INTERVENTION & CHANGE IN CAMBODIA

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INTERVENTION & CHANGE IN CAMBODIA

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY?



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preface

This book examines Cambodia and the problems of and prospects for democratization — one aspect of the "triple transition", a term widely used in the post–Cold War era (the other two transitions are from war to peace, and from a centrally planned or socialist economy to a market-driven or capitalist one). While the triple transition has often been treated as a simultaneous process, this book sheds light on how difficult it is to push the three transitions at one go. Without an effective change in the state-society power structure, the transitions from war to peace and from a command economy to a capitalist one run the risk of being thwarted. In war-torn states, power structures are shaped or even determined by material — especially military and economic — capabilities.

This book does not simply seek to describe the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, however. My purpose is to "measure" and explain the impact of foreign intervention on Cambodia's *state* and *societal structures*, in so far as it perpetuates political authoritarianism or allows democratization to emerge and mature. Although I do not pretend to develop a general theory of democratization and to predict trends for Third World politics, I aim to develop a broader theoretical perspective on the transition from political authoritarianism to liberal democracy. I hope to shed some new light on why it is extraordinarily difficult for weak states to make this transition, and why external intervention towards democratization often seems to run into many difficulties.

This study is important to current thinking on democratization in three respects. First, Cambodia is an excellent case study of the process of democratization, because attempts to establish democracy have not been as successful as one would have liked. From 1954 (after Cambodia gained its independence from France) to 1998, this Southeast Asian state has gone through a series of trials and tribulations. The seeds of

liberal democracy briefly fell on Cambodian soil after World War II, but they soon died when Cambodia witnessed the emergence of paternalistic authoritarianism (1954–70), republican dictatorship (1970–75), revolutionary totalitarianism (1975–78), and socialist dictatorship (1979–91). Between 1993 and 1998, Cambodia's newfound democracy was continually tested and it remains unconsolidated.

Second, Cambodia continues to command global attention. The UN has intervened in this state on an unprecedented scale. After four Cambodian factions had signed a peace agreement in Paris on 23 October 1991, they invited the UN to send a mission to Cambodia. The then-UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with the collective support of the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council, immediately set up a mission with an historic mandate: to create a neutral political environment in which the Cambodian signatories could compete in a free and fair election. The multifarious mission was made up of more than 20,000 personnel (of whom 15,000 were peacekeepers) and cost about US$2 billion.

The operational significance of this mission (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia or UNTAC) was that it had six components: military, civil administration, human rights, elections, repatriation of refugees, and economic rehabilitation. After the elections, external actors stayed committed to the process of nation-rebuilding by providing Cambodia with enormous amounts of foreign aid (US$2,336,925,000 in the 1992–97 period, to be precise). However, Cambodia is far from democratic. The last five years have seen human rights abuses, grenade attacks on political opponents, coup attempts, and armed conflict. It was not until late 1998 that the armed rebellion ended.

Third, although much has been written about Cambodia's tragic history, little attention has been given to theoretical issues correlating democratization with international intervention. Those who were critical of UNTAC tended to draw insights from the conventional wisdom that a country like Cambodia is unprepared for political pluralism. They base their analyses on one of these (pre-)conditions: political attitudes and behaviour, the level of economic development, institution-building, social structures and interactions among social groups, political institutions, the role of elites, and so on. Traditional theories have not seriously

examined a correlation between external influences and the persistence of authoritarianism. Those who did pay attention to the role of UNTAC and explain its impact on Cambodian politics tended to test the concepts of international peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Eminent Cambodia historian David Chandler offers us a sober reflection on the unpredictable nature of Cambodian politics when he asserts that "Cambodia has a large capacity to ambush prophets and take historians by surprise".[1] I think I know why. As shall be briefly discussed later, historians tend to describe political events in terms of who does what to whom, and then look for both a culprit and a "saviour" to rescue Cambodia from tragedy. What often happens is that as soon as a new leader emerges, he is turned into a "monster". Historical analysis unfortunately tends to centre largely on personality (Sihanouk's "hyperactivity" and "narcissism", Lon Nol's "phlegmatic personal style", and so on), individual intentions, political ideology, and cultural proclivity.

This study seeks to moderate the following intellectual traditions:

1. Personality determines political dynamics and systems.
2. Ideology single-handedly drives the politics of violence.
3. Cambodian culture is violence-prone, anti-democratic, and politically irredeemable; culture is anti-rational.
4. Violence is the way to destroy evil-doers and to build strong states.[2]

Instead, this study drives home the following points:

1. In weak states, the politics of survival matters most. In the absence of an overarching political authority capable of enjoying political legitimacy and justly regulating social behaviour, violence tends to serve as the means to achieve the end of security.
2. Personality, ideology, and culture are more or less by-products of other factors such as the political environment and can be changed or entrenched by change or continuity in power relations.
3. Cognitive change is difficult, if not impossible, especially when power relations among various socio-political forces remain asymmetrical.
4. External actors often contribute to the dynamics of power relations among socio-political forces within weak states.

5. The use of violence is often counter-productive, self-destructive, and ultimately anti-democratic.

My theoretical approach has drawn criticism from some scholars. One legitimate concern is that Cambodian politics cannot be explained by a single, grand theory. In other words, any attempt to advance a general theory of democratization is bound to fail because it overlooks certain crucial variables explaining war-torn Third World political dynamics. Be that as it may, it is important that we make sense of a complex world of politics by establishing certain patterns, by testing them empirically, and by drawing some general conclusions. This intellectual effort enables us to avoid the pitfall of being driven by emotions or personal feelings; it helps us to become more objective.

Because of the position I take in this study, I would like to make one clarification concerning my intentions. Writing on Cambodian politics has been a painful intellectual exercise for me. I have been labelled "strange", "irresponsible", "dishonest", "immoral", "propagandistic", and "hypocritical". Such characterizations often come from those who apparently see themselves as holding the "moral high ground" — those who hate evil. My critics are free to judge me as they please. I have no qualms with their declaring themselves "saints" and thinking me a "terrible sinner". My hope is that they will not go beyond the bounds of scholarship. But what often confuses me is that the "saints" who seek to avoid "sin" have basically rejected my position against the use of violence as a way to accomplish political objectives. The one thing my critics can accuse me of is that I always speak against violence. I have never belonged to any political party, nor have I ever sought to defend a regime. My attitude towards violence is as simple as this: we ought to be careful, lest in fighting evil one becomes evil itself. Events such as the National Hate Day (commemorated on 20 May in Cambodia; initiated by the government in the 1980s) is understandable. But take a second look at what government leaders had done during that decade and thereafter.

It is worth stressing that I am a student of international relations/comparative politics and do not claim to be an expert on Cambodia. My academic interest in this country has only grown out of my personal experiences living there until mid-1979, at which point I was in my

early twenties and left for Thailand, and later Canada. I have since devoted a large part of my life to helping myself better understand the incredible sufferings that the Cambodian people have undergone. This book has largely resulted from my general reflections on Cambodian politics. When I first contemplated writing this book, I felt a strong sense of despair, because seeking to understand Cambodian politics seemed an impossible task. And it is still a dreadful thought, knowing that I may have embarked on something too complex and too unmanageable. Only a few leading scholars such as David Chandler, Milton Osborne, Michael Vickery, Ben Kiernan, Serge Thion, and Steven Heder can truly be called Cambodia experts. Their works have truly enriched my intellectual thinking.

I would like to end my remarks by assuring those who hate evil that I am with them on moral issues. The only difference between us is the question of how we should work to defeat the "evil" we all despise. I wrote this book not to convince my critics that they were wrong, or to prove which of us is more "righteous". The future of Cambodia is all that drove me to write this book.

I argue that the use of violence to defeat "evil" is often counterproductive and self-defeating, and thereby run the risk of being accused of "moral spinelessness" — especially when using the word "forgiveness". Still, I stick to this principle because I feel it makes me more human and less self-righteous, and enables me to solve what I consider a "moral dilemma". A call for forgiveness does not exonerate wrongdoers, nor does it make the forgiver morally irresponsible. What it does do, however, is to enable adversaries to get out of the trap that condemns them into an "eternity" of violence. I could not agree more with what John Bolton, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs during the George Bush Administration, wrote: "Perhaps most destructive of true 'nation-building' in recent Cambodian situation is the idea of an international tribunal to try charges of genocide. To get the full cathartic benefit of war crime trials, a nation must be willing to take on the responsibility of judging its own. It may choose to opt for the amnesia of a general forgiveness of past crimes, but if the nation wants justice instead of amnesty, they should try the criminals themselves."[2] The philosopher Hannah Arendt once said that for-

giveness brings redemption to the inevitability of history; otherwise, humanity remains trapped in the "predicament of irreversibility".

The tragedy of Cambodian history calls for a national awakening. Its people must stop putting the blame on one another, their blameworthy leaders, and outsiders to the extent that more violence becomes "justified". Knowing that state-making is a very bloody process may help us understand better the dilemmas political leaders in weak states always have to face.[3] The Cambodian people and their leaders should learn from and not repeat their tragic history, by nurturing the spirit of forgiveness. They must not look back revengefully at all the horrors that have afflicted them. As they prepare themselves for what lies ahead, Prime Minister Hun Sen should be given a chance to lead the nation. He should not, however, entertain any idea that he would rule the country for life. This book warns against any such wishful thinking.

The 21st century will bring many great challenges to Cambodia, but I still have faith in the ability of the Cambodian people to overcome their tragic past and to rebuild their nation in such a way that peace and prosperity will endure.

Sorpong Peou
15 January 1999
Singapore

NOTES

1. D. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History Revisited", *SAIS Review* 14, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 1994): 89.
2. John Bolton, "Cambodia Will Test ASEAN's Maturity: Further U.N. Intervention Would Be Paternalistic and Useless", 13 October 1997 <soc-culture.cambodia>.
3. Although I argue in this book that accommodative rather than hegemonic politics is the way out for Cambodia, I am well aware that state-building is a bloody process. In weak and fragmented states, leaders are almost always tempted to use repressive violence as the way to build political communities. This approach is well recognized by leading social scientists. Charles Tilly is among them. As he has observed: "The building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor ... The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state-building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control

of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities ... Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of strong states." (See C. Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making", in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, p. 71.) For Tilly, state-making is the principal source of "organized violence". As he puts it: "Under the general heading of organized violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities: 1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force; 2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories; 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients; 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities — war making, state making and protection." (See C. Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", in *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 181.) Political scientist Joel S. Migdal even suggests that severe social dislocations are necessary conditions for building strong states, while world historical timing, military threat, an independent bureaucracy, and skilful leadership are sufficient conditions for the task. He remarks: "[Without] severe social dislocations and additional conducive conditions, it is unlikely that new strong states will emerge in the foreseeable future. New policies, management techniques, administrative tinkerings, more committed bureaucrats are all inadequate to change the structural relations between weak states and strong societies: the effect of society's fragmented social control in weakening the state and the effect of a weak state's politics and administration in reinforcing fragmented social control in society." (See J.S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, p. 277.) Migdal also provides some good insight into the politics of survival in Third World states: "It has been part of a praiseworthy informational-political campaign, led by Amnesty International, to lend a helping hand from outside the society to protect victims and potential victims. Academic literature, for the most part, has not gone beyond indictment of particular leaders and regimes." (Ibid., p. 214.)

acknowledgements

I wrote this book with a personal conviction, based on my long-term observations of Cambodian politics and the insights and inspirations I drew from those with whom I have interacted over the years. I would like to thank them.

First of all, I would like to thank my good friend William Wood, who kindly helped edit the book at manuscript stage. Natarajan Nagarajan, who always came to my rescue when my computer ran into difficulties, deserves my sincere appreciation for his prompt responses to my calls. Colleagues at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) also made it possible for this book to be completed. They have kindly shown patience and friendship and this has made my academic life most enjoyable. My sincere thanks go to Professor Chan Heng Chee, former Director of the Institute, and Professor Chia Siow Yue, current Director, for their support during my four-year stay at ISEAS.

Since 1992, I have visited Cambodia often (two to three times a year) and talked to hundreds of people. My interviewees, none of whom can be identified for various reasons, offered me valuable insights that helped me clarify my thinking on different complex issues. I share their hopes and despairs. To them I offer thanks and wish them well in all that they seek to accomplish.

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among those who have kindly assisted me. I am particularly grateful to Bunleng Men for his help during my fieldwork in Cambodia in the last several years. Mrs. Ling LeBrun, Nina Roy, Kao Kim Hourn, and Nay Chhuon have also provided me with invaluable assistance.

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My wife Chola has endured the most hardship, having to put up with me during my travelling and busy days. Her patience and love has made it possible for me to complete this book. I am most indebted to her.

Above all, I thank God for teaching me to be mindful of my self-righteous tendencies and to be aware of the "beam" in my own eye.

Although I am grateful to everyone who had lent a helping hand, I would like to stress that I alone take full responsibility for the views I express in this book and for any factual inaccuracies or errors of judgment or interpretation that remain.

acronyms & abbreviations

ADB — Asian Development Bank
AFPFL — Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
AMM — ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
ANFREL — Asian Network for Free Elections
ASEAN — Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLDP — Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (KPNLF's Party)
BLP — Buddhist Liberal Party
CC — Constitutional Council
CDC — Council for the Development of Cambodia
CGM — Consultative Group Meeting
CGDK — Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIA — Central Intelligence Agency
CMAC — Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CNAF — Cambodian National Armed Forces
COM — Council of Ministers
COMFREL — Commission of Free and Fair Elections
CPK — Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP — Cambodian People's Party
CPT — Communist Party of Thailand
CRDB — Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board
DK — Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)
DNUM — Democratic National United Movement
EOU — European Observation Unit
ERC — Economic Rehabilitation Credit
ERP — Emergency Rehabilitation Project
ESAF — Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EU — European Union

Funcinpec — National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia
FUNK — United National Front of Kampuchea
GDP — gross domestic product
GNUNS — Government of National Union of National Salvation
GSP — Generalized System of Preferences
ICM — International Control Mechanism
ICORC — International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia
IFC — International Finance Corp
IMF — International Monetary Fund
JIM — Jakarta Informal Meeting
JCACR — Joint Commission for Abnormal Conflict Resolution
JIOG — Joint International Observer Group
KNP — Khmer Nation Party
NPKC — National Peacekeeping Council (Thailand)
KPNLF — Khmer People's National Liberation Front
KPRC — Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council
KPRP — Khmer People's Revolutionary Party
LDP — Liberal Democratic Party
LSDP — Liberal Social Democratic Party
MCRRC — Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia
MFN — most-favoured nation
MOI — Ministry of Interior
MPs — members of parliament
NADK — National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)
NBC — National Bank of Cambodia
NEC — National Election Committee
NGC — National Government of Cambodia
NGOs — non-governmental organizations
NLD — National League for Democracy
NLF — National Liberation Front
NUF — National United Front
NVA — North Vietnamese Army
ODA — overseas development assistance

P-5 — Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council
PAP — People's Action Party (Singapore)
PAVN — People's Army of Vietnam
PDK — Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)
PIUs — Programme Implementation Units
PMUs — Project Management Units
PNGC — Provincial National Government of Cambodia
PRA — People's Representative Assembly
PRK — People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRPK — People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea
RAM — Reform the Armed Forces Movement
RCAF — Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RNGC — Royal National Government of Cambodia
SCM — Supreme Council of Magistracy
SEATO — Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SNC — Supreme National Council (of Cambodia)
SOC — State of Cambodia
SLORC — State Law and Order Restoration Council
STF — Systemic Transformation Facility
UCD — Union of Cambodian Democrats
UNAMIC — UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNDP — United Nations Development Program
UNESCO — United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNTAC — United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
YOU — Young Officers Union



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introduction

A Reflection on Major Theories of Democracy

In recent decades, Cambodia has been rent asunder by rebellion, repression, violence, war, invasion, and occupation. Its people have suffered mainly at the hands of their own leaders, who — from Prince Norodom Sihanouk to President Lon Nol to Prime Minister Pol Pot to Prime Minister Hun Sen — have refused to play by the democratic rules of the political game. Sihanouk abdicated his throne, became head of state in 1955, and ruled the country with an iron fist until a successful coup in March 1970. A political regime led by General Lon Nol subsequently emerged and became known as the Khmer Republic. But the new political regime soon found itself engulfed in a widespread civil war with a communist guerrilla force known as the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot. In April 1975, the war was over when the Khmer Rouge army marched into the cities and forced the republican leadership to surrender. The Khmer Rouge promised an era of peace but instead began a reign of terror. In late 1978, Prime Minister Pol Pot was overthrown and a new regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), came into existence. The PRK became the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989 and ruled the country until 1991, when four warring factions signed a peace accord known as the Paris Agreements to transform Cambodia into a liberal democracy. Between 1991 and 1998, however, the country's newfound democracy remained far from consolidated.

As shall be discussed in subsequent chapters, these regimes — respectively, paternalistic authoritarianism, republican authoritarianism, revolutionary totalitarianism, socialist dictatorship, and unconsolidated democracy (with the potential of moving towards what is called "Asian democracy") — are all characterized as anti-democratic.

External attempts at steering Cambodia away from its anti-democratic culture have failed. Seeds of foreign ideology — whether socialism or political liberalism — sown on Cambodian soil have sprung up but soon withered away and died. They seem, to use a Biblical phrase, to have fallen "among thorns that have sprung up and choked them".

Although this study rejects the tyranny of the elite, its primary purpose is not to defend liberal democracy as a perfect political system. It mainly seeks to identify the "thorns" that "choked" the democratic seeds sown in Cambodia by outlining a relationship between Cambodia's political systems and its domestic power structures and a correlation between domestic power structures and foreign intervention. Its principal purpose is not to blame foreign powers for all that went wrong in Cambodia, but to show why their intervention failed to help this country transform its power structures into ones governed by democratic rules.

One theoretical theme advanced here is as follows: political regimes or systems are to a certain extent the by-product of power relations between the state and other social groups (which can be called "factions"); however, relations between local factions and external powers also determine these domestic power relations. In weak states, political leaders do not enjoy unconditional legitimacy and are constantly subject to violent challenges, both from within the national boundaries and from without. In such a fragile political environment, the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy is arduous. Prospects for democracy look promising only if the domestic power structure (characterized by anarchy or one dominated by hegemonic control) can be effectively transformed into one to be described as a hurting balance of power — a fundamental precondition for democratic emergence. The presence of such a hurting balance can force the adversaries to come to a "democratic" compromise. External powers can help the balance to emerge and sustain itself; usually, however, they disrupt it.

By examining state-society and domestic-external relations, this study first reflects on conventional theories of democratization, which take either the "bottom-up" (cultural, social, and economic) or "top-down" (state-centric) approach. Emphasis is placed on a correlation among anti-democratic and democratic systems (as a dependent variable), Cambodia's power structure (as an intervening variable), and foreign interven-

tion (as an independent variable) capable of helping to create or sustain a hurting balance of power (the analytical concept) among local power contenders. This study contends that a hurting balance of power — at the state level and/or level of state-society relations — is a necessary (pre)condition for the emergence of democracy.

Key Terms & Definitions

Since anti-democratic and democratic systems are the dependent variable, it is necessary to define them. These systems are not fixed, but are rather shaped or determined by political dynamics and processes. The term "democratization" also needs clarification. In a nutshell, democratization implies "process" (rather than "outcome"), including "transition" and "consolidation".[1] Democratization is to be "measured" against a variety of anti-democratic forms of government, such as totalitarianism, dictatorship, authoritarianism, and neo-authoritarianism. These terms and others, such as foreign intervention, are clarified in the following paragraphs.

Totalitarianism, Dictatorship & (Neo)-Authoritarianism

A "regime" is a system of government or a mode of governance. Political regimes are simply treated as political systems, which differ from one another, ranging from anti-democratic regimes (totalitarianism, dictatorship, authoritarianism, and neo-authoritarianism) to democratic ones. These terms are closely examined here.

Alain Touraine provides a useful discussion of their differences.[2] Totalitarianism grows out of "the disappearance of social actors". A totalitarian state is "a sectarian state, whose primary function is to fight its internal and external enemies and to ensure the greatest and most enthusiastic unanimity possible". Two key elements of totalitarianism are the "proclamation of unanimity" and the "constant denunciations of the enemy".[3] Totalitarian states use police or ideological terrorism to achieve their political objective: a perfect harmony among political leadership, party, and people by mobilizing and stimulating society. Three basic forms of totalitarianism are *nationalist* totalitarianism (associated with such terms as "ethnic cleansing"), *theocratic* totalitarianism (driven by religious belief), and *modernizing* totalitarianism (closely identified

with the defence of reason, progress, and modernization). If the ideological or political goal is to modernize the state and society through the process of total restructuring, my position is that this form of totalitarianism should be characterized as revolutionary.

Dictatorship borders on totalitarianism, but the former is less generally pervasive than the latter. Dictatorship is a system of government in which the ruler's power is absolute or near total. There are different types of dictatorship: ancient dictatorship, modern dictatorship, and revolutionary dictatorship.[4]

Authoritarianism also differs from totalitarianism in that it does not seek to mobilize or stimulate society by the use of ideological terrorism. Authoritarian regimes may be content with the need to crush or silence society and to maintain or restore political stability. Their primary concern lies with chaos, social rebellion, or foreign invasion. Unlike dictatorship, authoritarianism generally leaves many activities to private discretion; a certain amount of freedom of expression is permitted so long as it is restrained. Authoritarian leaders may curtail economic and political rights and, at times, abridge civil liberties. While claiming to act in conformity with the existing constitution, they are not constitutionally responsible to an electorate or elected representatives; an elective assembly is normally allowed as long as it has little power. Authoritarian rulers may or may not come to power by non-electoral means, such as revolution or *coup d'état*. Authoritarianism may also be republican or paternalistic. Touraine views the republican idea as anti-democratic because it "gives birth to the autonomy of the political order but not its democratic character". Republicanism may begin with the overthrow of a monarchy, but it can give rise to absolute power being transformed into terror.[5] Paternalistic authoritarianism can be characterized as a system of government within which a single leader arbitrarily rules as though he were the father of the nation.

Neo-authoritarianism still differs from traditional authoritarianism. Rather than emphasizing personal or collective rule over the economic and political realms of social life, neo-authoritarianism offers some economic freedom, recognizing an element of private life in the economic sphere; individuals are allowed to enjoy a certain number of economic rights to ensure or further economic development. Their political rights

and liberties, however, are curtailed. Neo-authoritarian leaders presume that they are the only ones enlightened enough to lead a society full of individuals driven by selfishness, hunger for power, and a willingness to create chaos at the expense of the common, national, or collective interests. Political power, they believe, needs to be centralized in order to create order, stability, and peace. Neo-authoritarianism is a monopoly of political power — an illiberal or non-liberal form of democracy.

Neo-authoritarianism may also be called "pseudo-democracy", which is also similar to the conception of "Asian-style democracy". Pseudo-democracy is identified with the following factors: the leadership's claim to be "democratic", *de facto* if not official one-party domination, regular election-holding, little competition, and mass intimidation. This notion of democracy also appears similar to what some have termed "illiberal" democracy, developed to characterize "Asian-style democracy". Such thinking is prevalent among scholars who contributed to *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia.*[6] Asian democracies are "illiberal", it is purported, because Asian thinking is hostile to Western liberalism. Asians have "alternative cultural baggage"; they neither prefer autonomy, nor do they seek equality. Elections do take place, but they are conducted to promote stability through legitimizing the rulers' right to govern, and not to promote individual freedom. Asian democracy has been characterized as follows: "first, a non-neutral understanding of the state; second, the evolution of a rationalistic and legalistic technocracy that manages the developing state as a corporate enterprise; finally, the development of a managed rather than a critical public space and civil society".[7] Asian-style democracy may be stable, but free and fair competition does not exist in any meaningful way. Neo-authoritarianism, pseudo-democracy, and Asian-style democracy — these terms are similar in meaning and thus may be used interchangeably.

The transition towards neo-authoritarianism is only part of the process of economic liberalization; it is not necessarily part of the political liberalization process. Liberalism is a key but insufficient characterization of liberal democracy; it is a historical process, whereby the middle class or bourgeoisie seek freedom from feudal and monarchical control. Feudalism, seen by Karl Marx as the precursor of capitalism, is a more or less fixed form of social organization or social order in which monarchs

and overlords and their subjects enjoy an unquestioned hierarchy of status based on the principle of reciprocity backed by loyalty and obligation. Monarchs or overlords own all or most of the land, which could be granted, often on the basis of a sub-lease, to those who provide them with services based on an oath of loyalty. Economic liberalism alone, however, does not make societies liberal democracies.

Procedural Definition of Democracy

While economic liberalization in the form of neo-authoritarianism may one day be conducive to further political democratization, it does not automatically turn a polity into a political democracy. According to Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, democracy is not about economic efficiency ("more efficient economically than other forms of government"), nor is it about administrative efficiency. Moreover, democracy neither brings about peace and orderliness nor does it lead to an open economy.[8] What, then, is liberal democracy?

In this study, liberal democracy is none of the following: radical democracy, guided democracy, socialist democracy, and consociational democracy. These forms of "democracy" have anti-democratic tendencies. Radical democracy may permit the tyranny of the majority. Guided democracy encourages the tyranny of the elite. Socialist democracy perpetuates the tyranny of the communist party. Consociational democracy reinforces social divisions and immobilism. Liberal democracy, however, has its own actual and potential problems: it may entrench elite domination through the politics of representation and unequal distribution of resources.[9] These problems, though on their own worthy of further study, are not the subject of inquiry in this study.

Noteworthy is the fact that liberal democracy has different shapes and forms. Presidential systems differ in form from parliamentarian ones. Both generally have a set of political institutions like the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies. Representatives are elected from political parties. Presidential systems are known to be rigid and confrontational; they tend to produce electoral outcomes where the party (in plurality voting in single-member districts) collecting the most votes wins all. In parliamentary democracies, however, the electoral systems tend to be multi-party and are usually associated with the electoral system of pro-

portional representation, which is said to be able to prevent a zero-sum outcome or a situation where the "winner takes all".

Whether a liberal democracy is presidential or parliamentarian in form, scholars generally agree that it must follow certain procedural norms and civic rights. Generally known as "representative democracy", liberal democracy stresses the importance of *political* relations between the ruler and the ruled; the electorate regularly, freely, and fairly choose a small number of people to be their representatives, usually organized in political parties. Democracy usually means free and fair contestation and participation. "Freeness" and "fairness" imply that no political party will always win. There is an element of uncertainty, if not unpredictability, known as "*ex ante* uncertainty". The winning party will be allowed to assume public office, the loser will accept the election result until it can compete again in the next election ("*ex post* irreversibility"), and elections will take place on a periodic basis (repeatability). Samuel Huntington's procedural definition of democracy is: "Most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."[10] Other scholars go beyond these dimensions by adding civil and political freedoms. Georg Sorensen, for instance, lists three dimensions of procedural democracy: "competition, participation, and civil and political liberties".[11]

This study accepts that mature democracy may be what John Higley and Richard Gunther call "consolidated democracy", with the following characteristics: "a regime ... meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also all politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adherence to democratic rules of the game".[12]

But the political transition towards consolidated democracy is neither simple nor straightforward. Both scholars also identify three other types of democracy, which lie between neo-authoritarianism and consolidated democracy: pseudo-democracy (as outlined above), unconsolidated democracy, and stable limited democracy. Unconsolidated democracy exists when political regimes are democratic in terms of their constitutions and workings, but are "unstable and extremely precarious", due mainly to clashes between paramilitary groups and/or civil war. This type of democracy also lacks the presence of "elite consensual unity".

In a stable limited democracy, political leaders come to power through regularly held and publicly contested elections, competing political parties respect electoral outcomes, agree to let the winner form executive bodies through peaceful transfer of power, do not attempt coups or other irregular power seizures. Mass participation is still restricted or even isolated, however; the masses remain uninvolved.

The transition from neo-authoritarianism to pseudo, unconsolidated, or stable limited democracy may come through what O'Donnel and Schmitter call "elite pacts", what Sartori sees as a movement from "politics-as-war" to "politics-as-bargaining", or what Higley and Gunther term "elite settlements" and "elite convergence". Elite settlements refer to these procedural features: speed (settlements are accomplished quickly), face-to-face secret negotiations, formal agreements, and informal forbearance among experienced leaders ("elites suddenly and deliberately negotiate compromises on their most basic and disruptive disputes"). Elite convergence is "a series of tactical decisions by rival elites gradually leading to procedural consensus and increased integration". A political transition from an anti-democratic to a more democratic regime can thus be identified by the way in which factional leaders negotiate to establish democratic rules of the political game, as well as by the way in which they adhere to the established rules.

The process of democratization is not irreversible: if there is progress without major setbacks, democratization may be considered "steady"; if there are major setbacks, the process is unsteady, precarious, or even regressive. This study sees the process of steady democratization in two major steps: democratic transition as moving from authoritarianism to pseudo, to unconsolidated, or to stable limited democracy; and democratic consolidation as progress towards consolidated democracy.

As noted earlier, political systems are the by-product of power relations among political actors. Within political systems, other elements exist: structure, units, and interactions. Structure is shaped or determined by how units (political actors) interact with or relate to one another. As shall be elaborated, anti-democratic systems may emerge if no single political actor becomes the dominant group within the power structure. Democratic compromise is to some extent the by-product of symmetrical power relations among political actors who also share the

same goals in nation-building. But local power relations can also be the by-product of power relations among external actors.

Foreign Intervention: What It Means

Traditionally, the term "intervention" carries a negative connotation in that it goes against the political principle of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state by another state or a group of states. Under international law, however, such coercive intervention may be considered legitimate or legally justifiable. One legitimate reason is that the state that intervenes has been granted a right to do so by treaty.

Another legitimate reason is when there is a violation of agreement by a state, which acts unilaterally. Intervention by a state to protect its citizens may also be legally justified, as may be the need for self-defence. States may also intervene legally if another state is seen as violating international law. The concept of collective security, evident in the UN Charter, permits members of the international community to take collective, punitive action against any state that threatens or breaks the peace or commits an act of aggression against another sovereign state.

This study discusses the above forms of coercive intervention with reference to Cambodia, but adds three other forms: competitive, consent-based or cooperative, and co-optative intervention. Competitive intervention refers to intervention by competing external powers primarily interested in installing a regime sympathetic to their own causes. This form of intervention tends to generate hegemonic instability.

Consent-based intervention in the form of international peacekeeping is based on adversaries' consent, the principle of political neutrality, and non-military activity. This form of intervention is not considered as interference in a sovereign state's domestic affairs; its aim is to help war-torn countries succeed in the triple transition: from war to peace, from authoritarianism to democracy, and from a command or socialist economic system to a market-driven one. Consent-based intervention also includes the role of international organizations in offering membership to aspiring members. Economic membership, often politically motivated (namely to engage a state in regional dialogue for domestic and international peace), is also a form of consent-based intervention.

Co-optative intervention differs from competitive intervention but

is similar to consent-based intervention in that it occurs when external powers generally support one local group or faction with the aim of integrating the country into the global or regional economy, and also for the sake of political stability in that country. This form of intervention has the potential to create and strengthen hegemonic stability.

Finally, equalizing or de-hegemonizing intervention may help to transform weak states' hegemonic power structures (as when external actors are both willing and able to weaken the "top dog" and strengthen the underdog, with the aim of creating a hurting balance of power between socio-political actors (to be explained later).

While making reference to the different reasons for outside intervention in Cambodia, this study is primarily concerned with the impact such intervention has had on the country's domestic power structures. As noted previously, this study seeks to establish a correlation between forms of foreign intervention and different political systems. Due to the limited scope of this study, its state-centric approach to interventionism makes passing reference to the role of civil society such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). To a large extent, the role of NGOs during the early stage of democratization is, as shall be elaborated, still determined by the relational dynamism of socio-political actors.

Conventional Approaches to Democratization

Let us take a critical look at some conventional theories of democratization, starting with bottom-up and top-down approaches and ending with those that generally consider external factors as having a positive impact on democratization.

Bottom-Up Approaches: Socio-Cultural and Socio-Economic Perspectives

Some scholars contend that unless a people as a community is willing to accept a common authority as a means of resolving conflict, no democracy is possible.[13] Only Western culture based on Christianity is conducive to the development of democratic institutions; countries to which this culture is alien are not good prospects for democracy.[14] Asian (non-Christian) cultural values clash with liberal democratic ideas.

There are empirical and conceptual weaknesses in this clash-of-cultures perspective. One flaw lies in the logic that democracy is impossible in Asian societies. That Asian cultures are "illiberal" in the sense that people respect and obey their superiors is inaccurate.[15] Cambodian history is replete with revolt, rebellion, violence, and individual initiatives to acquire power.[16] Classical realists such as Greek historian Thucydides, Italian political adviser Niccolo Machiavelli, British philosopher Thomas Hobbes, and American political scientist Hans Morgenthau would argue that this so-called Khmer "conduct" is part of general human nature or a systemic problem, unaffected by time and space. Hobbes, for instance, observes human beings as driven by the desire for self-preservation. In the state of nature (absence of a sovereign power), "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short".[17]

Anti-democratic culture may also be a matter of power relations, rather than an issue of cultural traits. Thucydides remarks that "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept".[18] As shall be argued, cultural attitudes may also be shaped by economic factors or the power capabilities political actors acquire. We may need to ask if one would always be out to beat someone to death if certain structural conditions existed or if both were equal in strength.

Rejecting political culture as a crucial variable explaining democracy, some scholars established a direct relationship between economic development and democracy. Early Marxists saw the connection between capitalism and democratic development.[19] Others also contended that modernization allows a powerful capitalist class to emerge and assert itself against neo-mercantilism, which stresses the accumulation of state power through national economic aggrandizement. Industrial development thus precipitates regime change by giving rise to the bourgeoisie whose economic interests contradict the continued existence of authoritarian or neo-mercantilist regimes.[20]

Wealth and prosperity as the crucial variable explaining democratization remains problematic, however. Dependency theorists argue that the prospects of economic development in Third World countries do not look promising — that there is no point talking about democracy in this part of the world. Others see economic development generally as being "neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic tran-

sition".[21] One could even argue that poverty propels social forces to demand change and push for political and economic liberalization.[22] While recent experience has proved this point, poverty has a limited impact on democratization. While generally agreeing that material affluence does make democratic regimes stable, both Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi persuasively contend that the level of economic development does not really affect the probability of transitions to democracy.[23]

Other scholars view social structures as the variable permitting democracy to emerge and mature. Perhaps influenced by Barrington Moore's *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambodia historian Michael Vickery simply asserts that democracy came about after centuries of violent change, as "newly influential classes competed for power with old entrenched classes"[24] — the social struggle in the last classical stage when a capitalist bourgeoisie wrested political power from feudal, post-feudal, aristocrats, and/or absolute monarchs, while at the same time uneducated peasants were becoming more educated urban workers. This alone was not a sufficient condition for democracy because the capitalist group had an interest in excluding the masses.

Thus, "real democracy came about through the efforts of non-capitalist and anti-capitalist groups, classes, parties, who achieved, often only after great effort and some violence, voting rights for all, in a society where there was sufficient education for the exercise of some intelligence in voting"; furthermore, "Cambodia has none of this". The peasants, the bulk of the population, are poorly educated and have little experience in voting or in any kind of political participation. With the exception of the Communist Party from 1979 to 1990, the factions relied on the support of a prominent personality. Taking power away from a monarch or his aristocracy was still considered a crime.[25]

Michael Vickery's undeveloped remarks (apparently based on Moore's rich historical and comparative analysis) are powerful; economic development alone, as noted earlier, may not give rise to democracy if the social and political structures remain unchanged, and may indeed further legitimize the ruling elite's political control. By focusing on social groups, this perspective sees democracy as emerging out of revolution rather than peaceful reconciliation. This perspective, however, does not explain the emergence of democracy in other parts of the world, where

such pre-conditions do not exist. The focus on social groups as agents of change often through violent revolution is based on the classical European experience. Although Third World revolutions have been violently repressive and costly in human terms, they have failed to bring about structural changes in any meaningful way. Violence has not even destroyed old social structures or given rise to the capitalist class and bourgeois democracy.

The remark that the Cambodian monarch is "absolute" is also misleading. Moreover, the monarch does not always work against political democracy, if his power base is small. When serving as an effective check on aristocratic power-holders, the monarch can also play a constructive role in the process of democratization.[26]

Other theorists also point to the problem of factional violence. While sharing Vickery's pessimism about democracy in Cambodia, they do not see an end to violence induced by political factionalism. Pierre Lizée contends that international intervention was a futile endeavour.[27] The merit of this thesis lies in the crucial element of *time* in the process of *social transformation.* There are no shortcuts to democracy. In Western societies, the process took many centuries.[28] This view, however, fails to take note of the *possibility* of conflict resolution or/and political change[29] and ignores structural change among factions.

Statism, Institutionalism, & the Elite's Role

Scholars have also devoted much of their attention to the role of political leadership in explaining repressive violence and anti-democratic behaviour. To what extent do personality, ideology, and power matter when explaining anti-democratic regimes?

Before assuming the position of state leadership, the various Cambodian leaders — from Sihanouk to Lon Nol, to Pol Pot, to Hun Sen — did not appear particularly terrible, or even out of the ordinary. They had high ideals and noble aspirations for their country. President Lon Nol was known as a staunch Buddhist. Pol Pot, in the early period of his political life, was critical of Sihanouk's repressive policies, and perhaps saw "communism" as the way out of the monarchical dictatorship.[30]

As political leaders, however, they all became capable of using repressive violence. Ideology alone does not explain anti-democratic

behaviour. The Khmer Rouge leadership's radical utopianism could be said to have been drawn from the intellectual combination of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism — which do not shun the use of violence to help transform the existing hierarchical class-based society into a classless one. But communist ideology and power in themselves do not explain its anti-democratic behaviour. During his years in power, Prince Sihanouk was authoritarian and had no love for communism; but he never developed a serious political ideology, except for his "Buddhist socialism". He was more concerned with "achieving a limited number of practical goals than with developing a coherent political philosophy ... he had no commitment to bringing about a basic reordering of Cambodian society".[31] Also not a communist, Lon Nol became just another authoritarian leader. For ideology and power to have any great explanatory worth, they must be put in a structural context.

For some scholars, a democratic state is a strong state; state-building is the primary condition for democracy.[32] The lack of democracy in Third World countries is due to the absence of a strong state. Authoritarian states are structurally weak and vulnerable to various social challenges.[33] State-building involves consolidation of state power. On this point, Mohammed Ayoob is clear: state-making has been historically achieved through violence.[34] To ensure success in democratization, this transition must not thwart the process of state-making.[35]

The difficulty with Ayoob's perspective is the way the use of coercive force can effectively weaken social forces. An excellent study on "the political economy of death squads" by David Mason and Dale Krane explains why the use of violence may be counterproductive. Their findings suggest that "escalating repression is perpetuated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state preludes its resort to less violent alternatives".[36] Because of their inability to meet rising popular demands for redistribution of wealth and/or political power, the regime adopts a coercive strategy "to preempt a successful challenge to its authority". To escape this violent pattern, the warring parties must negotiate for peace.[37]

Negotiation for democratic peace appears to be somewhat compatible with institutionalist arguments, which emphasize the establishment of democratic rules for the political game.[38] Whether or not institutions

will dictate the form of political transition is debatable. Institutionalist assumptions, however, ignore the question of process: how did rules come into existence in the first place? Why do people agree to establish the democratic rules of the game? Some have argued that we cannot understand the institutional impact on democratization unless we first know how and why political actors engage in the process of setting up those rules. Some suggest that we look at the actors who make the choice, not simply at the formal rules of the game.[39]

But how do political actors make choices conducive to democracy? Some scholars seem to accept that choice is not a matter of preference; it results from power relations. As Gerald Easter puts it: "Institutional choice should be viewed as a strategy by which elite actors attempt either to secure access to the power resources of the state or to deny access to others."[40] This implies that, in the context of unequal power relations, the strong will not make democratic choices in favour of the weak. It further implies that unless there is power equilibrium, no easy political compromise among factions is possible. Consequently, the power structure remains hegemonic or anti-democratic.

External Factors' Impact on Democratization

In Third World politics, international factors more often than not are as important as domestic ones. The ontological focus on state leaders in the process of democratization overlooks the role of external actors. There exists a small body of literature that attempts to link personal involvement, international organizations, and the international economic system with the process of democratization. Samuel Huntington recognizes the positive role of external forces in the process of democratization. The European Community (EC) helped to consolidate democracy in southern Europe. Democratization in Eastern Europe was made possible by the withdrawal of Soviet power. The US also played the role of a major promoter of democratization.[41]

Other scholars have further examined how pressure by regional organizations (i.e. the EC or EU, European Union) can contribute to the establishment and consolidation of democracy. While the "democratizing effects of high income may be modest, they believe that "the role of international pressure was an important one". The "possibility

that conditionality will substantially accelerate the pace at which countries are unable to cast off the yoke of authoritarian rule deserves serious consideration and should be weighed against the higher short-run costs implied by trade sanctions".[42] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are also believed to be proactive in pushing for or promoting economic and political liberalization.

However, the literature on third-party intervention also tends to concern itself with tactics and strategies for cooperation or compliance with third-party players. Approaches such as conflict resolution bear out the point.[43] Some see the technical benefit of private individuals or international organizations actively engaged in such democratic activities as peace-making and poll-watching.[44] As mediators, they can help bring the antagonists to the negotiation table, help them devise the democratic rules of the political game, and guarantee a modicum of fairness in the electoral process.

Many writers who have studied the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) recognize the democratic benefit of UN intervention, but they put different emphases on UNTAC's organizational problems, tactics, and strategies. Trevor Findlay, for instance, argues that UNTAC gave the Cambodians the opportunity "to choose their government in a comparatively free, fair, and democratic manner"; its limited effectiveness, however, resulted from the UN's organizational defects.[45] Michael Doyle and Janet Heininger likewise recognize UNTAC's qualified success, but these scholars generally espouse different tactics: unlike Heininger, who stresses the virtue of non-enforcement, Doyle views the international community as lacking the political will to enforce the Paris Agreements.[46]

Sorpong Peou also provides a study on the role of the UN Security Council's Permanent Five (P-5) in the successful process of democratization in Cambodia. He looks very closely at the P-5's impact on Cambodian factional politics and argues that with the collective support of the P-5, the UN can make a difference in Third World countries. In other words, a UN peace mission that is aimed at neutralizing protracted war — "a process whereby military conflict can be rendered inactive by third-party intervention through democratic means" — has the potential to turn the battlefield into a ballot-box. The main conditions for

democratization established in this study are as follows: the UN must be able to act in the best security interest of all domestic parties to ensure that they can reach a democratic agreement and abide by the new democratic rules of the political game. To succeed in this objective, the P-5 must act impartially and effectively and support the UN mission collectively with the aim to enable the competing parties to participate in the elections in a free and fair manner. In short, then, this study only looks at the impact of great power diplomacy on UNTAC performance in the process of Cambodian democratization.[47]

The weakness of the above study lies in the fact that its scope is limited to great power diplomacy. In its analytical focus, the P-5 constituted the principal actors. The role of other external forces, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is largely ignored. Peou's concepts give attention to the issues of impartiality and effective performance. His macro-level systemic approach does not establish a correlation between inter-factional power relations and democratization. He assumes that if the UN acts effectively and impartially with the support of a united UN Security Council, the antagonists would be willing to play the political game by its rules. While this insight sheds new light on the role of international intervention in creating conditions for democratization, it remains inadequate. Impartiality and adequate performance alone are not sufficient conditions for democratization.

The extent to which external actors can put pressure on anti-democratic countries to liberalize their economies and to institute democratic reform is debatable. Other liberal scholars consider sanctions as having adverse effects.[48] Some have in fact questioned the future of liberal democracy: "Liberalization and democratization are not necessarily the wave of the future."[49] This perspective does not seriously contradict some critical theorists' charge that neo-liberalism is in fact compatible with authoritarian government. Stephen Gill, for instance, contends that pressures from economic globalization force domestic actors to adopt neo-liberal reforms that run against democratization. Despite their talk of aid as a contribution to democratization, "Western donors have wanted a state that will open up the economy for capitalist development, and political stability rather than participatory democracy".[50]

An Anti-Hegemonic Theory of Democratization: Concepts, Variables, Methodology, & Structure

The following section seeks to combine the intervening variable (Cambodia's domestic power structure) and the independent variable (foreign intervention) in an attempt to explain one dependent variable — the problem of democratization. Based on the theoretical insights from the above discussion, this study advances an alternative perspective that combines three levels — the state, society, and external factors — to explain power structures (the intervening variable) that can work for or against democracy (the dependent variable). It will be argued that external intervention (the independent variable) can help plant and nurture democratic seeds in weak states only if they are both *willing* and *able* to help create a "hurting balance of power" between political actors within the state and/or between power-holders and social challengers.

Analytical Concept & Intervening Variable

This book's approach to democratization is anti-hegemonic. Hegemony simply means domination. In Greek, a *hegemon* is a *leader*; a political hegemon is therefore a political leader who dominates or seeks to dominate the state and society. But the hegemon is only one of many political actors within the state and society. Political actors are social groups interested in both security and political power. This study refers to political actors as political factions. Political factions lack cohesiveness, however. Far too often, they are loosely structured, and subject to either consolidation or disintegration. Within weak states, as shall be discussed, power relations among political factions are in constant flux partly because factional members are not always loyal to their leaders.

This study echoes the perspective by Tatu Vanhanen, who contends that "democratization takes place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony".[51] The approach also echoes D.A. Rustow's theory of democratic transition and provides an analytical concept similar to the concept of the "hurting stalemate". Rustow views the transition from authoritarianism towards liberal democracy as possible only when rival leaders agree to end their

conflict by striking a compromise rather than risk total national disintegration. Two key factors may lead adversaries to choose competition in the electoral process rather than to continue the conflict: they either share "some sense of community" or they reach "some even balance of forces" that makes wholesale expulsion or genocide impossible.[52]

Other scholars who have studied the possibility of the battlefield being turned into a ballot-box also recognize the importance of what William Zartman calls a "hurting stalemate" — as a "ripe moment" for resolution through peaceful compromise. A "hurting stalemate" is a politico-strategic situation, whereby the antagonists come to the realization that they cannot win by military means and that the protracted conflict will only diminish their own strength.[53]

The more precise term to be advanced and applied in this study is "hurting balance of power". But what is it? Before we can answer the question, it is helpful to explain why weak states are inherently anti-democratic. The conceptual issue of Cambodia being a weak state has drawn criticism from a few observers, who believe that Cambodia has been either a "non-state" (because of its lack of a modern organizational structure) or a "strong state" (because of its authoritarian nature). The position this study takes is that Cambodia has been a state, but that its repressive tendencies have resulted from it being weak.

This insight is drawn from Joel Migdal's work on strong societies and weak states, a recipe for violent repression and anti-democratic behaviour. Weak states use repressive violence because societies are often resistant to political leaders' policies. States are weak because of their leaders' inability "to use the agencies of the state to get people in the state to do what they want them to do".[54] He concentrates his analytical attention on the issue of state "capacity", not on its ability to use repressive means. Strong states are ones with "capabilities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationship, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* society or use resources in a determined way".[55] Weak states are without these capabilities and also are vulnerable to social challenges.

Strong societies are capable of influencing or shaping the character of state leaders, making it difficult for the latter to get their people to follow them or implement their policies. Social forces are capable of resisting central authorities, thus making the latter unwilling or unable to

overcome such resistance. Strong societies are dominated by autonomous social organizations and characterized by social diversity, fractionalization, and fragmentation. Thus, "[in] societies with weak states a continuing environment of conflict — the vast, but fragmented social control embedded in the non-state organizations of society — has dictated a particular, pathological set of relationships within the state organization itself, between the top state leadership and its agencies".[56] The resistance from society is continual and sometimes proves too powerful for state leaders to pacify.[57] This "weak state–strong society" phenomenon gives rise to "politics of survival", as each group seeks autonomy from the others but struggles to dominate them.[58] The state tends to remain hegemonic but structurally unstable.

Although all hegemonic powers tend to be anti-democratic, they are not equally violent and repressive. They can be benevolent or malevolent. Benevolent hegemons are capable of providing public goods and enjoy a high decree of political legitimacy; malevolent ones do not. It thus makes sense to make a distinction between benevolent and malevolent hegemonic power structures and to note that they are not equally repressive. In a hegemonic power structure without a democratic tradition within which political actors are accustomed to playing politics by the rules, the hegemon can be one of the following: an authoritarian power-holder, a dictator, or a totalitarian leader.

A non-hegemonic power structure exists when a hurting balance of power emerges and remains.[59] A "hurting balance" (the analytical concept) may exist at two different levels: within the state and between state and society. Within the state, no one person or party permanently dominates the state power structure. On the level of state-society relations, a hurting balance exists when the state cannot effectively suppress social challengers and when the latter cannot undermine the former.

The term "hurting" (with specific reference to a balance of power) generally implies the inability of adversaries to eliminate each other by force, as well as the painful reality that maintaining the balance hurts them equally. The reason the term "balance" is used in this study rather than "stalemate" is that the former is easier to measure. A stalemate can be sustained even when no power equilibrium exists. In Third World countries, stalemates seem persistent even when the state remains

hegemonic, if vulnerable. A balance of power is more measurable. A political or social unit's power is defined in terms of capability (military and material resources and external support), inner strength (internal cohesion and leadership legitimacy), moral appeal (social support), and legal status (legitimate vs. illegitimate control of power).[60]

Two parties to a conflict can achieve a hurting balance of power only when they share roughly the same number of these attributes. If they fail to end their conflict through cooperation, their struggle will drain their sources of power equally, and permit the continual ruination of their country. It is assumed that a hurting balance of power arises when a politico-military struggle for security among adversarial groups reaches a stage where power relations become roughly symmetrical. A "hurting balance" thus suggests that contending groups remain locked in an adversarial situation whereby no one has enough strength to remove their enemy from the politico-military arena.

Achieving or maintaining a "hurting balance" within Third World states is extremely difficult. Weak states are constantly faced with strong social forces. Although the state is the hegemon, having access to coercive means, it is far from invincible; it is a "vulnerable hegemon". This helps explain why many political regimes in the Third World are inherently fragile. They rise and fall as challengers gain strength and are capable of toppling existing power-holders, without, however, being subsequently able to retain power when other challengers emerge. This may be termed "hegemonic instability", in contrast to "hegemonic stability", where the state is stable because it has not grown vulnerable.

Both hegemonic stability and instability result from social relations that shape the character of state and society. Political rulers may use coercive means or a certain ideology to control society in order to promote their right to rule — their legitimacy. The dynamics of domestic politics are similar to those of the anarchical international system (the absence of a common government or sovereign), within which sovereign states are said to seek domination or to maximize their security. States that are relatively less powerful seek to prevent a hegemonic state from "laying down the law" for them.[61] Declining hegemonic powers are interested in maintaining the status quo and will go to war to prevent a challenger from undermining their global status.[62] During periods of

power transition, the political leadership may attempt to prevent challengers from coming to the fore in the political system; the underdog challengers may thus feel threatened and attempt to keep the hegemon down. Asymmetric power relations are not only anti-democratic, but also war-prone, especially when adversaries fear each other.

In a world of asymmetric power relations, weak powers are not always interested in seeking a new alliance to keep the hegemon in check. The adversarial actors, depending on their cost-benefit calculations, sometimes jump on the hegemonic power's bandwagon. If this happens, hegemonic power structures remain unchallenged, as well as unchanged.

Whether one faction succeeds in dominating the others is not simply a matter of political will. Change in power capability is in constant flux and depends upon political factions' ability to survive and outmanœuvre each other. The one with the most military and economic resources may be able to maintain its hegemonic role. As soon as its resources begin to deplete, its members may not be able to maintain "group solidarity". And hegemony does not last forever. A hurting balance of power can emerge and then break down, depending on the dynamics of competitive power relations among competing factions with different power capabilities. Such a balance is not determined by domestic factors alone. As shall be seen, external powers may also have a decisive impact on the transformation of states' domestic power structures.

External Intervention as Independent Variable

Although they result largely from the struggle for survival among sociopolitical forces, hurting balances of power are rarely independent from the influence of external actors. Joel Migdal argues that colonialism and the liberal world market penetrated non-European societies and radically transformed them.[63] By the time they regained their independence, political leaders had already lost control over their societies.

Colonialism, however, might not be the only force responsible for social fragmentation, which in some weak states had existed long before the process of Western colonization began. But colonialism or foreign intervention further weakened already socially fragmented societies. During the Cold War, great powers competed for allies in the Third World

with the aim of putting into power those local clients who would serve their own strategic interests. This form of competitive intervention tended to create unstable hegemonic power structures because the external powers, which were always relatively unequal and had changing policy objectives, not only exacerbated internal conflict within weak states, but also contributed to hegemonic instability or the rise and fall of weakly hegemonic regimes. Post–Cold War intervention may not be as divisive as that during the Cold War. External powers may even be cooperative or simply co-optative, thus strengthening weak states' hegemonic power structures as the external powers involved support the same local group or faction for the sake of political stability or simply compete with each other for the latter's loyalty.

Foreign intervention with the primary aim of fostering a spirit of democracy can succeed if external actors are willing and able to create a hurting balance of power during the early transition from war to peace. This policy prescription for third party or external intervention in protracted conflict may seem dangerous, largely because it suggests a kind of pro-active equalizing intervention. The reason for such a prescription, however, is not based on wishful thinking but on the reality of power relations among adversaries. The main emphasis is not reconciliation at any cost; any appeal for this end will only fall on the deaf ears of hegemonic powers and their challengers alike.

Creating a hurting balance of power is intended to bring about a long-term structural transformation that will eventually lead not only to mutually acceptable compromise, but also to democratization. If external actors are to help put in place a new process of democratization in weak states, they would have to (which is not to suggest that they always should) achieve a hurting balance. Christopher Mitchell also argues that for third parties to intervene in a conflict within war-torn states, they need to develop a strategy to achieve one of two goals. The first goal is what he calls "positive symmetries", namely "equalities in the conflict system that lead towards reduction and settlement rather than an escalation or exacerbation of the conflict". The second goal is "positive asymmetries", namely inequalities having the same effect.[64]

In short, then, for democratization within weak states and strong societies to emerge, external actors must avoid doing anything to disrupt

the hurting balance of power between socio-political actors within a state. Moreover, they must not weaken a state and strengthen a social challenger to the point where the latter is capable of bringing down the former, nor must they do anything to help a hegemonic state eliminate a weaker social challenger. They must not compete with each other to empower their client parties at the expense of their adversaries — because doing so will produce hegemonic instability — nor promote hegemonic stability through co-optative intervention.

Methodology and the Book's Structure

This book was not written from the perspective of a historian. Historians tend to be narrative-based and are primarily concerned with details as well as the accuracy and descriptive completeness of political stories. Political scientists, on the other hand, tend to pursue theory-based explanations and can be accused of intellectual simplicity.

Be that as it may, this book seeks to advance a theory that explains the impact of foreign intervention on states' political systems by comparing five different Cambodian regimes. Since this study seeks to "measure" (for the lack of a better term) the extent to which foreign intervention in weak states alters or perpetuates domestic political processes and institutions, its methodology may be seen as positivist and deductive. The study, however, will not be based on mathematical techniques. It will take a classical rather than a scientific approach to political analysis, which reflects on what Hedley Bull calls "a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment".[65]

This study also draws on the wisdom of Stanley Hoffman, who sees this enterprise as "the attempt to seize the meaning of what has been explained" and as "an artistic enterprise rather than a scientific one".[66] There is no attempt to test hypotheses by statistical methods. This is an impossible task considering the fact that it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate statistics in Third World states such as Cambodia. Explaining political events and regime changes, therefore, is a matter of imperfect interpretation, which must rely on intuition and discernment without at the same time sacrificing academic rigour.

Due to its broad scope and its historical and structural perspective, this study is necessarily synthetic: it relies on numerous published sources, such as books and articles, as well as unpublished papers. Primary sources such as confidential reports have also been consulted and cited, whenever possible. Many insights are also drawn from personal interviews. During the past six years, I had visited Cambodia several times, often two or three times a year, and spoken with diplomats, Cambodian leaders, NGO personnel, and academics — both Cambodian and foreign.

This book is structured thus: an introduction, three parts, and a conclusion. As noted, the introduction offers some remarks on theories of democracy. The conclusion seeks to generalize the Cambodian experiences with anti-democratic political regimes and liberal democracy, tentatively proposes an anti-hegemonic theory of democratization, and offers some recommendations for policy action.

In Part One, Chapter 1 looks at four anti-democratic regimes in Cambodia (paternalistic authoritarianism, republican authoritarianism, revolutionary totalitarianism, and socialist dictatorship) during the 1955–90 period. Chapter 2 analyses the relationship between anti-democratic political systems (Cambodia's hegemonic power structures). Chapter 3 looks at foreign intervention during the Cold War period, which perpetuated the country's unstable hegemonic power structures.

Part Two seeks to explain the transition from socialist dictatorship to liberal democracy in the 1991–95 period. Chapter 4 traces the beginning of Cambodian democratization by examining the peace negotiation process in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 1993 elections, and important democratic documents. Chapter 5 explains why the trend towards a hurting balance of power was thwarted. Chapter 6 examines the difficulties facing UNTAC and other external powers in weakening the entrenched hegemonic power structure.

Part Three examines political developments in the 1996–98 period and explains why Cambodia may be moving towards an unstable or "Asian-style" democracy. Chapter 7 describes major democratic setbacks, the 1998 elections, and the government's political agenda. Chapter 8 explains why Hun Sen rose to a new hegemonic status. Chapter 9 looks at how external actors contributed to Hun Sen's ascendancy.

NOTES

1. On democratic transition and consolidation, see T. Vanhanen, *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States: 1980–88*; N. Bermeo, ed., *Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*; J. Higley and R. Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*; S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell, and S. Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective.*
2. Raymond Aron defines totalitarianism as follows: (a) one party's monopoly on political activity; (b) the party's ideology becomes the official truth of the state; (c) the state's monopoly of coercive and persuasive means; (d) the state's control over most economic and professional activities; (e) an ideological fault leading to police and ideological terrorism. Hannah Arendt defined totalitarianism in the following terms: the dissolution of classes, the triumph of the masses, lawlessness (without any standards of right or wrong for individual behaviour), and the state's use of terror (A. Touraine, *What Is Democracy?* pp. 98–102).
3. Ibid., p. 100.
4. N. Bobbio, *Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power*, pp. 158–66. While classical dictatorship is limited to the exercise of executive power by an extraordinary magistrate, modern dictatorship includes one leader's executive as well as legislative and even constitutive powers. In revolutionary dictatorship, a dominant class (the proletariat) or a vanguard party or a few leaders — whose vision is to establish socialist democracy — exercise power. Dictatorship is legitimate and temporary, legitimated by a state of necessity, and it is temporary in the sense that it is in a transition towards some form of democracy.
5. In France, "the celebration of the republic in fact meant the seizure of power by the people, which led to the Terror and Bonapartism as well as to the overthrow of the ancient regime". See A. Touraine, *What Is Democracy?* p. 79.
6. D. Bell, D. Brown, K. Jayasuriya, and D.M. Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia.*
7. Ibid., p. 163. Long-time observers of Cambodian politics are sceptical about the prospects of democracy in Cambodia; power-sharing is a difficult goal to achieve simply because, in Cambodian political culture, power is to be treated as a possession to be monopolized. See M. Leifer, "Power-Sharing and Peacemaking in Cambodia?", *SAIS Review* 12, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 1992): 139–53.
8. P. Schmitter and T.L. Karl, "What Democracy Is ... and Is Not", in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, edited by L. Diamond and M. Plattner, p. 40.
9. I do not intend to engage in a theoretical debate on what democracy is or which form of democracy is superior to others. The term democracy has been controversial in academic writing. Robert Pinkney classifies five types of democracy:

radical democracy, guided democracy, socialist democracy, consociational democracy, and liberal democracy. (R. Pinkney, *Democracy in the Third World*, pp. 5–17; those interested in what democracy is may want to consult A. Touraine, *What Is Democracy?*)

10. S. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, pp. 6–7.
11. G. Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*, pp. 23–24. Free and fair competition means that political parties engage in the electoral race in conformity with democratic rules of the political game at regular intervals without resorting to violence to claim the right to rule and without hindering mass participation based on universal suffrage. No person will be in a position to monopolize power by the use of force. While in office, an elected government should exercise constitutional powers unopposed while respecting the rights of citizens to express themselves. However, if unelected elements choose to undermine the government by force, the latter cannot be said to be legitimate. The state does not use terror to harmonize political leaders, political parties, and the people; it only acts somewhat as a referee. Elected officials represent individuals' or social groups' interests; citizens are equal before the law, and constitutional safeguards protect their rights.
12. J. Higley and R. Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, p. 3.
13. G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.*
14. G. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger*, pp. 41–43.
15. It is true that generally, Asian democracies are illiberal compared with most of those in the West; but they are becoming more liberal than before, when only minimal democratic procedures existed. The thesis of illiberal democracy also seems to focus its attention on a limited number of Asian states — Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and, to a much lesser extent, Thailand. Japan and the Philippines are not taken into account. Political culture is viewed by L. Dittmer as generated by human activity and is constantly being regenerated. See L. Dittmer, "Comparative Communist Political Culture", *Studies in Comparative Communism* 16 (1983): 9–24. In Asia, South Korea's Confucian tradition and Taiwan's cultural legacy of Chinese despotism have given way to liberal democracy. See F. Coulmas, "Faces of Democracy in Asia", *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 20 April 1997, p. 2. F. Fukuyama even argues that Confucianism is not totally incompatible with democratic values if Asian leaders do not use values such as discipline and social cohesion as their weapon for political control. Some writers believe that even in communist China, the process of democratization is taking place. In *The Democratization of China*, the author Baogang He makes a case for the relevance of liberal-democratic ideas and values. By examining recent

mainstream conceptualizations of democracy in this communist state, he develops a Chinese conception of democracy. Discussing the political discourse on democracy in this country, he shows the relationship between universal values and Chinese practice. China's recent experiences, not Western influence, have turned the struggle for democracy into a political issue. See He Baogang, *The Democratization of China.*

16. Cambodian individualism is quite strong. One of the commonly heard jokes about Cambodians is that "if there are one hundred Cambodians, there will be one hundred associations". In Buddhist societies, individualism is encouraged through the concept of self-reliance; such societies tend to be loosely structured. See H.D. Evers, ed., *Loosely Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative Perspectives*; R. Textor, "The Loose Structure of Thai Society: A Paradigm under Pressure", *Pacific Affairs* 50, no. 3 (Fall 1977): 467–73. One high-ranking Cambodian government official made a claim that should be taken seriously: "Cambodians are liberal people; they don't like socialism, and that's why this ideology has never worked in this country; Cambodians don't take anything seriously; they even disobey their superiors." (Interview, 2 March 1997.) If anything, kingship in Cambodia is a reflection on the need to maintain and enhance social order (Somboon S., "Buddhism, Political Authority and Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia", in *Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia*, pp. 101–53). Buddhist countries such as Thailand have become democratized (Surin M., "The Making of Thai Democracy: A Study of Political Alliances among the State, the Capitalists, and the Middle Class", in *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia*, pp. 141–66). In fact, if there is anything that is anti-democratic in Cambodian culture, it is perhaps a lack of social tolerance or civil obedience and the difficulty of achieving political compromise. As a Khmer, who has been involved in many community activities, I can testify to this fact. Most other Khmers would not object to this kind of explanation either. Seanglim Bit, a Cambodian social psychologist, reiterated a concept of "warrior heritage" to explain why it is difficult for Cambodians to achieve peaceful conflict resolution (S. Bit, *The Warrior Heritage*). Another Cambodian scholar also puts the blame on religious influences that have shaped the culture of non-compromise; political leaders are seen as always concerned with "face", "honour", "dignity", and so on as values to be cherished. See A. Peang-Meth, "Understanding the Khmer: Sociological-Cultural Observations", *Asian Survey* 31, no. 5 (May 1991): 442–55. Perhaps the most widely read book among Cambodians is one by Bunchan Mol, a Cambodian politician. *Charet Khmer* [Khmer practice or conduct] describes the bestial nature and divisions of a liberation movement (known as "Khmer Issaraks", meaning Khmers who are their "own masters") formed in 1946 that he helped lead against the French colonists. He also describes subsequent tragic political events until 1973 and bemoans the fact that the Khmers could not work together and tolerate one another. The following characteristics are described to show what general Khmer practice or conduct is all about: egoism, plagiarism, ingratitude, indecency, arrogance, lack of

consultation, political apathy, generational revenge, unwillingness to accept defeat and end a combat until the opponent is totally destroyed. As he puts it: "A Khmer does not want ... others other than himself to become more popular and cannot trust anyone else enough to let the latter soar higher than himself. He must be the supreme leader who stands over and above everyone else." See Bunchan M., *Charet Khmer*, p. 217. The determination to destroy one's enemy is explained as follows: "We Khmers ... If one knocks down another person, one will not stop there; one will rush to finish him off by beating him until he either loses consciousness or even dies"; "if the loser is still alive, it would mean that victory has not yet been won" (ibid., p. 180). Here the concept of victory is defined as the inability to end a conflict peacefully or let the opponent live because of the fear that the loser will seek retribution. In short, the Khmers are egoistic, insecure of their positions, and have a deadly win-lose or zero-sum mindset. As shall be seen in this study, the Cambodian factions behaved more or less the same even after the book was published, and continues to do so today. This cultural perspective may help explain why factional politics (with fragile compromises) seems to remain a vicious cycle. Having said that, I would not take this approach seriously, however. In spite of its popularity, this line of thinking only states the obvious and lacks scientific rigour. These works are based on personal impressions and experiences. There is nothing truly unique about this so-called "Khmer conduct".

17. See Williams, Wright, and Evans, *International Relations and Political Theory*, p. 93. See also H. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, esp. pp. 4–10.
18. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, p. 402; D. Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism", *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (1989): 3–28.
19. Marx considered the bourgeoisie as the agent of change capable of transforming the feudalist structure into the capitalist one that then gives rise to bourgeois democracy. One of the earliest modernization scholars who paid special attention to the economic aspect of democratization argues that democracy co-exists with prosperity explained by per capita wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and levels of education. See S.M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105.
20. K. Hewison, R. Robinson, and G. Rodan, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism.*
21. Anek L., "Development and Democratization: A Theoretical Introduction with Reference to the Southeast Asian and East Asian Cases", in *Democratization in Southeast Asia and East Asia*, p. 17. In the 1950s and 1960s, economic development in the Philippines did not lead to democratization; instead, it led to President Marcos' dictatorial rule. On the other hand, the poorer Philippines is now more democratic than the richer Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore. The experience of these three Southeast Asian countries reveals that "statist economic devel-

opment" has given further legitimacy to authoritarian rule. See Khoo B.T., "Democracy and Authoritarianism in Malaysia since 1957: Class, Ethnicity, and Changing Capitalism", pp. 46–76; A. Santoso, "Democratization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order", pp. 21–45; Heng H.K., "Economic Development and Political Change", pp. 113–40, all in *Democratization in Southeast Asia and East Asia.*

22. Robert Pinkney has this to say about the relationship between economic development and democratization in the Third World: "Economic development may sometimes be a spur ... but in other cases economic stagnation, or even economic collapse, has undermined the foundations of authoritarian governments and paved the way for democracy." He then adds: "Still in other cases, economic development may actually strengthen the hands of anti-democratic elites, which can use material resources to reward friends and punish foes." See R. Pinkney, *Democracy in the Third World*, p. 169.
23. A. Przeworski and F. Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts", *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 155–83.
24. B. Moore, Jr. *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.*
25. Michael Vickery's answer to Rebecca Eisler's questions about the future of Cambodian democracy. "CAM-Future of Democracy?", Southeast Asia Discussion List <SEASIA-L@MSU.EDU>, 3 April 1997.
26. In England, common people and the aristocracy formed an alliance against the king; in France, however, the people and the king formed an alliance against the aristocracy. Why should peasants always be anti-democratic? Mitchell Seligson argues that "there is much literature that suggests that democracy in the US and Costa Rica are at least in part an outgrowth of the yeoman farmer". He adds: "If so, then one would want to have more of those farmers." See M. Seligson, "Tatu Vanhanen Thesis and the Prospects of Democracy in Latin America", in *Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries*, p. 281.
27. The Paris Agreements are seriously flawed in that UNTAC did not achieve its main objectives in creating a "neutral political environment" for free and fair elections and in ending the Cambodian war. Conceptually, the intellectual foundation upon which the UN peace plan rested fundamentally contradicted Cambodia's political traditions dominated by "factional aggrandizement" and "violence". Unless a strengthened state structure, a cohesive administrative apparatus, and a capitalist economy emerge and allow social groups to rise, a movement from violent to non-violent politics in Cambodia is not plausible (P. Lizée, "Building Peace: The Challenges and Contradictions of the Cambodian Peace Process"). Lizée lists four major obstacles to the Cambodian peace and democratization process: (a) "imposing what amounts to a new social contract in Cambodia will be *difficult* since this will involve in a short time changes that have taken

centuries to develop in other societies"; (b) "the plausibility of the idea of non-violent politics in Cambodia will be *difficult* to establish, the social transformations necessary to allow a shift from violent politics cannot be implemented"; (c) "dominant groups in Cambodia will seek to challenge the reforms which endanger the social order on which their power rests"; (d) "these groups will exploit the uncertainty surrounding the validity of the idea of non-violent politics in the Cambodian context and try to substitute ... the concepts of peace which legitimize the social order that they want to preserve" (ibid., pp. 3–4; italics added).

28. Pushing the Cambodian factions to accept alien liberal values and to play by the democratic rules of the Western political game is futile. This thesis assumes that a clash of Cambodian and Western political cultures and the absence of a strong state structure, a cohesive administrative apparatus, and a capitalist economy will doom the UN endeavour. In this view, the Khmer Rouge was not the only group worthy of blame for factional aggrandizement. Cambodia's social, cultural, and economic, and institutional conditions are the problem. Lizée's assessment of prospects for liberal democracy is profoundly negative. In his view, Cambodia has not developed a liberal culture; its economic conditions are appalling; political institutions do not exist; political factionalism kills any political will to adopt liberal democracy; without these indigenous conditions for democracy, any UN intervention is simply a futile exercise.
29. War is not perpetual and can in fact lead to democratization. See Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth.* Steven Hood did an interesting study on the democratization of Taiwan by looking at the role of the Nationalist Party of China (Kuomintang or KMT). As he puts it: "Taiwan's democratization has been a long-term process of elites wrestling within the confines of political institutions. For this reason, democratization came about through reform of the KMT party-state, Taiwan's representative bodies, and political ideology." He then adds: "Driven by a subethnic split between Taiwanese and mainland-born Chinese and a desire for a liberal regime, the opposition was the catalyst for putting the reform agenda in motion." See S. Hood, *The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan*, pp. 11, 12. The point to be made here is that Taiwan's cultural legacy of Chinese despotism is not only giving way to democracy, but that factional or subethnic conflict may not always lead to, or perpetuate, violence and war, and that the role of the opposition can push for ideological change.
30. D. Chandler, *Brother Number One*, pp. 39–40; E. Becker, *When the War Was Over*, p. 77.
31. M. Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*, p. 135.
32. On the distinction between anarchy and hegemony, see N. Onuf and F. Klink, "Anarchy, Authority, Rule", *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 149–73.
33. According to Mohammed Ayoob, regime-holders in weak states lack the kind of

social cohesion and unconditional political legitimacy enjoyed by their Western counterparts. The persistent problem of "inadequate stateness" in Third World countries is that their internal vulnerabilities and frailties perpetuate regime insecurity. These states are overloaded with too many problems like the highly disruptive colonial inheritance, the juridical nature of statehood, economic redistribution, and the demand for political participation. Moreover, these weak states lack adequate time to cope with this political and social overload (M. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*).

34. Based on Charles Tilly's argument about European state-making that "war makes states", he contends that the accumulation of power through coercive strategy is crucial to the state-making enterprise.

35. The first condition to attain this goal would be to get rival groups within society to surrender their arms and to depend on the central government's good faith. In return, the central authorities must abide by their commitment to popular political participation, protection of their rights, and their autonomy. Mohammed Ayoob is, however, pessimistic about this form of power consolidation, partly because this kind of political arrangement is difficult to achieve and partly because the demand of democratization and human rights and those of state-making are often irreconcilable. This is what he calls "the Third World security predicament" (ibid., pp. 182–84).

36. D. Mason and D. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror", *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1989): 175.

37. According to David Mason and Dale Krane: "Protracted low-intensity warfare is a burden that the war-weary populations and fragile economies of Third World nations can ill-afford to bear. Our analysis suggests that, ultimately, non-military initiatives such as negotiated cease-fires and amnesty programmes designed to integrate an insurgent opposition back into the mainstream of conventional politics may be the only way to bring an insurgency to a peaceful conclusion. In the absence of any credible assurances against violent reprisals, rebels have nothing to lose by continuing their own programme of violent opposition." See D. Mason and D. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror", *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1989): 193.

38. Some, like Juan Linz, see presidential systems as rigid, less representative, and more confrontational due to their fixed terms in office and winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. Rules of the game within parliamentary systems would, however, lead to superior democracy (J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism", in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, pp. 108–26). On the debate whether the presidential or parliamentarian system is more or less democratic, see L. Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy"; J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism", and "The Virtues

of Parliamentarianism"; D. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems"; A. Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies" and "Double-Checking the Evidence"; G. Lardeyret, "The Problem with PR". The above are all chapters in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy.*

39. G.M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS", *World Politics* 49 (January 1997): 184–211.
40. Ibid., p. 210. For more analysis on how power relations shape institutions, see P. O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary", *World Politics* 48 (July 1996): 579–603.
41. S.P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave", in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, pp. 5–6.
42. J. Londregan and K. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?" *World Politics* 49 (October 1996): 28.
43. Conflict resolution seeks to address human perception or misperception, to facilitate communication between adversaries, to meet human needs, and to develop strategies for getting them to come to the negotiation table. See D. Barash, *Introduction to Peace Studies*; J. Burton, ed., *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*; R. Coate and J. Rosati, eds., *The Power of Human Needs in World Society*; J. Burton and E. Azar, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*; J. Stein, ed., *Getting to the Table*; and D. Kolb, *The Mediators.*
44. J. McCoy, L. Barber, and R. Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, pp. 178–90.
45. T. Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, p. 155.
46. M. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*; J. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia.*
47. S. Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box.*
48. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey Scott, for instance, discovered that economic sanctions experienced a declining success rate from 75 percent in the 1914–73 period to only 28 percent in the 1973–84 period (G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, and K.A. Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, pp. 18–28). Even eminent neoliberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane do not see bright prospects for democratization in the Third World. In their edited volume aimed at measuring the impact of internationalization on domestic politics, Robert Keohane and Helen Milner conclude that "internationalization is having profound effects on domestic politics" in terms of shaping domestic actors' policy preferences, economic policies, and political institutions (H. Milner and R. Keohane, "Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An Introduction", in *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, p. 7).

49. H. Milner and R. Keohane, "Internationalization and Domestic Politics: A Conclusion", in *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, p. 258.
50. F. Cheru and S. Gill, "Structural Adjustment and the G-7: Limits and Contradictions", in *Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism*, p. 152.
51. T. Vanhanen, *Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries*, p. 24. The British philosopher Thomas Hobbes considers anarchy in the state of nature as war-prone — the war "of every man, against every man" — as opposed to the commonwealth — "the Multitude united in one Person". His prescription for the latter implies a structural transformation of power: from anarchy to hierarchy. In a hierarchical political system, the individual unit surrenders his/her own power to the Leviathan who acts to preserve law and order, peace, and stability. The Hobbesian concept has come to be known as state sovereignty. But as Samuel Makinda points out, state sovereignty is undemocratic because it "runs counter to democratic principles". There are two levels of state sovereignty: internal and external. External sovereignty refers to "the territorial integrity of the state in international law, an equality of status with all other states, and the claim to be the sole official agent acting in international relations on behalf of a society" and to the state of independence or freedom from external powers' interference. Internal sovereignty refers to the domestic jurisdiction, namely that the state be free to pursue its policy within the national boundaries unencumbered from external constraints because it "has supremacy over the people, resources, and all other authorities within the territory it controls". See S. Makinda, "Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations", *Global Governance* 2 (1996): 150.
52. In Sweden, "a general stalemate" was reached, which led to what Rustow calls the "Great Compromise". See D.A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamics Model", *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970): 358.
53. W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*; "Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost and Change"; *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 518 (November 1991): 11–22; W. Zartman and V. Kremenyuk, eds., *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars.*
54. J. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, p. xiii.
55. Ibid., p. 4.
56. Ibid., p. 207.
57. "Numerous Third World societies have been as resilient as an intricate spider's web; one could snip a corner of the web away and the rest of the web would swing majestically between the branches, just as one could snip center strands and have the web continue to exist." (Ibid., p. 37.)
58. My structural analysis of Cambodia's political system stresses the concept of secu-

rity rather than that of power. In this context, it is similar to Kenneth Waltz's "neorealism", which recognizes that "the ultimate of states [within the 'self-help' anarchical international system] *is not for power but for security*" (K. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", in *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, p. 80).

59. Note that even "republican liberals" such as Immanuel Kant, who wrote the much-celebrated *Perpetual Peace*, do not reject the utility of the balance of power as an initial or short-term condition for international order and peace. See F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, chap. 4; A. Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations", *Review of International Studies* 16 (1990): 183–205. According to Stanley Kober: "It is incorrect ... to say that idealism rejects the balance of power. In fact, idealism recognizes that in the face of a military threat, there is no alternative to maintaining a balance, or even a preponderance, of power." See S. Kober, "Idealpolitik", *Foreign Policy* 79 (Summer 1990): 13.
60. Christopher Mitchell develops a sophisticated table of power resources, but I think it is too complex for me to apply in the Cambodian context. See C. Mitchell, "Asymmetry and Strategies of Regional Conflict Reduction", in *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars*, pp. 25–57.
61. A number of political scientists have developed political theories about the causes of interstate wars by looking at power transitions within the anarchical international system. According to A.F.K. Organski, rising powers, which are not satisfied with the status quo, will challenge the hegemonic power in the international system (A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*; and A.F.K. Organski and J. Kugler, *The War Ledger*).
62. R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; J.S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War", *World Politics* 40 (October 1987): 82–107.
63. As he puts it: "The steady onslaught of the world market weakened old forms of social organization and social control substantially." See J. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, p. 79. During the 19th century, the spreading world market was the dislocating force that shattered existing patterns of social control. Capitalism's "effects were institutionally devastating" (ibid., p. 92).
64. C. Mitchell, "Asymmetry and Strategies of Regional Conflict Reduction", in *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars*, p. 41.
65. H. Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach", in *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, p. 20.
66. S. Hoffmann, "International Society", in *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations*, p. 17.