detention of Nik Adli (the son of Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Aziz) for having trained in Afghanistan and subscribing to militant Islam could well weaken the counter-hegemonic discourse of PAS. In this regard, UMNO can be expected to capitalize on recent developments and project itself as the vanguard of a liberal and tolerant variety of Islam that is more suited for practice in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state.

Whereas Hilley’s book is a major contribution to the recent scholarship on Malaysia, especially from a left-of-centre perspective, one wonders whether the hegemonic construct that he attributes to Mahathir’s conscious construction is entirely a conscious and self-directed effort. Moreover, even if it is, whether his successor, if such an individual does indeed exist, will be able to retain and exercise the construct. In other words, is Mahathir’s person interactive with the existence of Gramscian-styled hegemony?

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Ian Martin, former Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular Consultation and former head of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), is the first UN senior staff member to publish his “account of events and own analysis of them” (p. 13). (Jamsheed Marker, former Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General for East Timor, will probably be the next.) This book begins with a brief background description of the East Timor question, in particular between Indonesia’s regime change in May 1998 and the signing of the 5 May 1999 New York agreements, which set the conditions for the Popular Consultation in East Timor. Martin describes how the dynamics of the negotiations evolved during that period, particularly the 27 January 1999 announcement when Indonesia caught Portugal — and probably everybody else — by surprise, when President Habibie stated that he was prepared to accept the independence of East Timor if the special autonomy proposal was rejected. Martin points out that when the Indonesian Government announced that it was prepared to accept the territory’s independence,
the dynamics of the negotiations changed. Lisbon ceased to be focused on the nature of the autonomy deal — as promoted by Jakarta — and became interested in the method of consultation to be chosen. Martin says that “a UN-administered universal ballot” was “a key objective” to Portugal (p. 28).

Even though this is largely true, it might be slightly misleading. It is now known that Lisbon was not at all confident that this would be possible and was prepared to accept under certain conditions — if necessary and if accepted by the pro-independence leader Xanana Gusmão — either an indirect ballot in which the East Timorese would elect a representative council or an informal consultation with the East Timorese leaders. Furthermore, the author does not mention that Habibie's intention of solving the East Timor question once and for all in accordance with his interests in improving his international and domestic image as a democrat, might have been in some ways prejudicial to how most Indonesians saw their country's interests. It is also now known that, if necessary, and under certain guarantees, Portugal was prepared to accept a popular consultation materially organized not by the United Nations, but by Indonesia itself.

Habibie's timetable and his own political constraints meant that the United Nations had to accept less than perfect conditions to hold the popular consultation. The book describes in great detail the dilemma behind the security arrangements and the impossibility of compelling Indonesia to accept UN peacekeepers prior to the ballot. The decision to go ahead with the popular consultation in East Timor under Indonesian police supervision was to be greatly criticized later on. Martin convincingly explains why there was no other option. He then looks at the procedural details prior to the popular consultation. He explains why — owing to Indonesian demands that the ballot had to be held in August — UNAMET was confronted with a difficult timetable, the operational details behind its establishment, the reasons that led to the registration postponement, and the extension of the registration period. He also describes how, despite the efforts of several political actors, including the United Nations, the period from the May agreements until the popular consultation was marked by violence. Although Indonesia did not fulfill the security conditions required by the May agreements, the United Nations, supported by the pro-independence East Timorese and Portugal, decided to go forward with the registration and the ballot. Martin does not point out clearly the importance of this decision. In fact, with both decisions the United Nations was by itself interpreting and developing the May agreements. This was so because contrary to the requirements of the agreements, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, never declared that there had been an achievement of the security
conditions necessary for the registration process and to conduct the ballot.

The period between 4 and 10 September 1999 — from the day of the announcement of the ballot result until UNAMET’s hasty withdrawal — is described in just four pages. Even though the book “is not a personal memoir” (p. 13), the treatment of this period could have been more detailed. Readers will almost certainly be interested to know in fuller detail the different views of the UN senior staff members — Martin included — about the best way to deal with what was going on in East Timor. Contrarily, he describes fully the international context leading to the establishment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) on 15 September 1999 (pp. 103–17). As a consequence, and despite the efforts of those who did everything to disrupt the popular consultation, in the end East Timor ceased to be part of Indonesia. This was achieved with a lot of bloodshed. Inevitably, the author has taken a few lessons from the UN involvement in this process. First, the United Nations “placed too much hope in the changes in [Indonesia’s] military command” (p. 124). Secondly, the United Nations “underestimated the extent to which many Indonesians and pro-autonomy East Timorese still believed that the coercive autonomy campaign would be successful, or nearly successful” (p. 125). Thirdly, “the planning of Phase II came too late to strengthen UNAMET at the time this was most needed: the immediate aftermath of the ballot” (p. 126). Despite the cost in lives lost, and bearing in mind that the opportunity might not arise again in the future, like many others, Martin thinks that the window of opportunity was uniquely important. This reviewer shares this view, and although theoretically it makes sense to raise the pros and cons of whether the United Nations should have accepted Indonesia’s offer to allow the popular consultation under controversial conditions, politically there was no other way out. Consequently, Indonesia’s refusal to accept the presence of UN peacekeepers in East Timor before and after the ballot — which probably would have been able to avert the bloodshed — dictated that a vulnerable UNAMET was unable to prevent the spiral of violence.

One additional lesson proposed elsewhere to the United Nations, to take into account in similar situations in the future, is related to the role of the police and the military. Despite the organizational separation of the police from the military in Indonesia, in reality the police were not autonomous from the military. Therefore, it might have been more useful if the New York agreements had attributed to the military the responsibility for guaranteeing security before and after the ballot — a practice not followed by the United Nations, and possibly hard to accept by East Timor’s pro-independence leaders. The reality is that, if
accepted, it would not have allowed the military to hide behind the militias and to appear in the end as a remedy to police incompetence. Indeed, today, the military would not have the juridical arguments allowing them to claim their innocence since only with the introduction of martial law on 7 September did they become formally responsible for security.

None of the above leads Martin to regret his involvement in the process. He believes “that the achievement of self-determination for East Timor did great credit to the United Nations as an institution” (p. 14). Bearing in mind that the United Nations took twenty-four years to resolve the East Timor question, this claim might be controversial to some observers, especially among the activists of this cause. However, this and other critical views usually ignore the realpolitik considerations that occur in world politics.

The overall impression of this reviewer is that despite being a short book — there is much more to be said — Martin should consider the time he devoted to write it as well spent. Even though he does not bring to light unknown facts to an informed reader, he offers balanced and insightful views of the events in East Timor during 1999.

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Once again, Sheldon W. Simon and his colleagues at the National Bureau of Asian Research have brought together a diverse group of authors who provide a wide-ranging and generally perceptive review of recent developments in East Asian security from a number of different angles. The impressive mix of academics, policy analysts, and practitioners furnish a carefully considered and often insightful set of essays which address many of the major security issues that have faced East Asia in the last few years. There is always a danger, however, that in commenting on current trends, events will overtake the analysis. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States have clearly changed the way the world looks at security and have had a major impact on Asian international relations. Much of the analysis of this book remains highly relevant, but there are a few places where the