Book Reviews


Nayan Chanda, the Far Eastern Economic Review’s former Indochina Correspondent, has produced a tour d’force. Brother Enemy is a comprehensive analysis of the complex factors which led to the “Third Indochina War”. It is written in a literary style designed to appeal to the intelligent general reader, university student, government analyst as well as academic specialist. There is no substitute on the market and Brother Enemy is now the indispensable reference work for all interested in developments in Indochina during the period 1975–85.

Brother Enemy defies classification. It is not a journalist’s memoir, yet it recounts the events which Chanda personally experienced. It is more than “class-act journalism”, a phrase used by Professor Donald Emerson on the dust cover. Brother Enemy is part scholarship, but falls short of being a comprehensive review of the academic literature. This is not necessarily a drawback. Chanda has the knack of picking the eyes out of specialist writings on Indochina when arguing a point, and in this respect his text is copiously footnoted. But there is much in the book which is undocumented and unsourced. In this regard Brother Enemy is a prime reference source for information which has not yet been declassified or otherwise released from government archives.

Brother Enemy comprises eleven chapters, each of which is given an eye-catching title. For example, chapter two is headed “Silkworms and Mice” while chapter ten is entitled “A Red Christmas”. Chanda also includes four sections dealing with Norodom Sihanouk which are unnumbered and interwoven in the text like a sub-theme or musical counterpoint. Thus, the average student will have difficulty browsing through the table of contents to determine which chapters are of interest, by subject or time period. If Brother Enemy is to be used in academic courses, the lecturer in charge will have to provide explicit chapter and page references to various subjects, even though the book has an excellent index.

Brother Enemy approaches its task of analysing the complex of factors which led to the breakdown of relations among the communist states in Indochina by examining each set of bilateral relations in a more or less chronological fashion. Chapters two and four are historical flashbacks, providing an account of Khmer–Vietnamese and Sino–Vietnamese relations from the pre-colonial period to 1975. In Chanda’s view, history and nationalism are more important factors than ideology in explaining the breakdown of relations among the “red brotherhood” [p. 7].
Brother Enemy begins with an account of Kampuchean–Vietnamese and Sino–Vietnamese skirmishing over off-shore islands, which are treated more as a symptom of the relationships than the cause of its breakdown. The book then proceeds to analyse Vietnam's relations with China (chapter 3), the United States (chapters 5 and 9), and the Soviet Union (chapter 6). Vietnam's border war with Democratic Kampuchea is dealt within chapter seven. Chapter eight deals with domestic developments in Vietnam (the Hoa people), Kampuchea (eastern zone rebellion), and China (the rise of Deng Xiaoping) which impinged on the external relations of these three states. Chapter ten recounts Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, while the last chapter covers developments from 1981–85.

The account which emerges is testimony to Nayan Chanda's well-deserved reputation as the best journalist writing in English to cover Indochina in the decade following the communist victories of 1975. Each of the above-mentioned chapters is mainly written on the basis of Chanda's first-hand experience or on the basis of subsequent interviews with scores of key actors. Chanda obviously had special entrée to Jimmy Carter's circle of advisers as well as special access to Prince Sihanouk. Chanda also enlivens his account by citing high-level officials in Hanoi and Beijing as well as conversations with Soviet, Eastern European, Australian, French, and Indian contacts. Where necessary, and to good effect, Chanda summons forth his own on-the-spot interviews with Vietnamese peasants and Khmer refugees to underscore a point being made.

Brother Enemy focuses on the conflicting security concerns and perceptions of policy-makers in Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Beijing which led to the break-up of the “Indochina Alliance”, forged in 1970 in Canton. Chanda is insistent that nationalism is the key explanatory variable (pp. 77 and 102). In his view, China is bent on resurrecting the tribute system in new form and has been consistent in fashioning a regional policy to prevent the emergence of an Indochina dominated by Vietnam (pp. 123–25). Chanda points to the historical memory of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the nineteenth century, held by the Democratic Kampuchean leadership as one of the main factors in their refusal to be drawn into a “special relationship” with Vietnam (pp. 48–57).

Vietnam's motivations are, in Chanda's view, similarly based on historical experience. He quotes one Vietnamese official as observing, "In all of history... we have been secure from China in only two conditions. One is when China is weak and internally divided. The other is when she has been threatened by barbarians from the north. In the present era, the Russians are our barbarians" (p. 135). Chanda argues that Hanoi, in order to safeguard its security interests, has sought to establish itself as primus inter pares in Indochina (pp. 118–24). At the same time, Chanda effectively
dissects the notion that Vietnam is striving to create an Indochinese federation (pp. 117–35).

Chanda portrays the Vietnamese–Soviet relationship as one based more on strategic considerations than shared ideology. The turning point, in his view, came in the summer of 1977. Prior to this, Vietnam had rebuffed Soviet attempts to establish a consulate in Ho Chi Minh City and gain access to Cam Ranh Bay. In one particularly vivid account, Chanda describes in detail a snub delivered to the Soviet Ambassador by Pham Van Dong on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (pp. 170–71). Perhaps there is a hint here that if Sino–Soviet normalization proceeds, a Soviet military presence in Vietnam will be phased out (p. 403).

_Brother Enemy_ concludes with a plea for the United States to take a more active and concerned role in Indochinese affairs. Although published nearly three years ago, this special pleading is all the more pertinent as the new Bush Administration comes to grips with its Indochina policy. In Chanda’s words:

A heavy responsibility — and opportunity — however, lies with the United States. An ironic turn of the wheel has again placed Washington in the position of an arbiter in Asia. It is best placed to guarantee a new balance of power in Southeast Asia, guarantee Thai security against Vietnam, reassure Hanoi against Chinese hegemony, while alleviating Chinese concerns about Moscow, and provide Hanoi with an alternative to total dependence on the Soviets.

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Written by both American and Southeast Asian scholars, this book represents a collective effort to assess what are the likely effects of recent political and economic changes in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on ASEAN and their bilateral relations. It is a collection of papers which originated from a conference in January 1987 organized by the Institute of