Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1 Fujiwara Iwaichi, *F Kikancho no Shuki* [Memorandum of the Chief of the F Agency], Jieitai, Tokyo, 1959. Most of the information in this chapter is derived either from Fujiwara’s Memorandum, from his more recent (1966) book entitled *F Kikan*, or from interviews with General Fujiwara in Tokyo over a period of four summers, 1964-67.


3 Harimao was the Japanese transliteration for “tiger” in Malay.

4 Fujiwara, *F Kikancho no Shuki*, p. 28.

5 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

6 Ibid., p. 34.

7 Ibid., p. 35.

8 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

9 Ibid., pp. 42-44.

10 *Kikan* means “agency”.

11 Maruyama Shizuo, “Himitsu no Tatakai” [Secret Struggle], in *Biruma Hen* [Burma Volume], *Hiroku Dai Toa Senshi* series edited by Ikeda Yū, Tokyo, 1953, p. 89.

12 Ibid., p. 91.


14 Ibid., p. 58.

15 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

CHAPTER TWO

1 Japanese sources and informants uniformly refer to Mohan Singh as “captain”. Mohan Singh himself reports he had just been promoted to major at the time.

2 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 31.

3 Interview with Mohan Singh, 5 March 1966, New Delhi.


5 Unpublished statement of Mohan Singh alleged to have been smuggled from prison during the war, now in possession of Ram Singh Rawal, New Delhi.


7 Ibid., p. 85.

8 Ibid., p. 89.

9 Ibid., p. 93.

10 Ibid., p. 97.
CHAPTER THREE

3. Ibid., pp. 53-56.
4. Information derived from an interview with Ishikawa Yoshiaki, former student of Hindi and Urdu at Tokyo University of Foreign Languages who was language officer and interpreter for the F Kikan; Tokyo, 13 July 1966.
6. British and Australian prisoners were not turned over to the Japanese together with the Indians at this juncture. This discrimination even in surrender annoyed many Indian officers and in some cases tipped the balance in favour of volunteering for the INA.
9. Figures according to Mohan Singh’s unpublished manuscript were 42,000 volunteers, 13,000 non-volunteers, p. 124. Other sources make the division more nearly equal.
11. Statement of Major M.L. Bhagata in the INA History Committee File, p. 11, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, Delhi.
13. Ibid., pp. 200-1.

CHAPTER FOUR

6 N.S. Gill statement in INA History Committee File, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, p. 7.
7 Correspondence of N.S. Gill, April 1967, with the author. Rawal, *The I.N.A. Saga*, pp. 76-77.
9 Sōma, *Ajiya no Mezame* [The Awakening of Asia], Tokyo, 1953, pp. 17, 24-25.
11 Devnath Das in an interview in Calcutta, 7 October 1965, asserts that between 1937 and 1939 the League recruited young Indian volunteers for military training by Japanese military and police advisers in the use of arms, drill, and other military aspects. Certainly during the war some thirty-five Indian students attended the Military Academy in Tokyo. Many of them brought from Southeast Asia by Subhas Chandra Bose: information from interview in Tokyo with A.R. Dutta, August 1967.
14 Sōma, *Ajiya no Mezame*, p. 76.
15 Ibid., p. 77.
16 Ibid., p. 78.
19 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 132.
20 Correspondence of N.S. Gill with the author, April 1967.
21 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 132.
24 Ibid., pp. 64, 91.
30 Ōkawa Shūmei, *Ajiya Kenseitsuša* [Builders of Asia], Tokyo, 1941, p. 285. Ōkawa’s other major works were *Dai Tōa Shin Chitsujo Kenseitsu* [Building the New Order in Greater East Asia], Tokyo, 1943, and *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no Michi* [The Way of Japan and the Japanese], Tokyo, 1926.
31 Richard Storry enumerates the following nationalist organisations with which Ōkawa was associated: *Yūzonsha*, founder; *Jimmukai*, president; *Gyochisha* [The Society of Action], president; *Aisoku Kinōto* [The Patriotic Labour Party], adviser; *Kokuryūkai* [Black Dragon Society], member; *Kokka Shōkai* [The National Socialist League], adviser; Storry, *The Double Patriots*, Boston, 1957, pp. 309-13.


CHAPTER FIVE

2 *Gaimusho Kiroku* [Foreign Ministry Records], *Dai Tōa Sensō Kankei Ikken; Indō Mondai* [Matters Concerning the Greater East Asia War; India Problem], Secret Communiqués from Okazaki to Matsuoka, nos. 11975, 11978, 11979, pp. 30-31, April 1941.
3 Interview with Colonel Ozeki, formerly of the 8th Section, IGHQ, on 15 July 1967, at Hashima, Gifu Prefecture; interview with Lieutenant-General Arisue, former chief, Second Bureau, IGHQ, 19 August 1967, Tokyo.
4 Ike, *Japan’s Decision for War*, p. xvi.
5 Correspondence with Lieutenant-General Iemura, 21 August 1967. Colonel Nishiura Susumu, wartime secretary to Tōjō, asserts that this is not true, that he (Nishiura) and Colonel Iwakuro originated the proposal for the Total War Research Institute, and that their model was the French National Defence Institute: correspondence, 7 December 1968.
7 Interview with Ishikawa, 13 July 1966, Tokyo.
8 Ike, *Japan’s Decision for War*, p. 247.
9 Secret document signed Ott (German Ambassador), Tokyo, 7 January 1942, IMTFE Exhibit 1271.
11 Tōjō speech in the Diet, early 1942, in the *Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu* [Defence Agency, Defence Training Institute, War History Library]; Tōjō speech on military activities in India, Imperial Conference Decision, 4 April 1942, in the *Bōeichō Senshishitsu*.
14 17 April 1942 *Renraku Kaigi Kettei* [Liaison Conference Decision] in the *Bōeichō Senshishitsu*.
18 *Bōeichō, Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen*, pp. 492-3.
19 Kaneko Noboru, “*Pinantō Tokumuhana*” [Penang Island Special Mission Group], in *Nihon no Himitsu Sen* [Japan’s Secret War], *Shūkan Yomiuri*, 8 December 1956, p. 129.
20 Ibid., p. 129.
CHAPTER SIX


2 Interviews with Mohan Singh, 5 March 1966, New Delhi, and with N. Raghavan, 26 March 1966, Madras.

3 Interview with C.R. Narula, a businessman in Thailand since before the war, on 26 May 1966, Bangkok.


5 Ibid., p. 73.

6 *Gaimushō, Subasu Chandora Bom to Nihon* [Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan], Tokyo, 1956, p. 85.

7 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 139. One does not question Mohan Singh’s capacity to keep an audience enthralled with his personal narrative, having had the privilege of listening to it; interviews in Delhi, spring, 1966, cited above.


10 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 149.


12 Ibid., pp. 83-85. The *Gaimushō* publication, *Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon*, p. 86, indicates that the Bangkok Resolution contained sixty articles. With the exception of K.R. Palla in *My Adventures with the I.N.A.*, Lahore, 1946, p. 27, Giani as well as other Indian sources mention only thirty-four articles.


14 *Gaimushō, Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon*, p. 86.

15 *Bōeicho Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu* [Defence Agency, Defence Training Institute, War History Library], *Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen* [Burma Offensive Operation], Tokyo, 1967, p. 490.

16 Interview with Iwakuro, 4 July 1966, Tokyo.

17 By Iwakuro’s own account; interview, 4 July 1966, Tokyo.

18 Iwakuro commented, for example, on Mrs Gandhi’s 1966 diplomatic attempts at peaceful mediation: “Open diplomacy can’t succeed. Everything must be done in secrecy.” Interview, 4 July 1966.

19 Fujiwara used this analogy in a conversation with the author, in July 1966, Tokyo.

20 Iwakuro told the author in July 1966 that he was writing four books. One of them, *Senso Shiron* [Essays on Military History], was published in 1967.

21 Iwakuro, “Iwakuro Kikan Shimatsu Ki” [Record of the Management of the Iwakuro Kikan], *Nihon no Himitsu Sen* [Japan’s Secret War], *Shiikan Tomyuri*, December 1956, p. 120.

22 Letter from Iwakuro to Rash Behari Bose, III Documents File, National Archives, Government of India, New Delhi.
23 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 151.
24 Ibid., pp. 152-4.
25 Interview with Devnath Das, 7 October 1965, Calcutta.
27 Unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, p. 155.
29 Interview with Ishikawa Yoshiaki, 13 July 1966, Tokyo.
30 Statement of N.S. Gill in the INA History Committee File, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, Delhi, pp. 7-8.
31 Chatterji, *India's Struggle for Freedom*, p. 46.
32 Gill statement in INA History Committee File, p. 8.
33 Ibid., p. 9.
35 Revised unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, ch. XV, p. 2.
36 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
37 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
38 Ibid., ch. XVI, p. 1.
39 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
40 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
42 Revised unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, ch. XVI, p. 8. Iwakuro approached Mohan Singh privately, attempting to make a “deal” to give him full support. Under the misapprehension that the civilian members of the Council were primarily concerned with control of civilian property in Burma, Iwakuro thought he could use Mohan Singh against other members of the Council. Ch. XVIII, p. 16.
44 Ibid., p. 103.
46 Ibid., p. 105.
48 Ibid., p. 106.
49 Revised unpublished manuscript of Mohan Singh, ch. XVI, pp. 9-11.
50 Ibid., p. 13.
53 Ibid., pp. 21-23. Mohan Singh’s account here coincides exactly with Giani’s, pp. 113-14. Mohan Singh and Giani do not completely agree in their accounts of Mohan Singh’s conversations with *Kikan* members, though many of the sentences are identical.

Another version of Iwakuro’s reply includes other items as follows: “1) Japan has no territorial, political, military or economic ambitions toward India; 2) India should be an independent country, an ‘India of Indians’; 3) as the IIL is an organization of Indians in contact with the national movement within India, Japan has no intention of utilizing it as a Japanese fifth column, but it should not infringe the sovereignty of other countries; 4) the INA is an army belonging to the IIL, not a private army belonging to an individual and Japan has no intention of using it for any purpose other than provided in the resolutions of the Bangkok Conference; 5) Japan’s aim of establishing peace in Asia … is a natural expression of Japanese national sentiment … respect and love for India.” And on other matters: “1) Japan cannot reply to the resolutions of the Bangkok Conference because the IIL is a political organization not a state; 2) Japan has refrained from making a public announcement of the existence of the INA because we thought a
greater strategic effect could be gained if this were done simultaneously with the start of the Indian campaign; 3) Japan cannot agree to the proposal to put the Indian prisoners under the supervision of the GOC of the INA. The manners and purposes of using the prisoners shall be solely decided by the Japanese side according to its own discretion; 4) Colonel Gill was arrested because of the defection of Major Dhillon and other subordinates to the British side; 5) the Japanese Army has never attempted the dissolution or disarmament of the INA; 6) “Mr. Mohan Singh, driven by an impulsive sentiment, blinded by a narrow minded subjective idea, has made indiscretely [sic] an error this time of hampering the IIL movement and creating an unfortunate breach between Japan and India. However, considering his distinguished services to the establishment of the INA and his sincere devotion to his mother country, we Japanese will regard him with honour and respect his own will as regards his future movement, as long as he refrains from any conduct that may injure the Japanese Indian relations of the Indian independence movement; 7) regarding the assault and insult inflicted by the Japanese upon the officers and men of the INA, we have already made an arrangement with all those concerned in order to guard against such happenings with full precaution, and therefore in future the situation will be better. Should such things happen again, we shall deal with each case on its merits in good faith.” This list, included in a statement to the INA History Committee by Major M.L. Bhagata, in the INA History Committee File, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, Delhi, does not accord with the statement recorded by Mohan Singh, except for the item about the impossibility of an itemized reply to the Bangkok Resolution.

CHAPTER SEVEN

2 Quoted by Bose, ibid., p. 56.
4 Ibid., pp. 29-41.
8 Ibid., p. 116.
10 Bejon Kumar Sen Gupta, *India’s Man of Destiny*, Calcutta, s.d., p. 50. The problem of whether Bose was close to Hitler ideologically, and of how far left or right he was, is still being debated. More than one person offered to collaborate with the author on a book on Bose “to prove that he was not a fascist”, and to prove other things about Bose.
18 Ibid., p. 81.
19 Ibid., p. 157.
21 Ibid., p. 134. Dr Mookerjee states that Bose was unable to interrupt Hitler and get a chance to speak: conversation, September 1965, New Delhi.
22 Yamamoto Bin, “*Kakumeiji Umi o Wataru—Chandora Bosu Berurin Dasshutsu Ki*” [A Revolutionary Crosses the Ocean—Record of Chandra Bose’s Escape from Berlin], in *Nihon no Himitsu Sen* [Japan’s Secret War], *Shukan Yomiuri*, December 1956, p. 123.
23 Maruyama Shizuo, *Nakano Gakko*, Tokyo, 1948, p. 120.
25 Yamamoto Bin, “*Kakumeiji Umi o Wataru*”, p. 123.
26 Gaimushō, *Dai Tōa Sensō Kankei Ikken, Indō Mondai, Indō ni taisuru Seisaku Keikaku* [Foreign Ministry, Matters Relating to the Greater East Asia War, India Problem, Plan for Policy toward India], p. 6.
27 Gaimushō, *Ajiya Kyoku* [Foreign Ministry, Asia Office], *Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon* [Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan], pp. 90-91.
28 The 10 January decision of the Liaison Conference was: “1) India’s sea communications should be intercepted, and 2) to instigate anti-British sentiment in India and to stimulate the anti-British movement, propaganda should be strengthened and the policy should be developed concomitantly. For this purpose we shall invite him to Tokyo and judge his utility value from the standpoint of this policy. At the same time we shall inform him of Japan’s national power and the enthusiasm of all Japan for assisting India’s independence. The Army section
of IGHQ shall be in charge of his treatment and guidance and the agencies concerned shall co-operate.” Böeicho Senshishitsu, Renraku Kaigi Kettei [Liaison Conference Decisions]. Sambō Hombu [General Staff Headquarters], Sugiyama Memo.

29 Interview with Girija Mookerjee, 29 September 1965, New Delhi.
30 Correspondence with ex-Ambassador Ōshima, 21 July 1967.
31 Interview with ex-Ambassador Ōshima, 25 July 1966, Chigasaki City, Japan; Böeicho Senshishitsu, Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen [Burma Offensive Operation], Tokyo, 1967, p. 582.
32 Repeated invitations by the Indian Government to Mrs Bose have been refused, but her daughter Anita accepted an invitation to visit the homeland of her father.
33 Böeicho Senshishitsu, Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen, pp. 583-4.
34 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon, p. 98.
36 Generals Fujiwara, Isoda, Ōshima, Katakura, and Iwakuro, of those still alive, regularly assemble annually in Tokyo to pay their respects to the memory of Bose on 18 August, the anniversary of Bose’s death in an airplane crash in Taiwan in 1945.
37 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon, p. 100; Yamamoto Bin, “Kakumeiji Umi o Wataru”, p 126.
38 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon, p. 100.
40 Unpublished manuscript by Hayashida Tatsuo, Biography of Subhas Chandora Bose, pp. 103-4. Now published as Higeki no Eiyū [Hero of Tragedy], Tokyo, 1968.
43 Hikari means “light” in Japanese, in this case “light from the East”.
44 Indian and Japanese accounts consistently describe Subhas Bose as a huge man over six feet tall. In actuality he was about five feet seven inches. The author was shown a picture of Bose standing with his nephew Sisir K. Bose, a man five feet eight inches in height who resembles his uncle. Subhas Bose was even shorter than his nephew. The illusion of great height was created entirely by Bose’s imposing bearing and his commanding, charismatic personality. Perhaps his uniform helped create the illusion.
45 M. Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 116-7.
47 Ibid., pp. 11-18.
48 A Journalist, Netaji, Lahore, 1946, pp. 93-94.
49 Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, pp. 122-3.
50 Ibid., pp. 123-4; Das Gupta, Subhas Chandra, pp. 217-8.
51 Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, p. 125; Chatterji, India’s Struggle for Freedom, pp. 72-73.
52 Palta, My Adventures with the I.N.A., pp. 73-74; Chatterji, India’s Struggle for Freedom, p. 75.
53 Ibid., p. 74.
54 Ibid., p. 76.
55 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
57 Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, pp. 128-9.
58 Ibid., p. 133.
59 Chatterji, India’s Struggle for Freedom, p. 83.
60 Units of the Azad Hind Fauj were: No. 1 Division, commanded by Major-General M.Z. Kiani, consisting of three guerrilla regiments: 1) Gandhi Regiment, commanded by Colonel I. Kiani; 2) Azad Regiment, commanded by Colonel Gulzara Singh; and 3) Nehru Regiment, commanded by Major-General Shah Nawaz Khan; the Field Force, Bahadur Group, Intelligence
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Group, and Reinforcement Group remained unchanged; Chatterji, *India’s Struggle for Freedom*, pp. 94-97.

61 Ibid., pp. 100-2.


63 From interviews with Shah Nawaz Khan, 26 Feb. 1966, and Dr Raju, 2 December 1965, New Delhi.

64 This conversation is as recalled by Mohan Singh during an interview on 5 March 1966, in New Delhi.

65 As recalled by Mohan Singh in an interview on 19 May 1966.

66 This version of the story was related in an interview with Shah Nawaz Khan, 26 February 1966, New Delhi.

67 Correspondence with Ambassador to Mexico, N.S. Gill, 4 April 1967.

68 Interview with N. Raghavan, 26 March 1966, Madras.


70 Ibid., pp. 348-9.

71 Ibid., pp. 348-9.

CHAPTER EIGHT


3 Ibid., pp. 136-7.


5 Ibid., p. 381.

6 Chatterji, *India’s Struggle for Freedom*, pp. 139-40.

7 Gaimushō, *Subasa Chandara Bosu to Nihon*, p. 124.

8 Azad Hind, Syōnan (Singapore), 25 October 1943; Sivaram, *The Road to Delhi*, p. 157.

9 Sivaram, *The Road to Delhi*, p. 157.

10 Ibid., p. 158.


16 Gaimushō, Indō Mondai, Subhas Chandra Bose address, pp. 3-4; Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, pp. 161-2.
17 Gaimushō, Indō Mondai, Bose address, pp. 5-7.
18 Ibid., pp. 8-10.
21 Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, pp. 167-8.
23 Motiram, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort, Exhibit UUU, pp. 370-1.
25 This was the explanation given in Azad Hind, no. 7/8, 1944, p. 10.
26 Counsel for defence of the INA officers tried for treason in Delhi after the war, in making a case for the FIPG as an independent government, maintained the islands were actually ceded even though not all aspects of the administration of the islands were transferred to the FIPG: K.L. Gaube, Famous and Historic Trials, Lahore, 1946, pp. 315-6.
27 Motiram, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort, Exhibit EEEEE, Statement to Subhas Chandra Bose by Vice-Admiral Oka Takazumo, Chief of Military Affairs Section, Imperial Japanese Navy, 16 Nov. 1943, pp. 375-6.
28 Ibid., Exhibit EEEEE, Statement to Subhas Chandra Bose by Vice-Admiral Oka Takazumo, Chief of Military Affairs Section, Imperial Japanese Navy, 16 November 1943, pp. 375-6.
29 Ibid., Exhibit LLLLL, Correspondence between Bose and Loganadhan, June-July 1944, pp. 379-81.
30 Interview with Colonel P.K. Sahgal, Kanpur, India, 22 December 1965.
31 Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, pp. 168-9; Toye, The Springing Tiger, p. 105.
32 Some forty-five Indians from Southeast Asian countries soon after entered the Military Academy: interview with A.R. Dutta, Tokyo, August 1967.
33 Interview with Major-General Nagai Yatsuji, formerly of the 8th Section, Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo, 10 August 1967.
34 Köseishō [Welfare Ministry], Hikiage Engokyoku [Repatriates' Relief Bureau], Isoda Saburu Chūjō Kaizōroku [Recollections of Lieutenant-General Isoda Saburō], Tokyo, 1954, pp. 1-6.
35 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
37 Ibid., pp. 217-18. Ayer, Minister of Propaganda and Publicity of the FIPG, has recounted in some detail negotiations of Bose and members of his cabinet with staff of the Kikan. Vide Appendix.
38 Isoda Saburu Chūjō Kaizōroku, pp. 32-33.
39 Interview with Major Ushiro Masaru, former supply officer in the Burma Area Army, Tokyo, 22 July 1967.
40 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandara Bosu to Nihon, pp. 88-89.
41 S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness, p. 186.
43 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandara Bosu to Nihon, p. 176.
44 Chatterji, India's Struggle for Freedom, pp. 216-25.
45 Gaimushō, Indō Mondai, Plan for Policy toward India, p. 25.
46 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandara Bosu to Nihon, pp. 199-200; Hayashida, op. cit. p. 188.
47 Ayer, Unto Him a Witness, pp. 175-6.
49 Nippon Times, 3 November 1944.

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CHAPTER NINE

1 Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell’s Despatch on Operations in the India Command, New Delhi, 1 January-20 June 1943, p. 1; Historical Section, Defence Ministry, Government of India.
2 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
4 Wavell’s Despatch on Operations in the India Command, p. 6.
5 Air Staff HQ, Air Command, Southeast Asia, The Siege of Imphal: Air Aspects, p. 1; Historical Section, Defence Ministry, Government of India.
6 British military historian Colonel A.J. Barker also accepts the assumption that the Japanese were planning a “march on Delhi”. See Barker, The March on Delhi.
7 Wavell’s Despatch on Operations in the India Command, p. 17.
10 These are in general the mountains east of the Imphal plain, the mountains west of the plain, and—more extreme—beyond Dimapur into Assam.
11 Barker, The March on Delhi, p. 55.
12 Fourth Despatch from the India Command from 21 June 1943 to 15 November 1943, p. 20.
14 Correspondence with the author of former ambassador to Berlin, General Ōshima Hiroshi, 27 July 1967.
15 Bōeichō, Biruma Köryaku Sakusen, p. 547.
16 Ibid., pp. 547-53.
17 Ibid., pp. 554-5. Tanemura, Dai Hon’ei Kimitsu Nisshi [Secret Diary of Imperial General Headquarters], Tokyo, 1952, p. 213.
18 Bōeichō, Biruma Köryaku Sakusen, p. 556.
19 Ibid., p. 557.
20 Ibid., pp. 559-61.
21 Ibid., p. 563.
22 Interview with General Katakura, 13 July 1966, Tokyo. Fujio Masayuki, “Biruma no Ryūkō” [Tiger of Burma], in Ikeda Yū, ed., Hiroku Dai Tōa Senshi, Biruma-

23 Bōeichō, Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen, p. 565.
24 Ibid., p. 572.
25 Ibid., p. 566.
26 Interview with General Katakura, 13 July 1966, Tokyo.
27 Bōeichō, Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen, pp. 566-70.
28 Ibid., pp. 573-4.
29 Interview with General Ayabe, former vice-chief of staff, Southern Army, 23 July 1966, Tokyo.
32 On 3 April 1943.
34 Itō Masanori, Teikoku Rikugun no Saigō, Shiitō Hen [The End of the Imperial Japanese Army, Death Struggle], vol. IV, Tokyo, 1964, p. 108.
38 Ibid., p. 104.
39 Interview with General Katakura, 13 July 1966, Tokyo.
41 Gaimushō, Subasub Chandora Bosu to Nihon, p. 172.
43 Ibid., p. 49.
44 General Kawabe Diary, 7 January and 10 January; Bōeichō Senshishitsu. Fujiwara, F Kikan, p. 358.
45 General Kawabe Diary, 10 January.
46 Gaimushō, Subasub Chandora Bosu to Nihon, p. 126. General Katakura’s estimate was that 10,000 INA troops saw action in the Imphal fighting; Motiram, Two Historic Trials, p. 125; Colonel Fuwa, former Operations Staff Officer, Burma Area Army, confirmed this figure in an interview, 18 July 1967, in Tokyo.
47 Interview with General Katakura, 13 July 1966, Tokyo.
50 Interview with General Ayabe, 23 July 1966, Tokyo.

CHAPTER TEN

2 This was a classical hiyodorigoe stratagem. The hiyodorigoe manoeuvre takes its name from a battlefield near Kobe where an historic battle was fought in 1184
during the Gempei Wars between the Taira and Minamoto clans. The Taira armies, defending the reputedly impregnable fortress of Ichinotani, were overcome by a surprise attack launched by Minamoto Yoshitsune, converging on the Ichinotani plain from ridges both east and west of the plain.

4 Ibid., pp. 111-3.
5 Ibid., pp. 121-3.
6 Ibid., p. 126. Fujiwara, F Kikan, p. 239.
7 Fujiwara, F Kikan, p. 353.
8 Ibid., pp. 353-4.
10 Fujiwara, F Kikan, p. 361.
12 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ozeki at Kawashima cho, Hashima gun, Gifu prefecture, 15 July 1967.
14 Fujiwara, F Kikan, pp. 359-60.
15 Ibid., p. 360.
16 Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, p. 142.
17 Unpublished summary of General Kawabe Diary, Bōeichō Senshishitsu, covering 1944 and part of 1943: 18 March, 6-7 April 1944.
18 Ibid., 10 May 1944.
19 Ibid., 22 June 1944.
21 Gaimushō, Subasu Chanda Basu to Nihon, p. 201.
22 Takagi Shirō, Kōmei [Insubordination], Tokyo, 1966, p. 27.
26 Ibid., vol. II, p. 147.
27 Ibid., vol. II, p. 147.
28 Takagi, Kömei, pp. 261-4.
30 Takagi, Kömei, p. 242.
31 Ibid., p. 246.
32 Takagi, Kömei, pp. 246-7, quotes from Satō’s memoirs.
34 Ushiro Masaru, Biruma Sensenki [Burma Battle Record], p. 34. Interview with Ushiro Masaru, 29 July 1967, Tokyo.
38 Unpublished summary of General Kawabe Diary, 7 June 1944.
41 Ushiro, Biruma Sensenki, pp. 43-44.
The following account of the same event was related by Lieutenant Nakai Goshirō and is the basis for the Takagi version: “Fujiwara was at 15th Array Headquarters when Operation U collapsed. He sat at his desk in staff headquarters, drafting an operation order. Apart from Mutaguchi, four other staff officers were in the room. Fujiwara was suddenly aware that someone was standing before his desk. It was General Mutaguchi’s voice: ‘So many subordinates have been killed and so much equipment lost. Now, as commanding general, I must commit suicide. I am responsible to the Emperor and to the souls of the dead men. What do you think of my position, Fujiwara?’ Fujiwara was aware that the other staff officers had stopped work and were listening. He still did not look up or stop writing. There was no perceptible change in his expression as he replied loudly: ‘It has always been since ancient times that those who say they want to die don’t die. Now you, a general, are asking me whether or not you should commit suicide. I must ask you not to commit suicide. I can do nothing else. If you feel responsible yourself, please commit suicide in silence. No one will interrupt you. And please go on to paradise. The failure of this operation is worthy of more than your suicide.’ Mutaguchi replied only, ‘I see. I understand.’”

Nakai Goshirō, “Junketsu no Otakebi” [War Cry of Thoroughbreds], in Rokunanakai, pub., Hohei Rokuju-nana Rentai Bunshu [Collected Record of the Sixty-seventh Artillery Regiment], Tokyo, 1962, p. 88. Takagi, Kōmei, p. 284. Fujiwara asserts this account is apocryphal. “I am a soldier. I would never say such a thing to my commander. And I am not such an unmilitary man as to neglect to stand up and salute or answer squarely if my commander should come to my room. Furthermore, the general was not a person to come to a room where his own subordinate was working to consult about his suicide.” Fujiwara interview and statement, 27 July 1967, Tokyo.


Nakai, “Junketsu no Otakebi”, p. 63. Takagi, Kōmei, pp. 248-9. Maruyama Shizuo states that he heard several similar accounts of this speech at the time from Mutaguchi’s staff officers: interview, 2 August 1967, Tokyo.

Maruyama Shizuo, a war correspondent in Burma, poignantly describes the retreat in “Imparu shi no Haisō” [Imphal Death Flight], in Chuō Kōron, August 1964, pp. 225-31. Hattori, Dai Tōa Sensō Zenshi, vol. III, p. 227. A.J. Barker in The March on Delhi, p. 226, puts the casualties this way: “… of the 6,000 INA members who had set out for Imphal only 2,600 returned. Of these, 2,000 had to go straight into the hospital. During their campaign approximately 1,500 had died of disease and starvation, 400 were killed in action, 800 surrendered and 715 others deserted and could not be accounted for.”


Major-General Nagai Yatsuji, former chief of the 8th Section, IGHQ, asserts, that Bose in November 1944 in Tokyo complained that the INA units received the order to retreat several days after Japanese forces did: interview, 10 August 1967 Tokyo.

Azad Hind, Singapore, no. 11/12, 6 November 1944.

S.A. Ayer, Propaganda and Information Minister of the FIPG, when questioned about Bose’s September 1943 statement that he would be on Indian soil before the end of the year, replied: “I found it difficult to fathom his mind on this point. He was a tremendous optimist. He may have done it for morale-building purposes. He may have believed with a lot of luck it would happen. He always talked in terms of symbolic achievements. But he was not under any illusion”; interview, 2 May 1966, Bombay. Lieutenant-General Arisue, wartime chief of the Second Bureau, IGHQ, reported that Bose in a secret conversation with him even before the start of
the Imphal campaign had expressed a desire to go to the Soviet Union: interview 19 July 1966, Tokyo. There was also the evidence of Bose’s attempt to contact the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo. This suggests that Bose had already contemplated where to turn to in the event of a Japanese defeat.


55 This evaluation is reflected in Subasu Chandora Bosu (Gaimushō), to which General Kawabe contributed significantly. See p. 198.

56 Interview, 12 July 1966, Tokyo.

57 This is suggested by Colonel Hattori, wartime chief, 2nd Section, First Bureau, IGHQ: Hattori, Daitō Sensō Zenshi, vol. III, p. 231.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

1 Isoda Saburō Chūjō Kaisōroku [Recollections of Lieutenant-General Isoda Saburō], pp. 36-38.

2 Chatterji, India’s Struggle for Freedom, p. 272.

3 Gaimushō, Subasu Chandora Bosu to Nihon, pp. 221-2; Isoda Saburō Chūjō Kaisōroku, pp. 38-41.


6 Ibid., p. 67. The official report of the Enquiry Committee, however, cites, evidence by General Isoda that the plane was bound direct for Tokyo, where the Japanese Government was to arrange the details of Bose’s transport to Soviet Russia via Manchuria. But since the Soviet Union was already at war with Japan, it seems more likely that Bose was hoping to go direct from Taihoku to Dairen and then on to Russia. Other officers gave Dairen as the regular stop-off en route from Taihoku to Tokyo. General Shidei, whom Bose met by accident at Saigon airport, was at any rate en route to Dairen as chief of staff of the Kwantung Army. Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Sadachar Movement for Purity in National Life, 1956, pp. 7-10.

7 Suresh Chandra Bose, Dissenting Report, p. 103.


9 Suresh Chandra Bose, Dissenting Report, p. 6.

10 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Sadachar, p. 31.

CHAPTER TWELVE

1 Hugh Toye, Subash Chandra Bose, p. 186.

2 Ibid., p. 187.


4 Report of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in India, covering the period 1 January to 31 December 1945: Historical Section, Defence Ministry, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 20.

5 Ibid., p. 20.

6 Ibid., pp. 20-21.

8 Foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru in Motiram, *Two Historic Trials in Red Fort*, p. iii.
9 Toye, *Subash Chandra Bose*, pp. x-xi.
11 Ibid., p. 272.
16 Ibid., p. 141.
18 Testimony in Motiram, *Two Historic Trials in Red Fort*, p. 128.
19 Ibid., pp. 129-30.
20 Shah Nawaz Preliminary Statement to Counsel, pp. 14-19, INA Committee File, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, Delhi.
23 P.K. Sahgal Preliminary Statement to Counsel, INA Committee File, p. 40, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, Delhi.
24 Dhillon Preliminary Statement to Counsel, pp. 6-16, INA Committee File, INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, Delhi.
27 Ibid., p. 123.
28 Ibid., pp. 124-6.
29 Ibid., pp. 120-6.
31 Ibid., p. 369.
32 Ibid., pp. 370-1.
33 Ibid., pp. 374-5.
34 Ibid., p. 375.
36 Ibid., pp. 377-80.
37 Ibid., pp. 381-2.
38 Ibid., p. 384.
39 Ibid., p. 384.
40 Interview with Mrs Kusum Nair, 25 January 1966, New Delhi.
41 For a discussion of this issue, see K.K. Ghosh, *The Indian National Army*.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN