informal deterrent function. More importantly from an internal viewpoint, the fighting prowess and record of the Gurkhas are well understood and serve as a major constraint on possible political adventurism on the part of any faction within the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF).

This bibliography is by no means definitive and the authors have readily acknowledged this in their preface. Whilst it does throw up some intriguingly obscure references, it ignores some very important studies. Nicholas Tarling's solid work, *Britain, the Brookes and Brunei* (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), and P. Blundell's *The City of Many Waters* (London, 1923) are, strangely enough, not mentioned nor is reference made to that excellent monograph by the late Dr David Bassett on *British Attitudes to Indigenous States in Southeast Asia in the Nineteenth Century* (Hull: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hull, 1980). In this monograph, Bassett expressed his misgivings about the reliability of British historical sources and disputed whether there was a decline at all in Brunei's trade or political stability between 1521 (the zenith of Brunei's "Golden Age") and the early nineteenth century. Dr Bassett also questioned Pigafetta's glowing description of Brunei in 1521, a stock-point of comparison for the more derogatory nineteenth century Western accounts of the sultanate. Additionally, in the section on fiction, Anthony Burgess's delightful novel, *Devil of a State*, earns nary a mention. Burgess has also much to say of his riotous experiences in Brunei in his more recently published autobiography, *Little Wilson and Big God* (London, 1987).

Fortunately, the book under review, which had apparently been frowned on by the Brunei authorities because of its inclusion of a number of references to the banned publications of the exiled leaders of the Partai Rakyat Brunei, was recently released for circulation within Brunei. Otherwise, it would have been a pity that the Bruneians themselves would have been deprived of knowing the extent of serious scholarly interest in their own country.

K.U. Menon
Singapore


Professor Paul Kennedy has edited a volume that will give more food for thought to those policy-makers and general readers targeted by his earlier
work *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Not specifically designed as a reply to those ideological rivals who had challenged his proposition of an America in relative decline, this book is instead a series of case studies analysing the grand strategies (explicit or implicit) used by past Western “great powers” to preserve their national interests in the face of adversity. Thus, regardless of how one feels in the debate over whether America will remain “Number One”, these essays collectively provide timely and valuable insights into the creation and maintenance of national power.

The book begins with an introduction by Kennedy in which he develops a definition of “grand strategy” by broadening the concept of “ordinary” strategy in two important senses. First, apart from traditional military considerations, Kennedy adds economics, diplomacy and morale (or national will) as the definitional whole. Then (and perhaps more importantly), he extends the concept of victory beyond the eventual termination of the military struggle to the peace beyond. Thus, if a country successfully marshals all of its available resources to secure the defeat of an enemy on the battlefield and yet fails to secure its interests in the ensuing peace, then its grand strategy may be said to have failed.

The case studies are divided into two major sections and a concluding final section. The first section deals with Great Britain and its grand strategies in the War of the Spanish Succession, World War I, and World War II. The second section analyses the grand strategies of Rome, Spain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, either during the approximate time of their peak influence or (once again) during the two World Wars. Kennedy himself wrote the single essay in the third and final section dealing with American grand strategy “today and tomorrow”.

All of the essays are informative and cover their subjects well, but I would have felt better able to respond to the Editor’s stated purpose (to suggest a “proper balance of priorities . . . that should be carried out by the United States in the world today”) if additional essays had dealt with two areas hardly touched upon. Both have to do with the nature of the challenge.

First of all, most observers tend to agree that the most serious competitors of the United States for influence, both currently and in the future, will be Asian, not European. As such, it seems more critical to me that American policy-makers develop an appreciation for Asian motivations and strategies. Though not a scholarly study and oriented towards business rather than grand strategy per se, Chin-ning Chu’s *The Chinese Mind Game* is a good introduction to basic East Asian strategies on a practical level. In Kennedy’s introduction he quotes Edward Mead Earle’s concept of grand strategy. Earle, in turn, was probably paraphrasing Sun Tzu, who
over two thousand years ago declared that "supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting". Without proper understanding of one's most serious opponents, conceptualizing a series of objectives that will secure one's long-term interest will be a fruitless exercise.

Secondly, only two of the historical studies (Elliot's essay on Spain and Rice's essay on the Soviet Union) deal in a significant way with the second aspect of Kennedy's expanded definition of "grand strategy": its application to peace-time. Most of the major power conflicts of the past have involved at least one monarchy, dictatorship, or other type of autocratic political structure. As more of the world's major powers become democratic (or at least pluralistic), the likelihood of military conflict between them will decrease. On the other hand, with human nature unlikely to change and resources that will continue to be limited, competition to secure or protect one's national interests will certainly remain.

Whether we conceive of it as a battle or not (a new type of "cold war"?), it should be obvious to most observers that this new form of competition has already begun. Certainly, it must appear that way to workers in certain countries being displaced by more efficient foreign competitors. This situation will be interesting to observe as it evolves because it will pit the laissez-faire form of capitalism in the West against the "corporatist" government–industry teamwork model of the East (for example, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan).

Professor Kennedy is certainly aware of this emerging contest. In the conclusion of a June 1990 essay in the New York Review he questioned whether the American political system is capable of implementing an effective peace-time grand strategy and suggested that the United States may have some fundamental reorganizing to do in this area. I tend to share his concern, for neither do I have any confidence in the successful outcome of a laissez-faire conventional war.

William A. Comley
United States Army