the author decided to adopt an academic format, his work would have lost its literary appeal, which it has. There are passages such as:

The President of the Philippines [Marcos] for the past twenty years must have taken a last lingering look at the Palace, its surroundings, its majesty and sedate splendor, for after all their separation would in most likelihood be final. He could only have experienced a heaviness of heart for it must have dawned upon him at last that the days of power and glory were over.

Without those passages, the book would have been an undramatic narration of very dramatic events. But to the historian and social scientist, they are not even valid descriptions of speech and action. They are verging towards mental construction, that is, towards pure imagination of the author.

The book, therefore, has definite utility as a historical source material, but the researcher must exert extra effort to screen fact from interpretation, and valid from invalid interpretation. For precisely the same reason, a reader with a literary eye would not be fully satisfied. To him, there may be too much of factual details, punctuated by refreshing insights and enthralling painting of events. If the author was aiming at both types of readers, he would probably not fully please both. But perhaps, he may not have been aiming primarily at these types of readers. The wide readership in and outside the Philippines may be his target, in which case the author will probably succeed.

A final note must be made. The world has yet to see almost six years of President Aquino’s term in office. We have not seen all there is to know about this woman leader. Besides, the national events that swept her to the presidency are far from over. She will do more things; many things could still happen. In the mind of ex-President Marcos waiting in Hawaii, for as long as he is still alive, the game may not yet be over. To him, “the last days of power and glory” may not yet be, borrowing from the author’s words. This is the risk the author takes: describing the forest when you are still too close to the trees, and to the changes still unfolding.

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This monograph is not likely to advance our understanding of the American role in Indochina very much — which is surprising since it is one of the first two studies in a new monograph series published by the serious-minded Indochina Studies Project at the University of California at Berkeley.

Allan Goodman’s monograph is an abridgement of his 1978 study, _The Lost Peace_, published by the Hoover Institution. His analysis is based on interviews done in 1974–75 with more than seventy-five ‘people (“virtually all of the U.S. and South Vietnamese officials who participated in the Vietnam negotiations”) as well as the usual documentary research. The strength of the study comes from the interviews. Goodman details differences
between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, illuminates American and South Vietnamese negotiating tactics, and describes the competition for influence in the White House among Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman, Nixon's chief-of-staff and top domestic advisor, respectively.

This is a running commentary, chronologically organized, on the American view of the negotiating process, but it fails to treat systematically at least three key dimensions of the U.S. Indochina role that inevitably affected those negotiations: the changing military situation in Vietnam; the impact of the war on U.S. domestic politics, most particularly the presidential election campaigns of 1968 and 1972; and the international politics of Washington's effort to involve the Soviet Union and China in the search for a negotiated conclusion to the American intervention. Moreover, in this abridged version of his earlier study, Goodman does not draw upon nor evaluate the more influential recent studies of the Vietnam War, such as the books by George McT. Kahin, Gabriel Kolko, and R.B. Smith.¹

Goodman, associate dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, comments on highlights in the progress of the war, but he does not analyse in any consistent way the obviously important relationship between the success of military operations in the field and the negotiating positions of the two sides. Both sides were engaged in a strategy of talking and fighting at the same time, and the success or failure of their troops in the field inevitably shaped their positions at the negotiating table.

The anti-war movement at home also influenced the positions of American negotiators, especially in the years of presidential elections. Goodman barely mentions the campaigns of 1968 and 1972 or the way in which Vietnam became an issue in U.S. domestic politics. When Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968, amidst disruptions by protestors of the nominating conventions and violent confrontations in the streets, it was clear that to be re-elected in 1972, he would have to make substantial progress in resolving the U.S. role in Indochina. This domestic political dimension of the search for a negotiated settlement is also omitted from Goodman's interpretation.

At best, Goodman's study presents only one side of the story. There is no serious examination of the available Vietnamese sources nor any attempt made to identify systematically Hanoi’s perception of the negotiating process. Moreover, the international politics of the final settlement is not treated. For example, there is no assessment made of the significance of Nixon's opening to China for achieving a negotiated withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina nor of the part that China played. Goodman does not even mention the historic Nixon visit to China in 1972, made at a critical point in the Vietnam negotiations, much less identify the key ways in which the Nixon-Kissinger strategic innovations in U.S. foreign policy linked the opening to China with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. This is especially surprising since he cites, for example, the work of Tad Szulc and Stanley Karnow, both of whom thoughtfully treated the China dimension of the search for a negotiated settlement in Indochina.

In short, this is a disappointing beginning for the Indochina Research Monograph series. To publish an abridged version of a 1978 study of the U.S. negotiating behaviour eight years later without consideration of the wealth of new materials now available seems

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¹ Goodman has, however, reviewed these and two other recently published studies in “Vietnam War Reviewed”, Problems of Communism (November-December 1986), pp. 97-101.
incomprehensible. What is the purpose? One expects more from Berkeley's Indochina Studies Project.

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This is at once a useful but rather disappointing book — useful because it offers a very comprehensive and thorough literature review of contending theories of development, but a little disappointing because its economics content is rather thin (and in places wrong), and its promise to apply general development theories to Southeast Asia never fully realized.

The book is divided into four parts. The first is a brief introduction to methodology (“the nature of social theorizing”); the second looks at classical social theory, and includes separate chapters on Marx, Durkheim, and Weber; while the final section draws together the main arguments and examines “lessons for the future”. The real meat is in Part 3 (“Contemporary Theories of Development”), which takes up about two-thirds of the book. This section comprises nine chapters which examine bourgeois liberal and Marxist theories of development and a long chapter (about one-quarter of the book) on the relevance of these theories for Southeast Asia. This review will focus on this section and, in particular, on the chapter on Southeast Asia (essentially ASEAN).

The author attempts to review the “bourgeois liberal” (his words) theories of development, but his sympathies clearly lie with the various strains of Marxist theory, which are examined in chapters 10–13. Unfortunately, his own views obscure important components of the development literature, and result in a few gratuitous (and quite unwarranted) back-handers. An example of the latter is provided early on, in the book’s summary, when, after correctly associating W. Arthur Lewis with early growth theory, it is asserted:

The idea of development is conceived narrowly: it is evidenced in economic growth ... which is called by the application of the technical scientific knowledge of (Western) economic experts (and their co-workers) (p. xiv).

For Lewis to be characterized in this manner is not only wrong, but downright insulting. But, more importantly, the author skates over a large and diverse growth literature, of growing sophistication since the 1950s.

Whatever criticisms might be directed at the literature on growth models and development planning — and there are many — a volume promising the reader an introduction

2. For example, the material published since 1978 by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry regarding Hanoi’s relations with China since the 1950s presents an entirely new official version of the international politics of the Indochina wars. See E.S. Ungar, “China Studies in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Changes and Implications”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 16 (July 1986).