
This book, written from a liberal perspective of international relations, seeks to identify a way out of the Cold War logic of structural conflict and to identify new developments and trends affecting inter-state relations which necessitate increased co-operation. While statecraft still defines the agendas and conduct of the business of global politics, the decisions of policy-makers are influenced by a multitude of factors which require a notion of security much broader than that which prevailed during the Cold War.

Consequently, Part I, of three parts, examines the history of the Cold War with a critical eye in order to distill the lessons of this period. Ned Lebow and Janice Stein expose the fallacy of nuclear security. The capitalist West (the United States) may have won the Cold War but at what cost? Did the world not come close to destruction of humanity on many occasions? Ken Booth’s “Cold Wars of the Mind” examines the different meanings of the Cold War and urges us not to forget the “real” Cold War. Amid Western gloating over its “victory”, Booth finds “a profound unwillingness to remember and internalize the potential costs of superpower Armageddon — nuclear amnesia”. If we live simultaneously in the past, present and future, then these lessons must be internalized and become part of an “honest” history. Such a history might reveal Raymond Garthoff’s contention that the start of the Cold War was not the result of structural confrontation between powers in an anarchical world, and the end, as a result of internal collapse, came “in spite of” Western pressure and not because of it. Opportunities for co-operation were perhaps missed by the superpowers based on a misreading (contrived or not) of each other’s intentions.

The resulting nuclear deterrence theory is the object of criticism through an analysis of “A Cold War Life”, that of Michael McGwire, an analyst of the Soviet Union whose career spanned the British intelligence service, academia, and Washington policy-circles. He consistently argues for a realistic assessment of Soviet politics, intentions, and capabilities. The pursuit of nuclear deterrence, then and now, is a chimera since it cannot be stable with two superpowers, let alone multiple players. A world of several active nuclear players is one in which a nuclear attack somewhere, at some time, is virtually assured. Those who formulated the theory had very little knowledge of the Soviets. Theoretical explanations should be based on sound empirical analysis, rather than the other way round — facts should not be made to fit theory. A “honeymoon” period at the end of the Cold War offers the chance to break away from Cold War deterrence thinking.
However, the remaining superpower, the United States, has not yet demonstrated the kind of leadership necessary to transform the international political structure, according to John Steinbrunner in Part II, which examines powers — the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, China, and middle powers — and their policies. For him, the United States is stuck in the Cold War mode in terms of military posture and ways of thinking about the world. Two changes in particular — information technology and unprecedented growth in world population — require novel thinking about the international system to solve problems such as unemployment. Wealth will have to be shared more equitably to avoid civil disorders, one of the most pressing problems. The United States seems not to have the will nor the stomach to intervene in every case of internal disintegration.

The problem of disintegration is most evident in Russia, which is the object of much discussion in this section. Chapters by Oles Smolansky and Karen Dawisha analyse Russia over a longer historical period. For the former, the seeds of a new political system have been planted in Russia which will help it to escape from its past. The old Russia — authoritarian, under the sway of the Orthodox church, the secret police, the bureaucracy, corruption, and nationalism — was not destroyed in 1917, but there is unlikely to be a return to authoritarianism. In matters of foreign policy, both authors point to the legitimate security interests in Russia's perceived sphere of influence, the "near abroad" — the newly independent states which were once part of the Soviet empire. For Dawisha, the will for traditional imperialism (the quest for territory) is not evident, but Russia will dominate this Eurasian space for security and economic reasons. The challenge for the states of the "near abroad" is to foster economic interdependence with Russia to avoid "autocolonization".

Such interdependence continues unabated in Europe, which defies neo-realist doom-and-gloom predictions of fracture. Europe has not descended into power politics but continues to experiment with deeper integration. Neo-realists erroneously assumed that European Union (EU) unity was a product of the Cold War (rather, it was a cure for Franco-German rivalry), that the United States will abandon the European continent (it remains despite domestic opposition) and that Western European governments will revert to balance of power policies. While the EU is not yet a complete international actor, Robert O'Neill notes that it has international concerns — the development of international law, the control of weapons of mass destruction, and the promotion of human rights and democracy.

Co-operation seems to be the hallmark of East Asian international politics and, in particular, as Geoffrey Hawthorne notes, of Japanese
foreign policy. What matters most to a Japan constrained by consensus decision-making is economic success, for which co-operation is necessary. But Japan, like the rest of East Asia, will no longer show the same deference to the West as relations converge on a more equal footing. China is the power most capable of challenging American hegemony in the international system in the future. But does it mean that a new Cold War will emerge? Michael Cox’s answer is no. Following McGwire’s example, he calls for a realistic assessment of Chinese intentions and capabilities. Worst case scenarios may be exaggerated in the light of the following: the existing power projection capabilities of China are inadequate, its leaders have embraced elements of capitalism, it is engaged in multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, it is keen to join the World Trade Organization, and the United States is keen to tap China’s markets.

The United Nations comes more into focus in the final chapter of Part II. Denis Stair examines the ambiguous concept of middle powers (such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Poland, India, Canada, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries), which by necessity must rely much more on collective means to achieve security and other goals. One possibility for a more effective contribution to international peace and security is that they could act constructively together in preparing for international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations of the United Nations, as the demand for its services seems to be increasing.

The liberal bias and the need to rethink Cold War concepts of security comes out clearly in the final section. International peace and security in the twenty-first century demands a reformed and revitalized United Nations, according to Barry Blechman in his opening chapter of Part III (“Resistances and Reinventions”). Economic interdependence, technology diffusion, global audience, and supposed emerging shared values are “leading to a structure of international politics far different from that which characterized the twentieth century”. For Blechman, there is an “accelerating tendency for countries to work together on international problems, and the United Nations is seen as the most effective instrument to co-ordinate efforts at dealing with global problems and to counter the hegemonic aspirations of powers.

Anthony Giddens’ discussion of a “post-scarcity” society creates a bridge between the international and domestic dimensions. More specifically, he shows how this influences our everyday lives and the choices we make. He introduces the notion of lifestyle bargaining, which “involves the establishing of ‘trade-offs’ or resources, based upon life-political coalitions between different groups”. For Giddens, “we always have possibilities of individual and collective choice — this is the very core of life politics .... We can try to use whatever choices we
have in a fruitful way”. Choice is also the core theme of Philip Alott’s penultimate chapter. He examines the myth of the concept of human nature, which requires us to believe in “a second self which is a universal self”, or an instinctive self. Since we are constantly creating the past as we make the future, the latter need not be held prisoner to the myth of an unchanging human nature. “We are what we choose to be”. In conclusion to this wide-ranging book, Ken Booth discusses three crucial aspects of global transformation — globalization, global governance, and global moral science. The last asks whether dominant ideas of the past are sufficient to answer questions for the future.

A minor critique of this work is the exclusion of India and Latin America, or one of its major constituents. Collectively and individually, these countries are having an impact on the international system, which is not negligible. While UNICEF’s Geoffrey Hawthorne rightly points to the need for a more collaborative spirit in helping Africa to face many challenges, which cannot be ignored, its inclusion in a discussion of “powers and policies” is incongruous.

Overall, this work should be required reading for students and theorists of international relations. Its multi-disciplinary approach and the inclusion of the policy-maker’s perspective into the overall analysis makes for a more holistic analysis of the increasing complexities of international relations. The attempt to incorporate the everyday lives of people into the broader picture of global events is an endearing quality of this book.

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When Soeharto abruptly resigned from the presidential office and passed the sceptre to B. J. Habibie on the morning of 21 May 1998, even Soeharto’s harshest critics were a little stunned that the tenacious old man had finally given up. Stefan Eklöf explains what happened in the long run-up to that fateful morning. From intra-élite machinations in the military and the regime to angry but unco-ordinated students, to