1

INTRODUCTION

No idea has been as vibrantly debated and contested in post-New Order Indonesia as the notion of democracy. The collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 paved the way for all elements of society to actively reconsider what constitutes the public good for the country.[1] The regime shift — from Soeharto's authoritarian regime to the so-called *Era Reformasi* — accordingly unleashed once-idle Islamist movements to become actively engaged in public debates over the ideological foundations of the country. Islamist social organizations such as MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, or The Council of Indonesian Muslim Holy Warriors), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, or Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation), FPI (Front Pembela Islam, or Front of the Defenders of Islam), FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, or Communication Forum of Ahlussunnah wa al-Jama'ah), and others have come to the fore, with the agenda of replacing Pancasila, the philosophical foundation of the country, with Islam. In a development reminiscent of the multiparty era in the 1950s, Islam-based political parties mushroomed during this early transitional period.[2] Pancasila has come to face sustained challenges and attacks from the Islamists. The Jakarta Charter, which had been included in the first draft of the constitution's preamble but which was eventually left out of the document, has been put back on the parliamentary agenda by Islamist parties, but their repeated efforts to reinsert the Charter into the preamble through constitutional amendments have failed.

Attempts at incorporating Islam into the state constitution did not stop there; the Islamists have tried incessantly and through various means to replace Pancasila with the ideology of Islam and to make Indonesia more Islamic. Having failed at the political and structural level, many Islamists

turned to a cultural struggle by attempting to Islamize society from below. Starting at the individual level, they hoped that the cells of Islamic society could be expanded more broadly into the state structure. Propagating Islam by means of religious gatherings all over the country, and by infiltrating local organizations or bureaucracies, the Islamists hoped to boost their strongholds in gradual steps towards the national level. Islamizing the state constitution was no longer regarded at the rhetorical level as an urgent priority. Rather, the Islamization of society and culture was now considered more important.[3] To support their efforts, they established a "non-structural alliance" in which Islamist groups from different segments of Islam could get together to formulate a well-armed proposal for an Islam-based Indonesia.[4] In this manner, they believe that a wider web of Islamism will eventually be instituted. To allay public distrust, they usually deploy democracy as the foundation of the freedom of expression. The proposal of an Islamic state in Indonesia, they argue, does not contradict the essence of democracy and human rights, particularly as Muslims comprise the majority of the population in the country.[5]

In addition, the multidimensional crises that have afflicted the country since the collapse of Soeharto's New Order have also been deployed by the Islamists as another reason why a return to Islam might be the solution for the country. They argue that if secular democratic regimes have been tried and proven unsuccessful, it is reasonable to try again with Islam. In their argument, the economic and political crises are partly attributed to the adoption of secular and democratic principles that have proven to be unsuccessful. It is simply fair, they argue, to try adopting Islam as the foundation of the country since it had been the foundation of some parts of Indonesia such as Aceh prior to Dutch colonialism.[6] Islam also brought about the glory of Muslims in the past.

The discourses and counter-discourses on democracy, as developed by Indonesian Muslims — particularly Islamists *vis-à-vis* non-Islamists — have become an important part of the country's long historiographical venture. Despite the harsh and at times extreme use of language, these discourses have been conducted in a relatively non-violent manner. Several violent acts perpetrated by *jihadi* Islamists undoubtedly do not represent the majority of Indonesia's Islamists and therefore will not be portrayed in this study. The reality of Islamism in the country is extremely complex and its trajectory will very much depend on many different variables. It is a matter of fact that Islamism is multifaceted and may not be understood through a single lens. The dynamics of Islamism in the country tends to follow the fluctuations of global and local geopolitics. In order to grasp the phenomenon of

Indonesia's Islamism, more than one perspective must be employed so that gross generalizations may be avoided.

Much has been written about the relations of Islam and democracy.[7] There has been a heated scholarly debate with regard to whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy. By all accounts, two opposite camps have emerged as a result of this debate. First, those who argue that Islam is inimical to democracy. They base their arguments either on normative grounds such as religiously derived values or on historical and factual phenomena of the Muslim world, which is considered to be lagging behind other non-Muslim civilizations, particularly the West. In these scholars' arguments, Islam constitutes a never-changing cultural element that is hostile to the idea of democracy. In the language of sociology and political science, the protagonists of this camp are commonly referred to as culturalists or essentialists.[8]

The second camp comprises those who argue that religion-based cultures are not static entities.[9] Just as Catholicism and Confucianism proved able to give birth to new forms of democracy, despite the fact that Weber had considered Protestant-based culture to be the only civilization suited to modernity and democracy, so Islam might prove itself capable of embracing democracy.[10] One of the basic arguments of this camp is that the birth and development of democracy has a lot to do with structural matters such as the distribution of wealth, the level of literacy, the relations between society and the state, the provision of room for freedom and self-expression, and so forth. The proponents of this camp, who might be called structuralists, do not believe in "essentialism"; instead, they look at the social and political realities of the Muslim world. In contrast to the culturalists, they believe that there will always be an opportunity for Islam to embark on the same course as that of Catholicism and Confucianism, which have already journeyed towards democracy.

This study seeks to move a step further than the seemingly never-ending debate portrayed above. Namely, it intends to portray the relationship of Islamism and democracy in the Indonesian context. The question of what Islamism contends about democracy and electoral politics, particularly in the Indonesian context, has not received adequate attention in academic circles.[11] One of the main reasons for this is the widespread belief that the firm stance of Islamism in rejecting democracy needs no further confirmation. Indeed, it is widely accepted that Islamists view democracy an alien to Islam and that it must therefore be rejected. At a rhetorical level, the Islamists' rejection seems to leave no space for compromise. Nevertheless, as this study shall demonstrate later on, the complexity of social phenomena means that they are never firmly black nor white. When we broach the subject of Islamism

in relation to social and political issues, it is misleading to apply one single monolithic approach, while neglecting the diverse and complex nature of Islamism amidst the rapidly changing global geopolitical context. The current study attempts to fill the theoretical gap by providing an analysis of Islamism and democracy in post-New Order Indonesia.

As many have argued, Islamists might pretend to accept democracy by taking part in general elections and playing down Islamist causes while secretly championing their hidden agenda.[12] It is also widely assumed that having gained power they would harness democratic institutions to exterminate democracy. As the notion of Islamic democracy is presumed to be an oxymoron, any government controlled by Islamists would be highly unlikely to be democratic. The argument that Islamists only "borrow" democracy in order to kill has been proposed by scholars in several Middle Eastern countries, with regard to the case of Algeria's FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), Turkey's Refah Party, and Palestine's Hamas.[13] Based on these experiments, it is argued that Islamists in Indonesia would be likely to behave the same way given the opportunity to take part in democratic processes.

Be that as it may, understanding Indonesia's Islamism in light of its counterparts in some other Muslim countries necessitates caution, particularly the various socio-political backgrounds and historical settings involved. The investigation of Islam, Islamism, and discourses on democracy in the context of post-New Order Indonesia might provide nuance to existing studies on such topics in other parts of the Muslim world. To date, only several somewhat cursory and broad-spectrum studies on Islamism and democracy in Indonesia have been undertaken.[14] However, they do not elaborate on the relationship between Islamism and democracy. The "thick description" of how discourses and counter-discourses on democracy have been produced should now be taken into account. The Islamists are often difficult to understand; their world-views, attitudes, and behaviours are not black and white. Some of them may be explained by the double-standard theory alluded to earlier, but others deal in good faith.

The current study focuses on three Islamist organizations: (1) MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, or The Indonesian Council of Muslim Holy Warriors); (2) HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia); and (3) PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or Prosperous Justice Party). The choice was based on the fact that these three organizations represent two ends of the spectrum of Islamist political ideas in contemporary Indonesian Islam. The first two organizations represent the pole that employs extra-parliamentary struggles to reject democracy, while the third represents the pole that seeks intra-parliamentary means to promote Islam through democracy.

There are of course other Islamist groups and movements whose agenda and world-views are similar to or the same as those of the three above-mentioned Islamist organizations. These would be groups such as FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, or Forum for Communication of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah) with its paramilitary wing Laskar Jihad, FPI (Front Pembela Islam, or Islamic Defenders Front), and many others. This study, however, does not cover these Islamist groups as some of them have been the subject of other works.[15] In addition, MMI and HTI have very distinctive approaches to the notion of democracy and power in general; while the first urges the total implementation of Shari'ah (*tatbiq al-Shari'ah*), the latter employs the issue of transnational Islamdom (*khilafah Islamiyah*) to attract a wider audience. Overall, all three Islamist organizations under scrutiny occupy an *avant-garde* position in the configuration of post-New Order Islamism and have developed relatively systematic discourses and counter-discourses on democracy through their own far-reaching media and publications.

The argument of the current book rests on the notion that discourses and counter-discourses on democracy among Indonesian Islamists are diverse and multifaceted. It is not democracy per se that is rejected by the utopian Islamists, but rather such typically Western values as liberalism, secularism, and capitalism. Furthermore, the Islamists' rejection of democracy is not purely blind; at a political level, it also serves as constructive criticism of inconsistencies of certain Western countries, particularly the United States, on the global political stage. Furthermore, the discourses and counter-discourses on democracy are usually inseparable from wider power discourses. The utopian Islamists' rejection of democracy, therefore, cannot be dissociated from internal and external socio-political circumstances faced by Muslims in Indonesia and beyond.

Post-New Order Indonesia provides fertile ground for public debates over the importance of democracy. People are starting to get used to the idea of freedom of expression and public deliberation — integral elements of democracy. Unlike during the New Order regime, the government now has no other option but to provide for the process of fair and public deliberation. Within this changing context, the participation of the Islamists is in fact unavoidable. Even though they may reject the idea of democracy at a rhetorical level, the Islamists do not have any choice but to follow the rules of the game as provided by democratic institutions. Indeed, Islamists have eventually been forced by circumstances to acknowledge the multicultural nature of Indonesia; regardless of their own parochial beliefs about the ideal society presided over by God. The new realities of post-New Order Indonesia

have compelled the Islamists to put up with differences within society and to live in coexistence with non-Muslims.

As this study will demonstrate, there is a split in Islamists' attitudes towards democracy. At one end of the spectrum are those Islamists who reject democracy, although inconsistencies are to be found on a practical level. At the other end of the spectrum are those who welcome democracy critically. To the latter, democracy means an open, public arena in which free and fair competition is constitutionally set. In their minds, the rise of another sort of "democracy" other than Western liberal democracy, that is, an "Islamic democracy", is not impossible. This sort of democracy would allow its stakeholders to engage freely in open and public deliberation. Democracy can mean winning the hearts and minds of constituents, even though for the utopian Islamists democracy also means revolt against God's sovereignty.

Islamism may be defined as a movement or organization that seeks to change Muslim societies by deriving its programmes and ideologies from the basic texts of Islam.[16] Unlike the terms "fundamentalists", "militants", "radicals", or "terrorists", which carry connotations of Western borrowings and may imply reductionism, the term "Islamists" (*Islamiyyun*) is a term that people who belong to Islamist movements use to identify themselves. "Islamist" is different from "Muslim" in that the former refers to people with a conscious, activist agenda while the latter is a nominal identity for people with a range of ideological views. Islamism refers both to Islamist politics and the process of re-Islamization. In this context, Salwa Ismail explains further that

> Islamist politics points to the activities of organizations and movements that agitate in the public sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic tradition. It entails political ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood as a government which implements the Shari'a (Islamic law). Islamization or re-Islamization signifies a drive to islamize the social sphere. It involves a process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions.[17]

In terms of its genealogy, Olivier Roy argues that contemporary Islamism can be traced to two religious movements and organizations: first, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), established by schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna in 1928, and, second, the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, founded by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi in 1941.[18]

Islamism was created both along the lines of and as a break from the modern *salafiya* (the return to the ancestors), spearheaded by three ideologues: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–98), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and

Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[19] By and large, Islamists adopt Salafist ideology: they preach a return to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the Shari'a and reject the commentaries that have been part of the tradition. Islamism begins with a theological concept that is the very foundation of Islam: *tawhid* (divine oneness), which says that God is transcendent, unique, and without associates. Islamists seek to apply this theological stance to society.

The construction of the concept of Islamism is inextricably linked to the circumstances surrounding Muslim politics. In the pre-September 11 environment, this term had been applied to those Muslim activists, liberal or radical, who had been actively involved in politics using religion as a yardstick in their struggles. During the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, several social scientists tended to lump the term "Islamist" together with "fundamentalist" to indicate any Islamic activism whose purposes were mainly to challenge with Islam an existing, often authoritarian, regime. These social scientists included associates of Muslim thinkers inclined towards democracy such as Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic National Front in Sudan, and Rachid al-Ghannouchi, an exiled leader of Tunisia's Nahda Party, and radicals such as members of Algeria's FIS and the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[20]

The September 11 tragedy, however, signified a turning point in studies of Islamism. Both emphasis and direction have changed as it seems that the meaning of Islamism in the context post-September 11 has now been narrowed down exclusively to radical activism whose political interests are different from, if not contradictory to, democracy. Those liberal Muslims who seek to define Islam within the framework of democracy have accordingly been excluded from the nomenclature of Islamism. The studies on Islam have associated Islamism with those radicals who deploy Islam as the main reference in their programmes for changing society.

This study, however, will use Islamism to refer to religious activism that deploys Islam both as symbol and substance in its political struggles. This study further focuses on those Islamists who reject the idea of democracy and also those who occupy the in-between position: on the one hand, these latter Islamists stand firmly on their Islamic identity but on the other hand they try to accommodate democracy as a means of political struggle.

The first group of Islamists espouse what I call Utopian Islamism. In the context of Indonesian Islamism, this variant is well represented by two of the Islamist organizations under scrutiny: MMI and HTI. Utopia means an "imaginary place or state of things in which everything is perfect".[21] This term is attributed to some of the Islamists in recognition of the fact that they are obsessed with establishing an ideal state of being and an ideal community

based on religion. Yet utopia is more than mere imagination. Mannheim in his now classic work defines utopia as "that type of orientation which transcends reality and which at the same time breaks the bonds of the existing order".[22] In his opinion, a state of mind is considered utopian when it is incongruent with reality, oriented to objects that are alien to reality, and when it transcends actual existence. However, not all incongruous states of mind are utopian; only those that, when translated into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or entirely, the existing order of things.[23]

The second group is referred to as meliorist Islamism. In the Indonesian context, PKS represents this stance par excellence. Meliorism, developed in the context of religious ethics debates in the aftermath of World War I, essentially argues that the world can be made a better place without necessarily devastating the existing social and political orders. It basically condemns the existing world as "a sorry state of affairs", and affirms with confident assurance the ability of human intelligence to improve on it. It advocates a practical motto: "Let us make a better world!" Meliorists are militant yet not necessarily radical in a pejorative sense, as they look at the reality of the world positively.[24] The basic assumption of meliorism is that

> The appearance of man was expressed in terms of struggle, and his history was said to consist in efforts to improve his status by acquiring greater control over the various elements constituting his environment and thus affecting his security and well-being. Thus the emphasis was shifted from possession to endeavor; from worship to work; from a sense of belonging to a wider order of reality and sharing in its life and spirit to a concern for remoulding the world wherever it thwarted desire.[25]

Meliorism has a lot to do with human effort in pursuit of religious causes; it is about promoting human progress in the world of materialism with a religious spirit that distinguishes itself from pragmatism, instrumentalism, and realism, which are all secular in tone. In the minds of meliorists, religion provides a prophetic code of conduct for its believers to achieve the betterment of life. In this context, religion in general is widely perceived of as consciousness of the highest social values. On the other hand, being irreligious is a state of indifference or hostility to that which promotes human well-being.[26]

It is important in this study to have a clear definition of democracy, even though the concept is not easily defined, as an "essentially contested concept".[27] The definition used here covers two meanings. First, institutional or procedural democracy as Joseph A. Schumpeter defines it: "the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's

vote".[28] Another definition of democracy has been offered by David Beetham as "a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control".[29] Procedural democracy has been elaborated further by Robert Dahl as the form of government that meets the following criteria:

1. Free and periodic competition between at least two candidates occurs for all effective decision-making positions. The end result is a peaceful succession of governments.
2. A high degree of political participation in the elections of leaders exists. The entire adult population is allowed to participate in elections; suffrage is universal.
3. There are guarantees of human rights and civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to join and form political parties, etc.
4. Leaders are held accountable to the public as long as they hold office. This requires the existence of a means of removing leaders from office if they violate the law.[30]

There are some other factors closely associated with democracy and democratization such as Lipset's theory of economic development[31] and Huntington's list of twenty-seven variables that are conducive to democracy (such as a market economy, a strong middle class, high levels of literacy and education, Protestantism, democratic authority structures within social groups, low levels of political polarization and extremism, political leaders committed to democracy, experience as a British colony, and so forth).[32] These factors are, however, beyond the reach of this study. Instead, procedural democracy will be the working framework in which the involvement of Islamists in general elections and/or their adoption of voting procedures in internal leadership elections will be analysed.

Second, democracy also covers such basic substantive values as liberty, equality, tolerance, and respect for the law as well as justice. As cited by Held, liberty or autonomy is seen by Aristotle as central to the idea of democracy, where the ideal is "not being ruled, not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alteration".[33] Aristotle goes on to argue that liberty also means "to live as you like", which is the essence of being free, "since its opposite, living not as you like, is the function of one being enslaved".[34] For a democrat, liberty and equality are, according to Aristotle, inextricably linked. There are two criteria of liberty: (a) "ruling and being ruled in turn" and (b) "living as one chooses".[35] In order to establish the first criterion as an effective principle of government, equality is essential: "without numerical equality", "the

multitude" cannot be sovereign. "Numerical equality", namely an equal share of the practice of ruling, is said by classical democrats to be possible because (a) participation is financially remunerated so that citizens are not worse off as a result of political involvement; (b) citizens have equal voting power; and (c) there are in principle equal chances to hold office.[36] Put simply, equality is the moral and practical basis of liberty.

Even though liberty is essential to democracy, obedience to public authority and the law is no less essential. While the idea of democracy is maximum freedom and autonomy, the very concept of rule involves limits on freedom. According to Pericles, a respected citizen, general, and politician at the time of Athenian democracy, rules and laws must be established on the basis of public-spiritedness, where private life must be subordinated to public affairs.[37] "The public" and "the private" are basically intertwined, although tolerance is likewise essential so that people can enjoy themselves "in their own way".[38] Put differently, the principle of tolerance involves self-imposed limits and restraints on spontaneous reactions such as keeping distance from other people's private lifestyles.

Central to the idea of tolerance is pluralism. Pluralism not only means the existence of a diversity of interests and competing value systems, but also denotes how these different interests and value systems are moderated by means of democratic mechanisms. This study will not go further into the complex debate on the causal relationship between democracy and pluralism, but it assumes that an ideal democracy necessitates the condition in which pluralism and tolerance are two sides of the same coin.[39] I tend to argue that pluralism can promote democratic norms by increasing tolerance, namely by making people aware of democratic processes as well as strategies of compromise and peaceful conflict resolution.

On the basis of the above mentioned definitions of democracy, this study employs both procedural and essential democracy as its conceptual framework for analysing Islamist discourses and counter-discourses on democracy in post-New Order Indonesia. While procedural democracy rests on ideas closely associated with general elections and electoral politics developed within the circles of the Islamists, essential democracy rests on civic liberties such as freedom of religion, freedom of expression, equality, pluralism, and tolerance. These values, however, will be used only occasionally as an additional yardstick for analysing the extent to which a particular group of Islamists is engaged in discourses on democracy. In this way, this study hopes to reflect accurately the contemporary debate on Islamism and democracy in post-New Order Indonesian Islam. Accordingly, it must be understood from the outset that this study is not intended to evaluate whether or not a particular group is,

or may become, democratic. Rather, it is aimed at providing an account of how far the Islamists are engaged in discourses and counter-discourses on democracy.

The main question I shall develop throughout the current study is: what discourses and counter-discourses on democracy are being developed in Islamist political thought in post-New Order Indonesia? More specifically, how do Islamists approach the notion of democracy? Do they have a unified response to democracy? These questions will be expanded into several more detailed research questions, as follows:

1. To what extent is the scholarly debate about the relationship between Islam and democracy being developed?
2. How can the relationship between Islam and democracy in the Indonesian context be explained?
3. How can we portray Islamism in Indonesia?
4. On what grounds is the notion of democracy rejected by the Islamists? This query tries to provide an analytical explanation of the first variant of Islamism, namely, utopian Islamism, as represented by two Islamist groups: HTI and MMI.
5. To what extent do Islamists approach and craft their own conception of democracy? This question examines the second variant of Islamism, namely, meliorist Islamism, which tends to be accommodating towards democracy.
6. How can we analyse Indonesian Islamism in the context of the power discourse among the Islamists?

This study consists of a qualitative examination based on the combination of theoretical and empirical investigations. Data were collected through bibliographical surveys and fieldwork. The internal publications of the three organizations studied here are of particular importance. Such materials include books, magazines, pamphlets, and documents such as the bulletin *al-Islam* and the journal *Al-Wa'ie*, both of which are published by HTI. The stockpiled materials were then codified, classified, and analysed using the methods of discourse analysis.[40]

A series of interviews was conducted throughout a four-month period of fieldwork (March–June 2005) in five cities in Indonesia (Surabaya, Malang, Solo, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta). A purposive, snowball sampling, technique was employed; the interviews were conducted on the basis of cues given by earlier interviewees. For example, the interview with K.H. Wahyuddin, director of the *pesantren* al-Mukmin Ngruki and son-in-law of Abdullah Sungkar, who was also a rank-and-file member of the Solo-based MMI,

was conducted based on a recommendation given by Irfan S. Awwas, the executive leader of MMI, in an interview in Yogyakarta. It must be noted that all interviews with MMI leaders were conducted before a rupture took place within the MMI organizational structure — a rupture which led to the departure of Fauzan Al-Anshari and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir from the organization in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The respondents were also taken purposively from those three organizations. They ranged from rank-and-files members to supporters and sympathizers at the grassroots level. The accessibility of data on the internet helped me to enrich and reconfirm the accuracy and reliability of the data at the analysis stage. The analysis itself formed an integral part of data gathering in order to minimize the discrepancies and paradoxes within the data.

Interviewees were always asked for their consent prior to each interview as a part of ethics of conduct in research. Interviews were not always easy since some of the people that were interviewed tended to be reluctant to provide correct and honest information. This was because the interviews were conducted during a sensitive period for the Islamists in which they were under close scrutiny by security officers following several Jihadist operations. The academic background of the researcher as an IAIN (State Institute for Islamic Studies) lecturer and student of a Western university — notoriously regarded by the Islamists as agents of liberal and secular thinking — also brought about another sort of inconvenience that influenced the flow of the interviews. Some of the interviewees were unfriendly, even hostile, and did not refrain from expressing their contempt at the involvement of the researcher in the afore-mentioned institutions. Nevertheless, this difficult situation was overcome by the researcher listening humbly and wholeheartedly to the information given by the interviewees, showing neutrality and taking part in some ritual activities such as prayers at the location of the interview.

Comparative analysis is employed to discern where the variants of Islamism clash and where they meet. This approach is particularly crucial in delineating the argument that internal cleavages are to be found in Islamism with regard to how Islamist ideas are achieved at a practical level. Multidisciplinary and "thick description" analyses have helped me unravel the "universe of meaning" contained within the many layers of delicate facts. By these means, it is hoped that the complexity of Islamism may reasonably be represented by this study.

This book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the background and significance of the study, the focus of the study, the main theoretical argument, the conceptual framework, the methodological note, and the structure of the book.

Chapter 2 seeks to reexamine the intricate relationship between Islam and democracy from a theoretical perspective, starting with a discussion of the cultural essentialist approach to democracy, followed by counter-arguments from the structural-instrumentalist approach. It concludes with an overview of the internal debate within Muslim society, which reflects the multivocality of Islam.

Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining the discourse on Islam and democracy within Indonesian Islam. This chapter deals with three main issues: first, the conceptual definition of Indonesia's democracy; second, a brief historical account of the development of Indonesian concepts of and experiences with democracy; and third, approaches to democracy among Indonesian Muslims.

Chapter 4 provides the context for the focus of the study, that is, Islamism in the Indonesian context since the fall of Soeharto. This chapter attempts to analyse the emergence and development of Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia. It starts with a general overview of Indonesian Islamism and the socio-political backdrop to and historical roots of Islamism. A brief description follows of the Islamist organizations analysed in this study, namely, MMI, HTI, and PKS.

Chapter 5 analyses the discourses on democracy within the utopian variant of Islamism, that is, HTI and MMI. This chapter covers the following issues: the Islamists' conception of democracy, the roots of exceptionalism in the Islamists' arguments, the social construction of anti-democracy discourses, the role of the media, the employment of democracy to reject democracy, the Islamists at ballot box, and their rejection of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.

Chapter 6 deals with the other variant of Islamists, that is, the meliorists, whose attitude and response to democracy is accommodating. The issues covered in this chapter are: the new era of political Islam, the new paradigm in Islamic politics, the reconsideration of an Islamic state, and the deployment of the Madinah Charter instead of the Jakarta Charter in politics.

Chapter 7 seeks to analyse comparatively the two variants of Islamism in light of power relations theory, beginning with the rise of Islamism in the light of public Islam, the Islamists' perception of power, manifestations of power among the Islamists, the Islamists' approaches to power structures, and commonalities and cleavages among the different streams of Islamism.

Chapter 8 concludes the study in terms of theoretical findings and reflection on whether or not a genuinely "home-grown" democracy could ever be constructed by the meliorist Islamists on the basis of Islamic and Indonesian values and norms.

Notes

1 For further discussion on the transition from the New Order to post-New Order regimes, see, for instance, Donald K. Emmerson, ed., *Indonesia beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah, eds., *Indonesia in Search of Transition* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002); Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman, eds., *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition* (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001); Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen, eds., *Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000); Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

2 For an authoritative account on political parties and democracy under Sukarno's regime, see Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–1959* (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1966); cf. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

3 The shift of strategy among the Islamists from state-structure to society-culture has been aptly highlighted by Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 3. See also, Masdar Hilmy, "Looking into God's Heaven: Theological Constructs of Islamic Radicalism in Post-New Order Indonesia", *Asian Cultural Studies* 15 (2006): 11.

4 MMI, for instance, has put serious efforts into developing a subdivision intended to conduct research on the feasibility, formulation, and spreading of Islamic Shari'a into society. This attempt has produced a proposal to amend the Constitution of 1945 with a Shari'a-based constitution. See MMI, *Usulan Amandemen UUD '45 Disesuaikan dengan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, n.d.).

5 See, for instance, one of the points in what the MMI calls the "Yogyakarta Charter" (*Piagam Yogyakarta*), which says that "whoever of the Muslims oppose the implementation of Islamic shari'a, they can be classified as hypocrites and human rights transgressors and are inclined to the life of conflict as indicated in some areas such as Ambon-Maluku, Aceh, Poso and others". See MMI, *Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Untuk Penegakan Syari'ah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, 2001), p. 6.

6 See, for instance, Herry Nurdi, "Risalah Islam Nusantara", special edition, *Sabili* 9 (2003): 8–15.

7 A number of volumes have been dedicated to investigating the complexity of the relationship between Islam and democracy. See, among others, M.A. Muqtader Khan, ed., *Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives* (New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006); cf. Ali Reza

Abootalebi, *Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing Countries 1980–1994* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000).

8 Samuel P. Huntington, with his "clash of civilizations" theory, has been recognized as one of the leading culturalist scholars advocate a firm fault line dividing Islam-based communities from the democratic Western world. Francis Fukuyama has enriched the culturalist viewpoint by arguing that human civilization has entered the last stage of its history, in which Western-style democracy has been confirmed as the champion in the "battle of ideologies". For further accounts of their theoretical constructs, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

9 See, among others, Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism", *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 140–46. cf. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

10 For Weber's view on Islam, see *The Sociology of Religion*, 5th ed. (London: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 265–66.

11 Saiful Mujani's Ph.D. thesis, at any rate, has been a pioneering study on the relationship of Islam to democracy in Indonesia, with particular emphasis on the two largest Muslim organizations in the country: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This study shows there is no convincing evidence that Islam is inimical to democracy, even though incongruence between the two is to be found in Islamist groups such as MMI, HTI, FPI, and Laskar Jihad. See Saiful Mujani, "Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2004).

12 Gudrun Krämer, "Islamist Notion of Democracy", *Middle East Report* 23, no. 4 (1993): 2–8. See also Daniel Brumberg, "Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy", *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 4 (October 2002): 56–68.

13 For more detailed information on discourses on democracy developed by Muslims in the Arab world, see, among others, Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004). See also, Najib Ghadbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997).

14 Many studies and research projects on Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia have been produced since the collapse of the New Order. See, for instance, S. Yunanto et al., *Gerakan Militan Islam di Indonesia dan di Asia Tenggara* (Jakarta: Ridep Institute and Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung (FES), 2003); cf. International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) in cooperation with JICA, "Islam and Peace Building in Indonesia: The Analysis of Radical Movements and Their Implication for Security-Development Prospects", unpublished final report (Jakarta: ICIP-JICA, 2004); cf. Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-*

ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); cf. Wardi Taufiq et al., *Gerakan Radikal Islam di Indonesia, dalam Sorotan!* (Jakarta: ASEAN Youth and Student Network, 2004); cf. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004); cf. Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, eds., *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Press, 2005), and many others. None of these studies, however, investigates the Islamists' rejection of democracy in great detail.

15 For more detailed information on Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006); cf. Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 1 (April 2002): 12–32. cf. Muhammad Sirozi, "The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background", *The Muslim World* 95, no. 1 (January 2005): 81–119.

16 Najib Ghadbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge*, p. 6.

17 Salwa Ismail, "Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics", *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004): 66.

18 Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 35.

19 For the difference between *salafiyya* and Islamism, see ibid., pp. 31–34 and 36–40.

20 For further information on the use of the term "Islamist", see, among others, Raghid El-Solh, "Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy: A Review of the al-Ghazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara'", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 1 (1993): 57–63; cf. Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan", *The Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 373–87; Claire Heristchi, "The Islamist Discourse of the FIS and the Democratic Experiment in Algeria", *Democratization* 11, no. 4 (August 2004): 111–32; cf. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algerian Islamists' Conception of Democracy", *Arab Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 65–85; cf. Vickie Langohr, "Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamisms and Electoral Politics", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 591–610.

21 *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), S.V. 'Utopia'.

22 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 173. In contrast to Mannheim, who highlights the importance of utopia and ideology in politics, Judith Shklar postulated that the last vestiges of utopian faith have vanished. See Judith Shklar, *After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. vii. For more detailed debates about utopia and utopianism, see, for instance, Ian Clark, "World Order Reform and Utopian Thought: A Contemporary Watershed?" *The Review of Politics* 41, no. 1 (January 1979): 96–120; cf. Lyman Tower Sargent, "Authority

& Utopia: Utopianism in Political Thought", *Polity* 14, no. 4 (Summer 1982): 565–84. For the discussion on utopia and democracy in Islamist context, see Lahouari Addi, "Islamicist Utopia and Democracy", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 524 (November 1992): 120–30.

23 Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 173–84.

24 I am referring to the conceptual framework developed by Daniel Sommer Robinson in his article, "A Critique of Meliorism", *International Journal of Ethics* 34, no. 2 (January 1924): 175–194.

25 Edward L. Schaub, "Spirit Militant and Spirit Harmonious", *The Philosophical Review* 32, no. 2 (March 1923): 177.

26 Ibid., p. 162.

27 W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956): 184.

28 Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 269.

29 David Beetham, "Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization", in *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West*, edited by David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 55.

30 Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

31 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 69–105.

32 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), especially pp. 37–38.

33 David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 19.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 20.

37 Ibid., p. 17.

38 Ibid.

39 For a philosophical discussion on the causal relationship between pluralism and democracy, see, for instance, Paul H. Conn, "Social Pluralism and Democracy", *American Journal of Political Science* 17, no. 2 (May 1973): 237–54.

40 I employ the term "discourse" in a Habermasian sense, as the exchange of reasons among the stakeholders of democracy over what constitutes the common good for all elements of society along with the process of public deliberation. Habermas' "discourse theory of democracy" can be seen as an epistemic explanation that is both procedural and complex, for it entails the rationality of deliberation in terms of the complexity of reason-giving procedures. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols., translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984), especially pp. 1–42 and 237–73.