Consensus Statement of
the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting

1. The second Jakarta Informal Meeting was held from 19–21 February, 1989, preceded by the second meeting of the Working Group of the JIM which convened from 16–18 February 1989.

   Both meetings were attended by Delegations from Brunei Darussalam, the four parties of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Indonesia.

2. As during the first JIM, the second Jakarta Informal Meeting was organized and conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding, concluded between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Vietnam on 29 July 1987.

3. The proceedings throughout the Meeting were characterized by a frank and constructive atmosphere, with all sides showing seriousness of purpose and effort to identify areas of common ground and to promote convergences of view on the issues discussed.

4. All participants agreed to build upon the progress already achieved at the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in terms of agreed understandings and approaches towards solution and, hence, to direct their further efforts towards addressing and resolving those substantive issues and aspects on which there were still divergences of view among them.

   Accordingly, they reiterated their common understandings that:
a) the Kampuchea question should be resolved through political means, thereby contributing to the establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia;

b) the ultimate objective to strive for is the establishment of an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea on the basis of self-determination and national reconciliation; this would ensure a Kampuchea at peace within itself, free from foreign interference by any quarter and posing no threat to any of its neighbours;

c) there should be a comprehensive, just and durable solution, encompassing all aspects of the question and taking into account the legitimate concern of all parties involved.

6. Participants also reiterated the view that the two key issues of the Kampuchea question which are inter-linked are the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, to be carried out within the context of an overall political solution and the prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure the cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces. They also saw the need to set definite timetables and to provide an effective international presence to supervise these processes.

Withdrawal of Vietnamese Forces within the Context of an Overall Solution

7. On this issue, participants concurred on the following general understandings:

a) a cease-fire throughout Kampuchea would take effect on the date of entry into force of an agreement on the solution of the Kampuchea question. Its modalities and detailed aspects would be further worked out;

b) immediately following cease-fire, the withdrawal from Kampuchea of all Vietnamese troops, military advisors and personnel, armaments and other war materials would begin, with the entire process of withdrawal being completed no later than 30 September 1989;

c) the manner of withdrawal, whether numerically or territorially based and whether phased or not, as well as all other practical modalities would be the subject of further negotiations;

d) the process of withdrawal and all other aspects related to it as referred to in paragraph 6 above, would be under the adequate and effective supervision of an International Control Mechanism, which would be in-place and deployed prior to the start of withdrawal.
Prevention of the Recurrence of Genocidal Policies and Practices of the Pol Pot Regime

8. Participants shared the view that concrete measures will have to be taken to prevent the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and the resumption of armed hostilities. Such concrete measures needed to be further discussed.

Cessation of all Foreign Interference and External Arms Supplies to the Opposing Kampuchean Forces

9. To cease all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces, the participants concurred that concrete measures should be taken, the details of which required further discussions.

10. The time-table of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in the context of a comprehensive solution of the Kampuchean question and the time-table for cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to all Kampuchean parties would be synchronized. The modalities of the synchronization will be further discussed and worked out.

International Control Mechanism

11. On this issue, participants concurred on the following general understandings:

a) an International Control Mechanism (ICM) would be established, having the required components so as to ensure its operational effectiveness, and equipped with the necessary arms for self-defence and for the discharge of its duties;

b) with due respect to the sovereignty of Kampuchea, the mandate/scope of functions of the ICM would be, inter alia, to monitor, supervise and verify the process of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and all other aspects related to it as referred to in paragraph 6 above, the prevention of a resumption of armed hostilities and the conduct of the general elections;

c) the nature (civilian, military or both), composition, size, operational principles and time-frame of operation of the ICM, as well as the auspices under which the ICM would operate (whether under the U.N. or other auspices), would be the subject of further negotiations.

Internal Aspects of the Kampuchea Question

12. Participants supported the principle agreed by the Kampuchean parties that in the exercise of the right of self-determination of the people of
Kampuchea, general elections would be held in a free and democratic fashion under the supervision of an International Control Mechanism. The electoral provisions and other organizational modalities for the general elections would be the subject of further discussions among the four Kampuchean parties.

13. Noting that there are disagreements in the positions of the Kampuchean parties on the internal aspects of the Kampuchea question, notably on the establishment of an interim quadripartite authority of national reconciliation under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the participants reaffirmed the universally recognized principle of people's right of self-determination and that the internal affairs of Kampuchea must be settled by the Kampuchean people themselves. They welcomed the continuation of talks between the four Kampuchean parties to settle the internal aspects. The participants proposed that within four months or sooner, the four Kampuchean parties will inform the JIM Chairman of the results of the talks.

The Establishment of Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia

14. All participants shared the view that a comprehensive solution of the Kampuchea question should contribute to the establishment of durable peace, stability and mutual co-operation in Southeast Asia. Having studied the provisions contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, concluded at Bali on 24 February 1976 and open for accession by all States in Southeast Asia, participants agreed that an undertaking by all Southeast Asian countries to become party to this Treaty, would serve to manifest in a concrete way their common desire to achieve that goal.

15. Participants also shared the view that a comprehensive political solution of the Kampuchea question would accelerate the realization of ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia.

The International Conference

16. Participants agreed that after achieving broad consensus on the various elements and aspects of a comprehensive solution to the Kampuchea question within the JIM process, there would be a need to convene an International Conference.

17. There was a common understanding that the main purposes of such an International Conference would be, inter alia, to obtain:
   a) guarantees by all participants of the Conference of full compliance with all agreements on the solution of the Kampuchea question;
   b) international endorsement of the declared status of Kampuchea as a
sovereign, independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned State within its territorial integrity;
c) the adoption and initiation of an international programme of economic reconstruction and development for Kampuchea and other countries of the region;
d) the necessary funding for the implementation of the Kampuchean peace process.

18. Questions with regard to date, venue and participants of the International Conference, as well as under whose auspices such a Conference is to be convened, would be the subject of further consultations.

19. Participants agreed to await the results of the talks among the four Kampuchean parties as referred to in paragraph 13. In the light of those results, the JIM Chairman will consult with all participants with a view to deciding what further action to take.


Extracts from a Statement by the Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Jakarta Informal Meeting, 19 February 1989

... One of the central practical questions that must be addressed is the integration of the internal and external aspects of the Cambodian problem in a comprehensive political solution. This is the key issue that must be squarely faced. There have been suggestions that while a comprehensive solution may be desirable, it may be more feasible to work for a partial settlement focusing on the external aspects.

We believe that this is a mistaken notion and probably a dangerous one. A partial solution is simply not viable. Nor will peace be obtained. An objective analysis of the nature of the Cambodian problem leads to the inescapable conclusion that a comprehensive solution is the only practical one; only a comprehensive settlement will secure the legitimate interests of all parties concerned, the Cambodian parties, Vietnam and ASEAN. Withdrawal without durable internal arrangements would only lead to intensified resistance against a regime that was installed as a result of external intervention...

... We have to recognize at the onset there is a war in Cambodia that has lasted for ten years. This means that the international supervisory mechanism must have the capability of dealing with a situation of armed conflict and its inevitable bitterness and suspicions. The international
supervisory mechanism must have sufficient armed capability to perform the following essential functions:

(i) monitor and supervise the Vietnamese withdrawal;
(ii) keep the peace between the various Khmer parties in areas vacated by Vietnamese troops;
(iii) ensure that in the interim between the withdrawal and the setting up of a quadripartite government, law and order and basic civil administration continues; and
(iv) monitor the gradual reduction of military assistance to all Cambodian parties and its eventual cessation in the context of a comprehensive political solution.

An international supervisory mechanism could also help administer the return of refugees and eventually assist in the organization of free elections.

There have been various suggestions on the size of military forces that such an international supervisory mechanism would need. This is primarily a technical question that can be decided by technical experts, taking into account such factors as the numbers of the military forces of the various parties, the topography of Cambodia, the location of its main population centres, its transportation networks, and so on. There have also been various suggestions about the composition of an international supervisory mechanism. Once the principle of the need for an adequate military component has been accepted, this can be negotiated.

The question of the auspices under which an international supervisory mechanism will be formed and the modalities of its introduction is perhaps a more sensitive one. But perhaps even such sensitivities can be overcome if all parties recognize that an effective international supervisory mechanism is in the vital interests of all Khmer parties. I do not think it is in any Khmer's interest to see a continued Vietnamese occupation. I do not think it is in any Khmer's interest to see a return to the policies and practices of the past or to see Cambodia slip into chaos. These are basic issues of life and death to all Khmers. Once this is acknowledged, sensitivities are a secondary question. As a practical matter, I would venture to suggest that only the U.N. has the necessary expertise to put together the kind of international supervisory mechanism, including a military component, that will be needed. And a U.N. umbrella, expressing the will of the international community as a whole, need not be regarded as an advantage to one side or another. There are many precedents. The situation in Namibia is the latest. In Afghanistan, the call for a U.N. peace-keeping role came too late. It is a useful lesson to remember....

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore.