personal savings is not yet conclusive (Hamada 1989; Hayashi 1989; Horioka 1989). The age structure of Japan’s population suggests that its young population will continue to decrease because of the low birth rate, while its elderly population will continue to increase because of increasing longevity. Maruo also notes that the Japanese economy may fall victim to “the Japanese disease” with the graying of Japan’s population in the 1990s. That is, Japan’s economic growth and performance may suffer mainly because of supply-side factors. Nevertheless, perhaps this may not happen in Japan, because, judging from projections of the world population, the Japanese have the longest life expectancies in the world (United Nations 1989).

Chapters 5 and 6 have more applied macroeconomic theories, particularly relating to price stability and income distribution. These two chapters have seemingly strong empirical support. Another important contribution that Maruo renders in Chapters 7 and 8 is to analyse substantively the unique features of Japanese companies that lead to a high rate of productivity growth. Why does Japan have a high rate of productivity growth? Maruo provides the following list of explanatory factors:

a) Incentive to save and investment for increasing the capital/labour ratio;

b) Incentive to technological progress;

c) Incentive to efficient work efforts ... (pp. 192).

... A high level of cooperation and integration between labour and management as well as among employees in their company is supposed to be one of the unique features of Japanese labour-management relations (pp. 241).

Indeed, Chapters 7 and 8 are particularly well done. The final chapter discusses very briefly the best way to approach a new type of welfare society, e.g. “welfare mix” and “ownership mix” where the public, private and informal sector are mixed optimally. Maruo clearly faced a difficult task in organizing this chapter but he has succeeded to some extent.

On the whole, this book makes an original contribution to theoretical, econometric, empirical and institutional findings about the Japanese economy. Indeed, this book offers extremely valuable and thought-provoking reading.

REFERENCES


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How should we limit the use of common-pool resources so as to ensure their long-term economic viability? In Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom, co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and professor of political science at Indiana University, offers an overview of the array of problems that are associated with governing and managing common-pool resource systems and illustrates the diversity of possible solutions to these problems. This is an ambitious work, with a fair amount of good reading in it and much that is bound to be familiar to anyone who has followed contemporary debates regarding the theory of public and social choice, the new institutional economics, law and economics, critical legal studies, the economics of transaction costs, and game theory.

Ostrom’s specific aim is to challenge the notion that common-pool resource problems can only be
solved through intervention by the state, and to begin to develop a theoretical framework to better understand the capabilities and limitations of self-governing collective actions for regulating common-pool resource systems. Six chapters provide a more or less comfortable sequence of topics for a critical review of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to common-pool resource problems and an exploration of the conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.

Ostrom first undertakes to explain the limited utility of the models which have most frequently been used to advocate state and market solutions to common-pool resource problems. In particular, the author denies the applicability of such models to smaller-scale common-pool resource problems, where individuals can communicate, can learn to trust each other, can learn the effects of their actions, can learn how to organize, can develop shared norms and patterns or reciprocity, and possess skills with which they can build self-governing institutional arrangements for resolving common-pool resource problems. Ostrom also highlights the relative importance of these models in supporting externally imposed solutions to resource use problems. As the author notes,

The models that social scientists tend to use for analyzing CPR problems have the perverse effect of supporting increased centralization of political authority. First, the individuals using CPRs are viewed as if they are capable of short-term maximization, but not of long-term reflection about joint strategies to improve joint outcomes. Second, these individuals are viewed as if they are in a trap and cannot get out without some external authority imposing a solution. Third, the institutions that individuals may have established are ignored or rejected as inefficient, without examining how these institutions may help them acquire information, reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, and equitably allocate appropriation rights and provision duties. Fourth, the solutions presented for "the" government to impose are themselves based on models of idealized markets or idealized states. (p. 216)

Policy prescriptions hinging on the notion that institutional change must be externally imposed on the individuals affected are also critiqued in the first chapter. Ostrom presents well the argument that economists make false presumptions about the state's monitoring and sanctioning capabilities, and about the accuracy of information available to the state and the costs of administration when they advocate state solutions to prevent the destruction of resources held in common by many individuals. Perhaps as a natural reaction to the extensive body of environmental legislation passed during the 1960s and 1970s in Europe and the United States, there has been a growing concern with the costs and complexities of environmental regulation, including state imposed common-pool resource schemes. In many areas these problems have been manifested in lengthy, uncertain, and complicated regulatory processes and in conflicting statutory responsibilities for local and central government authorities. These delays and inconsistencies have often been exacerbated by conflicts between uses and a lack of incentive for cooperation or long-term policy commitments by regulatory authorities and the affected communities of individuals. The claim that only a full-blown private property regime can hope to avoid the tragedy of the commons is also addressed. Privatization advocates, Ostrom points out, don't take into account the problem of defining private rights to some common-pool resource, and ignore the fact that even when particular rights are unitized, quantified, and salable, the resource system is still likely to be owned in common rather that individually. While some points could have been more pointedly and persuasively made, overall Chapter 1 makes it clear that different models and policy prescriptions are needed to analyse and solve the diversity of situations broadly referred to as common-pool resource problems.

Subsequent chapters comprise the main contribution of the book and include some interesting observations and conclusions. Ostrom attempts to outline an alternative theoretical framework for understanding self-organized collective action in Chapter 2. She suggests that stable institutions of self-government can be treated if certain problems of supply, credibility and monitoring are solved. Chapters 3 through 5 examine case studies of self-organized actions — both successful and unsuccessful — of governing the commons. Ostrom uses these cases
as an empirical basis to learn how institutional arrangements related to the effective governance and management of common-pool resources work, and how individuals change their own institutions. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests in Japan and Switzerland, irrigation communities in Spain and the Philippines, ground water basin projects in California, irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka, and fisheries in Canada, Sri Lanka and Turkey.

These chapters give a taste of the wide-ranging and extensive material that has been written about the strategies communities adopt to cope with common-pool resource problems. As the author admits, however, there are limits on the types of common-pool resource case studies examined,

... (1) renewable rather than nonrenewable resources, (2) situations where substantial scarcity exists rather than abundance, and (3) situations in which users can substantially harm one another, but not situations in which participants can produce major external harm for others. Thus, all asymmetrical pollution problems are excluded, as in any situation in which a group can form a cartel and control a sufficient part of the market to affect market price. (p. 26)

From the point of view of Southeast Asian readers, the absence of much empirical data from the Third World is also conspicuous and disappointing, especially in Chapter 4, which analyses case studies for what they reveal about the process of institutional change. The material examined, nonetheless, provides useful insights into the role self-governing institutions can play to help individuals cope with common-pool resource problems with reasonable degrees of success over the long-term.

The final chapter summarizes the lessons that can be gleaned from the case studies and discusses the implications of these findings for designing alternative self-organized schemes of governing the commons. It ends with a challenge to other social scientists to build on the theoretical formulations she offers for analysing common-pool resource problems. While Chapter 6 could benefit from further elaboration and refinement, the author’s analytical approach is a useful one, which other scholars may develop more fruitfully.

One of the author’s main conclusions is that current theories of collective action are of limited utility since they do not take into account individuals’ capacity to build on social capital to solve larger and more complex institutional arrangements, do not stress how the activities and policies of external political regimes can affect efforts at self-organization, and assume that complete information is freely available and that transaction costs can be ignored.

In summarizing her findings, Ostrom has also taken pains to clearly identify those variables that must be taken into consideration when explaining how some communities of individuals overcome, and others do not overcome, the problems associated with establishing stable self-governing institutions. Among the variables that the author singles out as bearing on the initial likelihood of self-organization are: the number of individuals making use of the common-pool resource, the size and structure of the common-pool resource, the temporal and spatial variability of resource units produced by the resource system, current conditions of the common-pool resource, market conditions and arrangements, the amount and type of conflict that has existed over common-pool resource use, the availability of data on current conditions and historical appropriations strategies, the rules in use regarding common-pool resource use, the nature of proposed rules governing resource use, the degree of heterogeneity of interests, the community’s autonomy to change rules, and the technology available to use and restrict the use of the common-pool resource. Along these lines, for instance, she notes that the likelihood that individuals in a remote location under a political regime that is basically indifferent to what happens with regard to common-pool resources will adopt new common-pool resource use rules to improve joint welfare is positively related to the following characteristics,

1. Most [common-pool resource] appropriators share a common judgement that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an alternative rule.
2. Most appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes.
3. Most appropriators highly value the continuation activities from CPR, that is, they have low discount rates.
4. Appropriators face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement costs.
5. Most appropriators share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital.

6. The group appropriating from the CPR is relatively small and stable. (p. 211)

Given that the margin for errors in decisions that can inflict irreversible changes for the resource base is diminishing, and given that neither state nor market solutions to common-pool resource problems have been uniformly successful, there is a genuine need to learn more about how common-pool resource use schemes can be organized to avoid both excessive consumption and administrative cost. Ostrom’s detailed review and discussion on the rules communities adopt to cope with common-pool resource problems and of the related problems of implementation and enforcement should be of particular interest in this respect. On the whole, this book is well-written, in a terse, jargon-free prose, and it provides a good beginning for future studies bearing on this issue.

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This slim but very useful book is based on a panel discussion organized by the Institute of Economic Growth in New Delhi on the 31 May 1990 industrial policy measures announced by the Indian Government. These concerned the promotion of small-scale agro-based industries, and changes in procedures for industrial approvals.

The measures relating to the small-scale sector consisted of raising the exemption limit (that is the level beyond which a firm is not considered small-scale and thus not eligible for the relevant benefits), locational subsidies, enlargement of the items reserved for production in the small-scale sector, technological modernization, provision of credit, and assistance for marketing and for development of business skills. These represent a mixture of protectionist and developmental measures. The consensus among the panellists was that the mix needed to be shifted decisively in favour of the developmental measures such as assistance in achieving economies of scale in design, marketing, and research and development; and provision of appropriate infrastructure. Several panellists such as Dhar and Krishnamurthy felt that the 31 May measures do not alter the mix sufficiently in favour of the developmental measures. Some panellists (for example Desai) emphasized a need to graduate firms from small to medium scale categories; and to combine easy entry policies with appropriate exit policies. Desai (p. 77) also makes an important point that various rules and regulations of the government need to be made more user friendly, and made easily available throughout the country to reduce search and information costs.

In the area of agro-based industries, the measures were aimed at integrating the producers of the raw materials with the setting up of the processing industries.

Measures concerning the industrial approvals were aimed at increasing the freedom of those in the business sector to make their own investment decisions based essentially on commercial considerations. The procedural changes involved exemption from licensing for small and medium sized projects. Thus, all units up to an investment limit of Rs. 750 million (US$1 equals Rs. 26) in backward areas and Rs. 250 million in the non-backward areas were exempted from licensing. For foreign investment, for those projects where the import component of the capital goods is below 30 per cent of the total value of the plant and machinery required for the unit, licensing was eliminated.

The above measures represent a continuation of the deregulation and liberalization process followed by successive governments since the late 1970s. As Khurso (pp. 16–17) argues, these were in response to certain economic and socio-political developments in India and abroad and, therefore, were not much affected by which party was in power. Several panellists (e.g. Chelliah, Rao) emphasized the need for thorough going reforms rather than piecemeal ad hoc measures as announced in the 31 May 1990 package. Isher Ahluwalia makes an important point that it is not just employment, but productive