The development of the multi billion-dollar Tangguh project will be a test case for post-Suharto Indonesia. It is the largest foreign invested project since 1998 and its success should encourage other foreign companies to return to Indonesia. Interestingly, Freeport was the first western company to make investment in Indonesia after the fall of Sukarno. As Leith writes in her study, this was seen as an endorsement of the Suharto government’s much more open policy towards foreign business. What BP’s Tangguh project will say about how Indonesia goes about managing the political, social and environmental implications of resources development in the new century will be worth another book.

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Wooing the Generals: India’s New Burma Policy. By Renaud Egreteau.

This book starts with the premise that Indian foreign policy, until recently, took little or no interest in Burma (Myanmar), a fairly important country on its eastern flank. Since India’s preoccupations have been mostly with its western and northern neighbours, Pakistan and China respectively, it exhibited little or no interest in building a better understanding with Burma. Not only the long border but more critically, the instability in the northeastern region that lies close to the Burmese territory should have prompted India to pay more attention to the Burmese connection. But apparently this was not the case. On the contrary, benign neglect followed by outright hostility to the military regime characterized Indian policy for a fairly long time. Burma should have merited closer attention also on account of the China factor for two reasons — Chinese encouragement for the insurgencies rampant in India’s northeastern states and the perceptible warming of Sino-Burma relations in the late 1980s. The book discusses these issues at length.

It also details the various facets of India’s Burma policy starting with the history of bilateral relations and the geostrategic importance of the region where Burma meets India’s northeastern states. The three factors of obvious Indian concern are outlined in the next part under
the sections on instability in the northeast, the burgeoning Chinese influence in Burma and Burma’s importance in the context of India’s Look East policy. The sources and tools of India’s Burma policy are described in the third part of the book followed by the concluding section which highlights the problems and prospects of Indian diplomacy towards its eastern neighbour.

Although between 1950 and 1988 Burma consciously adopted a policy of strict neutrality by maintaining friendly relations with both India and China, a discernible shift in this policy occurred towards the end of the 1980s when it began edging closer to China. The two countries found much comfort in each other’s company as the international pressure against their anti-democratic policies intensified (p. 76).

Burma witnessed a spate of student demonstrations against the repressive policies of the regime in 1987 which subsequently drew in other sections of the society. The regime’s brutal response to the demonstrations in which thousands were killed fuelled further protests followed by more repression. All this culminated in a coup d’état in September 1988 when a new military junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took over. Inexplicably in May 1990 it held an election in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi swept the polls. Unabashedly disregarding this verdict, SLORC declared the results invalid and arrested the NLD leaders thus derailing the democratic process.

A strong pro-democracy movement and its consequent repression was similarly witnessed in China. The June 1989 Tiananmen protests and the violent way in which they were put down produced universal revulsion. Much like Burma, China too faced international condemnation for its action. This drove the two condemned states closer in moral and material terms, as some scholars have argued. The SLORC found in China a ready and willing source for its military supplies which were disrupted by international sanctions following the junta’s crackdown. Diplomatically too China was of great help to the SLORC given its position in the Security Council and the world in general, where it could deflect criticisms against the military junta’s actions and by extension, its own brutal treatment of the unarmed Tiananmen protesters. International criticism of the actions by the regimes in the two countries were interpreted as unnecessary interference in their domestic affairs. A new found solidarity was thus created between China and Burma at a time when they were universally shunned. This worked to the benefit of China which gained a strong foothold in Burma in subsequent years.
As opposed to this, India was highly critical of SLORC’s repression of the pro-democracy activists and it expressed its condemnation in the most unreserved manner. Moreover India provided succour to Burmese political refugees, supported the pro-democracy movement there and used its broadcast media to highlight SLORC’s repressive actions. Burma felt intimidated by India’s extreme reaction although the reason for this is not explicitly brought out in the book. Possibly, SLORC’s fear of Indian interference was coloured by the pro-active Indian policies in its own neighbourhood, particularly in Sri Lanka and Maldives, however unfounded such fears might have been. By adopting a very inflexible position towards the regime in Burma, India inadvertently made it easy for Sino-Burmese relations to strengthen and flourish. In time, this enabled China to gain considerable influence in that country. Thus China’s sway now extends from the Spratlys to the Bay of Bengal.

The author avers that, sensing the damage that had been caused by this short-sighted policy, India in 1993 changed course and started cultivating the military junta. China’s military and political ties with Burma meant that it had gradually extended its strategic reach uncomfortably close to India’s maritime area. This was perceived as a further encirclement and one which had to be countered by providing sufficient inducements to Burma to balance its external links. Yet another motive for policy reversal had to do with the need for Burmese cooperation in the counter-insurgency operations in India’s northeast. Drawing sufficient inspiration from its newly crafted Look East policy, New Delhi approached the junta in a conciliatory manner, acknowledging that the democracy movement was purely an internal Burmese affair. India also put an end to the negative broadcasts against the military regime. Thereafter, official linkages and visits at senior levels were quickly resumed between the two countries. Restoration of trade links and technical collaboration as well as cooperation in dealing with drug trafficking also began taking shape.

Apart from India’s concerns about Burma’s growing dependence on China and the need to stabilize the situation in its troubled northeast, both of which forced India to be more tolerant towards the Burmese regime, the author also mentions that a potential Hindu-Buddhist alliance (p. 113) could be a factor in this rapprochement. He thus introduces a Huntingtonian twist to the evolving nature of this relationship. But this seems farfetched and is somewhat unconvincing and speculative. No concrete evidence of such thinking among the policy-making community has been provided in support of this view.
The book treats the pattern of Indian policy towards Burma within the idealist-realist framework. The attitude against the regime and support for the democratic opposition is characterized as an idealist-humanist impulse (p. 121) while the turnaround is depicted as a swing towards realism. However, in the opinion of this reviewer a more appropriate framework to analyse the policy reorientation could have been drawn from the foreign policy change literature thereby highlighting the adaptive nature of foreign policy behaviour and pinpointing the degree and level of change. The sources, conditions and consequences of foreign policy change could then be more systematically analysed and policy reorientation placed along a continuum stretching from moderate, significant to extreme restructuring. In the absence of such a framework the study is more like a compendium of mutual interactions.

In sum, the main merit of the book lies in bringing together the recent developments in India’s Burma policy without neglecting the historical and regional contexts within which this bilateral relationship has evolved. Those who are interested in one minor facet of India’s Look East policy might find this book quite useful.

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On 2 March 1962 the Burmese military (tatmadaw) led by General Ne Win seized power and went on to rule Burma for the next 26 years. Mary P Callahan provides a cogent and complex narrative of the events leading to this seizure of power that challenges many of the conventional explanations of the coup. These range from the official tatmadaw justification of its action to save the Union from disintegration following the concessions that Prime Minister U Nu had made to insurgent ethnic groups challenging the Union, to analyses that argue for the military’s growing appetite for political power following its first taste of it in 1958, when Ne Win first seized, or was “invited” by U Nu to take over a government besieged by factional fighting.

Callahan’s account starts with the 19th century British colonial state which found itself increasingly reliant upon armed coercion to administer its territories because the indigenous institutions which it could have deployed for indirect rule had been destroyed in a series of