that culture still contains ambiguities and paradoxes and is still in a process of evolution. It is equally clear that all cultures evolve and that all cultures begin somewhere. A culture organizes, integrates, and maintains a system of values and patterns of characteristic behaviour, and in this sense distinctive although still fluid local cultures already exist. This can also be seen by contrast. Singapore, for example, is a quite different society from, say, Hong Kong, and is very different indeed even from its close neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia.

Ultimately this process must be related back to the idea of socialization — to the inculcation of this pattern of ideas which, while it still contains many paradoxes, fits, as we have seen, into a recognizable cosmological pattern.

This leads quite naturally to a preoccupation with the problem of order: how to have both order and rapid change; authority and pragmatism; rationality and tradition. As we have seen, the concepts of "Asian democracy" in the political sphere, "Asian values" in the culture sphere, and a concern with tidying, ordering, and classifying in all spheres are the manifestations of this preoccupation. The objective of this review has been to begin an exploration of the system of thought that underlies this remarkable situation, to show that it forms a logical cosmology organized around certain key concepts. A great deal of conceptual and empirical clarification of this situation is still required, but these thoughts are offered because the "archaeology of ideas" is helpful; it assists thinking and throws light on the assumptions which policy-makers and local intellectuals utilize. It is not my place to judge these ideas. I would however argue that there are lessons to be learnt from the study of this book: firstly, how not to approach the problems of "Asian values"; secondly, how much intellectual rigour, which is not conspicuous in this book, will be needed to fully and comprehensively deal with the problems of modernization and their impact on ideological systems; and, thirdly, to enter a plea for a more systematically sociological approach to these problems, combined with a sense of history.

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This book represents one of five volumes in the 1980's Project of the Council of Foreign Relations which studies issues of potentially great importance in the next decade and beyond. The purpose, as Catherine Gwin states in her short introduction, is "to shed light on the closely related features of the South, the sources and strengths of the commitment of individual states to join with others to press for political and economic change, and the ways in which Southern perceptions of the
development problems will affect the kinds of claims that developing states will make in the decade'. Presumably, this would help the United States anticipate the demands of the South and define responses in the North-South confrontation. It is therefore written for the U.S. policy-maker and a wider lay audience who are normally ignorant of the Eastern hemisphere. It is not recommended for anyone who has been or is fluent with Southeast Asia unless he or she wants to be frustrated.

The volume is essentially a collection of three essays. The first by Pauker, loosely titled ‘National Politics and Regional Powers’, discusses four themes — the internal weaknesses of the states of Southeast Asia and the capacity of governments to cope with problems of development, the presence and roles of major powers in the region, the potential rivalry of Indonesia and Vietnam for regional hegemony, and the future line-up in the North-South conflict, forecasting a more active participation by Southeast Asia in the dialogue. Pauker, on the whole, is not optimistic about the ability of Southeast Asian governments to bring about development with distribution and social justice. He argues that it is unlikely that the governments can supply sufficient jobs to cope with the influx into the labour market and warns against the alienation of youth as a major destabilizing factor. With reference to power politics in the region, Pauker sees the decline of Western power as the result of military retrenchments and reduced security commitments, but Western economic and cultural influence will remain undiminished. The trend in Southeast Asia is to turn away from major power dependence to seek practical formulas of self-reliance.

Frank Golay in his essay examines economic goals and strategies of Southeast Asian regimes though he shies off Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. The common goal of the political leaders in the region is to maintain the growth rate. In the open economies of the region, he points out, the regimes have adopted mixed economies in which government intervention in economic processes with direct control, public financial institutions, and diverse state enterprises is extensive. This is not due to a commitment to efficiency or competition so much as it reflects a preference for control and regulation of economic activities to pursue national priorities identified by the elite. Most of the governments pursued rapid industrialization under protectionist policies and attempted to restructure the economy by increasing the role of the indigenous entrepreneur. Whilst regionalism is an attractive idea to Southeast Asians, Golay contends that the obstacles to co-operation are many and he suggests that Southeast Asia's role in the concert of Southern voices will be weak as Southeast Asia will not act as a regional entity. Unlike Latin America which is stridently seeking to radically reform or replace the international economic order, Southeast Asians, not yet disabused of their nationalist idealism, believe that there is still a reservoir of will and capabilities within their own societies to sustain economic and social progress.

Cynthia Enloe’s analysis of the ethnic diversity in the region and the potential for conflict is the most structured or least rambling of the three essays. She predicts that ethnic tensions will not subside in the eighties and will be affected by two trends. Firstly, as political authority is centralized in new states, central governments will be less tolerant of continuing attempts by ethnic groups to resist assimilation. Secondly, the increased involvement of foreign governments and private organizations will affect ethnic relations as they affect the economic mobility of the groups differently.
Ironically, regimes pursuing supposedly "integrative" policies may in fact exacerbate ethnic tensions, for governments are seen by their own citizens to be ethnically based. Enloe suggests that ethnic disputes spill over into the regional discussion of politics, and the growth of ASEAN as a regional co-operative body is hampered by the unresolved tension between member states. In the international forum, Southeast Asian nations are likely to actively support initiatives to reorder the distribution of rewards in the international economic system.

As a general comment, all three essays share the same shortcomings inherent in writings attempting to come to grips with Southeast Asia as a region and attempting to sweep through the panorama of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. They are usually discursive, sketchy, and impressionistic. Pauker's and Golay's essays do not go beyond the data on non-Communist Southeast Asian states (except where Pauker reviews Vietnam's potential for military action), but both generalize boldly on economic and political development on all of Southeast Asia. Enloe's selection of three recent ethnic conflicts for analysis is arguably a more satisfactory basis for extrapolating conclusions. Still, it was uncomfortable to find that she included Papua New Guinea as part of Southeast Asia, and that in her discussion of ethnic conflict in Malaysia she did not hint at religion as one possible manifestation of ethnic tension and Malay alienation from the governing authorities. Today the heightening Islamic consciousness promises to be a major variable affecting ethnic relations between ethnic communities and within the Malay community.

In the assessment of domestic stresses, Pauker does not give serious attention to the leadership question, a crucial factor in the direction of politics — what are the weaknesses and strengths, the skills, the capacity, and ideology — above all, is there a political will?

Since the publication of the book in 1977, the turn of regional events has completely overtaken the prognosis on regional power play and to an increasing extent on regional co-operation, but it would be less than fair to accuse the authors of lack of foresight for not anticipating the Sino-Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict.

The reader will find that the broad conclusions in each essay are essentially reasonable. The ideas are not particularly fresh and have been part of the corpus of conventional wisdom of Southeast Asian scholarship for some time, though there are many statements in the book which are sufficiently reckless to invite challenge. A truly successful approach for a broad essay on Southeast Asia which is informative, enlightening, and careful still eludes the profession.

As I stated at the beginning of this review, this book is useful as an introduction, but I would really like to know how a policy-maker can be reliably guided by these very general comments to formulate policy.

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