Conflict arising from environmental externalities is most likely to result from an unwillingness to accept responsibility for environmental problems, or to take part in addressing them. Here, pre-existing economic or developmental rivalry can imbue the issue of environmental damage with a dangerous competitiveness. Rising demands within one state to address the external causes of micro-security distress, when met by non-cooperation from the source(s) of the environmental damage, may cause serious macro-security tension and even conflict between states.

This Adelphi Paper is useful in drawing attention to a new array of environmental security challenges in Pacific Asia. Further analysis and theorizing must be done on this subject, however, before assessments of the real implications and possible (negative or positive) impact of these developments can be made about the future of the region.

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This book is a well-written historical analysis of political developments in Taiwan from the 1950s to 1994 (taking into account some developments up to early 1996). The book began life in 1990 as a doctoral dissertation for a degree in international relations at a British university. Although the author does not seem to have stated explicitly the aim or objective of the book, he says in the Preface that “one of the things this work set out to do was to keep track of [the] helter-skelter developments and to understand how they are interrelated” (p. xi). With this goal in mind, he has indeed produced a readable narrative, highlighting major events that concern issues of nationalism, identity, democratization, and the international status of Taiwan.

The book is divided into seven chapters, dealing with the Taiwan and China nationalism issue; the one-China principle; the process of democratization; the development of a “post-nationalist” identity; and Taiwan’s “intermediate” state in international society, with a conclusion drawing all the threads together.
With a focus on Chinese nationalism, Hughes borrows wisely the four meanings of the word “nation” in the Chinese context from Wang Gungwu (pp. 100–1). This is a useful introduction to an understanding of Chinese nationalism, although he inserts it somewhere in the middle of the book instead of at the beginning, where it would have been more useful. However, for the purpose of laying a solid foundation for the book, one would have liked to see more of the author’s own analysis of Chinese nationalism from various perspectives: the Chinese in the mainland as well as the Chinese in Taiwan, the latter including those who fled to Taiwan with the Kuomintang (KMT) leaders in 1949, and those who were born in Taiwan. This basic analysis seems necessary, as there are differences in what constitutes Chinese nationalism among these groups, not least “KMT nationalism” (pp. 56 and 82), a term used by the author himself.

Hughes also uses two new terms in his book: “post-nationalist identity” and “intermediate state”. The first is used to describe the kind of identity that the Taiwan Government is trying to forge, by detaching its political development from Chinese nationalism in the process of democratization. The second term is used to describe Taiwan’s international status, which is caught somewhere in-between independence, on the one hand, and reunification with the People’s Republic of China, on the other. He concludes at the end of the book by saying that “perhaps the notion of a ‘post-nationalist identity in an intermediate state’ is the closest it is possible to get to catching Taiwan’s identity and status....” (p. 162)

The use of both terms is, however, problematic. First, since the author has not spelt out clearly the differences between the various shades of meaning of the term “nationalism” within the Chinese/Taiwanese context, it would not be precise to use “post-nationalist” to describe Taiwan’s identity. Secondly, the use of “post-nationalist” implies the existence of pre-nationalist and nationalist, of which the former is not touched on in the book. Thirdly, since the notion of nationalism, in the form of patriotism and in connection with concepts such as motherland, culture, civilization, and jiatianxia ([one] family under heaven), has been used by both overseas Chinese and some in Taiwan as the rationale for reunification, so the use of the term “post-nationalist” belies the role played by nationalism in a possible reunification between Taiwan and China. Fourthly, since the word “intermediate” is premised on independence, it would therefore be highly problematic, from Taiwan’s point of view, as the Republic of China currently enjoys full diplomatic relations with twenty-seven countries in the world as a sovereign state. In that sense, it is an independent state, de facto if not de jure. From a non-Taiwanese
perspective, this view is of course controversial. The term “divided nation”, which has been, and is still, used by scholars in the field, captures well Taiwan’s current status in international society. Finally, the author has not attempted to test the proposition that Taiwan has a “post-nationalist identity in an intermediate state”. The proposition therefore remains an assertion.

The lack of precision in the author’s analysis is also apparent elsewhere, including statements made in the Preface that Taiwan “has only been ruled by a mainland Chinese government for four years this century (1945–9)” and China “is prepared to go to war if any major international actor recognises the island as a state” (p. xii). The official name of Taiwan in the Olympic movement is “Chinese Taipei”, not “Chinese, Taipei” (p. 49). Moreover, some chapter titles and section titles do not seem to sit well with the actual contents. For example, in the section on “Hong Kong 1997” (pp. 122–7), the author has devoted much space to comparing the growth of imports from and exports to China and Taiwan.

It is apparent from the long bibliography that the author has done a diligent job in writing the book. However, the same bibliography shows that the author has relied almost solely on secondary sources. Surprisingly, he does not seem to have consulted academic journals, such as Issues & Studies in Taiwan, or works on Taiwan by Byron Weng and Gary Klintworth. There is no clear evidence of fieldwork in Taipei or Beijing.

Also surprisingly, the index does not list key words such as “nationalism”, “state”, “status”, or “international society”. “Taiwan’s status” is listed under “international relations”, while “identity” appears as “cultural identity” and “national identity”. “Intermediate state” is listed only on p. 129, but should have been extended to cover pp. 31, 129–52, and 162.

All in all, the book is strong in historical interpretation but weak in political science methodology. At US$75 for a hard copy, the publisher seems to have in mind institutional buyers rather than individuals.

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