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CREATING “GREATER MALAYSIA”
Decolonization and the Politics of Merger

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Preface

This study of the politics of merger between Singapore and Malaysia stems from my on-going interest in the emergence of post-colonial states in the aftermath of empire in Asia. While the formation of Malaysia has attracted the attention of scholars since the late 1960s, the contexts and processes have not been subjected to deep historical analysis that could illuminate the critical decisions that were taken during that episode in the history of Singapore and Malaysia. Although there has been a spate of books dedicated to Singapore’s association with Malaysia, none has examined, in detail, the manner in which the deal was constructed by the major parties concerned — British officials on the ground and in Whitehall, the People’s Action Party (PAP) government in Singapore and the Alliance leaders at Kuala Lumpur. With the de-classification of official records of the 1960s in the British archives in the past few years, the opportunity has presented itself for historians to dig deeper and to provide a fuller picture of the events of that momentous period — the transition between the end of British rule and Singapore’s independence through Malaysia.

My interest in the history of Singapore’s independence through merger was further piqued by the publication of the memoirs of Singapore’s founding Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew in 1998. In volume 1, *The Singapore Story*, Lee recounted Singapore’s tumultuous years in Malaysia, culminating in separation in 1965. The story of the failed merger between Singapore and Malaysia has generated excitement from both sides of the causeway, especially on the personalities and issues that had contributed to the break-up. Analysing the contentious and acrimonious relationship between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur between 1963 and 1965, it became apparent that the seeds of dissension had indeed been sown earlier, when the deal was being worked out that would bring Singapore, the Federation of Malaya
and the Borneo Territories of North Borneo and Sarawak together to form Malaysia. To understand the difficulties that emerged between 1963 and 1965, it is therefore necessary to take a few steps back — to look into the history of the making of Malaysia — to understand why the new Federation that was constructed in 1963 was fraught with so many innate problems. This study is intended as an analysis in the making of a flawed federation, the important prequel to the story of separation.

In the course of the research and writing of this book, I have benefited from the guidance and support from several colleagues and friends. It was Edwin Lee, former Head of the History Department, who set me on the path by suggesting that I venture beyond my preoccupation with South Asia to explore Singapore’s own historical transition from colonial to post-colonial state. As Head, he generously provided me with time to research and write, and it was with his support that I was able to secure a research grant from the National University of Singapore to undertake research in London and Australia. I would like to acknowledge the university’s support in this regard. Ernest Chew and Albert Lau, my colleagues in the History Department, encouraged and guided me in the early stages of my research.

I would like to express my gratitude to Mr Pitt Kuan Wah, Director of the National Archives, and his colleagues for facilitating my research through ready access to their archival and oral history collections. Tim Yap Fuan from the Central Library at the National University of Singapore (NUS) has offered constant support by keeping me updated with new publications on Singapore and Malaysia. I am grateful to the Singapore Press Holdings for allowing me use of a number of images from their photograph collections.

In the course of my research I have received timely help from a number of research assistants. I would like to express my thanks to Gabriel Thomas, Claudine Ang and Irene Lim. To Irene, I am especially grateful for her tremendous effort during the final stages of this book. She was able to multi-task admirably, helping with research, bibliographic compilations, proof-reading, and pulling all the loose ends together.

I would like to thank Mr Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, for encouraging me to publish this manuscript,
and Mrs Triena Ong, for being such a supportive and efficient editor. I am grateful to the three anonymous reviewers, whose constructive comments have helped improve my manuscript. While many people have helped in one way or another to improve this book, the shortcomings in this book remain my sole responsibility.

As always, this book is dedicated to Sylvia, Cheryl and Benjamin.

Tan Tai Yong
August 2007
1) Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, addressing the Foreign Correspondents Association of South-East Asia, where he broached the “possibility of bringing the territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak and the Federation of Malaya closer together in political and economic co-operation”.

[Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
2) Delegates from the Federation, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore coming together for the first meeting of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee in Singapore (August 1961). [Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
3) Lee Kuan Yew addressing a press conference on Singapore-Malaya merger. On his left is S. Rajaratnam.

[Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
4) Donald Stephens speaking at the opening meeting of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee. On his left is Yusof bin Ishak, the second Yang di-Pertuan Negara of Singapore. [Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
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Chief delegates from Sarawak, North Borneo, Brunei, Singapore and Malaya signing the Memorandum for Malaysia in Singapore in February 1962. [Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
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15) Lee Siew Choh and Lim Chin Siong of the Barisan Sosialis arrive at the Singapore Badminton Hall for the referendum results (September 1962). [Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
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[Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
17) Lord Selkirk, Commissioner-General for South-east Asia, in Singapore (February 1963). [Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]

18) The Malaysian flag being raised on 16 September 1963 at the proclamation ceremony in front of City Hall in Singapore. [Courtesy of Singapore Press Holdings]
Introduction

In September 1963 Britain ended colonial rule in Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) by integrating these ethnically distinct states with independent Malaya to form an expanded federation known as Malaysia. The making of Malaysia was an important watershed in the post-war history of Southeast Asia. It marked the formal end of the British Empire in Southeast Asia: Singapore and the Borneo territories of Sarawak and North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) achieved their political independence through merger with Malaya, having been independent since 1957, to constitute the new state of Malaysia. Brunei decided, just before the signing of the Malaysia Agreement, to stay out of the Federation and eventually became a sovereign state on its own. The transfer of sovereignty of the erstwhile British dependencies to the new Federation of Malaysia marked the successful attainment of British policy in post-war Southeast Asia. The British had been able to relinquish their formal empire in Southeast Asia without a major political fall-out in the region, and de-colonization had taken the wind out of the sails of their critics, among them international opinion against imperialism, domestic detractors who complained of the cost, burden and immorality of empire, indigenous nationalists advocating self-determination, as well as anti-imperialist communists. The outcome was indeed a happy one for Britain; its former empire in Southeast Asia had been replaced by a centrally positioned Commonwealth bastion, linking an extensive British strategic and military belt stretching from Aden to New Zealand.

The making of Malaysia, although a relatively small state compared to Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, represented federation-formation on quite an ambitious scale for it entailed the attempted integration of four very different and disconnected territorial entities — in
terms of historical development, ethnic make-up and stages of political and economic development — into a single unified state. The parts that came together “lacked an integrating, pre-colonial core” and the only common experience that they shared was that they had all been subjected to “various forms of British rule”. Yet, this was not an attempt at building an expanded nation-state. The Malaysia that came into being in 1963 was a political creation whose only rationale was that it served a convergence of political and economic expediency for the departing colonial power, the Malayan leadership and the ruling party of self-governing Singapore. The new state that was created within a relatively short period was the outcome of a series of decisions taken by British policy-makers and local political leaders from 1960 to 1963 and effectively entailed the attempt at politically grafting Singapore and the Borneo Territories onto the Federation of Malaya. Although the idea of integrating all the British dependencies in Southeast Asia into a super-federation had been talked about in British official circles since the late 1940s, the subject of which came to be known as the “Grand Design”, official negotiations on the formation of Malaysia only began in earnest in the middle of 1961. Two years later, in September 1963, the Malaysian Federation, or Greater Malaysia, came into being. The new state was fragmented geographically, and the multi-ethnic diversity of its population made economic, social and political integration a tricky proposition.

The problems of such a contrived and complex exercise in state-building were evident no more than two years after its formation, when Singapore separated from Malaysia in August 1965 under rather acrimonious circumstances. For Singapore, at least, this break-up has been emphasized in school textbooks and political biographies as a major turning point in the narrative of its national history. In his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew, who probably did more than anyone else in Singapore to secure merger with the Federation of Malaya in 1963, recalls the painful memory of his “moment of anguish” when Singapore separated from Malaysia two years later. Singapore’s failure in its quest to be part of a wider Malayan nationalism has ironically become a critical feature underpinning its post-1965 definition of a Singaporean identity. On occasions, the historical interpretations of the reasons and circumstances leading to separation have contributed to the on-and-off
relations between Singapore and Malaysia for the past forty years. Fortunately for the rest of Malaysia, Singapore’s departure did not trigger a similar reaction from the Sarawak and Sabah components of the Federation, but tensions in the relationship between East Malaysia and Kuala Lumpur were common features of Malaysian political life after 1963.

Malaysia was thus an artificial political creation, the outcome of a concatenation of interests and motives of a number of political actors in Southeast Asia in the early 1960s. This study seeks to examine the various factors and motives that came together to result in the formation of Malaysia. Geo-politics, in the form of post-war international pressures to decolonize, Cold War calculations and security considerations certainly played a part in pushing the impetus for the formation of Malaysia. It has been suggested that the formation of Malaysia was a masterstroke orchestrated by London and its successful outcome had allowed the British to perpetuate their hold (albeit in an indirect manner) on the region. This view argued that the transformation of the erstwhile British colonies in Southeast Asia into a new Commonwealth state was indeed a remarkable feat of British de-colonization in the 1960s. In Malaya the British were able to conspire with the local élite that they had created to establish a post-colonial entity in Southeast Asia that would continue to maintain British commercial and strategic interests in the region. To this, the British attached the tiny island-colony of Singapore, solving the security issue of an island about to go ‘red’ by rescuing the non-communist People’s Action Party (PAP) government through merger with Malaya. In the process the British were able to preserve the important strategic bases in Singapore well into the 1970s. At the same time, the British, in a single stroke, managed to solve the problems of the politically “under-developed” territories in North Borneo by allowing them to de-colonize as part of the Malaysian state, preventing them from falling into the hands of Indonesia and the Philippines which had long laid claims to them. Indeed, Malaysia worked so well that it came to be argued that the new state represented a very successful attempt by the British to impose a form of neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia.

This view has since been challenged. While the idea of Malaysia appeared to be the culmination of an expressed British objective of regional
consolidation, A.J. Stockwell and others have pointed out that in reality, “Britain lacked the power locally to secure control over its continuing interests in the post-colonial period”. The inspiration and initiative for Malaysia, Stockwell maintains, came from the Federation and Singapore, and that Britain merely “followed their lead, but never commanded the heights from which it might assert mastery over the planning and execution of the ‘Grand Design’”. Karl Hack asserts that “the reason for federation … had much to do with local developments, little to do with British plotting”. Reflecting on events when he was the United Kingdom High Commissioner of Singapore and British Commissioner in Southeast Asia, Lord Selkirk recounted that:

Whitehall in fact took no initiative until the Federation had been proposed, first in private and then in public, by the Prime Minister of Malaya and immediately supported by the Prime Minister of Singapore….It was only after the proposals had been endorsed by all the territories concerned that Whitehall gave its full cooperation to the establishment of the Federation and sought to make it a success.

The British ‘Grand Design’ notwithstanding, regional and local developments were instrumental in bringing about Malaysia. The role of the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in this enterprise was fundamental. On 27 May 1961, at a luncheon meeting at the Adelphi Hotel in Singapore, the Tunku, who had previously objected to the idea of taking the Chinese majority state of Singapore into the Federation, sounded the possibility of bringing the territories of Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak and the Federation of Malaya “closer together in political and economic co-operation”. Although the idea of a union between Malaya and the Borneo states had been current in UMNO circles from about 1956, and was already well-established by 1960, this public announcement by the Malayan Prime Minister has often been taken as the genesis of the Malaysia idea, which saw its fruition two years later, in September 1963. The main reason for the Tunku’s initiative was essentially political: he had
to overcome his earlier reluctance for merger with Singapore in an attempt to avoid the risk of having a “Cuba in his Malayan backyard”. He had come to accept that an independent Chinese-dominated Singapore, which might become increasingly oriented towards Peking, would be a greater danger to Malaya than a Singapore, which, if brought into the Federation, he could exercise some control over. Years after the event, the Tunku admitted that he had also harboured the romantic notion of his newly independent Malayan Federation offering a natural beacon of freedom, attracting the other still colonized states in the region to come into association with it as the way towards freedom. As he recalled in 1975

> Merdeka brought such happy years to Malaya, such peace, progress and prosperity, that it was only natural that other States in the region, which were still ‘British’ should look towards Kuala Lumpur, the glint of freedom in their eyes, thinking of ways to come into closer association.

Such a view may have been indicative of an elder statesman reminiscing personal glories in the twilight of his political career, but it does generate the impression that Greater Malaysia was borne out of the initiative and will of the Tunku. Yet the Tunku was never an advocate of merger with Singapore and had resisted the move until 1961, when he was finally convinced that unless he acted, Singapore would turn communist and the contamination would spread both to the Malayan peninsula and through Indonesia to the Borneo Territories. And even after his momentous announcement in May 1961, he had changed his mind several times, and on many occasions during the difficult negotiations leading to the agreement, he threatened to pull off the deal. If the Tunku believed that Britain could remain in charge of Singapore as long as the communist threat remained, he would never have agreed to merger with Singapore. But he understood that the British Government would not be able, or willing, to resist for long Singapore’s demand for independence. The Tunku was therefore clearly not interested in having Singapore; the real prize he was after was the Borneo Territories, and Singapore was the price he had to pay to secure it.
The inclusion of Singapore was essentially motivated by security considerations, and its ‘special’ place and position in the new state of Malaysia was to reflect the circumstances in which the Tunku had agreed to take Singapore into the Federation. It also informed the urgency and imperative of a Greater Malaysia that would incorporate the Borneo Territories. Cheah Boon Kheng has argued that the most significant consideration for Malaysia from the Tunku’s point of view was the ethnic factor. An enlarged federation of Malaysia, incorporating the Borneo Territories, would ensure that Malays and “natives of Malaya would always outnumber the Chinese, Indians and ‘non-natives’, ‘non-Malay’ population”.

The Tunku’s real design was to secure the integration of the Borneo Territories (more specifically Sarawak and Brunei) into the Malayan Federation. The motivation may have been political and economic, an expanded Federation that would have a huge reserve of natural resources, but it also stemmed from the Malayan leader’s desire to ensure that the Malaysian Federation would stay a Malay or indigenous majority state. It did not matter that the indigenous races in the Borneo Territories did not consider themselves akin to the Malays of the Federation; as far as the Tunku was concerned, they would assimilate more easily than the Chinese. There was clearly no cultural or social basis for the state; Malaysia was strictly a product of political expediencies.

The period leading up to merger was a fundamental turning point in the political history of Singapore. This was also a period of political plurality in which several different visions of Singapore’s political future contested one another in the political arena. The political awakening, in many ways triggered by the prospects of ‘independence through merger’, saw the rise of the People’s Action Party (PAP), whose leader, Lee Kuan Yew, was a tireless champion for merger with Malaya. In the first volume of his memoirs, *The Singapore Story*, Lee offers a fascinating account of the PAP’s battles for merger. Lee’s account, derived from memory as a key participant in the events that unfolded during that period as well as from contemporary documents, offers a version of the country’s freedom struggle, and it emphasized his committed belief (and justified his actions) that independence through merger was the only means by which the political and security threat of communism could be defeated and the economic
future of Singapore assured. Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP thus cut their political teeth during the political battles for merger, domestically with their bitter rivals the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front, hereafter BS), and through persistent and often acrimonious negotiations with a reluctant government in Kuala Lumpur to effect merger. The battles for merger had to be fought on a number of fronts, for Lee not only had to defeat his domestic detractors, but had to contend with British anxiety and Malayan mistrust as well. The colony eventually obtained political independence from the British by joining the Malaysian Federation, in the process entrenching the power and position of the PAP as the dominant political party in Singapore. Some had thought, in 1965, that the short-lived Malaysia was but a pyrrhic victory for Lee and the PAP. These doubters were proved wrong. By 1963, the defeat of the political opponents of the ruling party had indeed been thorough, and the PAP’s position, considerably strengthened as a consequence, was maintained despite separation from Malaysia two years later. In this respect, the story of Singapore’s road to nationhood must therefore be understood in the context of its major detour through Malaysia.

Despite the Tunku’s May 1961 announcement and the enthusiasm expressed in Singapore for a merger, the deal was, at that point in time, far from done. What followed from the announcement was a complex exercise involving complicated negotiations of the terms by which Singapore would merge with the Malayan Federation as well as the intricate manoeuvrings through which the Borneo Territories were cajoled into joining Malaysia. The detailed negotiations revealed that local politics, and locality specific interests — social, economic, political and ethnic — all of which were quite varied, complicated the progress towards and created problems for the constitutional agreement that would result in the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. In the upshot, Malaysia was ultimately an “uneasy agreement”, the outcome of a series of compromises among its constituent parts. In all this, without the role of an “honest broker”, played admirably by key British ministers and officials in the region, the Malaysian enterprise, beset as it was by doubts, disagreements, and distrusts, would have been aborted at an early stage. Selkirk might thus have understated the role played by the British when he asserted that the initiative and driving force were mainly
the Tunku’s. British policy thus had to be considered alongside the local 
dynamics which contributed in no small measure to the form and content of 
the Malaysia that eventually emerged. This study intends to demonstrate 
the interplay between high policy (of decolonization) and the dynamics of 
local politics in the processes that led to the formation of Malaysia.

The broad storyline on the formation of Malaysia is relatively well-
trodden ground. Many of the early accounts were written by political 
scientists and contemporary commentators fascinated by the emergence of 
a new political entity in Southeast Asia. Relying mainly on secondary 
sources and newspaper reports, these publications were but broad 
descriptions of the events that led to 1963, when the Federation of Malaysia 
was formed. The interest in the new state was eventually overshadowed by 
the greater absorption with the story of Singapore’s separation from the 
Federation just two years after the new state was heralded. In a similar 
manner, the national histories of Singapore and Malaysia carried the 
inevitable episode of merger and separation, but these accounts often treated 
the Greater Malaysia episode in a cursory manner, as a glitch in a dominant 
national narrative. Without the benefit of archival documents that could 
throw light on the thinking and actions of the major players as well as the 
wider context against which the events were unfolding during those critical 
years, these standard accounts of Malaysia’s formation, most of them 
published in the 1960s, could not offer anything beyond a broad recounting 
of the main events and issues that led up to Malaysia. In the 1980s, the 
story of merger was recounted in the autobiographies of key political actors 
who lived through that period. The memoirs of the Tunku, Ghazali Shafie 
and Lee Kuan Yew offered useful insights, but these personal recollections 
often reflected individual views and perspectives and were not always 
complete or comprehensive. In the 1990s, when archival records were 
gradually declassified in the London archives, historians have begun using 
these documents to construct more detailed accounts of the key events of 
the 1960s, and a number of useful analyses of aspects of the formation of 
Malaysia have since been written. In this regard, the works of Anthony 
Stockwell and Matthew Jones are especially noteworthy, although they 
focus mainly on the perspectives of British policy-makers. Building on
these earlier works, and utilizing recently de-classified documentary materials from London as well as oral interviews from some of the principal participants in Singapore and Malaysia, this study challenges the views that Malaysia was a done deal the moment the Tunku made his announcement in May 1961 by providing a detailed and in-depth analysis of the intricate processes involved in the making of Greater Malaysia. By moving beyond the simple expansionist-security explanations of the motives behind Malaysia, this study seeks to historicize the formation of Malaysia in the contexts of decolonization, domestic power struggles (especially in Singapore) and state-building. It addresses a fundamental question: how and why did merger take the shape and form that it did in 1963? The manner and timing in which the Federation of Malaysia came into being were instrumental in defining the character and content of the new state as well as creating the fault-lines that were inherent in its political structures. Subsumed under this larger question are a series of related questions: how did the Federation of Malaysia serve the purposes and interests of these disparate territories and the main political actors there—Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo Territories—each with their own special conditions and interests? Did these diverse interests explain why the form of merger that was effected between Singapore and Malaya was substantially different from the arrangements that were made between the Borneo Territories and the Federation? How did one set of agreements and arrangements affect the other? In a way, the Federation was incomplete without Brunei. Why did it happen in that way? Did the terms of merger, especially between Singapore and Malaya, sow the seeds of subsequent dissension that led to the eventual failure of merger in less than two years? It is these questions, and the intricate processes of negotiations and positioning among the main actors, that this book is concerned about.

The opening chapter of this book will explore British policies in post-war Southeast Asia, with emphasis on the so called “Grand Design”, the plan to integrate the disparate dependencies into a single political entity as a precursor to self-government and political independence for these colonies. British plans depended on local conditions and Chapter Two explains how local politics in Singapore and Malaysia dove-tailed with British interests to
lead to a concrete expression of the intention to create Malaysia. However, divergent interests between the two countries necessitated the adoption of special conditions for merger — the Ulster Model — that was effected between Malaya and Singapore. Chapters Four and Five deal with the complicated negotiations revolving around two key issues — citizenship and financial arrangements — that threatened at different times to derail the Malaysia Plan. Chapter Six explores and explains how the Borneo Territories were brought into Malaysia. The ease with which this was facilitated stood in stark contrast to the tricky negotiations that plagued the negotiations between Singapore and the Federation. It also seeks to explain why and how Brunei managed to stay out of Malaysia at the final hour.

NOTES
3 See, for instance, some Malaysian reactions to an account by Singapore historian, Albert Lau, on the circumstances leading to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in A Moment of Anguish (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998).
4 Cheah, Malaysia, p. 93.
6 Ibid., p. 152.
7 Stockwell, “Malaysia”, p. 152.
10 Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political
Introduction


13 Cheah, Malaysia, p. 93.

14 Noordin Sopiee refers to this explanation as the expansionist theory on the formation of Malaysia. See Sopiee, “The Advocacy of Malaysia — Before 1961”, p. 719.

15 Stockwell, “Forging Malaysia and Singapore”, p. 207.


