Ethnic Conflicts

in Southeast Asia
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Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia

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Introduction

Francis Fukuyama in his seminal book, *The End of History*, and President Ronald Reagan’s prediction of the “New World Order”, envisioned, as the Cold War came to an end, an international community at peace and with social and political stability being the norm. Unfortunately, the world has not lived up to their expectations. On the contrary, the term “New World Disorder” would be more appropriate as the emergence of a “new history” has been marked by destabilizing tensions and conflicts. More often than not, such conflicts have their roots in ethnic and religious rivalries and divisions. Conciliation, resolution, and a return to ethnic harmony have proved difficult, if not impossible to achieve. One has only to look at the chaos, for example, in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, and the current problems in Aceh, Indonesia, or the three southern provinces of Thailand to see examples of that disturbing them.

The end of the Cold War has also broadened the meaning of ethnic conflict, hitherto subsumed under the security of the state. At present, security has taken on multiple dimensions from the state down to the individual, thus adding more layers to the analysis of ethnic conflicts.

In Southeast Asia, ethnic diversity, social stability, and national unity, have all presented challenges with which all the countries have had to cope from the time of their independence. Thailand, although never colonized, is no exception. Also, without exception, ethnic problems are seen as a threat to the state and/or regime. Nevertheless, despite incidences of ethnic conflict, situations in the Southeast Asian region had been kept mostly under control in one way or another until Indonesia’s policy of “unity in diversity” unravelled after the fall of the New Order of President Suharto. This has led to concerns in other Southeast Asian countries about possible “echo effects”.

Moreover, ethnic conflicts in neighbouring countries have had cross-border impacts in the form of refugees, displaced persons, illegal migrant labour, as well as drugs and arms smuggling. Such impacts have had the potential to ruffle relations between countries, as has happened between Thailand and Myanmar as well as between Malaysia and Indonesia. Needless to say, the loss of life and human suffering from ethnic conflict, such as in Aceh, Ambon, and Myanmar, have been enormous and cannot be ignored for humanitarian and other reasons.

It is also to be recognized that different kinds of ethnic settings pose different kinds of problems for governments and leaders, and thus, different responses are to be expected. Five main sets of factors frame the ethnic setting in any country: demographic patterns and ethnic geography; pre-colonial and colonial legacies; the histories, fears, and goals of ethnic groups in the country; economic factors and trends; and regional and international influences.¹

One might also consider how the issue of globalization affects ethnic conflicts and their resolution. The positive and negative aspects of globalization are not limited to the economic sector, but have social, cultural, and political implications as well. There is no doubt that government policies on ethnic relations, if misguided, can aggravate existing problems even to the point of deadly confrontations. On the other hand, a benign policy can help mitigate ethnic problems. A country’s political system can also explain the goals and implementation of the policy that a government pursues: multicultural integration or assimilation; inducement or coercion. It is also possible that a policy that works well in one country at one particular point in time may not work well under other conditions.

The conference, thus, saw case studies that served to provide an empirical foundation and productive comparative platform for the development of some general arguments about causes, successes, and failures of the prevention and management of ethnic conflicts that could contribute to a theoretical discourse and serve the academic community. It also aimed at providing policy makers and administrators with policy options in dealing with ethnic problems in their respective countries, and, in the process, serves to prevent their adverse impact on regional stability.

In such an environment, it is essential not only to define and categorize the ethnic causes of conflict and understand the dynamics of
the conflicts, but also to develop strategies to prevent, modulate, and resolve such conflicts.

The keynote speaker of the conference, Surin Pitsuwan,\(^2\) set the tone with the statement that when ethnic groups feel threatened by the heightened pressure from the interaction of globalization with traditional culture, they “withdraw into their own familiar institutions, values, traditions, and rituals”. He noted that post-Second World War, newly independent states in Southeast Asia were managing the issue of ethnicity very well while going through the process of nation building for four or five decades, with Thailand standing out until recently for its success in integrating its Muslim population in the south.\(^3\)

In the chapter on Myanmar, Tin Maung Maung Than noted how, in the formation of the new state upon independence, much of the inter-ethnic goodwill and trust for the Bamar majority depended on the person of Aung San, whose assassination prior to independence did as much damage in this area, as in others, in the laying of strong foundations for the new state. The theme that runs through the effort at nation-building since independence from Britain in 1948, has been the conflicting options of a federation and a unitary state. Dr. Tin very elaborately outlined the efforts that the current regime undertaken to bring about ethnic harmony, as an “illiberal democracy” in a “unitary state”, including negotiating ceasefires and a return to “legal” existence with and for the ethnic minorities. To oversimplify, Dr. Tin shows very clearly the impossibility of the present regime’s quest to bring about the integration of the ethnic groups in the border regions, while insisting on a unitary state with all real power kept to themselves.

Rizal Sukma divided conflicts in Indonesia into horizontal and vertical ones. Kalimantan, Maluku, and Sulawesi were examples of the former, where violence was centred on purely ethnic lines (for instance, Madurese versus Dayak), whereas Achenese and Papuan conflicts were vertical and took “the form of secessionist conflict”. He also distinguished between immediate causes and permissive causes of conflict. The latter are considered to be at the root of conflict. He identified the root causes of the conflicts to be in the nature of Suharto’s New Order, characterized by centralism in politics, economics, and resource exploitation, and indifference to their impact. Addressing the debates on the various preferable forms of the Indonesian state in the wake of ethnic conflicts, Sukma examined the constitutional revision carefully to
establish the prospects of such an offer in satisfying ethnic and regional demands, and ended on a cautionary note as to the possibility of a return to autocratic rule if democracy was not carefully nourished and if the problems discussed were not solved.

Professor Ferrer, addressing the two significant problems of ethnicity in the Philippine Archipelago, reminded us that “conflicts are not cyclical nor do they evolve in a linear or ladder-like fashion”. When grievances accumulate, counter-elites become motivated to lead protests and even start wars, with both sides perpetuating the conflict until both are willing and ready to end it. As conflicts of ideologies emerge, they get prolonged alongside mismanagement by states. Such was the case of the Bangsa Moro of Mindanao, a conflict that went on for twenty-five years, in addition to the centuries of attempted repression preceding the present iteration of the conflict. Ultimately, Professor Ferrer was optimistic about the possibility that some form of autonomy or federalism would satisfy the Muslim population without threatening Manila’s basic requirement of territorial integrity. Nonetheless, the conflict that continues in Mindanao is not surprising, given the apparent lack of willingness in Manila to come to terms with the genuine needs of the minority, and the continued infusion of arms and ideology from outside into the minority region.

In a paper on Thailand that focused on the case of the non-Thai peoples of northern Thailand, Dr. Chayan noted how the government, while taking over border resources like the forest, chose not to incorporate all minorities in line with its policy of national integration. The Thai government, in fact, emphasized during the 1970-80s the replacement of opium cultivation with cash crops, following what was to be an altering of the policy of assimilation to that of “integration”. What happened, in fact, was a selective allocation of citizenship. As explained by Dr. Chayan, the reason was the fear that granting of citizenship so closely related to resource rights would result in greater flows of migration to the country. The discussion, however, emphasized the contrast between the policy in the north and that of the northeast, both regions whose population were ethnic cousins who could, and in fact, did, over time become integrated into the Thai nation.

In a paper on Malaysia, Professors Zakaria and Kadir pointed out that few societies were more racially divided than Malaysia, where, for example, students segregated themselves racially on campuses
for virtually all social purposes. Yet, few countries have been more successful in dealing with ethnic issues. The May 1969 racial riots sufficiently frightened all groups into encouraging an acceptance of “a new order”, in this case the New Economic Policy. The object was not to economically downgrade the richer Chinese or Indians, but to enrich the Bumiputra, the Malay majority, as the economy grew. The ensuing spectacular economic growth is to be considered an important part of the explanation of the country’s impressive stability since 1969. Though the Chinese still own a disproportionate share of the economy, increases in the Bumiputra’s percentage of the population resulted in the former’s acceptance of the Malay’s political stewardship of the nation. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Malaysia became an explicitly Malay-dominant society, rather than a multi-ethnic society. Indeed, Islam has become the “major” issue of Malaysian politics, as the authors note. An interesting theoretical point was made that, while change was mediated highly successfully in the political sector, the divisions remained explicit and almost absolute in the social arena.

On the whole, the conference participants gave special attention to conflict avoidance and conflict resolution. The latter could come about, as a number of papers suggested, when the issues of national integrity and sovereignty were separated as in the case of Mindanao, where the Bangsa Moro people were able to gain “sovereignty” while the Philippines maintained its national integrity. Democratization and devolution could also be seen to work in a similar fashion in the Indonesian case. Discussion at the conference focused on ways in which pluralism and democratization could be reconciled and enhanced. It was concluded that a clearer understanding of the forces at play and the many layers of issues at the heart of the conflicts were critical to any change in the prospects for conflict resolution. It is no less important to ensure that the provinces are happy.

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Notes


2 Former professor at Thammasat University, Foreign Minister of Thailand, who has served with international groups devoted to conflict resolution, as well as being a Muslim and a member of parliament from a southern province.

3 With the outbreak of violence in the southern provinces in 2002 and the government’s use of force in response, claims for Thailand’s successful integration of its Muslim minorities appear to be premature.