party that overwhelmingly won the May 1990 elections, and the icon of democracy. It also contains some observations on the practicality of those visions as well as a measure of prescription on how to realize such a transformation of the MAF under civilian rule. Selth rightly notes that “under current circumstances, a peaceful transition to democratic rule can only occur with its [MAF’s] concurrence, if not active support” (p. 290). As such, the most important goal would be to allay the junta’s fears of retribution against MAF personnel. If a compromise between the pro-democracy movement and the MAF cannot be reached, the MAF’s “real military capabilities will remain limited and its professionalism suspect” (p. 290).

The two appendices on the “order of battle” and statistics of “defence expenditures” would appeal more to the specialist reader. Despite the author’s qualifications and caveats regarding the degree of robustness of the data, they would appear to be confusing to the uninitiated. It would have been extremely helpful if the author provided the status of the weapon (whether it is obsolete or likely to have been unserviceable) besides the particular entry in the lists. For Appendix 2 too, it would be most revealing if the author could provide expenditures for health and education together with the figure for defence in the table showing the amounts in local currency, i.e. Kyats (p. 314).

All in all, this book is a significant addition to a very small body of works on the MAF and the author should be commended for his Herculean task in assembling a reader-friendly portrait of the MAF from a vast amount of disparate information over many years. It would benefit not only those interested in the MAF but also those in the area studies community as well as students of civil-military relations, comparative politics, and international relations.

Tin Maung Maung Than
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Singapore


This book looks at India’s potential to emerge as a major power, with contributions from eight scholars together with an introduction by the editor. It addresses the issue of India’s strengths and weaknesses by
delving into various aspects of India’s foreign, economic and security policies, as well as its relations with neighbours and major external powers. India has for several years been regarded as an emerging or rising state. It had always been the predominant power in South Asia. The question now is whether it can transcend its influence beyond South Asia and can emerge as a major Asian power? That is the main thrust of the study by Sumit Ganguly and others.

The theme of India’s power and influence in world affairs is not new. India’s enormous size especially in terms of its population, rich natural resources and its strategic location together with a civilizational past has long convinced Indian leaders of an imperative for playing an international role. The main plank of Indian foreign policy, non-alignment, was fashioned and re-fashioned by its leaders essentially to preserve the country’s independence and to maintain a balance in its relationship with the two superpowers. The strategy was aimed at drawing economic and technological aid for development from both powers as well as to provide an alternative model of international relations in a world which was then intensely bipolar. India’s policy was aimed at creating a cushion between blocs and reducing the likelihood of overt conflict, and ultimately transforming a bipolar system to a polycentric or a multipolar system.

Non-alignment gave India an international profile (soft power) larger than was warranted by its economic and military strength (hard power). It made it possible for India to maintain normal relations with all the major world powers, with varying degrees of warmth and intimacy, while facilitating the flow of technical and financial assistance from the two ideological blocs. In short, non-alignment gave India the maximum possible dividends in a bipolar world. India’s profile and influence, however, were not always balanced during this period; both external and internal factors combined (in the later years of the Nehru era and after), to deprive non-alignment some of its élan and effectiveness. Externally, India’s defeat at the hands of China in 1962 proved to be a major setback, and the relationship of near-permanent hostility with Pakistan exercised a disabling effect on India’s foreign policy. Internally it was seen as a crisis-ridden country with poor economic performance. Militarily, it could not elevate itself to the status of a major power as China did by exercising its nuclear option in 1964 despite its poor economic base.

Under Nehru’s successors, Indian defence policy increasingly came to embrace a realist outlook. In the absence of reliable, powerful patrons, India resorted to the strategy of self-help to protect its security interests. Even though the United States was keen on protecting India from
Chinese military pressures, support was not forthcoming. The American military dependence on Pakistan for bases coupled with “India’s neuralgic insistence on nonalignment”, (p. 2) to quote Sumit Ganguly, the editor of the volume, “foreclosed the prospects of an Indo-U.S. security relationship”. The principal thrust of India’s foreign policy under Indira Gandhi was more power and region-oriented than one of seeking out a new global role for itself. This she did by keeping the nuclear option open by conducting an underground nuclear explosion in May 1974, and launching India’s own satellite launching vehicle, SLV-3 into outer space in July 1980, thus placing in orbit an indigenously designed and built 35 kilogram satellite. Once India established itself as a regional power, Indira did make some attempts to seek a more global role by travelling overseas more frequently, attending the North-South Conference in Cancun in April 1981, and by hosting the Non-Aligned and Commonwealth summits in 1983. However, all these initiatives did not lead to the establishment of a real framework that would establish the parameters of India’s new global role.

What brought the change in perspectives on India in the post-Cold War era? To quote Stephen P. Cohen, another contributor to the volume: “After decades of unfulfilled promise, it now seems to be inching ahead, with more rapid economic growth, new attention from the major powers, and the development of a modest nuclear arsenal. Adding these developments to India’s traditional strengths — a unique and persistent democracy and an influential culture — it is no wonder that many have predicted the emergence of India as a major Asian power, or even a world class state” (p. 32). To Cohen’s list one may add the power of India’s Silicon Valley and its IT specialists.

One additional factor which contributed greatly in recent years in changing the way the United States views India is the growing clout of the Indo-American community in the United States. Indian-Americans have organized themselves and emerged as a powerful lobby in American politics and foreign policy. As Indian troops fought to repel a Pakistani incursion in Kargil in 1999, key staff members were bombarded with demands from Indian immigrants for a resolution condemning Pakistan’s “aggression”. U.S. lawmakers eventually complied, and a few days later, according to two senior American administration officials with direct knowledge of the conversation in a White House meeting on 4 July 1999, the President cited Congressional pressure in urging the now ousted Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to withdraw his forces.

In the final analysis, however, it was the change in India’s economic profile resulting from the liberalization and opening up of its economy...
to global competition together with progress of its nuclear programme that lent India its current status as an emerging Asian power. As for the economic reforms, the outcome has been quite significant. Shortly after embarking upon its reforms, India’s growth rate climbed from about five per cent or less to about seven per cent per annum. Even during the Asian economic crisis, when most of the economies in the region showed a negative growth rate, India was able to post a five to six per cent growth rate. The path of economic reform has not been easy, as pointed out by Sunila Kale in her essay in the volume on the political economy of India’s second-generation reforms, essentially because of India’s democratic trap of functioning under the compulsions of a strong trade union movement and electoral politics. Her essay analyses the broad failure of India’s attempts to deregulate its economy in the 1990s and the comparative success of privatization efforts since 2000. Kale suggests that the growing, though still limited, success with privatization is due largely to the new institutional environment of competitive investment unleashed by earlier waves of market reform. But barriers still remain. At the material level, these bottlenecks involve weak infrastructure in the pivotal areas of transportation, telecommunications, and power. At the socio-political level, critical reforms, especially in the labour and financial sectors, remain in abeyance. Eventually, India’s chances of emerging as a major power will be contingent on its acceleration of economic reforms to achieve a growth rate of between nine to ten per cent within this decade.

India’s nuclear programme is a function of finding new means to assure the country’s security against strategic uncertainty in the post-Cold War period and the possibilities of future Chinese nuclear blackmail. Ashley Tellis narrates the likely evolution of the Indian nuclear weapons programme which is defined as a “force-in-being” that exhibits a deterrent capability based on available but dispersed components capable of being constituted into usable nuclear weapons systems during a supreme emergency, and even after enduring an enemy nuclear strike. And he rightly argues that India’s nuclear posture will be limited in size, separated in geographical disposition, and centralized in command. India’s decision to challenge the existing global nuclear order initially led to significant setbacks in its relations with the United States, but as Ganguly suggests “adroit diplomacy enabled India’s leadership over the course of the next year to repair much of the rift that the nuclear tests had generated” (p. 3).

Indo-American relations had already shown certain improvements in the 1990s due to India’s opening of its economy, termination of its close ties to the erstwhile Soviet Union, and the consequential absence
of anti-American rhetoric. The relationship has gathered strength under the Bush administration, and particularly after the events of 11 September 2001, guided by common concern about the menace of terrorism. However, Robert Haithaway argues that the relationship is still far from being a strategic partnership because of the divergences on nuclear proliferation, the emergence of China as a world power, the pace of India’s economic liberalization and India-Pakistan tensions. He concludes by saying that a strategic partnership is achievable, but India will need to keep U.S. interests constantly in focus — a reality no country aspiring to be a regional or global power can ignore.

That brings the discussion to another hurdle in India’s path to achieving major power status, namely India-Pakistan relations. For Stephen Cohen, the India-Pakistan conflict has taken a new, nuclear turn, making South Asia one of the most dangerous places in the world, with the intractable Kashmir dispute representing only one aspect of the larger struggle between the two states. After discussing a variety of possible scenarios of conflict resolution, Cohen argues that little progress is likely without the involvement of a powerful external actor, namely the United States. Notwithstanding brilliant arguments in favour of all his propositions, one may raise issues with most of them. India wants to approach the problems in the relationship beyond Kashmir to open up economic and trade links so that a certain element of interdependence and economic stakes emerge between the two countries, facilitating compromise and concessions on Kashmir at a future date. Pakistan fears that opening economic and trade links between the two countries and the benefits that would accrue to their own people might lead to a diffusion of Kashmir as a “non-issue”, as people begin to realize the cost of that misadventure. That is why Pakistan opposes any improvement of relations on any other front before the Kashmir problem is resolved.

Similarly Cohen’s argument about American involvement in the resolution of the conflict does not stand scrutiny. Like the Arab-Israeli dispute, the U.S. has not been an impartial and a benign power in the India-Pakistan equation. Despite the prophets of doom, South Asia is not the most dangerous place in the world. If it has become a dangerous place, it is not because of nuclear proliferation, which the reviewer would argue has removed the chances of a full-scale conventional war between the two countries, but because of the presence of an infrastructure of terror in the madrasahs of Pakistan, supported and abetted by Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). It is not only India-Pakistan relations that is hostage to these terror networks, but also regional and global peace and stability. Until that terror network is destroyed, the war on global terrorism will not be over. India-Pakistan relations will remain a bleeding sore for quite some time to come.
India’s relations with its other contentious neighbour, China, is the focus of John Garver who finds a considerable gap between China’s public rhetoric and its internal assessments of India’s capabilities and intentions. Both China and India in recent years have been able to overcome their unpleasant past and concentrate more on finding advantages in each other’s markets. As a result, economic and trade relations have improved five-fold in the last couple of years. However, given the history of past mistrust, divergent regional security goals and interests, and the persistence of a border dispute, any improvement of Sino-Indian relations could only be gradual and incremental.

The end of the Cold War has opened new opportunities for India to refashion its relations with other states, such as France and Israel — the former in the context of a common concern over American hegemony, and the latter in the backdrop of both being the victims of terrorist threats. Jean-Luc Racine narrates the growing warmth between India and France in their desire for a multipolar world, one that would give greater weight to their interests and the interests of other middle-level powers. P.R. Kumaraswamy examines the new trends in India-Israel relations, which has a certain robustness in areas ranging from trade to arms transfers. The recent visit (September 2003) of the Israeli Prime Minister to India and the agreement to transfer certain important weapons systems further consolidated that bond.

One area where India has made a dynamic move and established its constructive presence in the Asia Pacific region is through its “Look East Policy”. New Delhi is not only a full dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), taking an active role in the security dialogue of the region, it is now also a part of summit diplomacy in the form of an ASEAN-India summit in parallel with the ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea) summit. Trade and investment relations have dramatically improved in recent years, offering India a certain status as a major power. Unfortunately the volume does not deal with India’s growing clout in the Asia Pacific: this is one of the major shortcomings of the book. The other shortcoming is the book’s basically Western perspective on India’s foreign and security policies. The only exceptions are Kumaraswamy’s and Sunila Kale’s essays. Ganguly, who is an Indian in origin but an American citizen, tries to bridge the gap somewhat. The volume, however, is a valuable edition to the growing literature on India as an emerging power.

BALADAS GHOSHAL
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi, India