us to take some significant steps forward in our understanding of globalization and its effects.

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Of late, it has become fashionable to dismiss ASEAN and its core normative and behavioural framework known as the ASEAN Way. Scholars who once recognized and praised ASEAN’s past efforts in diffusing inter-state tensions and acknowledged it as a respected regional grouping have now turned their guns against what they see as a “sunset” organization, a house divided against itself, or even a dysfunctional entity unwilling and unable to change its ways to cope with the many new challenges that ASEAN members states and the region as a whole face.

Jurgen Haacke’s ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture is an important new contribution to the literature on Southeast Asian regionalism set in the context of the growing debate on ASEAN’s accomplishments and limitations as a framework for regional order-building. The book’s main achievement is its dispassionate, detailed and systematic analysis of the “ASEAN Way”, defined chiefly in terms of the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members. Haacke recognizes ASEAN’s past contribution, but spares no effort in identifying and elaborating on its present failures in coping with the pressures of a globalized world. His explanation of ASEAN’s weaknesses in addressing new challenges focuses heavily on ASEAN’s resistance to allow its norm of non-interference to “evolve”. In short, this book is to a large extent about how sovereignty and non-interference hold the key to understanding ASEAN’s successes and limitations.

As the extensive bibliography attests, the book is well-researched. The analysis maintains a relentlessly serious academic tone. This is to be expected, as the book grew out of a PhD dissertation at the London School of Economics. The late Michael Leifer served as an inspiration
for the book, although Haacke’s reading of the ASEAN Way is somewhat more optimistic than Leifer’s, especially towards the last decade or so of Leifer’s illustrious career. Such differences in thinking and approach can only be regarded as healthy and creative.

The book is divided into eight chapters, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The introduction contains a brief (two and half pages) discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the book. The author situates himself within the constructivist approach to international relations, which regards “a diplomatic and security culture as the outcome a process of mutual recognition, possibly through a process of reconciliation or accommodation” (p.12). This sociological understanding offers a clear pathway to his view of the ASEAN Way as the dynamic product of an evolving process of socialization, rather than as a by-product of material power constraints (such as US military dominance or the balance of power) or material relationships (such as economic interdependence) alone.

Chapter 1 explores, in general terms, the background of the ASEAN Way, appropriately traced to a quest for respect and sovereignty. Chapter 2 more specifically focuses on the post-war imperatives of conflict management and reconciliation (e.g., between Indonesia and Malaysia or Malaysia and the Philippines) as the underlying basis for the ASEAN Way. In Chapter 3, the author turns his attention to ASEAN’s efforts to develop a framework for managing its extra-mural relations through the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept and the ASEAN Regional Forum, although even these were geared more towards upholding non-interference rather than providing ASEAN with usable tools for managing its relations with external powers. This is followed by an examination of how the ASEAN Way fared in dealing with the Cambodia conflict in Chapter 4. The next two chapters deal with ASEAN’s relations with external powers, first the United States and then China. Chapter 7 examines ASEAN’s attempts at reform: more specifically represented in the proposal for a “flexible engagement” approach to transnational challenges (such as the regional currency crisis and the haze) made by the then Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan. This chapter vividly describes how the contestations over this bold attempt to dilute the non-interference norm led to the compromise formula, termed “enhanced interaction.” Chapter 8 looks at how ASEAN has fared in employing this approach to subsequent challenges, notably in developing a financial surveillance process, the situation in Myanmar, the crisis and bloodshed in East Timor, the creation of an ASEAN Troika and in dealing with the Thailand-Myanmar conflicts in 2001.
Much of the recent criticism of ASEAN “as the most successful regional organization in the developing world” (p. 8) comes without being informed by comparative analysis which places ASEAN’s record against that of other regional groups such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Gulf Cooperation Council or even larger organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (recently renamed the African Union). Although Haacke himself limits his study to ASEAN alone, he is careful to recognize both ASEAN’s limitations as well as achievements.

A regional grouping is a dynamic entity which must change its ways in order to cope with emerging and often unexpected challenges. ASEAN’s founders could not have foreseen the extent to which globalization would overtake their much simpler world of strategic bipolarity and economic nationalism. With colonial dominance and superpower interventionism at the heart of their security concerns, ASEAN’s founders naturally turned to non-interference. Third World leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru once regarded non-interference as a moral doctrine, because it offered them a shield against neo-colonialism and superpower interventionism. Hence, the sources of ASEAN’s past strength remains at the heart of its present limitations, although it may be more fashionable in today’s world to use the present to dismiss the past.

Haacke’s analysis of ASEAN focuses heavily on the contestation between the forces for the status quo and the forces for reform (non-interference versus flexible engagement). As such, he pays less attention, especially in his conceptual reflections, to another important contestation that shapes the perception of ASEAN’s contribution: between its aspiration for regional autonomy and the material constraints of a regional order shaped by the balance of power dynamics. As he explains in a footnote (p. 234, fn.9), his analysis of the ASEAN Way focuses on its role as a “framework for mediating estrangement and insecurity and does not include as key elements the norms of ‘regional autonomy’, ‘collective self-reliance’ and ‘no ASEAN military pact’—norms which would be more central to interpreting and explaining ASEAN in terms of the larger balance of power dynamics (which incidentally is the subject of an important forthcoming study of ASEAN by Ralf Emmers).

Given that one of the central debates about Asian regional order focuses on how the balance of power, materially conceived, constrains ASEAN and its offshoot, the ASEAN Regional Forum, it would have been interesting to see what Haacke has to say about this. He does address these issues empirically in two chapters dealing with the United States and China (Chapters 4 and 5). But, as noted, even his
discussion of ZOPFAN and the ARF (Chapter 3) is bound by a framework that focuses on their contribution in institutionalizing the non-interference doctrine, rather than as instruments for managing extra-mural pressures. An analysis of the latter would be especially important in engaging realism and neo-realism in the analysis of Southeast Asia’s regional order, especially since realism has been, remains, and is likely to remain (in fact it has enjoyed a resurgence in the wake of the Asian economic crisis) the dominant perspective on the study of Asian security in general and Southeast Asian regional order in particular. But the author compensates for his decision to be less comprehensive in his definition of the ASEAN Way and the scope of his investigation by providing a more in-depth and extensive discussion of the conflict between non-interference and its alternatives.

Although Haacke’s analysis is conducted with objectivity and accuracy, there are areas of conceptual tension. For example, the author recognizes that “the participation of ASEAN members in an intervention force [in East Timor] clearly marked a significant moment in the evolution of the ‘ASEAN Way’” (p. 201), despite the fact that only some ASEAN members participated in their individual capacity. Such thinking suggests Haacke’s sophisticated understanding of multilateralism (that it can subsume concerted action by a few actors, rather than a rigid adherence to unanimity). But in coping with bilateral disputes such as the Thai-Myanmar “spat” in 2001, ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture was a clear barrier: “the multiple resort to force marked the first major violations of the most significant norm of ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture—the non use of force” (p. 210). Given the book’s consistent emphasis on non-interference as the core norm of ASEAN, one might say that the prior salience of non-interference is what might have prevented an ASEAN role in the management of the Thai-Myanmar dispute. But a larger question is whether one should regard these two events, especially the East Timor intervention (which was undertaken at the invitation of the Indonesian government of the day and was therefore fully consistent with the norms of non-interference) as a vindication or violation (albeit in a limited evolutionary manner) of ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture? Herein lies a major dilemma facing ASEAN and the analysts of its diplomatic and security culture.

A central paradox of any normative order is the contradiction between path dependence and efficacy. Its very success often contains the seeds of its own decline. The success of norms is defined in terms of their “stickiness” or ability to endure in the face of challenges. But once norms take hold, they are expected to remain in place and adhered to. Just as socio-cultural habits die hard, change is resisted because of
concerns that it will undermine an existing identity. Hence, ASEAN’s *Diplomatic and Security Culture* is both a cause for celebration and for despair. The “stickiness” of the ASEAN Way is in some measures a testament to its impact and confirms the identity of its members as sovereign-bound political entities. Yet, consistency and continuity are not guarantees of efficiency and credibility when dealing with new and unexpected turbulence. When faced with change, all rational actors face a dilemma: too much change is just as bad as too little. The key is to strike a balance between the necessity to find new pathways to deal with new challenges without significantly disrupting the foundational principles of an organization.

ASEAN’s problems lie in its failure to date to find such balance and to err too much on the side of the status quo. A core strength of this book is the way it captures these dilemmas clearly and historically. Haacke’s analysis, including his critique of ASEAN, is credible because it is advanced without degenerating into polemics and is backed by careful and detailed research. This book’s conceptualization of the ASEAN Way as something of a “work in progress” is interesting, affirming that the notion of a “diplomatic and security culture” is not impervious to redefinition and change. It attests to the core constructivist claim that norms and culture are not primordial and unchanging constructs, but are a set of beliefs and practices which are made and remade through socialization and institutional politics.

What are the prospects for the ASEAN Way? Haacke concludes that the ASEAN Way has served its purpose, but it is time for evolution and change. His own feeling is that ASEAN is likely to adapt. While “some features of the ‘ASEAN Way’ will probably endure for some time”, (p. 232) “it is reasonable to expect that the ‘ASEAN Way’ will evolve further in the medium term as the process of norm-rationalization within the Association and the ARF will continue. Should a relevant situation arise, ASEAN governments might, for example, shift from the mere limited conceptual endorsement of new intramural instruments, say in the field of preventive diplomacy, to their practical application”. (p. 233)

Those skeptical of the ASEAN Way may dispute Haacke’s judgement and its underlying optimism about ASEAN’s ability to change. To this reviewer, the book has made a valuable contribution by identifying the conditions, such as the premium on state sovereignty, which led to the origins and evolution of the ASEAN Way and explains its resilience today. Changes in the underlying conditions could remake the ASEAN Way. Haacke will be around to tell us how his thesis comes through in the years to come. In the meantime, the academic community specializing in Southeast Asia’s international relations should welcome
the arrival of a new specialist who, if this book is any indication, has the clear potential to make a significant contribution to the field.

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Scholarship on local politics in the Philippines has been dominated for a long time by society-centred perspectives which identify cultural norms and social structures as important variables in explaining the nature of power and power relations in Philippine localities. While these studies remain influential, there has also been a considerable shift in attention within the last decade, and a number of significant works have emerged that examine the role of the state and its institutions in explaining the dynamics of local politics. Kawanaka’s recent book contributes to this latter perspective with his case study of local power mechanisms in Naga City.

Kawanaka takes issue with sociocultural perspectives which usually identify kinship patterns, social relationships and traditional values that reinforce the patron-client system as crucial in explaining the continuing dominance of political dynasties in the Philippines. The rise of the political machine, especially after democratic restoration in 1986, has been explained as a transformation in political relationships due to transformations in society and the economy. As Kawanaka notes, however, this perspective “still considers that society defines the patterns of local politics” (p. 10). Such arguments are not surprising considering the influence of the strong society–weak state framework in political research in developing countries.

Statist arguments have sought to present an alternative explanation of how local power is obtained and maintained. In particular, the role of the state is emphasized by identifying two important realities neglected by sociocultural perspectives: competition among political leaders in gaining access to the state’s resources, and the salience of institutions that define how the state’s resources are allocated. Thus, monopoly in access to state resources, and the institutional capacity to distribute these resources, become important factors in maintaining local power.