belief in the historical victory of liberalism in his *End of History* is no match for Professor Jowitt’s more mature and erudite understanding of history and historical processes.

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A large number of studies have appeared, especially since the mid-1980s, on the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. For the most part, they deal with general Soviet foreign policy means and tactics, or the perceptions and attitudes of various Southeast Asian leaders towards the Soviet Union.

The very nature of the Soviet political system rendered it difficult to carry out systematic and detailed study of the decision-making process in order to understand the aims and values, and to gain insight into political bargaining among the various institutions. The beginnings of the era of perestroika and glasnost ushered in a new mode of political behaviour within the Soviet Union, making it more fruitful for scholars to understand the interplay between domestic and foreign policy.

Leszek Buszynski has addressed the “transformation of foreign policy upon the basis of domestic political change”. Though written before the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the author incorporates the tremendous changes unleashed in the preceding two years, and thus presents the inevitability of replacing “Soviet foreign policy” with the strong Gorbachev legacy, and the contending policies of the various republics as they grappled with the rising sense of nationalism and power struggle.

Buszynski, a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University, is in a unique position to study Gorbachev and Southeast Asia. He has the advantage of being familiar with both the Russian environment and the Southeast Asian context. The current book is his second on the Soviet Union and the region, the earlier one being *Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia* (1986) in which he explored the evolving Soviet-Southeast Asian relationship, with emphasis on the Brezhnev period. He has also published several other studies on related topics.
Using mainly Russian sources, Buszynski gives a detailed account of Gorbachev's foreign policy, the détente with the United States under Ronald Reagan, the change in Foreign Minister from Gromyko to Shevardnadze, the increased role of research institutes in Moscow and the gradual downgrading of ideology (de-ideologization). The “new thinking” and changes in foreign policy were not without criticism, as the study points out, culminating with the attack by conservative forces during the 28th Party Congress in July 1990. But the “new thinking” had its positive contributions: for instance, it did prepare for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and dealt with the changing alignments in Eastern Europe, despite the disappointments and policy disagreements of the conservatives.

Although the ASEAN countries did not feature significantly in Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in which he pronounced his “Look East” policy, they were given some consideration, while China and, to a lesser extent, Japan, were the Soviet’s major concern. Buszynski rightly observes that ASEAN’s common position over Cambodia prevented the Soviet Union from avoiding the issue or from dealing with individual states bilaterally. The period 1987–88 was the turning point in Soviet relations with Southeast Asia, marked by greater participation in the Cambodian question. The writer painstakingly reconstructs the Cambodian and Vietnamese roles in the conflict, and the Soviet connection with those two states. Several other writers have published on this event, but the author has not referred to them. Other studies have also not been included in the writer’s survey of the ASEAN countries’ relations with the Soviet Union, which were signalled by increased visits and promises of economic links.

On the whole, Buszynski has written a well-articulated and detailed analysis of the changing nature of Soviet foreign policy, emphasizing the period from the 27th Party Congress of February 1986 to the 28th Congress of July 1990. Many in the Soviet Union did not support the direction of the “new political thinking” of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, which resulted in the latter’s resignation and ultimately in the failed coup of August 1991.

In assessing the future relationship between Russia and Southeast Asia, the writer tends to read too much into the “ASEAN” attitude. There is no monolithic view or policy as far as the six member countries are concerned. A few individuals in some of these countries have expressed their strong support for Russia to be recognized as an active player in the Asia-Pacific region. The closest to there being a unified ASEAN stand was the invitation to the Soviet Union and China as guests to the 1991 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur and again in 1992 in Manila. Economic opportunities, once considered highly promising,
have not materialized. As Buszynski concludes: “Russian security concerns and foreign policy interests would be focused upon Northeast Asia without the pretensions for universal influence that characterized Soviet diplomacy. Residual political interests in Southeast Asia would remain but in general the region would be of peripheral interest to the Russians.”

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The name Pol Pot is associated with death and destruction. On seizing power in April 1975, the first thing that Pol Pot — leader of the Cambodian communists whom Prince Sihanouk called the Khmer Rouge or Red Khmers — did was to empty the cities of their inhabitants. Subsequently, he ordered the abolition of money and private property, banned religion and cultural practices, and broke up families by insisting that everyone ate at mass dining halls, and lived and slept in common quarters. People from the cities were sent to the countryside to work on large irrigation projects, the purpose of which was to increase agricultural production, particularly rice. The objectives were to attain self-sufficiency in food as well as to sell the surplus produce overseas in order to finance the building of light, and later, heavy industries.

Pol Pot was obsessed with two things. First, Cambodia was to be completely independent, that is, it should not rely on any country. Secondly, he wanted to build a socialist state within four years. To achieve these two objectives, he opted for a radical agrarian programme. He also set about destroying everything that contributed to, or was associated with, the decadent past, thereby starting from what French missionary Francois Ponchaud aptly called “year zero”.

Pol Pot’s obsession — to create a new Cambodia — brought death and destruction to his country and its people. Thousands died from malnutrition, disease and overwork. Later, more (including his closest comrades such as Hou Youn and Hu Nim) were executed by Pol Pot who was seized with paranoia, believing that his “enemies” (which included the CIA as