor

in international affairs and has no agenda of its own, is no longer valid, if it ever was. In fact, it is possible to discern a distinctively Japanese approach to international relations and with it a Japanese 'liberal' set of values."⁶ A distinctively Japanese approach can be found in Japan's ASEAN policy.

The question to be asked here is when and why Japan began to implement proactive multilateralism in its foreign policy. In answering the question, there could be two obvious points to be reckoned with. First, Japan's multilateral foreign policy was initiated by the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977, as Hisashi Owada explains: "Prime Minister Fukuda recognized that the creation of a regional identity and solidarity of ASEAN, which were being buttressed by a cooperative undertaking in Japan, would open up new opportunities for useful collaboration, thus, further strengthening solidarity."⁷

Second, due to the special Japan-ASEAN relationship, Japan's foreign policy has become proactive, as Masaru Kohno explains: "In 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda presented his long-term vision of Japan-Southeast Asia relations. In retrospect, the ensuing 'Fukuda Doctrine' was the first attempt by Japan to present a proactive foreign policy stance since the end of the Second World War."⁸ Since 1977, Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia has anchored ASEAN and nurtured ASEAN's regional governance within the framework of political, economic and cultural dimensions. When the third doctrine was announced in 1997, Japan-ASEAN relations began to embrace East Asian countries, thereby attesting to the fact that the Japan-ASEAN partnership has become the hub of East Asian regionalism. As such, it is also true that "the strengthening of Japanese-ASEAN relations is one of the outstanding achievements of postwar Japanese diplomacy."⁹ After many years of interaction, therefore, ASEAN has become a concept by which we measure Japan's contributions to East Asia.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 explains a framework for analysing Japan's ASEAN policy, which incorporates ideas, institutions and proactive multilateralism. While critically evaluating the traditional model of reactive foreign policy, this study will explore the reasons for multilateralism. Our central thesis in this study is thus to put Japan's ASEAN policy into a proper perspective by asserting that Japan's new policy initiatives towards ASEAN are not reactive, nor are they exceptions

in a broader framework of merely reactive foreign policy. In doing so, the chapter begins by critically examining the definition of a reactive state. Then, it introduces alternative perspectives on Japanese foreign policy, discusses the implications for Japan's ASEAN policy and finally constructs a framework for explaining Japan's proactive multilateral policy towards ASEAN.

Chapter 2 explores the origins of Japan-ASEAN relations and the evolution of the relationship until 1976. The earlier relations were conducted under the framework of the Yoshida Doctrine, which led to Japan's aggressive resource acquisition diplomacy. By the early 1970s, however, Japan was unable to pursue its Southeast Asian policy due to the unexpected withdrawal of the United States from Asia and the rise of anti-Japanese movements in Southeast Asia. Given the failure of Japan's economic diplomacy, to wit, the limitation of the mainstream, Tokyo began to formulate a new framework of regional order. Joined by ASEAN, a mutual quest for a viable partnership finally began.

Chapters 3 to 6 will explicate the dynamic evolution of Japan-ASEAN relations since 1977. Chapter 3 focuses on the Fukuda Doctrine, which laid the foundation for broader relations between Japan and ASEAN, including political, economic and cultural dimensions. This chapter closely looks at new developments in Japanese foreign policy from a different perspective, focusing on how Japanese policymakers came to define Japan's new role in a turbulent region, while pursuing multilateral policies towards ASEAN instead of traditional bilateral economic policies. Japan's new role can be seen in the process of forging the very first foreign policy doctrine in 1977. In fact, designating ASEAN as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy, Japan went through a significant experiment in playing a proactive political role in Southeast Asia between 1977 and 1986.

Chapter 4 traces the development of Japan-ASEAN relations since the proclamation of the Takeshita Doctrine in 1987. This second phase shows the consolidation of this relationship. Against this background, Japan also responded positively to stability in Southeast Asia. As with Fukuda's overtures, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita attended the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila and never failed to recognize the importance of ASEAN as a partner. Seizing the opportunity to officially proclaim another doctrine in 1987, Japan's ASEAN policy entered a new phase. In particular the end of the Cold War necessitated new initiatives from Japan. Japan's political role was required to resolve the Cambodian conflict and

to offer reconstruction assistance after the conflict in Indochina. Japan's economic role was also needed to boost ASEAN economies following the Cambodian conflict. It was also important for Japan to further strengthen mutual understanding by promoting cultural exchanges. Following the effects of the Fukuda Doctrine, this chapter observes closely how Japan reinforced political, economic and cultural relations with ASEAN in the post-Cold War period.

Chapter 5 explores the rationales for the expansion of Japan-ASEAN relations since the Hashimoto Doctrine in 1997. The third phase shows the relationship expanding beyond Southeast Asia. Although the goals of ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia summit overlap, it is clear that the Japan-ASEAN strategic partnership serves as a hub of East Asian regionalism. Against this background, Japan has also shown some notable initiatives in its foreign policy. It is notable because for the first time Japan has identified itself as part of East Asia. In particular, it was unprecedented that the Japanese government proposed the formation of an East Asian version of the International Monetary Fund in order to deal with the contagious financial crisis, despite American objections. When a populist premier began his domestic and foreign policy, however, Japan's East Asian policy turned around, thus adversely affecting Japan-ASEAN relations. In particular, worsening Japan-China relations, caused mainly by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, could serve as a testing ground for closer Japan-ASEAN relations in the twenty-first century. While closely following the footsteps of the Takeshita Doctrine, this chapter focuses on how Japan managed to cope with the transitional period of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Chapter 6 examines the post-2007 development of Japan-ASEAN relations until 2011, with special focus on the new administration under the Democratic Party. ASEAN's new direction hinged on its Charter, and Japan's new quest for viable regionalism hinged on the formation of a peaceful regime in East Asia, bridging the two with the shared idea of community building. Thus, beginning in 2007, Japan-ASEAN relations have entered a new phase; although whether a new ASEAN and a new Japan under the Democratic Party continue to serve as a hub of East Asian regionalism remains to be seen. In this last chapter, ASEAN's quest for three-pillars' community building and Japan's greater contributions to East Asian regionalism through a sustainable Japan-ASEAN partnership will be explored.

In conclusion, after acknowledging what this unique relationship between Japan and ASEAN brought about and how well it has been contributing to the construction of the East Asian community, the question of where Japan-ASEAN relations are heading will be discussed.

Notes

1. Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan Goes Regional", in *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response*, edited by Takashi Inoguchi (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 3, 15. See also Taizo Miyagi, "Sengo Nihon no chiiki chitsujo koso", in *EU to Higashiajia no Chiikikyodotai*, edited by Masaharu Nakamura and Yves Schemeil (Tokyo: Jochidaigaku shuppan, 2012), pp. 265–83 for Japan's attempts to pursue its regional policies.
2. For general discussions of the mainstreams of Japanese foreign policy, see especially Keiko Hirata, "Gaiko", in *Akusesu Nihonseiji ron*, edited by Hiroshi Hirano and Masaru Kono (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyoron sha, 2003), pp. 236–58 and Masaru Kono, "Gaiko seisaku", in *Gendai Nihon no seiji*, edited by Ikuo Kume and Masaru Kono (Tokyo: Hosodaigaku kyoiku shinkokai, 2011), pp. 173–85.
3. Thus, the cycle of excluding and including the United States in Asian regionalism transpires. See Shintaro Hamanaka, "Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall of Asian Regional Institutions", ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, no. 42, February 2010.
4. Shintaro Hamanaka, *Asian Regionalism and Japan: The Politics of Membership in Regional Diplomatic, Financial and Trade Groups* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 7.
5. There are only a few book-length studies in Japanese. They are Khoontong Intarathai, *ASEAN to Nihon* (Tokyo: Yazawa shobo, 1982), Toshiaki Arai, *ASEAN to Nihon* (Tokyo: Nicchu shuppan, 2003) and Sumio Hatano and Susumu Sato, *Gendai Nihon no Tonanajia seisaku 1950–2005* (Tokyo: Wasedaigaku shuppanbu, 2007).
6. Thomas Berger, "The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State", in *Japan in International Politics*, edited by Thomas Berger, Mike Mochizuki and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), p. 290.
7. Hisashi Owada, "Japan-ASEAN Relations in East Asia", speech delivered at Hotel New Otani, Singapore, 16 October 2000 <<http://www.jiia.or.jp/report/owada/Singapore>>.
8. Masaharu Kohno, "In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s", CNAPS Working Paper (Center for Northeast

Asian Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution, 1999) <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1999/fall_japan_kohno.aspx>.

9. Yoichi Funabashi, *New Challenges, New Frontier: Japan and ASEAN in the 21st Century* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 39. For a latest account of Japan-Southeast Asian relations, see Nicholas Tarling, *Southeast Asia and the Great Powers* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 93–113.