

modify the nature of the structural constraints imposed on the protagonists so that relations become less prone to conflict.

Lizée argues that the literature on conflict resolution needs to be rewritten to incorporate a new political vocabulary so that the socially constructed nature of conflict in peripheral societies can be addressed and transformed into non-violent politics.

Part four examines the role of the international community in the 1998 Cambodian elections and asks why the same patterns of thought and ways of conceptualizing conflict resolution were reapplied with similar results. One of Lizée's suggestions is that this problematic can only be addressed by opening up the practice and discourse of global governance to the concepts and insights developed in this work.

In sum, this is a powerfully written critique of the United Nations' orthodox and misguided approach to peace-building in the post-Cold War era. It challenges the conceptual premises on which U.N. intervention has been based and provides a devastating account of why the United Nations failed to achieve its main objective of creating a democratic Cambodian state based on non-violence and the rule of law. This book is highly recommended to conflict resolution specialists, diplomatic practitioners, military officers engaged in U.N. missions, and scholars with an interest in Cambodia.

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A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958. By Daniel Fineman. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. 357pp.

"Intrigue" and "tragedy" best epitomize this absorbing analysis of how the United States, in an evolutionary manner, developed a symbiotic patron-client relationship with a repressive military dictatorship in Thailand, a country of low priority in America's foreign policy concerns within Southeast Asia. This relationship baffled alike allies, critics, and enemies of the United States. Ironically, U.S. State Department officials were aware of what the Thai military leaders were doing, for their actions were nourished and sustained by large amounts of military aid.

One is tempted to view the officials in the White House, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the major players who cautiously opened the door to American military aid to Thailand after the coup in 1947, and which later led to a disastrous diplomatic role in Southeast Asia. The foreign policy objectives pursued by American Cold Warriors were inimical to Thai democracy. Furthermore, America's ambassadors to Thailand, sensitive as they were to the anti-American sentiments voiced by Thai journalists, politicians and students from 1947 to 1957, directly and inadvertently drove Thailand into the military arms of the United States. Edwin Stanton, a liberal Democrat, pressured Phibun Songkhram to include Democrats, such as Khuang Aphaiwong, in his government. William Donovan, who succeeded Stanton, worked furiously to convince Phibun to repress all dissident elements. Both Stanton and Donovan rallied Congress to appropriate military aid for Thailand. John E. Peurifoy, Donovan's replacement, vigorously pushed for additional military aid, and Max Bishop, the ever-aggressive ambassador, along with U Alexis Johnson, fought to preserve American interests. While these ambassadors worked diligently to make first Phibun and then Sarit walk a straight and narrow pro-American path, American businessmen, some of them former CIA officials, pressured Thai officials to suppress internal dissent. Even the British jealously guarded their trade relations with Thailand. In due time, the United States and their allies would turn their attention to the growing influence of communism in Southeast Asia.

A reader also detects in this book the blatant manner in which American officials used the carrot of military assistance to solicit the loyalty of Phibun, Sarit Thanarat, and other Thai officials. Military aid depended on the effective suppression of dissident elements within those groups in Thai society that lacked a united political front. Even Secretary of State Dean Acheson admonished Thailand to get its house in order so that the United States would not repeat the mistake made in China.

The American recognition of Bao Dai and military involvement in Korea encouraged a cautious Phibun to take action. After 1950, the greater Phibun's success in suppressing leftist elements, the more the military aid and support given to him by the United States. Compromises with leftist elements anywhere, and overtures to communist China, in particular, were anathema to American officials. By 1954 the effective suppression of leftist groups became "the litmus test of Thai loyalty" (p. 167).

This book is about more than "the practice of power" by the United States. Woven through the author's absorbing and very organized text is an account of the significant role played by interest groups and

powerful individuals in Thailand, jostling for power, striking compromises, and exploiting U.S. military assistance for personal gain. The sometime turncoat Phibun, the ever ambitious Phao Siyanon, and the opportunistic Sarit, were ever careful to maintain a reasonable measure of political contentment and stability among the various special interest and minority groups. In the background, American officials kept a close watch so as to discourage any policy decisions either in support of leftist elements or in pursuit of neutralist relations with them.

Other significant players in the symbiotic relationship were the intellectuals, journalists, students, and Thai Foreign Ministry officials who remained critical of American military aid. Eventually these factions would be suppressed, but only to the detriment of the Phibun regime. Members of the Cabinet, Members of Parliament, and civilians-at-large all understood that any actions jeopardizing U.S.–Thai relations would be met with stern reproof. Sarit was well aware on which side his bread was buttered. One glaring political shortcoming in Thai society was the lack of political consensus. Eventually, Sarit's military dictatorship in 1958 provided the United States with the opportunity to establish the military bases needed to fight the war in Vietnam.

The author's organization and use of archival sources are admirable and his main argument is hard to miss. Ironically, some of the most interesting material regarding the personal decisions and interactions of the main actors are found in the endnotes. The book is a significant contribution and a "must read" for those who continue in their efforts to unravel the United States' diplomatic and military fiasco in Vietnam.

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