NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY

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NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

For most of the nations of the Asian/Pacific region, the post-World War II decades have been a period of significant economic growth and progress toward the development of viable and stable political institutions. As diplomatic interactions have become ever more complex, and as trade relations among the various countries have expanded, both the economic vitality and the geo-political importance of the region have gained increasing recognition.

Continued regional progress is dependent, in part, on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of domestic and regional security which allow attention to be focused on the requirements of orderly political and economic development. The latter half of the 1970s, however, brought changes in the international climate and in the regional balance of power which, when viewed together, carry disturbing implications for the prospects for peace and stability in the Asian/Pacific area. These changes include:

1. The perceived reduction of the American commitment to Asian security; the actual reduction of U.S. military strength deployed in the area; and the uncertainties characteristic of U.S. security relations with such major allies as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines arising from American neglect or policy "shocks."
2. The rapid and extensive expansion of Soviet military power in East Asia and the Indian Ocean area, and the consolidation of Soviet military and political influence in Indochina.
3. The victory of communist forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea; the emergence of Vietnam as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia; and the current Vietnamese domination of the entire Indochinese peninsula.
4. The intensification in East Asia of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the outbreak of actual hostilities between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet-backed Vietnam.

5. The emergence of strained political and economic relations between and among the region's developed and developing nations arising from various pressures to restructure trade policies and tariff regulations.

The Asian/Pacific area has become a crucial arena of great power rivalry, for it is in this region that the interests and ambitions of the U.S., the Soviet Union, Japan, and the PRC intersect and often clash. At least partially in response to these realities, new or strengthened alignments or relationships—most of them tentative and not yet fully formed—are developing in the region, including the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochements, growing unity among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, and improved relations between ASEAN and the PRC. Whether these developments will serve to modify significantly the currently heightened uncertainties, tensions, and strains in the region remains to be seen.

Careful consideration of these varied and complex concerns has led a number of observers to conclude that today's international environment requires greater emphasis on security-related matters in Asia and the Pacific Basin. Acting upon this conviction, the National Strategy Information Center and five cooperating organizations co-sponsored a conference on "New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security" at Pattaya, Thailand in December 1979. This book contains the addresses, conference papers (some in slightly altered form), and committee reports which constituted the formal substantive aspects of the conference.

The organization of any conference requires often difficult decisions with respect to the range of issues to be approached, the formulation of specific topics, and the choice of participants—i.e., the determination of parameters which are neither too broad nor too narrow and which serve to define a framework for effective discussion of the matters at hand. In the view of the organizers and participants of the Pattaya conference, an adequate approach to security concerns must include attention to the political, economic and military dimensions, and the reader will find this recognition of the complex and multi-dimensioned nature of what comprises security reflected both in the book's organizational format and in its substantive analyses.

Conference participants included public- and private-sector leaders and scholars from eleven nations—Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—located in the area broadly referred to as "Asia and the Pacific Basin" or, alternatively, the "Asian/Pacific region." It is obvious that not all nations geographically situated in this region were represented at the conference. For the purposes of the Pattaya meetings, it was determined that the countries invited should share certain common foundations and outlooks, as reflected in their non-communist political and economic systems, general friendliness toward one another, and demonstrated commitment to cooperative regional endeavors. There exist a variety of approaches to the establishment of this particular parameter, and future conferences may well involve a different configuration of participating states.

It is the hope of the National Strategy Information Center that the essays contained in this volume will serve to focus attention on crucial issues of security and stability in an area of the world which has moved increasingly toward the center of international politics and economic relations. We wish to take this opportunity to offer our appreciation to the conference co-sponsors, the conference participants, the staff of the Thai Oil Refinery Company in Bangkok for their administrative assistance, Dr. Thanat Khoman for his special help, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore for its cooperation in publishing an Asian edition of this book.

Joyce E. Larson
Managing Editor
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

August 1980

FOREWORD

Perspectives on War and Peace: The United States and Asia at the Beginning of the 1980s

I.

At the beginning of the 1970s, key persons associated with the National Strategy Information Center became convinced that, in important respects, the flow of international developments was moving in directions contrary to the interests of the United States and other free nations which aspire to independence and self-fulfillment.

To begin a program of cooperative action in response to these troubling realities, NSIC—in liaison with concerned leadership and like-minded non-governmental groups in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—convened a series of four international conferences:

—"Economic and Political Development in Relation to Sea Power

Along the Routes from the Indian Ocean" (London, May 25-28, 1972)
—"The Emerging Era of the Pacific: Economic Development, Stability, and Rivalry" (Honolulu, Hawaii, February 4-7, 1975)
—"New Dimensions for the Defense of the Atlantic Alliance" (Winchester, England, November 18-21, 1976)
—"NATO and the Global Threat: What Must Be Done" (Brighton, England, June 1-4, 1978)

At the Brighton Conference, it was recommended that more attention be turned in the near future to the region of Asia and the Pacific Basin. Recent trends and events in this area have clearly indicated that the challenges to the security, stability, and economic well-being of non-communist states around the globe have by no means receded, and may in fact have escalated—thus making imperative an intensified search for the policies and pathways which can lead to a better and more secure future as we enter the decade of the 1980s. In an attempt to contribute significantly to this search, the National Strategy Information Center and several co-sponsoring groups convened a fifth international conference focusing on "New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security" at Pattaya, Thailand in December 1979.

Approximately sixty government officials, parliamentary leaders, university scholars, members of the business community, and labor representatives from eleven Asian/Pacific Basin nations were in attendance.[1] The co-sponsoring groups included the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia), the Faculty of Political Science of Chulalongkorn University (Thailand), the Institute for Pacific Affairs (Japan), the John F. Kennedy Foundation of Thailand, and the Pacific Institute (Australia).

II.

The seriousness of the occasion and of the participants was intensified by the several crises which weighed heavily upon international and regional politics at the time the conference was convened. These included:

[1]The full list of conference participants will be found in the Appendix, pp. 253 to 255. It will be readily apparent that conferees were invited from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Australasia, and the United States.

1) The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the subsequent war in that country between the ousted Khmer Rouge regime and the Vietnamese-dominated Heng Samrin government. This conflict has seriously endangered the peace and security of Thailand, and has heightened the ominous rivalry between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union, which are respectively supportive of the warring communist regimes in Kampuchea.
2) The ever-present dangers in the Korean peninsula, which at the time of the Pattaya conference were exacerbated by the dislocations in South Korea subsequent to the assassination of President Park.
3) The increasing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, leading ultimately to the Soviet invasion of that country in late December, less than a fortnight after the conference. The anxieties engendered at the conference by such Soviet actions were intensified when viewed from the perspective of the Soviet military buildup in the Indian Ocean and along the USSR's Pacific Coast.

Many other issues at a critical if not crisis level demanded and were accorded attention at the conference. Among them were the problem of assuring a continued supply of oil and other scarce mineral and agricultural resources; the need to better protect the vital sea lanes of communication; the challenges of trade and further national and regional economic development; and the difficulties arising from world-wide inflationary pressures. Last but certainly not least, much attention was paid to the enormous scale of human suffering caused by the forced exodus of the ethnic Chinese "boat people" from Vietnam and by the devastation and famine arising from the war between the rival communist regimes in Kampuchea. Firm statistics were impossible to obtain with respect to the many thousands of Kampuchean refugees in Thai and Malaysian holding camps. If, as is often estimated, the population of Cambodia totalled between six and seven million people at the start of the infamous Pol Pot regime, perhaps 10% of the survivors in the current war between the rival communist governments have now become refugees seeking to escape from both regimes.

III.

The crucial nature of the relationship of the United States to the above-mentioned concerns, ostensibly located comparatively

far from American borders, was apparent throughout the conference, and the need for a carefully formulated and clearly articulated U.S. policy with respect to the Asian/Pacific region was an undercurrent which flowed through much of the conference deliberations, often rising to the surface and itself becoming a topic commanding considerable attention. That such a policy is lacking hardly reflects a newly emergent inadequacy in American foreign policy. Twenty-five years ago Edwin O. Reischauer embraced this very problem in the title of his book, *Wanted: An Asian Policy.* Reischauer's request is even more appropriate today than when it first was stated, and it is not without reason that several American analysts of Asian affairs have recently echoed his plea.

Time and again many observers of the Asian scene have charged successive post-World War II American administrations, and most particularly the Department of State, with being Europe-centered and spasmodic, if not neglectful, in attending to the Asian interests of the United States. The refrains of this lament have been phrased in such variations as:

1) The development and implementation of America's Asian policy are frequently sacrificed for European policy. The U.S. policy for Asia is "dictated" by the London and/or Paris "desks" of the State Department.
2) Americans, being descendants mainly of European (or "Western") cultures, tend to downgrade Asian (or "Eastern") cultures. In so doing, they ignore the Asian origins and roots of the Judaeo-Christian and early Greek philosophical traditions, and otherwise neglect the richness, diversity, and vitality of Asia's cultural and historical heritage.
3) U.S. administrations tend to rush into and suddenly announce policy decisions or "doctrines" relating to Asian affairs without full examination of their merits and defects, without making proper provisions for dealing with the potential consequences, and frequently without undertaking reasonable consultation with other friendly regimes affected by such decisions.

Although such criticisms are often characterized by a certain amount of exaggeration, they nevertheless carry both substance and significance.

There is a great deal which must be known and understood

about Asia before reasonably satisfactory U.S. perspectives can emerge regarding issues of war and peace in that area of the globe. Asia is the largest of the continents, containing roughly one-third of the earth's land surface and probably 65% of the world's population. The continent abuts on the Arctic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans and a number of their adjacent seas. Asia's diversity of physical characteristics is accompanied by a seemingly endless variety and complexity in the distribution of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups.

To some extent the distortions, errors of political judgement, and conflicts which have arisen in U.S. policy on Asia since World War II can be traced to the insufficiency of American knowledge with respect to our friends, allies, and adversaries. There exist few, if any, short-cuts to learning, and while Americans have acquired well-earned reputations for many notable attributes, they are not as yet known for the thorough study and patient acquisition of experience which is required for the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy. If the U.S. is to develop supportable perspectives and policies with respect to Asia, it must begin with an enlarged data base to serve as a foundation for responsible deliberation and debate. In international as well as domestic affairs, analysts and policy-makers alike are never faced with a *tabula rasa*—i.e., a clean or empty slate from which to start. With this in mind, it is useful now to review in summary form the essential aspects of U.S. Asian policy as it has evolved since the end of World War II.

IV.

The so-called Cold War may be seen to have its origins in the failure to sustain the "grand alliance" of 1941-1945 into the post-war years. In response to the actions of the Soviet Union in Europe, the U.S. developed over a five-year period (1945-1950) a policy which can be summed up in the concept of the "containment" of communist expansionism. The twin operational means designed to carry out the policy of containment in Europe were the implementation of the Marshall Plan (1947) for the reconstruction and economic redevelopment of the war-devastated European states

and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) for Europe's defense.

In contrast to its stance regarding Europe, the U.S. during the same five-year period pursued a course of disengagement and partial withdrawal from Asia.[2] However, the eruption of several communist insurgencies (supported by the Soviet bloc) against the newly independent Asian regimes, the fall of the Nationalist regime on the Chinese mainland and its removal to Taiwan in October 1949, and—most importantly—the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 decisively altered the content and direction of U.S. foreign policy in Asia.

For the next twenty years, encompassing the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, U.S. policy in Asia—in principle, if not in quantity and quality of supporting means—paralleled U.S. policy in Europe. The concept and implementation of containment was extended to Asia at the beginning of the 1950s by means of a series of bilateral and multilateral mutual security treaties, which—according to U.S. constitutional law—imposed legally binding commitments on succeeding U.S. governments (until such time, if ever, as the treaties were properly terminated). Containment continued to imply the protection or extension at home and abroad of vital national values vis-a-vis potential and existing adversaries. The national and international objectives of the policy were the ensurance of security, the furthering of stability, and improvement in the conditions of living.

The seven U.S. "containment" treaties applicable to Asia included: the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines (August 30, 1951); the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand [ANZUS] (September 1, 1951); the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan (September 8, 1951); the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea (October 1, 1953); the Pacific Charter and Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty [SEATO] with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,

[2]Perhaps the best exposition of this essentially negative policy of disengagement or non-involvement in Asian affairs can be found in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's masterful but evasive "Defensive Perimeter" speech given at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on January 12, 1950. In many ways, this speech by the distinguished but Europe-oriented Secretary defined a policy which was already passing. See the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1950, pp. 111-18.

Thailand, and the United Kingdom, and the Protocol for Cambodia, Laos, and the State of South Vietnam (September 8, 1954); the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (December 2, 1954); and the Baghdad Pact and Middle East Treaty Organization [later CENTO] with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (1955).[3] In addition to the treaties, a supportive set of statements of lesser constitutional status, known as agreements, resolutions, or doctrines, were developed. These included the Eisenhower Resolution on Formosa (1955); the Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East (1957); the Rusk (Kennedy)—Thanat Khoman Agreement on Thailand (1962); and the Johnson Resolution on the Gulf of Tonkin (1964).

The policy of containment, however, did not survive the testing ground of Indochina. In the wake of the 1968 North Vietnamese "Tet Offensive," the eventual U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and what has been called the American "Vietnam Syndrome," containment as a focus for U.S. foreign policy disappeared for more than a decade. In its place the Nixon, Ford, and [at least until the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan] Carter administrations adopted and adapted the basic elements of the "Nixon Doctrine" (more accurately termed the "Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine") first enunciated at Guam in July 1969.

The new policy thrust rested on a revised analysis of world power, which held that the duopoly of power formerly shared by the U.S. and the Soviet Union had given way to a multipolar or polycentric world in which there no longer existed—if there ever was one—a communist monolith. Advocates of the new policy argued that the U.S. should enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union so as to achieve a state of detente based on a linkage of strategic parity, arms control, economic and cultural exchanges, a general relaxation of tensions, and other factors which were expected to lead toward behavioral restraints. It was similarly

[3]Since 1949 the U.S. has also instituted some sort of economic aid agreement with most of the nations in Asia. For a fuller treatment of the various treaties and agreements mentioned in this essay, see Frank N. Trager, "American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia," in R. K. Sakai, ed., *Studies in Asia* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 17-59; and Frank N. Trager with William L. Scully, "Asia and the Western Pacific: A Time of Trial," *Royal United Services Institute and Brassey's Defense Yearbook 1975/76* (London and Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1975), pp. 165-212.

stressed that negotiations with the PRC should be undertaken in pursuit of the goals of friendly relations and mutual recognition. With respect to Indochina, the new view held that the U.S. should seek to end the war in Vietnam through a process of "Vietnamization," i.e., turning the war in Vietnam back to the Vietnamese.

Apparent progress along these lines was made regarding detente with the Soviet Union (the SALT I treaty, the Vladivostok agreement, and the Helsinki agreement) and expansion of relations with the PRC (the Shanghai communique). In 1973 the U.S. took the final step toward disengagement from Indochina when the Nixon administration yielded to the North Vietnamese terms for peace.

Elsewhere I have written that:[4]

> Generally the Nixon Doctrine was received by our Asian allies with doubt, developing into shocks and suspicion, especially after the February 1972 U.S.-PRC meeting and its accompanying Shanghai communique. To wind down the war in Vietnam was "good," but was it wise to withdraw American and other forces before an *effective* cease-fire and peace agreement was accepted by *all* parties to the conflict? To maintain our nuclear shield for our allies was "good," but was this compatible with the decline in U.S. power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the paralleled rise of Soviet power and Chinese power in the same arenas? To aid our friends and allies who may become—or already were—the victims of conventional aggressive and subversive action by the Asian communist states and their other-national proxies was "good," but were such promises of aid reliable in the face of ambiguous statements about decisions to be made according to *our* interests at the crucial time?

These and related questions arising from the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine were being carefully examined in Asian capitals during the first half of the 1970s. Although the American leaders proclaimed repeatedly that the U.S. would "keep its commitments," a general uneasiness regarding U.S. credibility rippled through the capitals of friendly Asian states, many of them partners with the

[4]See Trager with Scully, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-05. I have been critical of the Nixon-Kissinger policies and "Doctrine" for a number of years. See my "Alternative Futures for Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 1971; and "The Nixon Doctrine and Asian Policy," *Southeast Asian Perspectives*, No. 6, June 1972.

U.S. in collective security treaties and agreements. For example, long-time Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, one of the most dependable supporters of SEATO, began after Nixon's Guam speech to question the organization's reliability. At least partially in connection with doubts regarding the future U.S. role in Asia, and taking into account the weakening of the Commonwealth Defense Agreement as a consequence of the virtual military withdrawal of the United Kingdom, Malaysia (led by the late Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak) introduced a proposal in 1971 which would create in Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Japan, too, was "shocked" by the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine and the Shanghai communique, a reaction which flowed less from the substance of these policies than from the manner in which the U.S. developed and then suddenly announced its proposals without consultation with its Asian friends and allies.

The advent of the Carter administration in 1976 added to the Asian feelings of political malaise and views of declining U.S. credibility. It was clear from the beginning of Carter's presidency that he and his major appointees would attempt, to the maximum extent possible, to distance themselves politically from the Nixon/Kissinger/Ford era. It was declared that there would be "no more Vietnams," "no more Watergates," no more "Metternichean" power ploys, and no more covert and clandestine "dirty tricks."

Nevertheless, however much Nixon's name (and, to a lesser extent, Kissinger's) was anathema to the Carter administration, the U.S. under Carter sought to carry out—even more vigorously than had Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford—the quintessential elements of the Nixon Doctrine, which the new administration reaffirmed in a series of speeches (e.g., Secretary of State Vance's Asia Society speech in June 1977 and Secretary of Defense Brown's Los Angeles World Affairs Council speech in February 1978). The Carter administration rejected as outdated the "belief that Soviet expansionism must be contained"—a stance, in Carter's view, which had flowed from an "inordinate fear of communism." Detente and arms control with the Soviet Union were pursued, along with plans for a cutback in the U.S. defense budget, and Carter sought to negotiate Nixon's SALT I into SALT II. Instead of designing its

own provisions for dealing with the PRC, the Carter administration proceeded to fulfill the terms of Nixon's Shanghai communique regarding the normalization of relations with Peking, at the expense of continued diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China and the Mutual Defense Treaty with that nation. Even in view of Hanoi's continuing and multifaceted intransigence in Indochina, the Carter regime made overtures toward the normalization of relations with Vietnam in May 1977 and again in the Fall of 1978.

Evidence of the inadequacies of American foreign policy during the decade of the 1970s manifested itself in a number of ways. Toward the end of President Ford's term of office, some members of the government and some Congressional leaders began to worry about the growing size and expanding deployment of Soviet military power in the Warsaw Pact bloc and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Nuclear parity, an essential foundation for deterrence, seemed to be slipping away to Soviet advantage. Furthermore, it fell to the Ford and Carter administrations to witness the fulfillment of the much-scorned but not irrelevant Eisenhower-named "domino theory."

It is true that countries and people are not dominoes, susceptible to toppling by the first shove, and the "domino theory" may well be an inappropriate name for a theory of international relations. The meaning of the domino theory is quite simple, however, and retains its significance in today's international realm. Weakness in the power structures of various states invites power plays from stronger, aggressive, and/or unfriendly neighbors or adversaries. International politics is afflicted with a sort of contagion or infectiousness similar to that which affects the health of individuals living closely in society. These aspects of the domino theory are reflected in the course of recent developments in Indochina. Hanoi in succession invaded and took over South Vietnam in 1975 (in violation of the terms of the 1973 Paris Peace Treaty)[5]; established dominance over Laos in 1976-1977; invaded Kampuchea in late 1978, replacing the communist Pol Pot regime with Vietnam's own communist puppet government led by Heng Samrin; and in recent

[5] The unpublicized Nixon-Kissinger commitment to reintroduce American troops and to resupply the South Vietnamese in the event that Hanoi seriously violated the 1973 peace terms was not or could not be fulfilled.

months on at least one occasion has carried the armed conflict over the Thai border, ostensibly in "hot pursuit" of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge forces which presumably were regrouping in Thai sanctuaries.

The 1970s also have witnessed an erosion of important segments of the institutional structure of collective security so carefully nurtured in earlier decades. Some treaties and agreements have been renewed (usually with amendments), but others have been formally abrogated or have withered on a contumelious vine. SEATO has been officially terminated, while CENTO—in a delayed death agony—retains Turkey as its sole "Asian" member.[6] From the beginning of the Carter presidency the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China came under constant attack by leading members of the administration. Uncritically accepting of the 1972 Shanghai communique, and apparently desirous of playing a so-called China Card in America's unresolved and continuing diplomatic contest with the USSR, Carter unilaterally denounced the ROC treaty to make way for the January 1, 1979 recognition of Peking—on the latter's terms. ANZUS also has suffered from neglect in Washington and from political opposition in Australia, especially during the preceding Labor government led by Prime Minister Whitlam. The successor Australian regime under Prime Minister Fraser, however, has been able to effect repairs with Washington, which seems belatedly to have recognized the importance of ANZUS.

Even those security arrangements which have been quite enduring have suffered some difficulties. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was renewed in 1960 for a ten-year period, and now continues on a year-to-year basis. In recent years an unprecedented series of Japanese White Papers on defense has emanated from both governmental and private sources.[7] While these White Papers cover many topics of concern, one recurring theme indi-

[6]Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, the other three Asian members, had previously exited from CENTO.

[7]See "Defense of Japan, White Paper on Defense (Summary)," *Defense Bulletin* [Defense Agency, Tokyo], Vol. III, No. 2, October 1979; Jun Tsunoda, "Is Japan's Defense Posture Adequate?" [summary translation of *On National Defense—1977 Edition*], *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. V, No. 4, March/April 1978; and Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1979* (Tokyo: 1979). Also see "Japanese Establish Arms Policy Panel," *New York Times*, April 7, 1980.

cates that much unhappiness and dissatisfaction remain in Tokyo as a result of the "shocks"—e.g., the threatened withdrawal in 1977 of U.S. ground forces from the Republic of Korea and applications of the U.S. "Swing Strategy"[8]—perpetrated by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. In the view of the Japanese (and in the eyes of the South Koreans and other Asians as well), these apparent policy decisions seemed to signal a significant U.S. downgrading of, if not withdrawal from, its commitments to the defense of America's Asian allies. The Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines until recently was jeopardized by protracted disagreement on the issue of the important U.S. naval base at Subic Bay and air base at Clark Field. This dispute between Washington and Manila was settled for the time being on January 7, 1979 when the two governments signed an amendment to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement stipulating U.S. retention of the military installations, under revised non-sovereign conditions, until at least 1983, when the Agreement is scheduled for review.

V.

Many varieties of imperialism, both "eastern" and "western," have through the centuries impinged upon the peace, security, and territorial integrity of various Asian peoples. In the years after World War II, however, the Asian continent became home for many newly independent and sovereign nations which had determinedly thrown off the fetters of colonialism. Nevertheless, there exist today several states with imperialist designs which pose an actual or potential challenge to the continued well-being of the independent Asian nations.

The first of these states, the People's Republic of China, may be undergoing (at least to a certain extent) a change in its stance. The PRC, a country which has sought to export revolution on its own terms, is now being perceived in Asia as less of an ideological, subversive, and material threat than at any time since the Communist Party of China came to power in October 1949. Peking for decades has given propaganda and diminishing material assist-

[8]See Rear Admiral Robert Hanks (Ret.), "The Swinging Debate," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1980; "U.S. Strategy Focus Shifting from Europe to Pacific," *New York Times*, May 25, 1980; and "U.S. Warily Expands Southeast Asian Security Role," *New York Times*, July 10, 1980.

ance to the communist insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Laos (until Hanoi came to dominate that country), and continues to support the communist Pol Pot regime in its war with Vietnam and Heng Samrin. However, since the termination of the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao Tse-tung, the ousting of the "Gang of Four," and the restoration (for the second time) of Teng Hsiao-ping and his colleagues, the presumptive moderating influence of the most able Chinese communist of them all, the late Chou En-lai, has come to prevail in the PRC, at least for the time being. Under this influence, the PRC seems to seek not a "purist," highly ideological, almost Trotskyist "permanent revolution" (to use Mao's term), but rather some sort of populist, socialist revolution under the authority and control of the Communist Party. As long as this course is continued, it can be expected that the perception of the PRC as a threat to regional states will continue to diminish, if only slowly, cautiously, and tentatively.

A second source of imperialism is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, supported in no small measure by the Soviet Union. Since the ill-fated Paris Peace Treaty of 1973, Hanoi has taken over South Vietnam (1975) and Laos (1976-1977); is now at war in Kampuchea; and has systematically proceeded to establish its de facto hegemony over the whole of the Indochinese peninsula. In addition to the general fears and anxieties generated in the region by Hanoi's successful aggressive behavior, Vietnam's actions may ultimately force upon its Asian neighbors the task of caring for some 500,000 to 600,000 Kampuchean refugees and Vietnamese inhabitants of Chinese extraction (the Vietnamese "boat people").

The third imperialistic force contributing to a pervasive atmosphere of political and military uncertainty in Asia is the Soviet Union. The USSR may be seen as an aggressive land and sea power whose borders are directly contiguous to three of the four major regional centers of Asia: 1) the oil-rich area of Southwest Asia; 2) South Asia (the world's second most populous region), with its fragile economies; and 3) East/Northeast Asia (the world's most populous region), with an industrial and technological capacity in Japan second only to that of the United States. With the aid of its present ally, Vietnam, the Soviet Union through its naval leapfrogging also has approached Southeast Asia, the fourth Asian subregion and one of the potentially richest resource areas in the world.

The Russian and later Soviet geopolitical penetration of the Asian land mass is an old story, but the ability of the Russian/Soviet bear to swim globally is a capability acquired mostly during the last quarter century, under the drive and leadership of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. The growth of Soviet naval power is visibly in evidence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the Soviets now have access to base facilities in such disparate parts of the globe as Ethiopia, Yemen, Vietnam, and the maritime provinces of Siberia. With the emplacement of Soviet seapower athwart the sea lanes vital to the economies of all nations, the Soviets may be in a position to threaten the commercial routes in the area of Southeast Asia and through the Indian Ocean (as well as the Cape Route), at a time of growing Western and virtually absolute Japanese dependence on the oil, other minerals, and raw materials produced in non-Western lands. The ability of Soviet naval power to close off the vital chokepoints in the Persian Gulf and through the Malacca, Sohya, Tsugaru, Tsushima, and Taiwan Straits—waterways which are essential for the preservation of the fuel and food life lines of all trading Asian nations—poses a new challenge which must be seriously considered.

The 1978 Soviet-fomented coup and 1979 armed intervention in Afghanistan constitute the most recent and blatant examples of Soviet imperialistic behavior. A more longstanding situation is the continued Soviet occupation of the northern Japanese islands (Southern Sakhalin and the four lower Kuriles) which the USSR acquired as "booty" at the end of World War II. This acquisition enabled Stalin to boast of the "Soviet Sea of Okhotsk," rounding out Soviet predominance in that gateway from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean. It is not without some historic irony to note that the Japanese have built a beautiful commemorative shrine (and associated museum rooms) to honor Admiral Togo Heihachiro (1848-1934) for his great victory over the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima Strait on May 27-28, 1905 (a victory which ended the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905). The Japanese now are keenly aware of the strength of the Soviet seapower deployed in and near their waters, and realize as well that Japan today could not withstand a Soviet attack without reliance on its sometimes troubled alliance with the United States.

Every other state on the expanding boundaries of Soviet power and influence in Asia is faced with similar worries. The

obvious growth of Soviet strength in the period since World War II—despite the country's climatic problems and difficulties in the areas of agricultural and industrial production and marketing—is indeed impressive and potentially threatening. It is not unfair to conclude that Soviet land and seapower in Asia form a potential giant pincer which affects all peoples and regimes from the Black Sea "apex" to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean on the northern land arm, and from that same apex mainly by sea over the Transcaucasus landbridge to the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. To close the pincer, the Soviet Union must complete the ring through the strategically important waters of Southeast Asia—a difficult and as yet unaccomplished task, to be sure, but one toward which Soviet progress is being made.

VI.

A belated "political awakening" now seems to be taking place in Washington, but it is not the one which was suggested by the easy optimism of Jimmy Carter as he assumed the presidency in 1977. Such traumatic events and developments as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese-perpetrated war in Indochina, the dangerous situation in the Caribbean Basin, and the tinder-box circumstances in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf at long last have shaken the complacency of Washington, particularly as it contemplates the deteriorating defense posture of the United States vis-a-vis its major—and aggressive—adversary, the Soviet Union. Prodded by its allies and friends, and warned repeatedly by well-informed international security analysts both public and private, Washington has begun to take stock of its foreign policy—Asian policy included—as the country squares away for yet another of its quadrennial presidential elections.

However America's approach to foreign affairs may become sloganized for the 1980s, it will be necessary—if sound policy is to eventuate—to make a return to fundamentals. In the case of the U.S.-Asian scene, what is required is the systematic re-examination of the mutually shared political, military, and economic data base. While Washington can and should make clear its own values and interests, the U.S. cannot successfully design an Asian policy (or any foreign policy) *unilaterally*. Because the U.S. can no longer "live alone and like it," if ever such a stance was

possible, the U.S. must decide *with other international actors* what objectives and goals will jointly be sought to enhance mutual well-being and defend against the power and threats posed by adversaries.

It is here assumed that we will continue in the 1980s to live in a non-peaceful and (at least in some sense) confrontational world. Just as the so-called Cold War period was never "cold" in Asia, so it is likely that the coming decade will continue to exhibit small wars, insurgencies, other forms of armed conflict, competition for scarce resources, economic difficulties, unmet humanitarian needs, and other threats to peace and human progress.

In the search for mutually shared responses and approaches to these problems, the international actors involved in any particular understanding or common policy necessarily must be limited to those whose projected view of the future is based on roughly similar assumptions. In this sense, the interaction between the United States and other international actors is *not* global in orientation; it should instead take place in terms of the recognizable regions which in fact constitute the geopolitical context for rational international security policy. Mutually shared analysis eventually can issue into bilateral or multilateral agreements, treaties, alliances, or other formal and informal instruments of international discourse. These instruments necessarily will be characterized by two conditions: a) they will not be passive, but will be directed toward actively meeting and resolving the central issue(s) at stake; and b) they will be collective in nature, entailing for all involved parties mutual obligations, while taking into account differences in capacity.

There is little reason to doubt that a mutually shared political, military, and economic data base can be developed and set forth for Americans and Asians, and that from this base can be extracted a mutually shared set of values, interests, objectives, and goals. Such a step is fundamental to the process of designing mutually acceptable policies, and while it is not easy, it is the less difficult of the two tasks. In this analysis, values are regarded as the most basic principles upon which the social and political order and the physical existence of the state are based. Values often are abstract, ambiguous, and couched in the most general terms. Interests, on the other hand, are specific, particularized illustrations (in geopolitical or social psychological terms) of the values held by the state.

One list of major values and some related interests reads as follows:[9]

1) The preservation of national institutions and survival of the nation as a self-governing entity, as opposed to subjugation to an alien power.
2) The ensurance of territorial integrity, or the preservation or freely negotiated restoration or rectification of national boundaries.
3) The protection of the commonly accepted rights and privileges of all nationals at home, on the seas, and in foreign lands.
4) The maintenance or improvement of the national wealth, health, and welfare.
5) The maintenance of prestige and responsibility in all foreign undertakings.
6) The establishment of security, including the assured capability for meeting any threat to the foregoing.

Each such list produced by individual authors will of course show variations in language, but the essential terms of reference will not vary considerably. What is valued by each nation-state is its security, stability, and improvement in the conditions of living. In the pursuit of these values, each state seeks the maximum degree of support from its own people and the cooperation—because it is necessary, not merely desirable—of other nations and peoples.

The United States and its presumptive friends and allies in Asia must begin to find solutions to a number of policy puzzles—some urgent, some important, some uncertain—which flow from or are otherwise connected to such sets of values. Among the policy puzzles to be resolved are:

1) The existing distribution of power in the world and its possible consequences for states large and small.
2) The competing geopolitical views prevalent in today's international politics, and the line-up of states behind these respective views.
3) The choice of economic models and priorities for resource allocation in a world of speeded-up expectations.

[9]See Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security," in Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *National Security and American Society* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 35-48.

4) The calculus of interests from among present trends and future stresses.

The security equation always must include the political and economic dimensions as well as the military component, and all three aspects have suffered from neglect and/or unwise or unpalatable U.S. decision-making in the last decade. In seeking solutions to the above-mentioned puzzles, it is necessary to yield the shopworn and procrustean concepts which too often have constricted the formulation of policy, and proceed to a re-examination of the current Asian data-base, taking into account the perceived and experienced realities of the recent past and the present. This database will certainly include a recognition of the roles played and the impacts exerted by the "super-powers" and the other "big powers" in the region. At the same time, however, full attention must be paid to the importance of the smaller regional powers, for at this juncture in history each of the states in the Asian/Pacific area has acquired some power to undergird its respective interests and is learning that shared interests can be mutually enhanced and protected.

While past decades cannot be negated—for, as mentioned earlier, there is no *tabula rasa* in international affairs—it is time for a curtain of sorts to be drawn on the past thirty years. As we enter the 1980s, the search for new policies will entail a number of complex considerations and challenges which must be taken carefully into account. For example, more than three decades' experience with a variety of failed or at least flawed security alliances involving the U.S. and various Asian/Pacific nations has created justifiable diplomatic anxiety in the region with respect to alliance systems in general. The U.S. should aim to reinvigorate the existing defense treaties with its remaining Asian and Pacific Basin allies (i.e., with the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand). Washington should not attempt, however, to revive old alliance structures such as SEATO and CENTO, which once were useful but no longer can serve as strong and viable foundations for mutual security in the Asian/Pacific region. It furthermore seems to me that this is not the proper time to forge a grand new alliance of the sort formed during

World War II, for most of the presumptive members of such an alliance are not yet ready to join; their "houses" are not yet in order. An effort to forge a new triangular alliance with the PRC and Japan would also be unwise, for such an entente would cause worry among most of the other Asian powers and would certainly dispose the Soviet Union to accelerate whatever aggressive timetable it may have prepared as a contingency plan in response to this possible development.

There are signs that the United States may be proceeding toward sounder and more fully considered policies for the Asian/Pacific region. The U.S. has now begun to realize that it no longer can treat the defense of its interests in the Pacific as of secondary importance to the preservation of its interests in Europe. Washington is just beginning to acknowledge and recognize the importance of the fact that the volume of U.S. economic interaction with Asia has for the past several years been greater than that with Europe. The realization also is growing that the U.S. must divest itself of such ill-suited defense policies as maintaining a supposed capacity for fighting "two-and-a-half" wars (the stance during the 1960s) or "one-and-a-half" wars (the thinking of the 1970s). In the world of the 1980s, the U.S. must be prepared to defend its interests in the Asian/Pacific region (and in the Indian Ocean area) with whatever conventional and nuclear capabilities which may be required.

Other encouraging developments may be noted as well. The five member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, are steadily building their efforts in the areas of political, economic, and bilateral security cooperation. The ASEAN nations individually and ASEAN as an organization are looking outward and in various ways are encouraging the U.S. to demonstrate once again a genuine concern for the preservation and furtherance of mutual American and Asian interests.

The re-examination of U.S. policies and reassessment of the Asian data-base suggested herein, if carried out in conjunction with America's friends in the Asian/Pacific region, hopefully will lead to circumstances in the 1980s in which a book entitled *Found at Last: An Asian Policy* can justifiably be published. Whatever words or slogans may be used to describe such a policy, it must be a policy which reflects the recognition of the United States of the need to

arrive at and carry out decisions *collectively* with the various nations in Asia and the Pacific Basin.

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Kamchatka Peninsula
Vladivostok
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Mongolia
Kurile Islands
Hokkaido
Republic of Korea
Tsugaru Str.
People's Republic of China
Japan
Nepal
Bhutan
Tsushima Str.
Ryūkyū Islands
PACIFIC OCEAN
India
Laos
Burma
Republic of China
Taiwan Str.
Bangladesh
Danang
Thailand
Vietnam
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