Notes

A Note on Military Organization

Preface
1. In his speech, Soeharto said he wanted to pass on the facts “as far as we know them” concerning the situation “which we have all been experiencing and witnessing together” in connection with the September 30th Movement. For an English-language translation of the speech, which ran to some 6,000 words, see “Speech by Major-General Suharto on October 15, 1965, to Central and Regional Leaders of the National Front”, in The Editors, “Selected Documents Relating to the September 30th Movement and Its Epilogue”, *Indonesia*, Vol. 1 (April 1966), Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, at pp. 160–78. On the National Front, see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 34. Sukarno had at one stage privately told the American ambassador he saw the National Front as a vehicle through which he could create a one-party state. The parties successfully opposed the idea, however, and the front became a propaganda agency for the government, increasingly influenced by Communists. Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream*, 4th ed. (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 245.
2. Interviews, Professor K.P.H. Haryasudirja Sasraningrat, Jakarta, 31 January 2000, 13 May 2000, and 22 January 2001, on which this account draws. Recalling this incident thirty-five years later, Haryasudirja thought that Soeharto had
addressed the National Front on the evening of 4 October. That is most unlikely. Harry Tjan Silalahi, the then secretary of the anti-Communist Front Pancasila, was one of a small group of conservative civilian leaders who called on Soeharto on 7 October 1965, and who was to attend a number of meetings chaired by him in the months that followed. He argues convincingly that it would have been too soon for Soeharto to have addressed the National Front on 4 October; the situation had not yet stabilized. Harry Tjan Silalahi, personal communication, 15 January 2020.

In his speech, Soeharto asked National Front members for their forgiveness for any lack of polish or coherence in his analysis. He was, he said, no expert at public speaking. He added, “I think we have a friend here who knows me, Mr Haryo Sudirdjo, who is also from Jogja. [He knows that] I am someone who very rarely makes public statements.” Soeharto is not recorded as saying anything more than that in regard to Haryasudirja. Can we believe Haryasudirja’s claim that Soeharto went further and told front members that if they had any questions about him they should ask Haryasudirja? Tjan, who was, like Haryasudirja, a Roman Catholic from Yogyakarta, albeit from a very different background, and who would go on to co-found a think-tank closely aligned with two of Soeharto’s key “political” and “financial” generals, was to become sharply critical of Haryasudirja in later years. But he found it entirely plausible that Soeharto did indeed make such a suggestion.

Haryasudirja was a leader of a small group of anti-Communist Catholic intellectuals in the National Front. K.P.H. is an abbreviation of Kanjeng Pangeran Haryo, a high-ranking noble title, equivalent to prince. Haryo, with an o, was the spelling he himself used for his title; he preferred Haryasudirja, with an a, when spelling his name.

3. Haryasudirja’s grandmother was a great granddaughter of Prince Diponegoro, who led the Java War (1825–30) against the Dutch. Haryasudirja’s grandfather on his mother’s side (the husband of this grandmother) was the son of Paku Alam III, ruler of the minor court in Yogyakarta. Paku Alam I was installed in 1812 by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, when the latter was Lieutenant-Governor of Java. Haryasudirja was a nephew of Paku Alam VIII and an uncle of Paku Alam IX, over whose installation he presided.

4. In March 1966 Soeharto would appoint Haryasudirja, who had studied engineering in London, Minister for Estates (Plantations) in his first cabinet (1966–67). That did not stop him dismissing Haryasudirja and the Minister for Oil and Mining, Slamet Bratanata, in October 1967. It was widely believed that the two men were sacked because they were not corrupt. They controlled the two most lucrative ministries in cabinet but were unwilling to allow funds to be siphoned off to support dubious “off-budget” government spending.

Haryasudirja had no contact with Soeharto or Ibu Tien in the three years after his dismissal from the cabinet. But in 1970 the First Lady asked him
to become a key adviser to the couple as they embarked on their plan to build a controversial Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah” (Beautiful Indonesia-in-Miniature) theme park on the outskirts of Jakarta. Haryasudirja accepted and held that position between 1970 and 1975. He went on to serve as rector of Trisakti University, one of the largest private universities in Jakarta, between 1980 and 1988. In the late nineties, he was chairman of the Paguyuban Wehrkreis III Yogyakarta, an association of veterans who had fought under Soeharto’s command in the Yogyakarta military region in 1948–49. Interviews, Haryasudirja, Jakarta, 31 January, 9 February, 5 May and 13 May 2000, and 22 January and 12 February 2001. See also P.K. Haryasudirja Sasraningrat, “Kenangan Penuh Syukur Ulang Tahun, ‘Commendatore di San Gregorio Magno’ Prof. Dr. Ir. KPH, P.K. Haryasudirja Sasraningrat”, 20 October 2000, and J. Pamudji Suptandar, et al., Prof. Dr. Ir. P.K. Haryasudirja: Tokoh Pejuang Kemerdekaan, Pembangunan dan Pendidikan (Jakarta: Universitas Trisakti, 2005).

5. Soeharto, Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi, Seperti Dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K.H., henceforth Soeharto, Pikiran (Jakarta: Citra Lantoro Gung Persada, 1989), pp. 90–91. In this book, Soeharto claims that the exchange took place when Sukarno visited Semarang for celebrations marking the first ten years of the Central Java military command (Tentara & Teritorium IV/Diponegoro), which would have made it October 1960. That is plainly wrong. Soeharto was dismissed as the military commander in Central Java in October 1959. In 1982, Soeharto had told a delegation of pro-government youth leaders that he discussed this matter with Sukarno in Semarang in 1956. See Ken Ward, “Soeharto’s Javanese Pancasila”, in Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch, edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Canberra: Griffin Press, 2010), p. 30. Once again, the suggested date looks wrong. Ward believes that if this conversation took place at all, it is more likely to have been in 1957, after the establishment that year of the Fourth Territory Development Foundation. While the exchange does appear to have come after the birth of the foundation, a more likely date is October 1958, when the President attended a celebration to mark the eighth anniversary of T&T IV, the eight-year cycle (windu) being of particular significance in the Javanese calendar. Soeharto’s 1982 account of the alleged conversation surfaced later in what was claimed to be a secret recording of his words. In his 1988 book Pak Harto: Pandangan dan Harapan, the then Youth and Sports Minister Abdul Gafur wrote that Soeharto asked visiting President Sukarno after the 1955 general election whether the PKI’s success at the polls did not endanger Pancasila, the state ideology or doctrine, which includes “belief in God”. Sukarno is said to have replied that the PKI was a fact and that he would change it to become “PKI Indonesia” or “PKI Pancasila”. Soeharto reportedly asked, “Is it possible?”, Indonesia News Service, no. 81, 9 March 1988, p. 3, citing Jawa Pos and Kompas.
6. This would not, it is true, be politics as usual. In the words of the American political scientist Douglas Kammen, it would be “the politics of blatant falsehoods, of hatred, of mass mobilization and of violence”. Douglas Kammen, personal communication. Few would argue with Kammen’s assessment. That said, there had been no shortage of falsehood, hatred and mass mobilization in the run-up to 30 September. For months, if not years, political pressures had been building. Communists and non-Communists had been circling one another with deadly intent, preparing for a showdown, mobilizing ceaselessly, both in towns and villages. What was new and significant was the sheer scale of the violence.

7. This saying comes with a subsidiary clause (kebat keliwat-liwat) which usually goes unquoted but which Soeharto never failed to mention and which warns in effect that if you rush into something you may overstep and fail.


9. In early 1966, Colonel H.N. “Ventje” Sumual was serving time in a Jakarta jail for his central role in the PRRI-Permesta regional rebellion of the late 1950s. In jail with him were some of the political leaders of that rebellion: Syafruddin Prawiranegara, who had been prime minister of the emergency government of the Republic on Sumatra in the late 1940s; Mohammad Natsir, a modernist Muslim leader and former Prime Minister, and Mohamad Roem, another Muslim modernist and one who had earlier held a string of important cabinet positions. Sumual knew Soeharto well; like Haryasudirja he had fought under him in Central Java during the latter part of the 1945–49 Revolution. The politicians did not know him. “Who is this Soeharto?” they asked Sumual. Interview, Colonel Ventje Sumual, Jakarta, 20 September 1996. It may be more accurate to say that the jailed politicians knew very little about Soeharto.


14. What he did create was Kopkamtib, a repressive military command.

15. The other economies were Japan, the “four tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), plus Malaysia and Thailand. For details, see “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 1. The World Bank used this term about Indonesia until the Asian Financial Crisis. What is striking about this report is that it makes almost no mention of China, except for a passing reference to the fact that China was growing rapidly.

17. Sukarno announced Indonesia out of the UN when Malaysia became a temporary member of the Security Council; Soeharto sent Indonesian diplomats back to the world body late in 1966.


22. For his comments on the ways in which Soeharto differed from Napoleon and Bismarck, I am indebted to Dan Lev. Personal communication.


25. Strictly speaking, the “nation” was never asked for its views on the matter. Arguments for an Islamic state were rejected when a team of Japanese-appointed delegates drafted the 1945 Constitution on the grounds that this would discriminate against non-Muslim minorities. A compromise that would have required Muslims to follow Islamic law was written into a preamble to the constitution. But this was dropped a day after the Proclamation of Independence when Hatta and several other leaders were advised that Christians in eastern Indonesia felt this implied a form of discrimination against minorities.


27. Transparency International, a Berlin-based anti-corruption NGO, branded Soeharto one of the world’s most corrupt leaders, allegedly misappropriating between US$15–32 billion during his thirty-two-year presidency. But this figure appeared to include a number of government bookkeeping transfers and concessions which, however dubious, did not necessarily result in funds flowing into Soeharto family bank accounts.

religious issues that had divided nationalist leaders in the pre-war period would resurface, and this generation would become increasingly disunited, promoting a range of visions for the future. Even so, the spirit of ‘45 remained of central importance, not least to officers of the Indonesian Army.


32. Their ranks include two other former presidents of Indonesia, two former vice presidents, a former prime minister, a former deputy prime minister, cabinet ministers, retired Japanese Army officers who selected and trained the young Soeharto, retired British and Dutch officers who fought in Central Java in 1945–49, senior Indonesian Army, Navy, Air Force and Police officers, as well as economists, student leaders, newspaper editors, Islamic leaders, Javanese mystics, intelligence chiefs, academics, think-tank directors, business people, novelists, political prisoners, diplomats, a former head of the presidential security detail, a former head of palace protocol and even the odd film star.

33. “In Memoriam: R. Darsono, Pioneer of Independence, Dies”, *Sinar Harapan*, 20 January 1976, *Current Affairs Translation*, published by Antara, January 1976 Bulletin, p. 77. According to the *Sinar Harapan* report, Darsono had been told the government was willing to allow him to be buried in a heroes cemetery but chose instead to be buried elsewhere. An infantry colonel acted as inspector of ceremonies at the funeral. It was only in 1950, on the intervention of Vice President Mohammad Hatta, whom he had met in Hamburg in 1921, that Darsono had been able to return to Indonesia, where he was given a position in the Foreign Ministry.


1. “The Sultan came to me and asked about that family tree”


This book, first published in Indonesian as *Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya*, has an interesting history. Colonel (later Brigadier General) Gufrani Dwipayana, a long-time aide to Soeharto, asked Ramadhan, who had produced a number of biographies of prominent Indonesians, to write about Soeharto. Ramadhan said he was not able to do that but indicated that if Soeharto were to tell his story himself, he would compose it. In the two
years it took him to write the book, he met Soeharto only twice, once at the President’s home in Jalan Cendana and once at his ranch, Tapos, in the hills behind Bogor. Once a week, Ramadhan submitted questions to Dwipa, and, every Friday, received recorded answers and a transcript. He then submitted follow-up questions. Ramadhan confessed once that he found it difficult to convey much of an impression of Soeharto, who was quiet and whose manner of speaking was flat and devoid of emotion. He was unable, he said, to draw out Soeharto’s feelings. This was in contrast with the rapport he had established with Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, the former governor of Jakarta, and General Soemitro, the former head of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib). See Kumala Dewi, “Saya Kira Angker”, Info Buku, Gatra, No. 23 Tahun III, 26 April 1997.

2. The hamlet (dusun) was one of a number of such clusters in the village (desa) of Argomulyo.


4. A photograph from the late 1960s shows a quite substantial dwelling, erected on a high, brick-enclosed base, with a tiled roof and gedek-panel walls; there are several large unglazed windows. As a substantial figure in the village, Soeharto’s father would have had a good house, but perhaps not as good a house as this. The original dwelling, upgraded when his father was appointed ulu-ulu, is likely to have been improved still further over Soeharto’s lifetime. Whenever anyone in a village got some windfall money it was used to upgrade the house. The first thing people did was put in a cement floor. This involves building a brick surround, filling it with earth and finishing it with a two-inch cement layer, which becomes quite shiny after years of being swept. As it happens, Soeharto may have spent only forty or so days in this house, although it is possible that he lived here again from the age of about fourteen to eighteen. For the photograph, see Roeder, The Smiling General, photo insert section after p. 148.

Soeharto told the Nihon Keizai Shimbun that his house had a thatched roof. See Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho (My Personal History)”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 January 1998. In the dying months of the New Order, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun carried an exclusive first-person account of Soeharto’s life story in thirty segments, publishing one instalment each day from 1 to 31 January 1998, with the exception of 2 January. The account, which was given to the paper’s staff correspondent, Komaki Toshihisa (or Toshikazu), appears to be based fairly loosely on the Soeharto autobiography. Though containing some new insights, it repeats many of the mistakes and distortions of Soeharto’s book.

6. “In those days,” Soeharto recalled, “there was no such thing as resident registration and so the date of my birth derives only from what [my great-aunt] told me.” Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 January 1998. Writing in 1967, Koentjaraningrat noted that village people rarely knew their age. See Villages in Indonesia, p. 249.

7. See O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969), p. 78. In this semi-authorized biography, Roeder speaks of Kartoredjo, not Kertoredjo, or, as that name is spelled in this book, Kertorejo. This is not uncommon: people often say kerto instead or karto, as in the case of Kertanegara and Kartanegara. Roeder’s book veers frequently into hagiography.


9. He chose as his new name Notokariyo.

10. For details, see Soeharto, Pikiran, pp. 568–69.

11. For an excellent introduction to the micro-ecology of irrigated rice, see Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 28–37, especially p. 31, on which this description is based.

12. The figure of 96 per cent is taken from M.P. van Bruggen and R.S. Wassing, Djokja en Solo, Beeld van de Vorstensteden (Purmerend: Asia Maior, 1998), p. 53.


14. I am indebted to Joan Hardjono, Anne Booth and Bob Elson for a number of observations about the sort of life Soeharto’s father would have led.

15. For an account of this system, see Koentjaraningrat, “Tjelapar”, in Villages in Indonesia, p. 273.


17. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, pp. 97–98, with the plot size figures in fn. 21.


19. Joan Hardjono, personal communication.
20. In 1998, recalling his life in Kemusu, Soeharto said, “Most of what we could see there on earth was green, like rice paddies and sugar cane fields.” *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 3 January 1998.

21. In 1920, more than a third of the land in a broad crescent to the north, west and south of Yogyakarta was in sugar production. Geertz, *Agricultural Involution*, p. 73. Under the 1870 Agrarian Law, a ban on the sale of freehold land to non-natives was strengthened. However, Western companies were now allowed to acquire long-term leases over land. Robert Cribb, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1992), p. 6. These leases were often acquired with the collusion of the village head.


23. The claim that Sukirah was sixteen is given in Abdulgani-Knapp, *Soeharto*, p. 19.

24. Writing in 1985, sixty-five years after the marriage of Soeharto’s parents, the Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat made the point that, even then, village girls tended to marry between the ages of twelve and fifteen. See Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, paperback ed., 1989), p. 120.


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of Angkatan Bersenjata [Armed Forces], was a newspaper published by the Department of Defence and Security.

28. For an excellent account of the slametan cycles, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 30–85, on which this section draws.
30. Ibid., p. 40.
31. Ibid., p. 47.
32. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 5. For more on Sukirah, see Abdulgani-Knapp, Soeharto, p. 305.
34. “Penjelasan Presiden Soeharto”, p. 22.
35. See “Kata Pendahuluan: Uraian Bapak Probosutedjo”, in Suryohadi, ed., Silsilah Presiden Soeharto Anak Petani. As Probosutedjo was born nine years after Soeharto it is not clear how valuable his confirmation could have been.
37. See Soeharto, Pikiran, p. 6, and the English-language edition of that book, Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography, p. 5, which make it clear that Mbah Kromo was a younger sister of Soeharto’s paternal grandfather and thus his great-aunt. Confusingly, the official English-language autobiography goes on to describe Mbah Kromo, incorrectly, as Soeharto’s grandmother. See My Thoughts, pp. 5 and 7. See also the Soeharto family tree on p. 568 of Soeharto, Pikiran.
38. For an account of these events and a clarification of the family relationships, see Keterangan Presiden Soeharto tentang silsilah keluarga and Soeharto, Pikiran, p. 6; McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, p. 110; and “Soeharto Outlines His Family Tree”, Merdeka, 28 October 1974, Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Service, October 1974 bulletin, p. 726. Soeharto said at a press conference in 1974 that he was “not yet forty days old” when his mother and father were divorced. See Keterangan Presiden Soeharto, p. 11.
39. Suryohadi, Silsilah Presiden Soeharto Anak Petani, p. 40. Sukirah remarried at the age of nineteen and went on to have another seven children. One of them, Probosutedjo, became a wealthy businessman in New Order Indonesia. Another son, Suwito, was for many years the lurah (village chief) in Kemusu. For details, see Alberthiene Endah, Memoar Romantika Probosutedjo: Saya dan Mas Haro (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2010), pp. 47–49.
was adamant on this point. So too was his friend Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, a former deputy head of the Military Police. As will be seen, in 1974 Sukotjo was ordered to investigate a magazine claim that Soeharto was illegitimate. Sukotjo interview, 3 August 2000.

One of those who claimed to believe this was Haryasudirja, who was, as noted earlier, a prince of the Pakualaman. Another, according to Haryasudirja, was his friend Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. Interviews, Haryasudirja, Jakarta, 31 January 2000, and 12 February 2001. Haryasudirja had personal experience of this practice. When a former Paku Alam made a servant girl pregnant, he passed her on to Haryasudirja and his wife.

According to Islamic teaching, the birth of an illegitimate child (anak haram or anak jadah) is deeply shameful.


Elson, *Suharto*, p. 4.

Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, p. 8. Soeharto does not say what this working relationship was. Nor does he say how it came about. According to one controversial, and hotly disputed, account, Notosudiro was a descendant, five generations removed, of a prince who was a son of Sultan Hamengku Buwono V by his first concubine. See “Disekitar ‘Silsilah POP’ itu,” *Tempo*, 9 November 1974, p. 47, and Angus McIntyre, “Soeharto’s Composure: Considering the Biographical and Autobiographical Accounts” (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), p. 8. According to Elson, who bases himself on Anon., “Disekitar ‘Silsilah POP itu’”, Notosudiro had taken for his wife a woman descended, by a distance of five generations, from the princely son of Hamengku Buwono V by his first concubine. See Elson, *Suharto*, p. 4.

This account is taken from Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, pp. 8–9, but I have modified parts of it to give a better sense of the words in Soeharto, *Pikiran*, pp. 10–11.


Raden Rio Padmodipuro was known subsequently as R.L. Prawirowiyono. *Anak Desa*, p. 139. Haryasudirja wrote the name as “Rd. Rio Parwodipuro, Adjutan HB VIII” on his copy of a letter sent to him by the author on 26 January 2001.

Raden Rio was a raden by birth (the title can also be given as a reward) and had a connection with the Yogyakarta court, but he was five or six grades down the royal ladder. Rio is also a rank.


Haryasudirja interview. According to the story, Sukirah caught Raden Rio’s eye because she had a voluptuous figure. This is questionable: at that time,
very few poor Javanese women were well enough fed to have sizable breasts; what is more, the *kemben* flattens the breasts and completely conceals them.

52. Hamish McDonald refers to rumours that Soeharto was either “a lost or unacknowledged son” of the eighth Sultan of Yogyakarta or a grandson of “a distinguished officer in the sultan’s private army.” See McDonald, *Suharto’s Indonesia*, p. 9. Michael Vatikiotis mentions rumours that the ninth Sultan once confirmed that Soeharto was of royal descent. See Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Soeharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 10. Elson records that he heard similar rumours. Elson, *Suharto*, p. 3.

53. Throughout that five-year period, Haryasudirja claimed, Soeharto either dealt with the Sultan through an intermediary or went to some lengths to ensure that the State Secretary, Lieutenant General Sudharmono, was present if he and the Sultan met face to face.

54. The conversation, conducted in a mixture of Indonesian and high Javanese, is said to have gone as follows:

Sultan: *Har, pernah lihat ayahnya Harto?*

Haryasudirja: *Oh, belum!*

Sultan: *Ini lo! Bapaknya penyongsong waktu Rama seda.*

There is one small cloud hanging over this story. Although Haryasudirja claimed to recall the exact words used by the Sultan, he gave conflicting evidence about the date on which those remarks were made. On one occasion he said that this conversation took place some time in 1966 or 1967 when he, Haryasudirja, was a minister in Soeharto’s cabinet. Interview, Haryasudirja, 31 January 2000. On another occasion he said that the Sultan made these remarks in the late 1970s after he had stood down as Vice President. Haryasudirja, interview, Jakarta, 12 February 2001.

By the time of Hamengku Buwono VIII’s death, Padmodipuro is said to have moved up a grade, from Raden Rio to Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung, or Regent. If Raden Rio was Soeharto’s father it would follow that the former was born no later than the very early years of the twentieth century. It has not been possible to establish whether this was in fact the case. Haryasudirja conceded that it was possible Raden Rio was born after that time.


56. Interview, Haryasudirja, 5 May 2000. It might be asked why, if Soeharto felt himself to be part-royal, he would publicly deny it. What Haryasudirja was getting at, or imagined, was that Soeharto felt this way privately and derived some confidence or satisfaction or inner strength from that belief.

Sumiskum, a diplomat who went on to serve as Deputy Speaker of Parliament, told a similar story. Soeharto, he assured Elson, “was the son of a courtly servant entrusted with wielding the yellow parasol above the
head of Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII.” Elson, *Suharto*, p. 316, fn. 9, citing a 12 July 1997 interview with Sumiskum. It may or may not be relevant that Sumiskum, like Haryasudirja, had turned against Soeharto by the time he made these comments.

57. Jono had served as Indonesian defence attaché in Beijing in the mid-sixties and as counsellor at the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo (1967–68 and 1971–75).

58. In an interview, Jono Hatmodjo said that in pre-revolutionary times it had been difficult for a woman from a noble family to marry a commoner. He knew this well from his own experience; his father had refused to allow his daughter, Jono’s sister, to marry a commoner. After the Revolution, his father had changed his mind and the marriage had gone ahead. Interview, Jono Hatmodjo, Jakarta, 2 February 2000. Did it follow that Soeharto, who married in 1947, would have had no such problem? Not at all, Jono Hatmodjo answered. Siti Hartinah could not have married Soeharto had he been a commoner. “If he was not royal,” Jono declared, grandly and a little pompously, “he could not marry my niece.” Interview, Brigadier General Jono Hatmodjo, Jakarta, 6 May 1999.

In the earlier interview, Jono had made it clear that Hartinah’s family would have needed to know everything about Soeharto’s family background. They would not have been at all pleased to learn that Soeharto’s father was a lowly village irrigation official, and the fact that Soeharto was a lieutenant-colonel would not have been enough to change their mind. What persuaded them, he claimed, was the fact that Soeharto was the secret son of an aristocrat. This claim, which carried more than a trace of snobbish disdain for the commoner, is not persuasive. Besides, it is not at all certain that Hartinah’s family would have known anything in 1947 about Soeharto’s alleged royal connections.


61. “When the Sultan resigned,” Mochtar Lubis, a prominent newspaper editor and author, recalled some years later, “I asked [him] why. ‘He [Soeharto] never consulted me on anything while I was Vice President.’” Interview, Mochtar Lubis, Jakarta, 29 February 1984. The Sultan had earlier told General A.H. Nasution, a former Army Chief of Staff and Defence Minister, the same thing. “He said he was Vice President,” Nasution recalled, “but was not used as Vice President. For protocol! And secondly he would like to see the civilian counterparts of the government with more authority. He’s the man for the civilians. But Soeharto is dictating.” Interview, General Nasution, Jakarta, 11 March 1982.

The Sultan may have had still another reason for stepping down. Shortly after the 1974 Malari riots the Vice President agreed to receive members of a Bandung student group who were coming to Jakarta to protest against some new government policy. He thought it only sensible to give them a hearing.
On the day of the visit, the Sultan found that his personal security detail had been changed and the meeting cancelled. Learning from the mass media that he was “ill”, the Sultan made a point of driving around town to show that he was, in fact, perfectly well. As John Bresnan, a former head of the Ford Foundation in Jakarta, wrote, “If Suharto could treat his own vice-president—the legendary Sultan of Yogyakarta, no less—in this heavy-handed fashion, what chance was there for freedom or justice for the ordinary citizen?” John Bresnan, *At Home Abroad: A Memoir of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia 1953–1973* (Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox, 2006), pp. 196–97.


63. Confidential Source One, 1 February 2016, and 7 February 2017. Although Soeharto had apparently been angry with Mashuri over the claim that he was of Chinese descent, this source said, he had chosen not to make an issue of it; the two men went back a long way.

64. Interview, Haryasudirja, Jakarta, 4 August 2000.


66. Interview, Sabam Siagian, Sydney, 25 September 2006. The banknotes were printed in Australia, when Siagian was serving there as ambassador in the early 1990s.


68. See John Elliott Monfries, “A Prince in a Republic: The Political Life of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta” (PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, 2005), p. 35, citing a fourteen-page unpublished memoir *Yogyase Raddels* (Yogya Gossip) by Dr Rudolf Frederick Westerkamp, who was the private physician first of Hamengku Buwono VIII and then of Hamengku Buwono IX between 1939 and 1942. Dr Westerkamp wrote the memoir for his family in about 1983. The claim that the seventh Sultan was senile is made on p. 4.


70. Interview, Onghokham, Jakarta, 11 May 1999.

71. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 7 August 2000.
72. POP was an abbreviation of Peragaan, Olah Raga, Perfilman.

73. AB, 17 February 1975, in ICATS, February 1975, p. 135, and Tempo, 9 November 1974, pp. 45–46. This summary of the relevant part of the POP article is drawn from McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, p. 108.

74. Anak Desa, pp. 139–40. According to the POP article, the President was the nephew of B.P.H. Hadinegoro, a prince of the Yogyakarta court. Hadinegoro was a younger brother of the eighth Sultan and an uncle of Hamengku Buwono IX.


76. To a critic, Moertopo could thus be seen as both a Savary and an unsavoury character. The quoted observation, by Pierre Lanfrey, is cited in Pieter Geyl, Napoleon: For and Against (Harmondsworth, England: Peregrine, 1965), p. 99. One of Moertopo’s former civilian advisers has confirmed that Moertopo knew in advance about the contents of the POP article. Confidential Source One, Jakarta, 17 April 1998.

77. During two days of unrest, gangs set fire to Japanese and other cars, wrecked the showrooms of the company which imported Toyotas and burned and looted the large Senen shopping complex. It was widely believed that the rioting was instigated by Moertopo’s agents in an attempt to discredit Moertopo’s chief rival, General Soemiritro, the head of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib). The riots embarrassed Soeharto, who was hosting a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. Soeharto forced Soemitro to retire and dissolved Aspri.

78. McDonald, Soeharto’s Indonesia, p. 198. A subordinate of Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi in Solo during the 1945–49 Revolution, Soegianto had gone on to become the first intelligence officer of the Army para-commando Regiment (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD) and was senior at that time to 2nd Lieutenant (later General) Benny Moerdani, an up-and-coming special forces officer who would become one of the most powerful figures in Soeharto’s New Order government. All three men were Roman Catholics. Drummed out of the RPKAD—but not cashiered—following an abortive 1956 coup attempt and not subsequently promoted, Soegianto was taken up, or “rescued”, in 1966 by Moertopo, a man of the shadows who liked to surround himself with men who had a similar background and who shared similar characteristics. Personal communication, Harry Tjan Silalahi, 8 December 2015, and interview, Lieutenant Colonel Aloysius Soegianto, Jakarta, 3 September 1997.

79. Confidential Source One, 15 November 2018. The two Solonese principalities, the Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran, were formally abolished in 1946 after they failed to adequately support the Republic. Following the death
of Mangkunegoro VIII in 1987, however, President Soeharto and Ibu Tien would give their blessing to the view that the late ruler’s heir should assume the position as head of the Mangkunegaran royal family in the interests of preserving the court culture. *Kompas*, 28 September 1987, *INS*, No. 39, 14 October 1987, p. 3.
80. Confidential Source One.
81. Interview, Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, Jakarta, 3 August 2000.
82. Confidential Source One, 17 April 1998.
84. Also present were the Attorney General, Major General Ali Said, the Minister of Information, Mashuri, and the head of the State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin), General Yoga Sugama.
86. In a subsequent court case, the journalist who wrote the *POP* magazine piece, Lisa Sulistio, said she was no longer convinced of the truth of her article.
88. To back up his case, Probosutedjo introduced four villagers from Kemusu, all of whom had been flown to Jakarta that morning, a clear indication of the seriousness with which the “revelations” were viewed and of the extraordinarily rapid response of those who sought to counter them. One of the four was a man named Prawirosudarmadi, who was described, correctly, as a younger brother of Sukirah.
89. He referred, inter alia, to Mbah Rono, a villager of his father’s generation who was now eighty, and Mbak Idris, who used to nurse him when he was small. One of those “authentic witnesses” who had come to Bina Graha was Prawirosudarmadi, who was now described not as a younger brother of Sukirah but as the pensioned head of the technical school at Sentolo and a man “who was acquainted with the Head of State’s mother from the time she was pregnant until the baby Soeharto was born.” See Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, p. 5, and “Soeharto Outlines His Family Tree”, *Merdeka*, 28 October 1974, in *Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Service*, October 1974 bulletin, pp. 725–26.
93. Confidential communications.
94. Soegianto and another of Moertopo’s military operatives, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Irawan (“Kacang” [“Peanut”]) Soekarno, would be associated with the so-called “Balibo Declaration”, a 30 November 1975 appeal from anti-Communist East Timorese leaders to President Soeharto,
seeking integration with Indonesia. In an interview twenty-two years later, Soegianto claimed that the “konseptor” of the Balibo Declaration was Jose Martins, leader of the small KOTA party in East Timor. Martins, he said, typed the “declaration” up on a portable typewriter with a Portuguese keyboard when he and Soegianto and Soekarno were staying at the Hotel Penida in Bali. Martins may have typed the final document under the watchful eye of Soegianto. But he was not the konseptor. The evidence suggests that the Balibo Declaration was drafted not in Balibo nor even in Bali but in Jakarta by one of Moertopo’s senior civilian advisers. Soegianto, who had earlier liaised with anti-Communist East Timorese leaders inside East Timor, had simply carried the draft document from Jakarta to Bali and was to take it on, presumably to Indonesian West Timor, to which the signatories had by then fled, to be signed by them with varying degrees of enthusiasm. There are echoes here of the spurious, but seemingly spontaneous, 1943 “petition” which Gatot Mangkupradja, who had been a close associate of Sukarno, wrote in his own blood urging the Japanese Occupation authorities to create an Indonesian volunteer defence force. That affair had been stage-managed by Japanese intelligence officers. Interview, Lieutenant Colonel Soegianto, Jakarta, 3 September 1997, and Confidential Source One. See also Jill Jollife, \textit{East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism} (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), p. 150.

95. By one account, Ibu Tien’s father was the second son of RMT Haryokusumo, who was the second son of KPA Suryodiningrat, who was in turn the fourth son of Mangkunegoro III (r. 1835–1853). Ibu Tien’s mother was herself a distant descendant of Mangkunegoro III. See Arwan Tuti Artha, \textit{Bu Tien: Wangsit Keprabon Soeharto} (Yogyakarta: Galangpress, 2007), p. 51.

96. Arifin Surya Nugraha, \textit{Keluarga Cendana} (Yogyakarta: Bio Pustaka, 2008), p. 35. Arifin does not give an explanation for what looks to have been an early retirement.


99. Interview, Brigadier General Jono Hatmodjo, Jakarta, 2 February 2000, and personal communication, Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, 2 April 2016. Jono Hatmodjo was not always the most reliable witness—he seldom came across a conspiracy theory that did not enchant and bedazzle him—and some of his claims need to be treated with care. But there is no reason to doubt that he and Ibu Tien had once been close or that he and the Mangkunegaran royal family were dismayed at the eventual outcome of this affair. Sayidiman was a friend of Jonosewojo.

100. All but one of the subsequent Mangkunegaran rulers are buried at the Astana
Girilayu complex, an elegant but suitably sombre European-style building
some distance northeast of the Astana Mangadeg.
102. A second reason for the estrangement, Jono claimed, was that one of Ibu Tien’s
sons, whom he did not name, wanted to marry the daughter of Jono’s elder
brother, but nothing came of this. According to another source, Ibu Tien sought
to arrange marriages between some of her children and court aristocrats, but
was unsuccessful, a sign, allegedly, that the courts did not regard her as in
any sense aristocratic or royal. Benedict Anderson, written communication,
September 2008. There was, it is true, a precedent for that kind of marriage.
Sudjiwo Kusumo (G.P.H. Jiwokusumo), who succeeded his father and became
Mangkunegoro IX, had married Sukmawati Sukarno, a daughter of the former
president. The marriage was unhappy, however, and the couple divorced in
1984, after seven years. Kompas, 11 October 1987, in INS, No. 43, 28 October
1987, p. 3.
103. If Ibu Tien was displeased with some of her Mangkunegaran relatives,
Soeharto does not seem to have taken any steps to “punish” them. Jonosewojo
stayed on as national chairman of a number of sporting bodies, including
those associated with lawn tennis, basketball and bodybuilding. Soeharto
appointed Jono Hatmodjo Deputy IV at the State Intelligence Coordinating
Board (1975–80), after which Jono took up a senior position in the Foreign
Ministry (1980–81).
105. Indonesia News Service, No. 35, 30 September 1987, p. 3, citing a “protected
source”. On 3 September 1987, the day Mangkunegoro VIII died, the chairman
of the DPR [Parliament] Commission IX, told reporters “the bestowal of
to traditional titles such as was done by the Mangkunegaran in Solo was best
regulated by the government since some considered this to constitute feudalism.
Others saw it as the right of the Mangkunegaran.” Kompas, 4 September 1987,
in INS, No. 32, 19 September 1987, p. 3.
106. The ceremony was held twenty-five days before the first general election of
the New Order period, although there may have been no connection between
the two events.
107. For an account of this event, from which this chronicle is taken, see John
Pemberton, On the Subject of “Java” (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
108. Ibid., p. 165.
109. Ibid.
110. See L.R. Baskoro et al., Suharto: Farewell to the King (Jakarta: Tempo, 2013).
111. James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City

115. Writing about his schooldays in Wuryantoro in the early thirties, Soeharto notes that the district chief (*wedana*) was Raden Mas Soemoharjomo. Raden Mas is a title of the Javanese nobility, higher than Raden. Soemoharjomo was later awarded the more elevated nobility title Kanjeng Raden Mas Tumenggung, KRMT, which is one level down from prince. In some later narratives Soemoharjomo is even referred to as Kanjeng Pangeran. *Pangeran* is a high royal title, meaning prince. Soemoharjomo was never a prince of the Mangkunegaran house. But it is possible, some believe, that the title *pangeran* was given to him as a “souvenir” to honour his service in generating financial support for the household. If so, this would appear to be the first case in which the *pangeran* title was conferred. See Soeharto, *Pikiran*, p. 13, and Abdul Gafur, *Siti Hartinah Soeharto: Ibu Utama Indonesia* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1992), p. 122.

117. Ibid.
118. Pemberton, *On the Subject of “Java”*, p. 166. Pemberton does not discuss the Ndalem Kalitan.
119. For an excellent account of this affair, see Margot Cohen, “A Royal Mess”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 April 1993.
120. Interview, Haryasudirja, Jakarta, 31 January 2000, and 5 May 2000.
125. Ibid., p. 22.
126. I am grateful to Merle Ricklefs for his observations about the non-existent sultanate of Kediri.
128. That story, with its implicit criticism of Sukirah, appeared in the first edition of *The Smiling General*, in 1969. It was deleted when a revised, Indonesian-language
version of the book, *Anak Desa: Biografi Presiden Soeharto*, appeared in 1976. See Roeder, *The Smiling General*, p. 81. As we have seen, in 1969 Roeder was under the misapprehension that Mbah Kromo was Soeharto’s grandmother.


130. Ibid., p. xiii.

131. Ibid., pp. xiii–xiv.


133. Ibid.


2. “The cork on which the Netherlands floats”

1. Interview, Haryasudirja, Jakarta, 5 May 2000.


9. Ibid., p. 523.


15. The Cultivation System was not introduced in the four princely territories of Central Java, of which Yogyakarta was one. But large private plantations
developed there. Cribb, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 487. This resulted in exploitation of a similar kind, not least in sugar production.


19. I am indebted to Benedict Anderson for his comments on this process.


26. Anthony J.S. Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950* (Hawthorn, Melbourne: Longman, 1974), p. 1. Sometimes, it is true, these power relations varied. Eduard Douwes Dekker (Multatuli), a European official who was Assistant Resident of Lebak, Banten, in the 1850s, was dismissed after he clashed with the Regent (bupati).


28. Ibid., p. 185.


3. “They regard Holland as a very weak power”

1. The population figures are taken from van Bruggen and Wassing, *Djokja en Solo, Beeld van de Vorstensteden*, p. 41.

2. Another half squadron was kept in Solo for the Sunan.

3. For an account of how the people of Yogyakarta saw the Sultan, see Selosoemardjan, *Social Change in Jogjakarta*, p. 20.

4. Personal communication, Harry Tjan Silalahi, 7 January 2016. Tjan, who
was born in Yogyakarta in 1934, was known, when he was young, as Tjan Tjoen Hok. He is from a peranakan family which has been in Java for nine generations.


8. Minute by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, 7 March 1921.


10. Ibid., pp. 38–40.


20. There is a consensus among historians and some demographers that the 1800 Dutch estimate and the 1815 Raffles census, which put the figure at 4.6 million, are undercounts by a factor of 50 per cent or more. Personal communication, Terence Hull, 8 May 2020. Geertz, writing in 1963, thought there were probably
about seven million people on Java in 1800. *Agricultural Involution*, p. 69. For a discussion on the matter, see Graeme Hugo, Terence H. Hull, Valerie J. Hull and Gavin W. Jones, *The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 32–34, where the figure of seven to ten million is given.


30. Ibid., p. 255.


32. Ibid.

33. Interview, Sabam Siagian, 14 March 1986.

34. Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, pp. 7–8, on which this and the following two paragraphs draw.

35. See Roeder, *The Smiling General*, p. 82.


38. For an admirable outline of the late colonial education system, see Merle Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 4th ed., pp. 189–93, on which this paragraph is based.

39. By the thirties, there were some 9,600 of them “and, of Indonesian children
between the ages of six and nine, over 40 per cent attended a school of some sort at some time, most of them at government village schools and many of them more or less unwillingly.” Ricklefs, A History, 4th ed., p. 192.

41. In 1974, responding to the claims made in POP magazine, the President said that his father took him away in 1929, when he was about eight. See Penjelasan Presiden Soeharto tentang silsilah, p. 26. Other accounts suggest that he was almost ten at the time and in second year. In 1998, Soeharto told a Japanese journalist he left “a little before I turned ten”. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 4 January 1998. According to Probosutedjo, Soeharto left in 1931, when he was about ten. See “Kata Pendasahulan: Uraian Bapak Probosutedjo”, p. 6. Probosutedjo may be right about that, but his testimony suffers from the fact that he was born in May 1930, and can have had no recollection of the event.

42. Roeder, Anak Desa, p. 137.
44. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 9.
45. See “Suharto’s Regard for Foster Mother”, New Straits Times, 30 October 1974. Soeharto is said to have reminisced about his childhood to a close friend after attending the funeral of his father’s younger sister, Ibu Bei Prawirowihardjo, or Bu Bei as she was widely known, in 1971.

47. It was claimed later in a semi-authorized biography that the Prawirowihardjo family was living at that time in Solo. See O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General, p. 83. Soeharto is quoted as saying the same thing in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, on 4 January 1998. As Elson notes, the story is repeated in Anon, Soeharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta?: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1988?), p. 2. See Elson, draft of Chapter 1, fn 45, p. 7.

49. Sometimes, too, children from poor families are sent to live with non-relatives. Some prominent Indonesian army officers underwent such an experience. One was the 1945–49 Commander-in-Chief, General Sudirman. Another was the 1962–65 army intelligence chief, Major General Parman Siswondo. Sometimes, in the colonial period, the adoptive parents were Dutch. Alimin Prawirodirdjo, who was chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party in the late 1940s, was born into a poor family; he became, at the age of nine, the foster son of a Dutch official and attended good schools in Jakarta.

52. A former Indonesian politician supported the claim that Soeharto was exploited while living with foster families. Confidential Source One: 7 September 1998. Soeharto makes no mention of any specific ill treatment in his memoirs.
53. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 10.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 84.

4. “An invisible motivating force”
2. Ibid., p. 122.
4. For a description of this event, see Pemberton, On the Subject of “Java”, p. 165.
7. Suryohadi, “Penjelasan Presiden Soeharto”, p. 29. Soeharto told the Nihon Keizai Shimbun his uncle was “a civil servant working in the agricultural bureau”. For an (anonymous) account of the kindness of Soeharto’s aunt, see New Straits Times, 30 October 1974. See also “The Night Suharto Buried His Mother”, Sun-Herald, 9 January 1972, p. 49. In a magazine profile of the businessman Sudwikatmono, Ibu Prawirowihardjo’s name is given as Sukatinah. See “Raja Bisnis dari Wuryantoro”, Forum Keadilan, no. 20, tahun VI, 12 Januari 1998, p. 37. In the Forum version, Soeharto was seven when he went to live with his aunt and uncle.
12. McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 11–12, on which the following sentences draw.
16. At the time of her death, Hartinah’s mother’s was described as Kanjeng Raden Ayu Siti Hatmanti Soemoharjomo. She was buried in the family Mangadeg Mausoleum. *Indonesia News Service*, citing *Jawa Pos*, 1 May 1988, referred to her as “Ibu Sumoharyono”. But in its 31 July 1988 report on her death, *INS*, citing three newspapers, gives the spelling as Soemoharyomo—i.e., a half-modern spelling. Hatmohudojo is sometimes given as Atmohandoyo.
17. The story is told by Roeder, who interviewed the teacher. *The Smiling General*, p. 87.
20. Ibid., pp. 9–10.
23. There were nine government-run HBS schools, two of them in Jakarta (Koning Willem III and Prins Hendrik School) and one each in Medan, Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Malang and Makassar. As well, there were three privately-run HBS schools, two in Jakarta (Christelijk HBS and Carpentier Alting Stichting [Carpentier Alting Foundation], or CAS) and one in Bandung (Christelijk Lyceum). Only one or two cities had a lyceum, which consisted of a HBS part and a gymnasium part. The lyceum provided six years of study, including the study of Latin and Greek.
24. Cribb, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 141. Most of the HBS teachers were university graduates.
25. Sukarno went on to study engineering at the Bandung Institute of Technology. Mohammad Hatta, after graduating from the Prins Hendrik School, studied economics at the University of Rotterdam.
26. A number of Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) officers—including R. Didi Kartasasmita, R. Hidajat Martaatmadja, Muhammad Rachmat Kartakusumah, G.P.H. Djatikusumo, Alex Kawilarang and Eri Sudewo—had graduated from the HBS system before the Japanese
Occupation. A number of other future officers were in that school system when the Japanese shut it down in 1942. They included Kemal Idris, Daan Jahja, Sentot Iskandaridinata, Ashari Danudirdjo, Alwin Nurdin, Purbo Suwondo, H.R. Dharsono, Satari, Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Achmad Wiranatakusumah, Muskita, M.T. Harjono, Oetojo Oetomo, Maulwi Saelan and Koesno Oetomo.

27. Written communication, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, 20 May 2002. Purbo attended the pre-war HBS in Malang. HBS graduates were generally eighteen when they left school.

28. In some cases, as many half the HIS graduates were sent to the Voor-Klas.

29. There were two separate streams in the AMS system. At the sole AMS-A, a government-run school in Yogyakarta, where the language of instruction was Dutch, the curriculum was organized around two sub-streams: AMS-A I, which focused on Eastern culture and languages, and AMS-A II, focusing on Western culture and languages. The languages taught at AMS-A I were Javanese, Kawi Javanese (classical Javanese, akin to Latin in Europe), Malay, Dutch, French, English and German, as well as all the usual subjects. At the AMS-A II students took Latin, Dutch, French, English and German, as well as the usual range of subjects.

At the AMS-B, where the language of instruction was also Dutch and where English, German and French were compulsory as well, the focus was on physics and mathematics. AMS graduates were twenty at least if they had attended a MULO Voor-Klas. In addition to the one government-run AMS-A school, there were five government-run AMS-B schools, in Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Malang. There were, as well, two privately-operated AMS-B schools, the Christelijke AMS in Jakarta and the Taman Madya of the Taman Siswa in Yogyakarta. The Dutch government did not recognize most private schools, especially those of non-Dutch organizations such as the Taman Siswa and Muhummadiyah. If, for example, a Taman Madya graduate wanted to enter the Law School in Jakarta he had to pass the final examination at either the AMS-A or AMS-B.

Students who graduated from a Teacher’s Training College for Natives (Hollandsch-Inlandsche Kweekschool, HIK), a six-year high school course for prospective teachers, were likewise obliged to pass this exam if they wanted to go on to higher education. The Christelijke HBS and the Christelijke AMS-B in Jakarta (which both Lieutenant General Simatupang and Lieutenant General Achmad Yani attended) and the Christelijk Lyceum in Bandung were the only private schools with government recognition, meaning that their final exams were equal to those of the government-run HBS and AMS schools.

As well as the AMS and the HIK schools, there were a number of senior high schools for vocational education: the Senior Technical High School
(Middelbare Technische School, MTS,), apparently in Bandung, the Senior Forestry High School (Middelbare Bosbouw School) in Madiun, the Senior Agriculture High School (Middelbare Landbouw School) in Bogor and two Secondary Training Schools for Native Civil Servants (Middelbare Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, MOSVIA), one in Bandung, the other in Magelang. MOSVIA educated MULO graduates for the civil administration (Pangreh Pradja). There was as well the Nederlandsch-Indische Artsen School (NIAS, Netherlands Indies Medical School) in Surabaya, which offered MULO graduates a nine-year education as medical officers. Though well trained, NIAS graduates did not have the same status as those who had passed through the Geneesekundige Hoge School (Medical Faculty) in Jakarta.

At the beginning on the Japanese Occupation all Dutch schools were closed. The Japanese set up the Sekolah Rakyat system to provide elementary education for children aged 6–14 years, including those who had formerly attended one of the four types of Dutch elementary school: the ELS, HIS and HCS, where the language of instruction was Dutch, and the Tweede Inlandsche School, a second-rank school which used the vernacular language. The Japanese established Lower Secondary Schools (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, SMP) for all former students of the Dutch MULO and for grades 1–3 of the HBS and Upper Secondary Schools (Sekolah Menengah Tinggi, SMT) for students of the AMS-A, AMS-B and HBS grades 4–5.


Four HBS or AMS graduates who were to hold prominent leadership positions in the post-war Indonesian National Army had, on completing their secondary education, been accepted by the pre-war Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire Academie, KMA) at Breda in the Netherlands: R. Didi Kartasasmita, R. Hidajat Martaatmadja, Soerjosoerarso and R.S. Suryadarma. A number of other men who had come up through the HBS or the AMS system and who were also to hold prominent leadership positions in the TNI had been accepted as pre-war officer cadets in the East Indies. Djatikusumo attended the Reserve Officers Training Corps (Corps Opleiding Reserve-Officieren, or CORO) in Bandung. Others, including Simatupang, A.H. Nasution, H.M. Rachmat Kartakusumah, Askari, Kawilarang, A.J. Mokoginta, R.O. Alibasjah Satari, Soerjosoemarno, Suprapto, Suryo and Abdul Kadir, attended a substitute KMA set up in Bandung after the fall of Holland. Mokoginta and Satari were in the second (1941) intake at
the KMA Bandung. Nasution, a graduate of a Teacher’s Training College (HIK), had been obliged to pass the final AMS-B exam before entering the KMA Bandung.

35. Although Soeharto does not say in his autobiography when he began at the *schakelschool*, 1934 appears to be the most likely date. Abdul Gafur says that Soeharto started *schakelschool* in 1931, which means he would have been only ten at the time. See Abdul Gafur, *Siti Hartinah*, p. 119. That would mean that he had begun at the *volksscholen* at six. This appears to be wrong. What is more, if Soeharto started at the *schakelschool* in 1931, he would have completed the five-year course in 1936, not 1939, as was the case.
36. At the *schakelschool*, according to Colonel Soepardio, who retired in 1980 as Deputy Head of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) Military History Division and who had himself attended such a school, “Pak Harto came up through the Dutch language stream basically.” Colonel Soepardio, written communication, 21 May 2002. That would appear to overstate the case.
38. Interview, Slamet Bratanata, Jakarta, 13 March 1982. Bratanata was appointed Minister for Mining and Energy in 1966 but Soeharto dismissed him the following year. Bratanata had sought to ensure that Pertamina, the state-owned oil company, which came under his ministry, transfer taxes collected from Caltex directly to the government. The head of Pertamina, Brigadier General Ibnu Sutowo, an all-but-autonomous oil czar, was widely believed to be transferring large sums to an army slush fund. Bratanata later became an outspoken critic of Soeharto.
39. Interview, Major General Achmad Sukendro, Jakarta, 15 March 1982. Sukendro had no particular reason to like Soeharto, who had jailed him for eight months in 1967. But he could not help admire the way in which Soeharto had gathered so much power in his own hands. “The ‘king-makers’ at Hankam [Department of Defence and Security] do not exist,” he said. “The king is the maker!”
41. Soeharto had evidently turned ten when he was in Wuryantoro, in grade three of primary school. He had spent his eleventh year in Kemusu, presumably repeating year three, there being only three grades in the village schools. He had come back to primary school in Wuryantoro after he left Kemusu but it can only have been for a very short time, perhaps a month or two.
NOTES TO PAGES 73 TO 81

42. See “President denies having amassed riches”, Antara, 27 January 1978.
44. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 12.
47. See Mashuri’s comment in Anon., “Isu Soeharto Cina, Siapa Bapaknya?”.
48. Interview, Haryasudirja, Jakarta, 4 August 2000.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
53. The quotations in this paragraph are drawn from interviews in Jakarta with Confidential Source One, on 17 April 1998, 7 September 1998, and 8 August 2000.
54. See McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, p. 104. This kind of analysis is not without its critics. Benedict Anderson, for example, did not accept what he saw as McIntyre’s unquestioning borrowing of Western psychology theory for Indonesians. Personal communication.
56. Elson, Suharto, p. 8.
57. McIntyre argues that Soeharto’s disrupted childhood may have made him unusually receptive to these behaviour patterns. Personal communication, 9 February 2007, and McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency, p. 114.

5. “What kind of Islam is this?”
1. When Geertz speaks of Java, he means “East and Central Java”; the Sundanese people of West Java have a quite distinct culture.
5. As Robert Hefner notes, Marshall G.S. Hodgson gave voice to such concerns

   Writing in 1999, the Australian political scientist Lance Castles noted that there had been a huge swing to Islamic parties since 1955. Three factors, he suggested, were involved. One was demographic. Family planning had caught on earlier among the Javanese, so that they had declined as a proportion of the population—and they had been the stronghold of the non-Islamic vote. Second, there had been an Islamic revival. Finally, the total elimination of the PKI and its affiliated organizations from village Java had possibly left survivors susceptible to the blandishments of the invigorated rural-based Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). See Lance Castles, “Is the *aliran* pattern in Indonesian voting in decline?”, typescript, Yogyakarta, 9 March 1999, pp. 3–4.


8. The words in quotation marks are those of Benedict Anderson, personal communication.

9. The front brought together leaders from all the main political parties except the PKI and the Ali Sastroamidjojo wing of the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI).

10. Tjan was deputizing for the chairman of the front, Subchan Z.E., who was in Semarang.

11. Interviews, Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jakarta, 7 and 8 June 2002, and Sydney, 7 April 2008. Members of the delegation had sought the meeting to raise concerns about Soeharto’s decision to ban KAMI, the anti-Communist student action front. Among the generals present were Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, Maraden Panggabean and Basuki Rachmat. For a slightly different account of this meeting, see J.B. Soedarmanta, *Tengara Orde Baru: Kisah Harry Tjan Silalahi* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 2004), pp. 173–74.


16. For details, see Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, pp. 51–53, on which the following passage is based.


18. Ibid., pp. 52–53 and pp. 240–41. As Geertz notes, *iklas* conveys a sense of “detachment from the contingencies of the external world so as not to be disturbed when things go awry in it or if something unexpected occurs. Geertz’s account of the way a mother steps over her son three times was
drawn from his observations in Pare, near Kediri, in East Java. It is not clear how widespread this practice was.

19. Benedict Anderson, personal communication, on which the following sentences are based.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p. 326.

26. I am indebted to Mohammad Said Reksohadiprodjo, Susilo Harjoparakoso and Major General Sudjono Humardani for my understanding of some of the matters discussed in this and the following paragraphs. Interviews, Mohammad Said, Jakarta, 8 March 1978; Susilo Harjoparakoso, Jakarta, March 1978, and Major General Sudjono Humardani, Jakarta, 12 March 1978. As Sudjono saw it, there are four elements—water, air, fire and earth—and one draws from them additional powers which one can use to do good. It is necessary to do this continuously to develop one’s harmony with God. You do this not only for yourself and your community but also for your country.

27. Interview, Mohammad Said Reksohadiprodjo, Jakarta, 8 March 1978.


30. In his memoirs, Soeharto makes no mention of the fact that he lived with Daryatmo, saying only that he sometimes went alone to his home. But the claim is made quite explicitly in Roeder, *The Smiling General*, p. 89, and there is no reason to disbelieve it, given that Soeharto was Roeder’s primary source when he wrote that book. Another source is adamant that Soeharto lived as orang ngéngér with Daryatmo. Confidential communication, Jakarta, 7 September 1998.

31. I am indebted to Angus McIntyre for his observations on this point and for his insights, reflected in the following sentences of this paragraph, into the way in which Daryatmo was to influence Soeharto’s life. Personal communications, 9 and 14 February 2007.

32. “Watashi no Rirekisho”, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Pt 4, 5 January 1998. It is not clear whether “creed” means the Islamic Confession of Faith. It is possible that something was lost in the translation from Indonesian to Japanese and then to English. The Japanese journalist uses the words *shoto chugakko* (elementary junior high). The reference is clearly to the *schakelschool*. As has been noted, *schakelschool* was not junior high school but a prelude to it.


34. Ibid., p. 12.

40. Confidential Source Seven.
42. Interview, General Benny Moerdani, Jakarta, 18 September 1998.
43. Interview, Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 8 March 1978. Natsir, who was sixty-nine in early 1978, was born in West Sumatra. Educated at the pre-war AMS-A II senior high school in Bandung, he served as Minister of Information in 1946–47 and 1948–49 and as Prime Minister in 1950–51. In 1967 he founded, and became general chairman of, the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council) which sought to promote the further Islamization of Indonesian society. He was also vice president of the World Islamic Congress. The Dewan Dakwah received significant sums of money from Saudi Arabia, something that continues to this day. Surprisingly perhaps, Soeharto did not see any danger in that.
44. Roeslan’s title was Ketua Tim Penasihat Presiden mengenai Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P7).
45. Interview, Roeslan Abdulgani, Jakarta, 26 March 1982. It might be argued that Sukarno was naïve in believing that the deeply divergent interests and aspirations of Indonesian Communists and Muslims, differences which had surfaced as early as the 1920s, could be kept in check indefinitely. There had been stark evidence of those distinctions when Communists and Muslims clashed during the bitter Madiun Affair of 1948, with the Hatta Government and the central army leaders lining up against the Communists. The differences between Communists and Muslims were to come to the fore again, with far greater bloodletting, following the attempted “coup” of 1965. Whether that was at heart an internal army affair, as some historians argue, or something rather more complex, there can be no doubt that army officers, angry and determined men led by Soeharto, encouraged the mass slaughter on Java, Bali and elsewhere. That should not, however, blind us to the deeply entrenched religious and class hatreds that underlay the extreme violence of that time. Many of the Muslims, Hindus and Christians who participated in the killing appear to have done so quite willingly.
46. Interview, Slamet Bratanata, 25 March 1982. Frans Seda related the story, Bratanata said, at the home of the Australian ambassador.
47. Interview, Soedjatmoko, Jakarta, 8 August 1978. I drew on this interview in
**Suharto and His Generals**, albeit without identifying Soedjatmoko, who wished at that time to remain out of the limelight. But as these observations go to the heart of Soeharto’s attitude towards Islam, or at least political Islam, in the late seventies, I think they bear repeating here. I have corrected one or two minor errors in the interview transcript.


51. More prosaically, it might be argued that Pancasila was not so very different from the generalized principles enunciated by other political leaders, including Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who, in 1898, had proclaimed his Three Principles (nationalism, democracy and socialism).

52. See, for example, Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society”, p. 32, fn. 83. An article on the president’s pilgrimage in Tempo, 6 July 1991, Hefner notes, made the point that the president received part of his education in Muhammadiyah schools and read the Arabic script. Tempo may have over-egged that argument. As far as one can tell, Soeharto attended only one Muslim-run school, the Muhammadiyah *schakelschool* in Yogyakarta. Nor is it clear how much of the Arabic script he would have learnt, or remembered, from his school days, or what bearing that might have had on his thinking about Islam. As we have seen, the evidence suggests that Islamic principles and doctrines impinged only marginally on his attachment to Javanese beliefs. It is possible that Soeharto studied Arabic in the late 1980s and early 1990s; but, once again, we are entitled to wonder what, if any, impact that had on his thinking.

53. Born in 1936, Kosim Nurseha did not participate in the 1945–49 Revolution but subsequently joined the Indonesian National Army. The Soeharto family is said to have become especially close to Professor Mohammad Quraish Shihab, rector of the tertiary-level State Islamic Religious Institute (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) in Jakarta, following the funeral of Ibu Tien. Quraish Shihab served as Minister for Religion during the final two months of Soeharto’s presidency.


55. General Nasution, commenting on Soeharto’s use of *bismillah* in speeches, thought this might have been a reflection of Habibie’s influence. Interview, Nasution, Jakarta, 15 July 1995.

56. Confidential Source One.


60. Ibid., p. 121.
61. Greg Fealy, quoting a Muslim intellectual who was close to the Habibie family. Personal communication. Traditionalist Muslims, such as those in the NU, will have the imam whisper instructions into the ear of the deceased regarding what they should say on Judgment Day. Muhammadiyah people do not do this. As Fealy notes, some members of Muhammadiyah claimed Soeharto as one of their own, “although it is by no means clear, of course, that he saw things this way,” because he had spent some time at a Muhammadiyah school and because he appointed many Muhammadiyah people, but not NU people, to key positions. That is true. Soeharto was closer to Muhammadiyah leaders and members than he was to those from NU. That may also be due to the fact that Muhammadiyah is centred on Yogyakarta, while NU has much of its core strength in East Java. There are clear differences in the mentality of the Yogyanese and the East Javanese. In Yogyakarta, and indeed in Indonesia more broadly, the East Javanese are seen as blunt, open-minded and, in certain districts, somewhat kasar (unrefined). For an account of Javanese customs relating to death, see Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, pp. 68–72, and Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture*, pp. 361–65.
63. Interview, General Benny Moerdani, Jakarta, 17 September 1997. Moerdani had attended some, if not all, of these ceremonies, at the Soeharto house in Jalan Cendana in Jakarta and at a family retreat, presumably the Ndalem Kalitan palace, in Solo. In Fealy’s view, Moerdani’s remarks about the funeral might be seen by some as typical Catholic stereotyping of Muslim practices. As he puts it, “Yes, he’s correct that there’s no slametan in Saudi Arabia but that’s hardly the benchmark for Indonesian Islam, and especially at that time. NU people do often use slametan, or a somewhat Arabized version of it. Muhammadiyah people don’t.” Greg Fealy, personal communication.
64. Written communication, Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, 6 December 2018. Sayidiman, who was born in 1927, had been a student at the pre-war HBS high school in Semarang, where the language of instruction was Dutch and the teaching standards high. When the Japanese closed all Dutch schools he enrolled in the Taman Madya senior high school in Yogyakarta. Taman Madya was run by the Taman Siswa, the nationalist school system founded by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. Dewantoro was concerned about Javanese identity and held views on Islam that would have been anathema “to the more puritanical of Islamic reformers”. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, p. 49. Taman Siswa’s kebatinan background, Ruth McVey notes, marked it as on the abangan side of Java’s great cultural cleavage. Ruth T. McVey, “Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening”, *Indonesia*, No. 4 (October 1967), p. 131. Although Sayidiman was much influenced by
his education at the Taman Madya, he would later become a member of ICMI.

6. “Soeharto is a closed book”

1. Soeharto was not overly particular in his categorization. In the text of his *Pikiran*, he refers to three “don’ts” and includes *ojo dumeh*, the odd aphorism out, as the third in the listing. In an appendix, he includes all four “don’ts”, with *ojo gugupan* tacked on at the end. For details see Soeharto, *Pikiran*, p. 13 and pp. 570–71, and Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, p. 11 and p. 488.


4. Nono Anwar Makarim, personal communication, Sydney, 27 June 1989. A second message of the speech, said Makarim, was that there had been a constitutional transfer of power in 1966; there had been no coup d’etat.


6. At the same time, his management style was often surprisingly hands-off. Once he had determined the course, Soeharto left its implementation to his subordinates, often giving them no clear instructions about how a goal was to be achieved, leaving them to fathom his intentions, not always an easy task.

7. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 272. Yet another aphorism that commended itself to Soeharto was *mikul dhuwur mendhem jero*, which literally means “to lift up high and to bury deep”. This, as he was fond of pointing out, encapsulated the attitude one should adopt towards one’s parents or ancestors. “We must not defame them in any way,” Soeharto explained. Should they have erred or made mistakes, there was no need to bring those faults or shortcomings into the open. Rather, those faults should buried deep while those who had observed them should do their best not to make similar mistakes. Soeharto, *Pikiran*, p. 576. As well as all this, Soeharto said he liked to remember “the teachings of our ancestors: respect for God, teacher, government and parents”. He realized, he says, in a homily that sits uneasily alongside some of his other, more direct remarks, “how much I loved my parents and how much I was loved by them, my foster parents, my brothers and sisters, both the children of my own parents as well as those of my stepfather”. The translation is from Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, p. 11.


9. See J.B. Soedarmanta, *Tengara Orde Baru: Kisah Harry Tjan Silalahi*, p. 190. Djatikusumo was a son of Pakubuwono X by one of his forty secondary wives.

12. For details, see ibid., pp. 227–48, on which the following section is substantially based.
15. Ibid., pp. 239–40.
16. As noted earlier, *iklas* involves making oneself as impervious as possible to the inevitable disruptions and dislocations of everyday life, achieving a certain inner serenity, calmness, tranquillity and imperturbability. See Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, pp. 240–41. I am indebted also to Ben Anderson for his insights into these Javanese values.
17. Ibid., p. 241.
19. Personal communication, Roeslan Abdulgani.
23. Interview, Jusuf Wanandi, Canberra, 7 April 1993. In 1967 Wanandi joined the staff of Major General Ali Moertopo, a member of Soeharto’s personal staff (Spri), which was widely seen as a powerful “kitchen cabinet”.
27. See *Jakarta Post*, *Sinar Harapan* and *Terbit*, 12 March 1985. USETUPS.
28. Personal communication, Richard Woolcott.
29. Personal communication, Sabam Siagian.
32. *Abangan* families preferred to send their children to government-run schools, but that opportunity was not always available. If a place could not be found in a government school few *abangan* parents were opposed to sending a child to a privately-run Muslim or Christian school.
34. The suggestion that he attended a MULO school is in Elson, *Suharto*, p. 6, citing *Kompas*, 23 March 1973, and in Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, p. 118. *Kompas* erred in claiming that Soeharto had two years at a MULO school. Soeharto makes it plain he did not go beyond the Muhammadiyah
schakelschool, which he completed in 1939. See Soeharto, *Pikiran*, p. 16. If Soeharto had attended a MULO school, even for two years, he would have been able to speak Dutch quite well, which was not the case.

36. Taman Madya was the senior high school run by the Taman Siswa.
42. This is now Bank Rakyat Indonesia.
44. In 1998 Soeharto told a Japanese journalist he left the bank due to a minor “shippai”. *Shippai* is a Japanese word which can be translated as a mistake, a failure, a blunder or a goof. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 5 January 1998.
46. Dr B.J. Habibie, who was to meet Soeharto in 1950 and remain close for the best part of half a century, was asked once to name some of Soeharto’s friends. After thinking it over for some time he tentatively suggested the names of several senior army officers, none of whom would have seen himself as a friend of the former President or have been seen as such by anyone else. Interview, Dr B.J. Habibie, Paris, 28 June 2001. Nor could anyone else name many or any friends, save for the odd *cukong* (Chinese businessman), which was itself revealing.
47. Confidential Source One, Jakarta, 7 September 1998. This source acknowledged that the rumours, though persistent, had never been confirmed. As it happens, the *mantri polisi* was the future father-in-law of a future Attorney General, Sukarton.
49. Personal communication, Colonel Carel Heshusius.
52. Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia’s first Vice President, made the disclosure about Sukarno’s mercy plea during a reunion of pioneers in 1968. See *Antara* in English, 13.42 GMT, 16 February 1968.
53. Sabam Siagian, personal communication.
54. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 3 September 1998.
and 324–27. During his time in Moscow, Lockhart had been implicated in a plot to assassinate Lenin.


60. Ibid.

61. Written communication. Lieutenant General Sayidiman.


64. I am indebted to Henk Schulte Nordholt for making this point.


66. Ibid.


69. I am grateful to Angus McIntyre for his comments on this section and have drawn significantly on his thinking, not least about the notion of compensation. McIntyre, personal communications, 9 and 14 February 2007.

7. “I was suited to the disciplined life of the military”


2. See record of conversation between the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and the Dutch Minister, E. Michiels van Verduyven, 29 July 1940, FO 371/24717 [F3687/2739/61], cited in Tarling, *Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War*, pp. 144–45. As it turned out, the Dutch would never have been
prepared to resist the Japanese alone. Written communication, Dr P.M.H. Groen, 3 June 2019.


4. Tarling, *Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War*, p. 147.


10. From the time of its formation in 1830 until 1933 this force was known simply as the East Indies Army (Oost-Indische leger). At that time, it assumed the name KNIL. See Zwitzer and Heshusius, *Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger 1830–1950*, p. 10. At the end of 1948 the word “Indonesisch” was substituted for the word “Indisch”.

11. Historians believe that perhaps 250,000 Javanese died during the Java War, with the Dutch side losing the lives of 8,000 European and 7,000 indigenous soldiers. About 100,000 Acehnese (and 12,000 men from the Dutch side) lost their lives in operations during the Aceh War. According to Dutch sources, 58,000 Acehnese were killed during the last fifteen years of the Aceh War (1899–1914). Cribb, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 226, Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 4th ed., p. 142, and written communication, Dr Petra Groen, 3 June 2019.


17. Colonel Heshusius, personal communication.
18. In 1938, when the population of the East Indies was approaching seventy million, the KNIL was a force of 35,400 men. At the top of the pyramid was an officer corps of 1,066 men, about half of them “true Dutch”, the others Eurasian. At the next level down were 8,200 non-commissioned officers. Most of the sergeant-majors were Dutch or Eurasian. But about half the sergeants were Indonesian, as were about 85 per cent of the corporals. At the base of the pyramid were 26,150 enlisted men, most of them Indonesian but with about 1,500 Europeans and Eurasians. Written communication, Colonel Heshusius, 18 April 2001.

19. Written communication, Dr Petra Groen, 3–5 June 2019, citing the Koloniaal Verslag, a report on the situation in the Dutch colonies which was sent to the Dutch Parliament annually from 1848 to 1939. From 1930 onwards this report was known as the Indisch Verslag. The annual recruitment figures are to be found in Annexes B, C or D of the Koloniaal Verslagen.


24. Not that this made much difference. The Koloniale Verslagen reported year after year that it was impossible to recruit enough Eurasian soldiers.


27. In 1998 Soeharto claimed that until the immediate pre-war period the Dutch had “recruited soldiers mainly from the eastern islands, such as Ambon, where the people were Christians who felt close to the Dutch. But as it became necessary to meet the Japanese advance to the southern areas they changed their recruitment policy and hired Muslim Javanese as well.” [Italics added]. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5 January 1998. Soeharto may not have been guilty of bad faith when he made that observation. But his comments betray, at the very least, a certain disregard for the truth and a pervasive ignorance, characteristics which seemed to exist side-by-side with an excellent memory and, when it suited him, fastidious attention to detail. The belief that the KNIL was made up largely of Menadonese and Ambonese finds expression in numerous Western academic studies. For example, Benda writes that the KNIL “had been predominantly recruited from among Christian Indonesians.” See Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942–1945 (KITLV,
Dordrecht: Foris Publications Holland/USA, 1983 [original: The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958]), p. 254, fn 48. Benedict Anderson has argued that Soeharto was following the established national line when he made these observations. That line was influenced, he believes, by the fact that after the revolution broke out, most Javanese ex-KNIL disappeared or entered the TNI, while many Menadonese and Ambonese stayed with the KNIL, so that probably the ratios of Easterners and Javanese changed completely from 1940 to 1946. Personal communication.

28. See J.J. Nortier, *De Japanse aanval op Nederlands-Indie* [The Japanese Attack on the Netherlands Indies] (Rotterdam: Ad. Donker, 1988), p. 10. The other main groups were the Menadonese (15 per cent), the Ambonese (12 per cent), the Sundanese (5 per cent) and the Timorese (4 per cent). The Dutch drew no distinction between those from East and Central Java. In 1905, the colonial army and navy had consisted of 15,866 European officers and men and 26,276 Indonesians, most of whom were in the army. Of these, 68 per cent were Javanese. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 4th ed., p. 179.

29. Zwitzer and Heshusius, *Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger 1830–1950*, p. 10. The other main ethnic groups at that time were the Sundanese (1,800) and the Timorese (1,100). There were 400 others, including Madurese, Buginese, Acehnese and Malays.


32. Nortier, Kuitj and Groen, *De Japanse aanval op Java, Maart 1942*, pp. 255–56. Some Indonesian and Western writers have failed to pay sufficient attention to this striking post-1936 bifurcation within the KNIL. Writing in 1956, the then Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, Major General A.H. Nasution, who had joined the KNIL in 1940, claimed that, “The KNIL army was simply a police army, comparable to our present [Police] Mobile Brigade and State Police. Its assignment was to suppress ‘the enemy within the country’, its organization was smaller than our present Mobile Brigade and it had only a few more men than the [East Indies] Police. Thanks to the efficient policies of the colonizers, these two small police organizations, the [East Indies] Police and the KNIL, were able to maintain internal security in the widespread archipelago.” Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, vol. I [The Indonesian National Army, vol. I] (Jakarta: Jajasan Pustaka Militer, 1956), JPRS translation, p. 50.

33. The KNIL was entirely separate from the Dutch Army, or Koninklijke Landmacht. As previously mentioned, the Commander-in-Chief of the KNIL
came under the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, who was generally a civilian but sometimes a retired general. The Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies squadron of the Dutch Navy (Koninklijke Marine) reported administratively to the Minister of Defence but was placed at the operational disposal of the Governor General, who reported to the Minister of Colonies. Bussemaker, “Paradise in Peril”, p. 328.

34. The Java-based field battalions were supported by seven squadrons of cavalry, by artillery units, some of them mechanized, some of them dependent on pack horses, and by twenty-four light tanks, the nucleus of a planned armoured corps. Six of the garrison battalions were on Java, the remaining twelve in the Outer Islands. Interview, Colonel C.A. Heshusius, The Hague, 23 April 2001, and written communication, Petra Groen, 5 July 2019.

In 1890, when conventional military tactics were found wanting in Aceh, the Dutch had established a Korps Maréchaussée. The corps had considerable success in counter guerrilla and commando operations. Maréchaussée battalions, each consisting of two companies, were later set up on Java to deal with such things as banditry; the theft of plantation rubber and sugar cane, a common problem in East Java, and arson attacks on sugar plantations carried out by villagers at being forced to plant so much of their land under sugar cane. These units were known informally as the “asphalt [ashphalt] Maréchaussée” because they were deployed by road. Interview, Colonel C.A. Heshusius, The Hague, 23 April 2001, Zwitzer and Heshusius, Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, 1830–1950, p. 102, and Cribb, Historical Dictionary, pp. 285–86.

35. Petra Groen, written communication, 5 July 2019, citing “HQ KNIL. The Netherlands East Indies Army,” prepared at the office of the US Army Liaison Officer and the Netherlands Indies War Office, Bandoeng, Java, 1940–1941. NIMH.

36. These two forts were almost self-contained towns, sheltering behind ramparts up to six yards thick, sprawling over many acres, home to more than 250 officers and men, with administration and accommodation blocks, armouries, storerooms, kitchens, garages and blacksmiths forges, many of the buildings with steeply-pitched North Sea roofs, everything kept neat and freshly whitewashed.

37. It has been suggested that the police had only a limited presence in the Outer Islands and that responsibility for meeting serious challenges to public order rested with the army. Interview, Colonel C.A. Heshusius, The Hague, 23 April 2001. That may have been the case in the early years of the twentieth century. In 1905, the colonial police force had only 2,235 men in the Outer Islands. See Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades: Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915 (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 2005), p. 66. Twenty-five years later, however, police numbers outside Java had more than quadrupled. In 1930, the Veldpolitie (Field Police) had 4,654 men in the Outer Islands while the Algemene Politie (General Police) had 5,063 men, of whom 183 were European. Written communication, Dr Petra Groen, 3–5 June 2019, citing the Koloniale Verslagen. In the 1930s the colonial police force reached a maximum strength of 54,000 men, some 52,000 of whom were Indonesian. By that time, it was well established that it was the police force which had to deal with civil unrest in the first instance. The army only assisted the police when the latter could not handle the situation, as happened, for example, during the PKI uprisings of 1926–27. For a comprehensive study of the police in the Netherlands East Indies, see Marieke Bloembergen, De geschiedenis van de politie in Nederlands-Indië: Uit zorg en angst (Amsterdam: Boom; Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), published in Indonesian as Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda: Dari Kepedulian dan Ketakutan (Jakarta, Kompas and KITLV-Jakarta, 2011). The figure of 54,000 is from the Indisch Verslag II 1933. See Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda, p. xxxi. Bloembergen argues that the Veldpolitie had extensive experience in riot control.


39. Each brigade was commanded by a European, a Eurasian or an Indonesian sergeant first class. In Aceh, many of these nineteen-man patrols were conducted by the Korps Maréchaussée. In 1927 there were some 560 KNIL brigades in the Outer Islands, of which 168 were in Aceh. Of these 168, 108 were infantry brigades and 60 Maréchaussée brigades. Zwitzer and Heshusius, Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, 1830–1950, p. 102. In many armies, a brigade is a much larger force, made up of several regiments.

40. Interview, Colonel Alex Kawilarang, Jakarta, 31 August 1998. By the time the Japanese did attack Sumatra, in February 1942, Palembang was defended by six infantry companies (equivalent to one-and-a-half battalions), one machine-gun company and a section of artillery. Needless to say, that was no deterrent to the Japanese, who had launched the Pacific War to secure, above all, the oil at Palembang. They assigned a full division and some 300 aircraft to Operation L, the seizure of Bangka Island and Palembang. For details of the Japanese attack, see Willem Remmelink, ed. and trans., The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies [a translation of Volume 3 of the 102-volume Japanese War History Series, Ran-In Koryaku Sakusen (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1967)] (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2015), p. 265.
41. These troops were based, for the most part, at large garrisons on Java.
42. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 16.
43. He would also have received, as part of the standard issue for new recruits,
a sleeping mat, a blanket, a leather belt, singlets, underpants, socks, puttees,
a bamboo hat, a cap, a bivouac balaclava, a spoon and fork, a bowl, a pocket
knife, a water bottle, a gas mask and a collapsible spade.
44. Written communication, Colonel Heshusius, 17 October 1999. The material in
this section draws on information provided by Colonel Heshusius.
45. Marc Lohnstein, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army 1936–42 (Oxford: Osprey,
46. Interview, Colonel Heshusius, The Hague, 23 April 2001. The same point is
47. Written communication, Colonel Heshusius, 18 April 2001.
49. In earlier times, some recruits appear to have had their first (homosexual)
sexual experience in the barracks. In the early 1890s, well over half the recruits
at Gombong “were guilty of practicing unnatural vice.” The army leadership
“felt that this kind of situation fully demonstrated the value of concubinage”.Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage in the Indies”, p. 69.
50. Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence,
51. Yanagawa Motoshige in an interview with Ruth McVey, Jakarta, 13 November
1980.
52. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, p. 211.
53. Arthur J. Marden, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial
p. 88.
54. Imperial Navy position paper, “Study of Policy toward French Indochina”,
1 August 1940, cited in Henry P. Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia:
From the Sixteenth Century to World War II (Melbourne: Melbourne University
55. Stephen Howarth, Morning Glory: The Story of the Imperial Japanese Navy (London:
56. For details, see Bussemaker, “Paradise in Peril”, pp. 326–72. According to
another source, the Dutch had only three light cruisers, six destroyers and
eleven submarines. See John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of
American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random
57. I am indebted here to Benedict Anderson and, in this paragraph, draw
extensively on his exposition. Personal communication.
58. See Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia, p. 146.
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59. Ibid., p. 151. The United States, seeing the Dutch equivocate, was reluctant to sell them the military equipment they so sorely needed. Bussemaker, “Paradise in Peril”, pp. 125–26. On 7 December 1941, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Netherlands declared war on Japan.

60. Written communication, Colonel J.J. Nortier, 5 March 1996.

61. In 1940 the kwetsbare punten were Tarakan, Balikpapan, Palembang and Ambon.


63. G.H. Bousquet, “The International Position of Netherlands India”, Pacific Affairs XII, no. 4 (December 1939), p. 389. In the pre-war period, the Dutch relied on the semi-official de Javasche Bank (Bank of Java) to maintain the official rate of exchange between the Netherlands East Indies guilder and the Netherlands guilder.

64. Colonel Nortier, personal communication.


66. Much of the Wehrmacht, it is true, was pulled by horse at this time. But the Germans had also invested heavily in tanks and armoured cars.

67. It was the task of the cavalry to conduct reconnaissance and secure important road junctions.

68. In 1940, these battalions moved across the hills and rice fields of Java with their 75mm guns broken down into eight component parts, each of which was carried on a pack horse. A battalion on the move consisted of about 800 men, 157 large Australian packhorses, 411 Indonesian ponies, 34 bicycles, 14 horse-drawn cooking and water wagons and 89 other horse-drawn carts. (See Zwitzer and Heshuisius, Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, p. 120.) This enabled the mountain artillery battalions to go almost anywhere. But it meant they would be no match for the Japanese, who were to land on Java with trucks, light tanks and motorized artillery, allowing them to move at great speed.

69. For details, see Bussemaker, “Paradise in Peril”, p. 401.

70. The KNIL Chief of Staff, Major General Hein ter Poorten, a 220-lb officer who had been born in Surabaya, was not only an artilleryman but also an airman. He had won an international balloon race in Germany and had learned to fly an aircraft in 1911. “Het is Zoover”, Time, 26 January 1942.

71. The KNIL had capitulated by the time the first of these aircraft could be delivered.

72. Bussemaker, “Paradise in Peril”, p. 394. According to another account, the KNIL-ML was equipped with 83 Glenn Martins, 71 Brewster Buffaloes and...

73. When the Japanese attacked the Philippines on 8 December 1941, General Douglas MacArthur had the strongest American air forces outside the United States, with 277 planes, including 35 Boeing B-17 heavy bombers and about 100 modern fighters. He lost almost half of his best aircraft on the first day. See Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (London: Penguin, 1987), pp. 107–8.

74. Ibid., p. 108.


76. Bussemaker, “Paradise in Peril”, pp. 385–86. Each brigade would include ninety light and medium tanks, a squadron of scout cars, two battalions of motorized infantry as well as mechanized field artillery, mechanized anti-tank guns and mechanized anti-aircraft artillery. The word brigade is used here in its more conventional sense.

77. The KNIL was thus dependent mainly on its 24 Vickers Carden tanks. At around the same time, the Netherlands East Indies agreed to buy a consignment of second-hand Italian weapons captured by the British in North Africa. Once again, very few of the weapons arrived in time and they were allocated to the home guard.

78. Bouman, Van Driekleur, p. 446.

79. Interview, Lieutenant General G.P.H. Djatikusumo, Jakarta, 9 March 1981. Djatikusumo’s older brother was the second Indonesian cadet admitted to Breda. In 1936 Djatikusumo was himself offered a place on the course. He declined the invitation, saying he could not swear an oath to the Dutch queen. In 1939 the Dutch increased the number of Indonesian cadets at Breda, too late to have any impact.

80. Bouman, Van Driekleur, p. 448.

81. The first reserve officers training in the Indies had begun in 1936 at the First Depot Battalion in Bandung. In 1938 this became CORO. In 1940, Djatikusumo joined the CORO. The Dutch also established a Royal Naval Institute (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine, KIM) in Surabaya in August 1940 after the German occupation of the Netherlands.

82. This percentage is not especially high. Part of the problem may have been that young, educated Indonesians found the idea of service in the KNIL politically distasteful. Another problem was that the entry bar was set quite high; cadets were supposed to have a HBS education.

83. In the 1870s the Dutch Army discarded its early attachment to French military science in favour of emerging Prussian doctrines, which had been showcased so
successfully in the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian war. These doctrines stressed that victory depended not simply on advanced weaponry: the decisive feature was élan and fighting spirit. The Dutch Higher War College (Hogere Krijgsschool, HKS) was designed on the Prussian model; and in this institution, as well as in the Royal Netherlands Military Academy at Breda (and, after 1940, at a new KMA in Bandung), officers and military cadets got a thorough grounding in German military theory. The reading list was heavy with German texts, including Carl von Clausewitz’s *Von Kriege (On War)* and Hans Delbrück’s *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte [History of Warfare in the Framework of Political History], Volume IV: The Modern Era*. In the Netherlands and in the Indies, as in Germany itself, officers were very much interested during the inter-war years in theories about the mechanization and motorization of the army. As noted above, until 1935 no attempt was made to mechanize the KNIL, there being no money for this. The Japanese Army, which made a similar switch from French to German thinking between 1879 and 1885, would in due course place great emphasis on élan and fighting spirit during the instruction of Indonesian officer cadets in Bogor. For an excellent account of the German impact on Japanese military thinking, see Edward J. Drea, *Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009), pp. 58–59.

84. Magelang could no longer cope with the demands imposed on it and a new cadre school for candidate corporals had to be set up in Yogyakarta.


86. Written communication, Colonel Heshusius, 17 October 1999.

87. Soeharto said that he undertook not only his basic training but also his two NCO courses at Gombong. See, for example, Roeder, *The Smiling General*, p. 93, and Soeharto, *Pikiran*, p. 20. See also Soeharto’s curriculum vitae in Harsja W. Bachtia, *Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara National Indonesia, Angkatan Darat* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1988), pp. 341–42. Reference is made in this entry to the “Sekolah Kader Militer, Gombong, 2 Desember 1940”.


89. Magelang was the headquarters of the KNIL 2nd Division, which was not a division at all in the usual military sense, meaning a force of perhaps 12,000 to 15,000 men, but simply a headquarters responsible for the various KNIL forces in Central Java. It was also a regimental headquarters, the base of two infantry battalions and a heavy weapons company as well as the cadre school and a first-class army hospital, complete with medical specialists and dentists.


praktijkervaring opdoen als ondercommandant van een peloton van het Dertiende Bataljon te Tampel (sic), nabij Malang.” In this case, there has been a careless translation of the units below company level. In the pre-war KNIL infantry, one did not speak of a peloton but used the word sectie. Before the war, a KNIL infantry battalion, which was commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel, always a Dutchman or Eurasian, consisted of three (sometimes four) 180-man rifle companies and one weapons company, with each of the rifle companies headed by a captain or older first-lieutenant. Each rifle company consisted of a command group (compagniesstaf) and three 50-man secties (platoons). Secties were subdivided into three brigades (sections), each of fifteen men. Each brigade was headed by a sergeant, assisted by two corporals, and a command group. Personal communication, Colonel J.J. (Joop) Nortier, 30 August 1994. In a normal infantry company, two platoons were commanded by a first or second lieutenant, almost without exception a Dutchman or Eurasian, the third by a senior NCO, usually a Dutchman or Eurasian.

92. Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 161–79.
93. Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance, p. 149. Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi told Allied interrogators that in September 1941 his brother had been head of the European section of the Third Bureau, not the bureau as a whole. “Interrogation of Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi at Changi Gaol, Singapore Island, between 31st May and 14th June 1946.” Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies – Indische Collectie [NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Indies Collection] (henceforth NIOD), coll. 400, no. 718 and no. 314. Later, it appears, Maeda Minoru did head the bureau.

94. The Japanese presented their formal demand on 22 July. Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War, p. 332.
95. Ibid., p. 331.

8. A reassuringly familiar world
1. Infantry Battalion 502 was to behave with great brutality in Dili after Soeharto gave the order for an invasion of Portuguese East Timor in 1975.
2. Interview, Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, Jakarta, 3 August 2000.
4. In the heavy weapons companies, which were equipped with mortars and machine guns, the races were always mixed, experience having shown that it was not practicable to maintain ethnically “pure” units. A similar disregard for ethnicity was to be found in the nineteen-man fixed patrolling brigades in the Outer Islands. Here, too, the races were mixed, although not to any formula. Under the sergeant, who would be European, Eurasian or Indonesian,
there might be eight or nine Javanese, four Ambonese, four Menadonese and perhaps one Sundanese, Timorese or Batak.

5. Battalion commanders, who were always European, liked to have one European rifle company, it being thought that Europeans were better trained and more reliable. But they never said no to a Menadonese or Ambonese company and they considered the Javanese were good soldiers and found them easy to manage. If two of the three rifle companies were Javanese, as was sometimes the case, care was taken to ensure that the other was Menadonese, Ambonese or Sundanese. I have not been able to obtain data for 1941. But in 1935, the ethnic identity of the forty-seven rifle companies in the sixteen KNIL infantry battalions was as follows: Javanese 15, Menadonese 10, European 9, Ambonese 6, Timorese 3, Sundanese 2 and “mixed” 2. Personal communication, Colonel Heshusius, 22 August 2000. That would indicate that in 1935 Javanese accounted for about one-third of the manpower in the KNIL rifle companies. As noted earlier, in 1929 Javanese are said to have accounted for 40 per cent of overall KNIL manpower. By 1937, it appears, they accounted for just over 50 per cent. This may stem from the fact that the recruitment of Javanese soldiers varied, depending on how many men of the preferred ethnic groups (Ambonese, Menadonese and Timorese) could be recruited. I am indebted to Petra Groen for making this point. It is also possible that Javanese were present in larger numbers in the heavy weapons companies and elsewhere.


7. Married Indonesian NCOs from sergeant 2nd class upwards had their own small army houses, most of them inside the barracks but some just outside the barbed wire outer fence. Married European and Eurasian personnel, no matter what their rank, lived in army houses outside the compound. Unmarried Europeans and Eurasians were housed inside the barracks, the sergeants in private rooms, the corporals in a small room at the end of the shared dormitory of the European and Eurasian privates.

8. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 17.

9. Dutch officers were supposed to speak elementary Malay (pasar maleis).

10. It has been suggested that another possible explanation for the salary differentials is that Javanese were living in their own region and had access to their kinfolk. Ambonese and Menadonese were living far from home and unlikely to get any easy help. Benedict Anderson, personal communication. That may only be true up to a point. During the twentieth century, Moluccan and Menadonese quarters grew up around KNIL garrisons on Java: soldiers from those regions could get help from there. Javanese often had no wider family support during their long postings in the Outer Islands.

11. Dutch army records indicate that there was a Captain K.J.J. Drijber serving in 1941. He was born in 1897, which would mean that he was in his mid-forties
in 1941. However there was also a First Lieutenant F. Drijber; he was born in 1906 and might have been a captain in 1941. Written communication, Dr Petra M.H. Groen, Military History Section, Royal Netherlands Army, The Hague, 27 October 1994, and Colonel J.J. Nortier, 30 August 1994.

12. The “Hyneman” referred to by Soeharto may have been Sub-Lieutenant J.D. Heineman, who was born in 1903, or Sub-Lieutenant C.G. Heineman, who was born in 1904. Both were serving in 1941. Sub-Lieutenant (Onderluitenant) was the highest rank an NCO could reach before the war. Jansen is one of the commonest names in Holland. The Dutch have no record of an NCO by the name of Janssen or Jantzen. Here, too, I am grateful to Dr Groen for her help. As noted earlier, the term platoon was not used in the KNIL.

13. The responsibilities of a sergeant were considerably greater than those of a corporal. A corporal might have charge of a group of six men. A sergeant was responsible for a section (squad), or one-third of a fifty-man sectie (platoon). If he happened to be the most senior of the three sergeants in the platoon he had to be ready at all times to take command of the platoon if the second lieutenant was killed or wounded. In the Outer Islands, an Indonesian sergeant 1st class might find himself in command of a standard patrolling brigade of nineteen men, operating away from base for perhaps three weeks at a time, alone and self-supporting. He was the man in charge when the brigade was given riot-control duties, responsible for maintaining law and order while inflicting the absolute minimum number of deaths or casualties.


16. A sergeant 2nd class could get by without much written Dutch; all he needed was some understanding of spoken Dutch. But a man could not advance to sergeant 1st class or go on to attend the nine-month sergeant-majors course until he was reasonably fluent in Dutch and able to make simple written reports in Dutch. Indonesians of this rank were mostly Menadonese and Ambonese, who had benefited from the higher educational standards in their home regions.


18. For a valuable (and weighty) account of the Japanese landings in the Netherlands East Indies, see War History Office, National Defense College of Japan, Senshi Sosho 3. Ran-In Koryaku Sakusen [War History Series, Volume 3. The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1967). This volume is now available in English. See Willem Remmelink, editor and


26. After the fall of Singapore, General Sir Archibald Wavell, the British Commander-in-Chief of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, told the Chiefs of Staff that the loss of Java, though a severe blow, would not be fatal, but that Australia and Burma were vital. The Australian 7th Division, which was on its way to Java, should be diverted to Burma. Curtin refused to allow Australian forces to be sent to Burma. For details, see Nicholas Tarling, A Sudden Rampage, p. 97. For a good account of the Australian Government’s position, see John Edwards, John Curtins’s War, Vol. I (Australia: Penguin Viking, 2017), pp. 416–19.

27. Wigmore, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, p. 495.


29. Indeed, the Japanese would threaten to bomb Bandung when, on 8–9 March, the Dutch argued over legal niceties during the surrender negotiations.


31. By 1942, it is true, KNIL numbers had swollen to 122,600, made up of 45,800 Europeans and 76,800 Indonesians. But the KNIL was never in any position to resist a sustained attack. Included in the total were 19,000 Indonesians serving as part of a Dad’s Army on plantations and 4,700 elderly soldiers
who had been recalled to duty. Also included were 8,500 Dutchmen serving as part of the Home Guard. Written communication, Colonel C.A. Heshusius, 17 October 1999.


34. Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, p. 17. In 1998 Soeharto was quoted as claiming that he “was transferred to Army Headquarters in Bandung.” *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 5 January 1998.


37. Lieutenant General Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz, who served as governor of Aceh (1898–1904) and Governor-General (1904–1909), had himself been a foerier for three years.


39. For the hopelessness of the American position in the Philippines, see Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun*, pp. 137–38, on which this sentence is based.


41. Ibid.

42. Written communication, Colonel J.J. Nortier, 5 March 1996.


9. A policeman for the Japanese


2. Ibid.


4. Indonesians who had been KNIL officers in 1942 and who went on to fight for independence in 1945 were to argue that General Ter Poorten’s 8 and 9 March statements absolved them of any further loyalty to the Dutch Queen. However, Lieutenant General S.H. Spoor, the post-war commander-in-chief of Dutch forces in the East Indies/Indonesia, would take the view that only the Queen could discharge these men from their oath of loyalty and that they
were, formally speaking, deserters. See Memorandum from Lieutenant General S.H. Spoor to the Lieutenant Governor-General, 21 February 1946, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeprimeerde Archieven, 1942–1950, archiefinventaris 2.10.14, inventarisnummer 2601, hereafter abbreviated NANL 2.10.14, inv. 2601. This was an important point in Dutch military eyes. As the Dutch saw it, Indonesian officers remained bound by their oaths of allegiance.

5. Soeharto, My Thoughts, pp. 17–18.
9. Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, 3 February 1999. Kaneko had worked before the war as a writer for the Japanese Army magazine Rikugun Gaho (Army Illustrated). He was one of many Japanese civilian writers, poets, painters and cartoonists—the Japanese term was bunkajin, meaning “person of culture”—attached to the Sixteenth Army Propaganda Corps under Lieutenant Colonel Machida Keiji, who headed that department until November 1942. In August 1942, the Propaganda Corps was incorporated into the Military Administration (Gunseikanbu) and changed its name to Propaganda Department (Sendenbu).
10. Interviews, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 2 September 1997, and 3 September 1998. In his CV, Selo Soemardjan indicated, without elaboration, that he was an official in the Sultanate/Government of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta between 1935 and 1949 (Pegawai Kesultanan/Pemerintah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 1935–1949). In Yogyakarta in the pre-war period, there were, in fact, two different sets of offices, those of the Sultan and those of the Dutch. The police force came under the Dutch, with Dutch police officers at the apex of the pyramid and Indonesians below them. Selo was one of those Indonesians. When the Japanese occupied Yogyakarta, he was working in the political section, or what one might call the Special Branch, of the Yogyakarta police force, which kept a strict watch on the nationalist movement. “I had to learn the trade,” he explained half a century later. His office was in Jalan Bayan Kara in Reksobayan. In the first of these interviews, Selo gave the impression that he was appointed as a subdistrict head (camat) in Kulon Progo not long after the Japanese arrived. Pressed on the point, he conceded that this appointment had actually come in 1943. This would suggest that he stayed on in the special branch for perhaps a year, if not longer, under the Japanese. He said he was surprised to learn, only then, in the late 1990s, that Soeharto had worked for a time in the Japanese-run police force. Although his
surprise is itself surprising, it is likely that Selo had taken up his appointment as a camat by the time Soeharto joined the police force. For a fuller than usual account of Selo Soemardjan’s CV, see P.J. Suwarno, *Hamengku Buwono IX dan Sistem Birokrasi Pemerintahan Yogyakarta, 1942–1974: Sebuah Tinjuan Historis* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1994), pp. 444–45. According to this account, Selo worked in the criminal section and then the political section of the Yogyakarta police force between 1940 and 1942 (sic).


12. I am grateful to Bill Frederick for making this point. As he notes, even some of the bunkajin attached to the Propaganda Corps, although predisposed to think well of the indigenes, felt they had to adjust their opinions.


15. Interviews with Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, Morimoto Takeshi, Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and Tsuchiya Kiso, Asahigaoka, Mishima-shi, Shizuoka Prefecture, 2 February 1999.


17. Ibid.


22. The eastern islands came under the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Southern
Expeditionary Fleet, who had his headquarters at Surabaya. Day-to-day affairs were in the hands of the Naval Civil Administration Office (Minseifu) headquartered in Makassar. Because the area under naval administration was generally poor and underdeveloped, the Japanese there were heavily dependent on Java for food, transport and labour. An Imperial Japanese Navy liaison office (Bukanfu) was set up in Jakarta in August 1942 under Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi. For details of the Japanese liaison office and Japanese administration in the Navy regions, see “Interrogation of Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi at Changi Gaol, Singapore Island, between 31st May and 14th June 1946.”


The Imperial Japanese Navy’s unrealistic conceit that it could gain permanent possession of key Outer Island territories was fatally compromised, as were Tokyo’s wider war aims, when the US Navy inflicted a crippling defeat on the Japanese at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. The defeat came only three months after Japan had brought the Netherlands East Indies under its control.


25. A translation of “Order No. 1 – Operation of Military Administration,” can be found in JAVINT 3131/4, SEATIC Det. HQ 23 Ind Div, 1 Feb 46, NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5185. This was the first public notice issued by the Japanese in Java. It had been prepared and printed in Taiwan and was posted up everywhere behind the advancing troops. Although Imamura had served in the Kwantung Army, he had a broader background than most other army officers. In 1918, he had been posted to London as a military attaché. A decade later, he served as a military attaché in British India. See “Hitoshi Imamura,” Wikipedia (accessed April 15, 2009). Before World War II, few Japanese army officers visited Britain or the United States. See Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 38. Imamura’s chief of staff, Major General (later Lieutenant General) Okazaki Seizaburo, who doubled as the head of Military Administration, had worked in both London and Geneva and had commanded a garrison regiment in China in 1937–39. He was considered a liberal in army terms. See EIPW, p. 568.
30. Robert Cribb, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, p. 221, from which this paragraph is in part drawn.
32. Nakamura, “General Imamura”, pp. 11–13, on which this paragraph is largely based.
39. Imamura, “Supplement”, pp. 1–2. Imamura was “keenly expecting” that Java would be the chief target for an attack by US and Australian forces. He was concerned that Europeans would work in concert with any Allied force that landed in Java and that, at the time of such an attack, Indonesians would once again turn on Europeans.
40. The aim, he said, was to coordinate the administration and the military in the expectation of defence operations. See Nakamura, “General Imamura”, p. 20. See also *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia*, p. 109, which makes the point that the Japanese officials were needed owing to a shortage of trained Indonesian officials and the difficulty of employing Dutch and Eurasians.
41. Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo in an interview conducted by Yamaoka Yasuko on behalf of the author, 8 April 1999.
42. Although a number of Japanese interviewees spoke of their earlier service in
Taiwan, in no case did anyone refer to prior service in Korea, where Japanese rule was infinitely harsher than it was in Taiwan.

44. Ibid.
46. For a good account of these events, see Hallett Abend, My Life in China 1926–1941 (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 268–75.
48. Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 18.
51. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999. Although the Japanese put great store by efficiency, both in Japan and in occupied territories such as Taiwan and Korea, the recruitment process used in Java shows anything but efficiency on the part of the Japanese, who were operating under wartime conditions and struggling with language problems.
53. Ibid., p. 237.
54. Soeharto, Pikiran, p. 22.
56. Ibid.
57. When asked in 1960 why the Japanese did not grant Islamic groups many of their demands, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, an Islamic political leader, replied that the occupation government “was primarily interested in keeping things calm and manageable”; they were interested in the continuing production of war material. Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 34.
58. In his memoirs, Soeharto claims that he enlisted in the volunteer army “soon after” he joined the police force. This is demonstrably untrue. According to a semi-authorized biography, Soeharto joined the police force on 1 November 1942. He remained in the police force until at least 8 October 1943, or very nearly a year. For details, see Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 19, and Roeder, The Smiling General, p. 193.
59. Cribb, Historical Dictionary, pp. 375–76; Takashi Shiraishi, “A New Regime of


63. Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, pp. 138 and 177–78. For further details about the Japanese-run police force during the Occupation, see Oudang, Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia, pp. 32–47.

64. Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, pp. 122–23, 177. See also Nihon Kenpei Seishi, p. 1026.

65. Ibid.

66. Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, p. 178. In October 1944, the Keimubu changed its name to Chianbu. According to another source the change was made in November 1944. See Hata Ikuhiko, ed., Nanpo gunsei no kiko, kanbu gunsei-kan ichiran [Japanese Military Administration of Southeast Asia 1941–45 Organization and Personnel] (Tokyo: Nanpogun Gunsei-shi Kenkyu Forum, 1998). According to the Java Yearbook, the Keimubu was created within the Military Administrator’s Office (Gunseikanbu) in September 1942. On 1 November that year, police affairs were officially transferred from the Kenpeitai to the police. See Java Nenkan (Java Yearbook) (Jakarta: Jawa Shimbunsha, 1944), reprinted by Bibrio (Tokyo) in 1973, pp. 129–32. I am indebted to Bob Elson for passing on Sato Shigeru’s partial summary of the entry in Java Nenkan.

67. It should be noted, however, that the Kenpeitai recruited heavily among Koreans and that some of the most sadistic Kenpei were Koreans.

68. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 2 September 1997. According to a Japanese
naval source, Dutch officials and police authorities had been “dreaded ... and greatly abhorred by the Indonesians-at-large as the direct perpetrator [sic] of exploitations.” See “Appreciation of Political Developments by Kaigun (Japanese Navy)”, NIOD coll. 400, no. 581. This typed, five-page document, which is unsigned and undated, appears to have been written by Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi, the head of the Japanese Navy liaison office in Jakarta. A handwritten entry at the top of the first page says, “bp 26/9/1945 opgesteld door Maeda” [“bp 26 September 1945, drawn up by Maeda”]. Professor Elson has questioned the claim that the Dutch police were deeply unpopular. Personal communication.


70. Yogyakarta was the home of two important Indies-wide institutions: the Taman Siswa school system and the Muhammadiyah, the modernist Islamic social and educational organization.

71. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 29 May 2002. According to a post-war study, “the police strongly tended to be subservient to the Military Police.” Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, p. 180. Even within the army, the Kenpeitai cast a long shadow.


74. Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, 1 February 1999. Taniguchi was a former chief of the Bogor Kenpeitai.

75. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 2 September 1997.

76. Personal communication, Benedict Anderson.

77. Teramoto Masashi in an interview conducted by Yamaoka Yasuko on behalf of the author, Inba-mura, Chiba Prefecture, 12 February 1999.

78. Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, personal communication, 18 August 2009. Sukotjo said that although the actions of former Kenpeihō NCOs had been abominable, “as soon as they became officers, they behaved themselves.” On the other hand, non-commissioned CPM officers and soldiers had continued to torture people until “around ’62-’63.” The practice stopped at that time, Sukotjo claimed, due to the impact of new courses at the CPM training centre in Cimahi. Sukotjo interview, Jakarta, 23 February 2011. Sukotjo spent eight years (1956–64) at Cimahi, initially as an instructor, later as deputy commander.
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Significantly, the Indonesians who served in the Kenpeitai did not form a post-war association of former kenpeiho. This was due to an abiding repugnance in Indonesian society over the behaviour of the Japanese Military Police Corps. There were no such inhibitions among men who had served in the Japanes-sponsored volunteer defence force (Peta) and various other mass bodies set up by the Japanese. On the contrary, they were proud of their association with these institutions.

80. Sato, who was born in Miyagi Prefecture, north of Tokyo, in 1897, was one of the oldest detachment heads in the Kenpeitai. A man with a square face and a solitary manner, he had worked his way up from the rank of private but appears to have led a life that was irredeemably gloomy. According to Taniguchi Taketsugu, a former teacher who headed the Military Police detachment in Bogor (and who was afterwards sentenced to fifteen years in jail on war-crimes charges), Sato was an honest and affable officer who did not drink and who could often be found sitting cross-legged, “like people do when they meditate.” Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, 1 February 1999. Taniguchi provided additional information about Sato on 5 September 2003. To Taniguchi, “he looked like a Buddha.” But there was something about Sato that set him apart from his colleagues. “He was a little different—in a negative way, if I may say so—from the buntaicho [detachment commander] pattern. He was conservative and deeply serious.”

Sato took up his appointment in April 1942, shortly after the Japanese landings on Java, and remained in the post for more than two years, at which time he was transferred to Solo. The Kenpeitai unit in Yogyakarta, which controlled subunits in Purworejo and Magelang, had a complement of thirty-three to thirty-five Japanese. Interview, former Major Nakano Kinichiro, 8 February 1999; interview Taniguchi Taketsugu, 5 September 2003, and written communication, Captain Kawano Teruaki, Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 21 February 1997, based on a conversation with Taniguchi Taketsugu. See also “Schema van de Plaatselijke K.P.T. [Kenpeitai] Djokdjakarta”, NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5192. Additional information about Sato’s military career and trial was provided by Rolf Utermöhlen of NIOD. Written communication, 14 July 1997. NIOD staff have been unable to locate Sato’s file. No fewer than 199 of the 538 Kenpei stationed in Java at the end of the war were convicted at the subsequent
war-crimes trials in Jakarta. Forty received the death sentence. Only fifty-eight non-Kenpei soldiers were convicted from a pool of 20,000 regular army soldiers. See The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra, translators’ preface, p. 17.

81. The charges related to the treatment Sato meted out to the Dutch governor of Yogyakarta, Lucien Adam, to members of the Roman Catholic clergy and to employees of the Gondang Lipuro sugar mill, as well as to his ruthlessness in investigating the wrecking of the railway in Tugu. In Surabaya, it was said, Sato did nothing to curb the excesses of his subordinates. Written communication, Rolf Utermöhlen, NIOD, 14 July 1997. For more on Adam’s career, see Robson, The Kraton, p. 372.

82. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 2 September 1997.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 29 May 2002.
86. See “Interrogation of Lieutenant Onishi Kyutaro, Glodok Jail, Batavia, May 17, 1946”, NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5280. Theodore Friend notes that the “Japanese army in general and the Kenpeitai in particular tended to replicate Dutch fears about communism and Islam. They distrusted them both as blind faiths, fanatical and unpredictable” (Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, p. 206, citing Nihon Kenpei Seishi, p. 1038). For most of his presidency, it might be added, Soeharto was to harbour an identical fear of communism on the left and political Islam on the right, which allowed him to claim, conveniently but somewhat implausibly, that he was a man of the political centre. Above all, the Kenpeitai had “supreme responsibility for army discipline.” See Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, pp. 186–87.

87. Interview, Teramoto Masashi, 12 February 1999.
89. Ibid., p. 48.
90. Ibid., pp. 48–49.
91. This elite unit had the mission of protecting the kokutai, Japan’s ostensibly unique “national structure,” through “the proper guidance of thought.” Tipton, The Japanese Police State, p. 153. During the 1930s, the Tokko had dealt ruthlessly with left-wing and labour groups, while fighting a rearguard and increasingly unequal battle with the Kenpeitai, which was interfering more and more in civil police matters. Nor was Java spared the attentions of the Japanese political police. A Tokko division was set up in Jakarta, with a branch in Yogyakarta.

The Kenpeitai had three divisions, namely, Tokko, Keimu (police affairs), and Shomu (general affairs.) Organizationally, the Kenpeitai belonged to the
Ministry of the Army (Rikugun-sho), while the police reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs (Naimu-sho). According to a former Kenpeitai officer who served in Java, in Japan the main task of the Kenpeitai’s Tokko section was the control (torishimari) of spies (choja) and cabals (inbodan) from outside Japan. The Tokko section of the civil police, on the other hand, concentrated on identifying communists. However, in overseas territories such as Java, he said, the two groups had more or less the same function. Nevertheless, the Kenpeitai chief was higher than the police chief and could give orders to the latter. Taniguchi Taketsugu in a telephone interview with Yamaoka Yasuko on behalf of the author, 13 May 2003.

92. It has been argued that the Tokko drew its inspiration from Joseph Fouché, the former terrorist and intriguer who founded Napoleon’s political police. See Tipton, *The Japanese Police State*, p. 45, citing Brian Chapman, *Police State* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 27–29. However, as Umemori Naoyuki has shown, the Meiji government sent officials not only to European countries but also to British colonial East Asia and Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore) to research their police and prison systems. The institutions and practices of the Metropolitan Police Office were influenced by the practices of the British colonial police in several important aspects. See Umemori Naoyuki, “Modernization through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan” (PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago, 2002), pp. 13–14.


94. Koizumi Saburo, 13 June 1999, in an interview conducted by Yamaoka Yasuko on behalf of the author.

95. Miyamoto Shizuo, 8 April 1999.

96. “The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies, prepared statement of K.A. de Weerd, Attorney-at-Law, Major RNIA, International Prosecution Section, Netherlands Division”, November 1946. TNA: PRO WO 325/111, 75491, p. 39. Major Klaas de Weerd, who had practised law in East Java, Bali, Southeast Borneo [Kalimantan], and North Sumatra between 1929 and 1941, was a reserve officer in the KNIL. He spent the war as a POW in West Java.


98. The strike force was set up in April 1944. For details, see Situs Brimob Polri, 0.1 Sejarah Brimob, http://brimobpolri.wordpress.com/sejarah-brimob/ (accessed 2 October 2008); M. Oudang, *Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia*, pp. 46–47; and Jones et al., “Reforming the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB)”, p. 6. The details in the main text about the Tokubetsu Keisatsutai arsenal and duties are from the Brimob Polri site.
A number of Indonesians who had earlier served in the KNIL joined either the regular civilian police force or the Tokubetsu Keisatsuutai. One of them was R.M. Soerjosoerarso, an aristocrat from the Mangkunegaran court who had attended the Royal Military Academy (KMA) at Breda in the Netherlands and who would retire as a major general. In 1943–45 he was the deputy police chief in the Residency of Kedu, in Central Java. Another was A.J. Mokoginta, who had attended the KMA in Bandung and who retired as a lieutenant general.

99. The heavily armed mobile units of the Japanese-era Special Higher Police became, after the proclamation of independence in 1945, the Indonesian Special Police (Pasukan Polisi Istimewa), evolving, in 1946, into the Police Mobile Brigade (MOBRIG, later BRIMOB). To this day, BRIMOB is used primarily for military-type operations. It is not known whether the Polisi Istimewa and its successors inherited the unique and all-embracing powers of the Tokko section of the Japanese civilian police force or just those of its well-equipped mobile strike force. It has been suggested that today’s BRIMOB is in some ways the direct heir of the NEI Veldpolitie; see Jones et al., “Reforming the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB)”, p. 6. That is only partly true. While it is quite likely that the Dutch-era Field Police was, institutionally, a forebear of BRIMOB, in terms of police practices, the Japanese lineage appears to be of greater significance. The pre-war Field Police force was indeed well armed; but it was set up to deal with criminal activity. The Tokubetsu Keisatsuutai was given combat training and, during the Revolution, Special Police units performed as well as normal army infantry units. In practice, BRIMOB traces its descent from the powerful and repressive Japanese-era Special Police Strike Force in much the same way that the Indonesian Army’s Military Police Corps (CPM) traces its lineage back in some ways to both the Yugekitai, the Japanese-sponsored Special Guerrilla Force, and to the Kenpeitai.

100. Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, personal communication, 22 April 2009.

101. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”.

102. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999. There must have been at least one Japanese secretary as well. As noted earlier, Tsuchiya was the senior Beppan officer in Yogyakarta at that time.

103. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”. As we have seen, Soeharto also mentioned this in his autobiography.

104. Lieutenant Colonel Uchida Takefumi, 12 February 1999, and 5 September 2003. A former judge of the Yokaichiba District Court in Chiba Prefecture, Uchida was the head of the police department in the Yogyakarta Princely Territory from April 1944 until the end of the war, having succeeded Takeoka Kenji. Uchida was not aware in 1999 that Soeharto had once worked as a policeman in Yogyakarta. Nor did Takeoka, whom Uchida met for the first time at post-war gatherings of the Jawa no kai (Java Society), ever mention
Soeharto’s name. Former civilian police officers, most of whom had served in Taiwan, were given military rank before they took up their new positions in the civilian police force in Java. The interviews with Colonel Uchida were conducted by Yamaoka Yasuko on behalf of the author. I am indebted to Yasuko for her help in establishing the police chain of command in Yogyakarta at this time.

105. Other major police stations were in towns such as Wates and Wonosari.
106. According to Tsuchiya, “Soeharto was a policeman [keisatsukan] working under the Japanese police station commander [keisatsu shocho].”
107. The details of Okamoto’s career come from the 12 February 1999, interview with Uchida Takefumi.
111. Elson writes that Soeharto carried out his police duties “apparently at the rank of keibuho.” Elson, Suharto, p. 9.
112. Strictly speaking, there were eight police ranks after July 1943: keishi (superintendent), keibu (inspector), keibuho (assistant inspector) (grade one and two), junsabucho (sergeant) and junsa (policeman) (grade one, two and three). Jawa Nenkan, pp. 129–32. According to Taniguchi Taketsugu, the civilian police ranks were as follows: keishisokan (superintendent general), keishikan (superintendent supervisor), keishicho (chief superintendent), keishisei (senior superintendent), keishi (superintendent), keibu (police inspector), keibuho (assistant police inspector), junsabucho (police sergeant), junsacho (senior policeman) and junsa (policeman). The keishisokan position only ever existed in Tokyo. Written communication, Taniguchi Taketsugu, November 1997. This footnote draws also on a written communication from Kawano Teruaki, 21 February 1997. In the Netherlands Indies there had been some twenty police ranks.
115. These rates were set out in regulations issued on 1 July 1943. See Genchi Min Shokuin Jinji Jinu Teiyo, pp. 3–14.
116. Koizumi Saburo interview, 13 June 1999. During his time as chief of the Special Higher Police section in Yogyakarta, Koizumi worked closely with Soedarsono. Soeharto would be ordered to arrest Soedarsono at the time of the 3 July Affair in 1946. In some ways, it is true, Soedarsono was an exception to the rule when it came to education; he had attended only a Dutch medium primary school (HIS) set up for children of the indigenous elite. Another
man, who went even further, was a Javanese officer who, it is said, was also
named Soeharto. According to a former Japanese chief of police in the Princely
Territory of Yogyakarta, there was “a very capable Indonesian police officer
everyone called Soeharto Keibu (Inspector Soeharto), who worked in the Yogya
police station.” However, this was “definitely not the same Soeharto who later
became the president, for he was at that time already thirty-seven to forty
years old.” Interview, Lieutenant Colonel Uchida Takefumi, 12 February 1999.

117. Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, 1 February 1999.
118. Interview, Teramoto Masashi, 12 February 1999.
120. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.
121. There is evidence for this view in Roeder, The Smiling General. Roeder says
(p. 96) that Soeharto enlisted as a volunteer “in the Japanese-sponsored
police force, KEIBUHO.” An official curriculum vitae published during
Soeharto’s presidency said that in 1942 Soeharto joined the “police (Keibuho)
Antara, nd.), p. 79. In his 1988 autobiography, Soeharto wrote that he saw an
announcement that “Keibuho, the police” wanted new recruits (see Soeharto,
My Thoughts, p. 18. On p. 22 of the Indonesian-language version, Pikiran,
Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya, Soeharto writes “bahwa Keibuho, Polisi, menerima
anggota baru”). See also Hasja W. Bachtiar, Siapa Dia?, p. 341.
122. The documents are housed in the NIOD archive on Herengracht. Copies of
some of these documents are also held at the Nationaal Archief in The Hague.
123. “Staff Beppan Isum for April. 30 April, 1943. Bandung branch of Beppan”,
JAVINT 3117/14, SEATIC Det. 23 Ind. Div., 28 Nov. 1945. NANL, 2.10.14,
inv. 5197, p. 1.
124. Ibid., p. 2. The Japanese do not appear to have widely pushed these burial
instructions, which would have produced a furore wherever they were
introduced. Muslim dead should be buried with their faces towards Mecca.
125. “Staff Beppan Isum”, April 1943.
126. Ibid. Japanese Army military brothels, or “comfort stations”, were supervised
by the Kenpeitai.
127. T.B. Simatupang, The Fallacy of a Myth: Tracing the Experimental Significance of
an Army Officer Belonging to the Generation of Liberator for the Future of Indonesia
(Translated and Introduced by Peter Suwarno) (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan,
1996), p. 96. I have made one or two very minor changes to the wording given.

10. An armed force conjured out of nothing
3. About half of the 45,000 British Indian troops who had surrendered in Singapore
volunteered to join the INA within two months of its formation.
4. Created at the end of 1944, the Yugekitai was an undercover force designed to gather intelligence and conduct guerrilla operations behind the lines in the event of an Allied landing on Java. Six hundred recruits enrolled in January 1945 and a further 600 in July.

5. A Barisan Hizbullah training camp was officially opened in West Java on 18 February 1945. For details about Hizbullah, see “Statement by Capt. YANAGAWA, dated 14 Dec 1945”, Javint 3132/2, SEATIC Det., GSI, 23 Ind Div., 15 Jan 45,” NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5190. The twenty-one-page Yanagawa “Statement,” which contains invaluable details about the establishment and training of Peta, the Yugekitai and Hizbullah, is in three parts: Part I (8 pp.), Part II (9 pp.), and Part III (4 pp.). A three-page attachment gives an account of Yanagawa’s actions after the Japanese surrender. Page 1 of Part II of the “Statement” is missing from the file held at the Nationaal Archief. However, Part II of the “Statement” can be found in the NIOD Indische Collectie. See “Translation of statement by Capt Yanagawa Munenari [sic], dated 14 Dec 45. (Continued).” NIOD coll. 400, no. 601B. In the “Statement”, the translator has erred in rendering Yanagawa’s given name as “Munenari”, a common mistake. It should be Yanagawa Motoshige. The same error appears in Joyce C. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II (Singapore: Heinemann, 1977); and in Mitsuo Nakamura, “General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation”, pp. 1–26. Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951–1966 (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), refers throughout to Yanagawa Tomoshige, although this may be a typographical error.

6. “Intelligence in the New Japan”, CIA website, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v07i3a01p_0005.htm, pp. 5–6, on which this and the following two sentences are based (accessed 20 September 2007). Tokumu means “special task”. Kikan is “organization” or “system”.


8. Lieutenant General Fujiwara Iwaichi, interviewed by Ruth McVey, Kyoto, 16 October 1980, McVey Archive, and Tsuchiya Kiso, in an interview with the present writer, 2 February 1999. I am indebted to Ruth McVey for permission to copy and cite her interviews with Fujiwara, Yanagawa Motoshige, Tsuchiya Kiso, Togashi Tomoshige and Yoshitake Chikao, among many others. The characters used in Japanese names can sometimes be read in more than one way. When Yanagawa, who had worked closely with Togashi during the early part of the occupation, referred to him a number of times in his 14 December 1945, “statement”, Allied interrogators took the name down as Togashi Takeomi. Taketomi is another possibility. For details see Togashi interview with Ruth McVey, October 1980, and “Statement by Capt. YANAGAWA, dated 14 Dec 1945”, Javint 3132/2, SEATIC Det., GSI, 23 Ind Div., 15 Jan 46.” NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5190, p. 2.

10. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 20 August 2002. The transformation from *han* to *pan* is explained by phonetics.

11. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 29 May 2002. Kokubu was chief of staff from May (some sources say June) 1943 to November 1944.


13. Kokubu later served under Tojo in the War Ministry.

14. “Written Statement of Kempeitai [sic] Capt. Yoshitake”, Item 2047, Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) Intelligence Bulletin, No. 225, 4 January 1946, TNA/PRO WO 203/6303. The claim that Yoshitake was a member of the Kenpeitai is a glaring error; he was a member of Beppan. See also “Captain YOSHITAKE, The Beppan of the General Staff”, Kantoor voor Japansche Zaken, Batavia, undated. NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5300, p. 4. By the end of the war, Beppan appears to have had a staff of about 300 people.

15. Interrogation of Lieutenant Onishi Kyutaro, Glodok Prison, Batavia, 18 May 1946. NANL, 2.10.14, inv. 5280. Onishi, who was stationed in Java throughout the Japanese occupation, joined the Imperial Army as a private in 1919, transferring to the Kenpeitai two years later. In 1933, he was attached to the feared Kwantung Army Kenpeitai in Manchuria and reached the rank of warrant officer four years later. Between 1943 and 1945, he was attached to the Tokko (Special Higher Police) division of the Java Kenpeitai Headquarters in Jakarta. In the words of Captain Yoshitake, “Sometimes the Kempeitai misunderstood Special Section as if it was an organization to keep a check on Kempeitai. At times there was very bad feeling between the two organizations.” “Written Statement of Kempeitai Capt. Yoshitake”, pp. 12–13.

16. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 20 August 2002. Tsuchiya was the head of Beppan during the final stages of the war.

17. Kokubu may have been the “big boss” of Beppan, but Major Kuriya actually directed it. Although his name is usually given as Kuriya Tsugunori, Tsuchiya said that he and his colleagues in Beppan called him Jisuke. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 29 May 2002. Kuriya had served in Jakarta as a military attaché. Tsuchiya Kiso, in an interview with Ruth McVey, October 1980. See also Stephen C. Mercado, *The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army’s Elite Intelligence School* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 36.
18. The name is sometimes given as Marusaki.
20. Supported by a government-run company set up to finance intelligence operations, Maruzaki took lessons in Indonesian and Dutch and, as one writer put it, “generally had quite a good time,” at least until December 1941, when he and other Japanese officials were interned by the Dutch following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nugroho Notosusanto, Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang di Indonesia [The Peta Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979), p. 59.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 29 May 2002. Beppan’s task, another officer observed, was to “collect and properly arrange … information on the movements of each race and the voice of the general population in the island.” See Yoshitake “Statement”, p. 4. To this end, Beppan’s offices in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya compiled monthly reports for Sixteenth Army headquarters.
27. Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, 15 September 1998.
28. Nugroho Notosusanto, “The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia” (PhD dissertation, Universitas Indonesia, 1977), p. 97. Kuriya “thought that Indonesians would be less conspicuous than Japanese in Australia”, especially as many Indonesians were in Australia with the Dutch. The aim was to assess the possibility of training Indonesians as “excellent suppliers of infm,” to create “good observers along Jap[anese] army lines.” Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt I, p. 3.
32. Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, 3 February 1999.
33. Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, 1 February 1999.
34. Interview, Lieutenant General Kemal Idris, Jakarta, 1 September 1998.
36. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, 1 September 1998.
38. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, pp. 7–8.
40. “I never heard him say a word about Lawrence of Arabia,” said Tsuchiya, who was one of Yanagawa’s key army associates during the Japanese occupation of Java. “Nor can one find any such references in his book Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui. However, when I met him in Jakarta in about 1970, I gained the impression that he was isolated from the Japanese community in Indonesia, which may have led him to a state of mind much like that of Lawrence of Arabia.” Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 29 May 2002. There are, in fact, two references to Lawrence of Arabia in Yanagawa’s book. In one instance, he refers to Colonel Suzuki as the “Lawrence of Burma.” In the other, he says, in effect, that the people of Indonesia should all become like Lawrence in order to win independence. This hardly proves that Yanagawa saw himself playing such a role in the early 1940s, but the possibility should not be discounted.
42. Yanagawa is generally given the credit for establishing the asrama. Tsuchiya and Yoshitake believe this was not solely Yanagawa’s achievement, but Maruzaki’s too. Yanagawa, they feel, claims too much credit. Yanagawa was, however, the head of the asrama. Tsuchiya and Yoshitake in an interview with Ruth McVey, Osaka, October 1980.
43. Among those in the first intake were R.M. Jonosewojo Handayaningrat, Suprapto Sukawati, Zulkifli Lubis, Daan Mogot, Kemal Idris, R. Hidajat Martaatmadja, Sroehardjojo, Dr Sutjipto and Suprijadi, who was to lead a revolt against the Japanese in 1945. Sroehardjojo was to serve later as a battalion commander under Soeharto. Among those in the second intake were R. Umar Wirahadikusumah, who would serve as Vice President (1983–88) under Soeharto, R. Achmad Kosasih, Kusnowibowo and Rukmito Hendraningrat. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 52. According to Yanagawa, the recruits were mostly from Jakarta; about ten were from Surabaya, half a dozen from Central Java, and several from Bandung. Yanagawa “Statement”, Part I, p. 4. According to Togashi, Beppan asked each kabupaten (regency) on Java to send
three or four people, who should be devout Muslims (*tegas Islam*). Togashi
interview with Ruth McVey, October 1980.


a warning from the case of Colonel Suzuki in Burma, who, “when he tried to
redeem his promise to the BIA of independence, lost his position as head of
the Minami Kikan.” Yanagawa, *Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui*, p. 112, cited
in Lebra, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia*, p. 100. Yanagawa told Ruth
McVey the same thing. When Suzuki had pushed for Burmese independence,
he was “sent to Siberia,” so Yanagawa decided he would keep his mouth
shut and concentrate on training Indonesians to be ready for independence.


47. Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, 3 February 1999.

Kusnowibowo served later as a senior officer in Bakin, the State Intelligence
Coordinating Board. See also Yanagawa Motoshige, Jakarta, 13 November
1980.


50. “Statement” of Captain Tsuchiya Kiso, 3–8 March 1947, p. 3.


52. Lebra, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia*, p. 11, based on an interview
with Inada.


54. On 1 August 1943, Burma was declared officially independent. For details, see
Robert H. Taylor, *General Ne Win: A Political Biography* (Singapore: Institute of

55. “Interrogation of Gunzoku Saito Shizuo on the Independence Movement in
Saito seems to have erred when he told Allied interrogators that this order
was passed down via Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro, the commander of
the Seventh Area Army in Singapore. Itagaki did not take up that command
until April 1945.


57. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999. See also Anderson, *Java in a Time
of Revolution*, pp. 32, 420; Lebra, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia,
pp. 99–100; and Gatot Mangkupradja, “The Peta and My Relations with the
Japanese”, translated by Harumi Wanasita Evans and Ruth McVey, *Indonesia
5* (April 1968): 105–34. Tsuchiya said that although Gatot’s petition was a
Beppan initiative, it gave expression to a widely held aspiration. Afterwards,
“the whole of Indonesia flared up with hope that Japan would do something,
and many petitions came in from many islands, some written in blood." These were spontaneous, and "even when we said, 'We don't need any more petitions!' they kept pouring in."


59. The film was made by the Korean director Ho Yong (aka Hinatsu Eitaro and Hu Yung) under the direction of Major Kuriya and Captain Maruzaki. Wilfully misleading, it showed Australian prisoners of war living in "exemplary conditions". It was designed to "soften the Australian public for the anticipated Japanese invasion." For details see Yanagawa "Statement", 14 December 1945, Pt I, pp. 1 and 4; The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War, p. 509, and National Film and Sound Archives, Canberra, http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/34948415. For a description of this film and of the techniques used to produce it, see L. de Jong, The Collapse of a Colonial Society: The Dutch in Indonesia during the Second World War (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), p. 299.

60. Yanagawa "Statement", p. 5.


63. "Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies", a document drawn up by the headquarters of the Sixteenth Army. NIOD coll. 400, no. 792. According to this document, in August 1945 there were nearly 25,000 heiho in the region of Java, 2,500 in the region of Timor and around 15,000 distributed in other parts of the eastern region, in Sumatra and in mainland Southeast Asia. These figures refer only to heiho under the command of the Sixteenth Army. Kaori Maekawa believes there may have been twice as many heiho as there were members of Peta, meaning more than 70,000 in all. See Kaori Maekawa, "The Heiho during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia", in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire, edited by Paul H. Kratoska (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), p. 191. Although trained to fight, the heiho were used mainly as guards, drivers and labourers.


65. For details, see Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 163.

66. A Japanese battalion normally comprised one thousand men, but the Sixteenth Army thought it would be hard to control 1,000-man Peta battalions and made them half that size instead. Interview, Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, 4 February 1999.

67. There were sixty-six battalions on Java, with a total of 35,853 men, and three battalions on Bali, with 1,626 men. "Explanations Regarding All Kinds of

Although Bali was administered by the Imperial Navy, it had insufficient men to defend the island against Allied attack. In 1944, Tokyo would order the Sixteenth Army to take charge of Bali’s defence. When Captain Tsuchiya Kiso left for Bali to recruit and train three Balinese Peta battalions, he took with him seven young Indonesians who had performed exceptionally well on either the Seinen Dojo or the Bogor courses. The group included Zulkifli Lubis, Daan Mogot, Kemal Idris, Kusnowibowo and Sabirin Mochtar. Tsuchiya put Lubis in charge of the daidancho and chudancho cadets, while Mogot was responsible for training shodancho. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 29 May 2002. The Japanese sent Kemal Idris to train the Peta battalion at Negara, while Daan Mogot was given responsibility for the unit at Tabanan and Zulkifli Lubis the one at Klungkung. Rosihan Anwar, Ramadhan, K.H., Ray Rizal and Din Madjid, Kemal Idris: Bertarung Dalam Revolusi (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 46. See also Dr R. Koestedjo, “Pengalaman-pengalaman sebagai dokter Peta di Bali”, in Purbo S. Suwondo, ed., Peta: Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air Di Jawa dan Sumatera 1942–1945 (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 117. The date in the title of this book is misleading; Peta was not established until 1943. For a valuable account of the Japanese occupation of Bali, see Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 70–94. In later years, Kemal Idris would remember his time in Bali as “a golden period”, when, in his off-duty hours, he made many Balinese friends. Sabam Siagian private communication, 19 November 2012.


69. After the war, Colonel Miyamoto asked General Kokubu whether he or other senior officers had had any concerns at all about Peta. Kokubu replied that he had had no such worries in the beginning because when Peta was first established the tide of war was going in Japan’s favour. “But,” wrote Miyamoto, “considering a case of the worst coming to the worst, they didn’t put Peta under Sukarno’s control but kept it in the hands of the Japanese staff officer in charge of operations [sakusen sanbo].” See “Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi”, pp. 195–217. Needless to say, this did not stop Sukarno claiming later that, “The [Japanese] High Command requested Sukarno’s help in attracting the proper candidates for officers …. I looked for young men whom I could control …. I singlehandedly proposed the future colonels and generals of our Republican Army back in the fall of 1943.” Sukarno: An Autobiography, As Told to Cindy Adams (Hong Kong: Gunung Agung, 1966), pp. 186–87.
70. “Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies”, p. 3.

71. “Supplementary explanation of armed parties in Java under Japanese mil. adm.”, p. 5.


73. Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt I, p. 7. According to Miyamoto, about five Japanese were attached to each battalion “as trainers.” See Miyamoto Shizuo, “Jawa shusen shori-ki”, p. 222. According to Nugroho Notosusanto, each daidancho had a shidokan (supervisor), usually a captain or first lieutenant, who advised him how to run his battalion. The shidokan was assisted by several subordinate officers, who advised the chudanchos and the shodanchos. There were also Japanese noncommissioned officers who helped supervise the sections. Nugroho Notosusanto, “The Peta Army in Indonesia 1943–1945”, in Japan in Asia, edited by William H. Newell (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), p. 40.

74. Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt I, p. 6. The figures vary somewhat. Morimoto says there were 33 daidanchos, about 140 chudanchos, and approximately 600 shodanchos, 200 each from East, West and Central Java. Morimoto Takeshi, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, pp. 86–87. Yanagawa gave a figure of 34 daidanchos. An Indonesian daidancho was the equivalent, on paper, of a Japanese Army daitaicho, who carried the rank of major. A chudancho was the equivalent of a chutaicho, who was a captain. A shodancho was the equivalent of a shotaicho, who was usually a second lieutenant. However, the ranks of major, captain and second lieutenant were not awarded in the Peta.

75. For details, see EIPW, p. 568.

76. Among the others recruited in Central Java, either in this or in the two subsequent Peta intakes, were Sudirman, the future panglima besar (supreme commander) of the Indonesian National Army; five future army chiefs of staff (G.P.H. Dja tikusumo, Bambang Sugeng, Achmad Yani, Widodo and Surono), as well as Gatot Subroto, a future deputy army chief of staff; Sarwo Edhie, a future commander of the elite red beret unit, and Sarbini, a future commander of the East Java (Brawijaya) and Central Java (Diponegoro) military regions and a cabinet minister between 1964 and 1971. It does not follow, however, that Tsuchiya recruited all these officers. For one thing, he was responsible only for the first intake from Central Java; some of these men were in later intakes. For another, Banyumas, though part of Central Java, appears to have fallen within Yanagawa’s West Java recruitment pool. Tsuchiya was unable to recall visiting Banyumas; he thought that that region, known for producing many good soldiers, may have been part of Yanagawa’s zone. According to Kusnowibowo, it was. Yanagawa’s 3rd Company, as Kusnowibowo remembered it, consisted of people from the second intake at Tangerang and from Jakarta, Banten and Banyumas. Kusnowibowo in an interview
with Ruth McVey, Jakarta, 20 November 1980. On the other hand, Brigadier General Soemyarsono thought that young men from “Solo, Banyumas, Yogya” were in Tsuchiya’s training company, of which he was himself a member. K.R.M.T. Soemyarsono, telephone interview, 5 April 2001.

11. “The whole island was ablaze with enthusiasm”
2. That, at least, is what Tsuchiya Kiso, the Japanese army officer who recruited Soeharto that day, remembered him wearing. Soeharto, he felt certain, was not wearing his police uniform (Tsuchiya Kiso, personal communication). How reliable was Tsuchiya’s memory, both on minor matters such as this and on matters of substance? In a series of interviews, and in subsequent correspondence, Tsuchiya came across as an intelligent, objective and honest man, proud in an understated way of the role that he and his Beppan colleagues had played in forging an Indonesian volunteer defence force, but with no wish to overstate the case or downplay negative aspects of the Japanese occupation or, indeed, his wartime disagreements with fellow Japanese officers. His memory proved to be excellent on matters of substance that are easily cross-checked. After the war, Tsuchiya was arrested by the Allies and interrogated at length. The detailed account he provided in 1999, when he was eighty-two, and over the next five years, is remarkably consistent with the account he gave Allied interrogators in 1945–47. It is in accordance, too, with the picture that emerges both from Morimoto Takeshi, *Jawa boei giyugun-shi* [History of the Java Volunteer Defence Force] (Tokyo: Ryukeishosha, 1992), the 783–page semi-official Japanese history of the volunteer force, and with the memories of a significant number of Indonesian officers who served in that corps. At the same time, Tsuchiya readily acknowledged in 1999 that he could not recall a great deal about Soeharto from 1943. He told Ruth McVey in 1980 that he really couldn’t remember Soeharto. Ruth McVey, notes from interview with Tsuchiya Kiso, Osaka, October 1980. McVey archive. His 1980 claim appears to overstate the case somewhat, given the substantial evidence to the contrary.
3. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 6 May 2003.
4. Ibid.
5. The Yogyakarta branch had one officer, one sergeant-major and three interpreters. Interviews, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999 and March 2001; Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication 29 May 2002; “Interrogation of Captain Tsuchiya Kiso at Glodok Jail,” Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, Intelligence Bulletin No. 228, 25 January 1946, p. 26, TNA:PRO WO
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203/6306; and “VERKLARING. Afgelegd door: Kapitein TSUCHIYA Kiso (verbonden aan de Staf van de BEPPAN-NANSEITAI) gedurende verhoor afgenomen in de TJIPINANG-gevangenis te Meester-Cornelis (3-8 Maart 1947).” NIOD-IC, no. 006524–006535.

6. “Selection was to be made after strict screening of a large number of volunteers,” a Japanese officer noted immediately after the war. “But as a matter of fact, urgency led to indiscriminate selection.” “Document taken from 16 Army HQ,” NEFIS Document 2618, 14 November 1946, NIOD IC No. 006501-006506, p. 3.

7. Using Yogyakarta as his base, Tsuchiya made day trips to most of the towns on his list but stayed overnight at one or two of the more distant locations, such as Pati and Bojonegoro. During his recruitment drive, he interviewed candidates in Yogyakarta, Magelang, Semarang, Solo, Madiun, Pati, Mojokerto, Bojonegoro, and, according to Morimoto Takeshi, Banyumas. As noted above, Banyumas does not appear to have been in the Central Java catchment area. If Yanagawa was in fact recruiting at Banyumas, which is well inside Central Java, then Tsuchiya was operating well inside East Java when he recruited at Bojonegoro. Equally, if Tsuchiya is referring in his list to the Mojokerto some thirty miles southwest of Surabaya, his travels would have taken him surprisingly deep inside East Java. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 6 May 2003, and Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 84.

8. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.

9. Candidates of interest were asked to give their age, address and educational background, and to answer one or two other questions. They were also required to provide information about family members. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 6 May 2003 and 16–17 September 2003.

10. The main consideration of the Japanese was that the candidates be reasonably literate; in 1943, illiteracy was widespread in Java. Officers had to be able to read and understand instructions, write reports, keep records and so on. Benedict Anderson, personal communication, 26 February 2009.

11. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 6 May 2003.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


16. Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 6 May 2003.


20. In his memoir in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tsuchiya noted, “Soeharto said he hid the fact that he had once belonged to the Dutch army in order to be
admitted to the Peta. But we knew he had been there.” Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.

21. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999. Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, who was one of four staff officers responsible to the chief of staff of the Sixteenth Army, echoed those sentiments. Although he did not meet Soeharto at that time—“[Soeharto] was way, way down” in the hierarchy—he heard from his fellow officers before the end of the war that “Soeharto was so capable that he should be recruited even though he had been with the Dutch army.” Interview, Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, 4 February 1999. According to Taniguchi Taketsugu, the former Kenpeiitai chief in Bogor, Soeharto’s service in the KNIL was not something Soeharto needed to hide. “The Sixteenth Army,” he said, “didn’t take it as a big issue.” Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, 1 February 1999. Six decades later, Tsuchiya was unaware that another of the men whom he, or possibly Yanagawa, recruited, Achmad Yani, had, like Soeharto, been a sergeant in the KNIL.

22. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.


25. See Morimoto, Java boei giyugun-shi, p. 85. Yanagawa says the course opened on 22 October. See Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt I, p. 5.

26. For the details, see Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt I, p. 7. Morimoto gives slightly different, rounded figures. Morimoto, Java boei giyugun-shi, pp. 86–87. The 2nd Company, commanded by First Lieutenant Rokugawa Masami, had 220 cadets from East Java. Yanagawa was the commander of the 3rd Company, which had 246 cadets from West Java. The three shodancho training companies consisted of four sections (kutai), each with about fifty-five to sixty men. On paper, the commanding officer at Bogor was Colonel Uchino Uichi. But he was busy with other duties at Sixteenth Army Headquarters and the man who actually ran the centre and who personally trained the future Indonesian battalion and company commanders was the deputy commander, Captain Maruzaki. See Yanagawa “Statement”, 14 December 1945, Pt 1, p. 6. Morimoto writes that First Lieutenant Ito Seiji was in charge of training the battalion commanders. According to Yanagawa, the East Java cadets were supervised by First Lieutenant Mutsukawa Masayoshi.


29. This estimate was given by Purbo Suwondo, who has written extensively about the Peta. Personal communication, 8 July 2009. A well-regarded post-war Japanese study claimed that the volunteer force was centred around Muslim youth and oriented towards the exclusion of Dutch-educated youth and that
this was in distinct contrast to the way in which Dutch forces under the old regime were organized mainly among “Christianized Indonesians” such as Ambonese, Menadonese and Bataks. See Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, a translation of Indonesia ni Okeru Nihon Gunsei no Kenkyu, p. 195. That observation is misleading. For one thing, as noted earlier the KNIL counted a greater number of non-Christian Javanese than is widely acknowledged. For another, the Japanese were not seeking to exclude Dutch-educated youth from the Peta, only those Indonesians who had received officer training under the Dutch, a proviso that at least one key Japanese recruiter was willing to ignore from the start. Finally, there never were many Bataks in the KNIL.

Harry Benda, working from incomplete data and admitting that his conclusions are tentative, appears to overstate the Islamic dimension. Discussing the Peta, he writes that, “Muslims played an outstanding role from the very beginning.” The Indonesian officer corps, he adds, “contained a great number of kiyai. As far as can be ascertained, the new Indonesian military elite in effect drew its main strength from Muslim leaders and from members of the aristocracy.” Muslims “soon occupied an important, and perhaps even a predominant, place” in the Peta officer corps. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 138–40.

While it is true that there were a number of devout Muslim battalion commanders in the Peta—including such men as Kasman Singodimedjo (a lawyer and former head of the Muhammadiyah in Jakarta) (Jakarta Daidan); Sudirman (a Cilacap schoolteacher who would be elected in 1945 as the supreme commander of the Indonesian Army) (Kroya Daidan); Iskandar Idris (Pekalongan Daidan); Mohammad Saleh (Yogyakarta Daidan); Moeljadi Djojomartono (Solo Daidan); Abdul Kadir (Gombong Daidan); Arudji Kartawinata (Cimahi Daidan), and Imam Sudjai’i (Malang Daidan)—the Islamic factor should not be exaggerated. It was in areas such as Banten, West Java, East Java and Madura, which tend to have a stronger association with Islam, that the Japanese were inclined to recruit Islamic teachers and Islamic social and political leaders as battalion commanders. An identification with Islam does not seem to have been disproportionately strong, at least in Central Java, among the chudanchos, and still less so among the shodanchos, who would go on to play such a significant role in the future national army.

30. Written communication, Major General Soetarto Sigit, 5 August 2000. As one Japanese document put it, the aim was to recruit “local influential persons with an intense racial spirit.” See “Document taken from 16 Army HQ”, p. 3. The word “racial” should perhaps have been translated as “nationalist”. The central role of the daidancho “was to give moral leadership and exercise political supervision over their subordinates.”

32. Interview, Lieutenant General Djatikusumo, Jakarta, 9 March 1981.
33. Nugroho Noto Sosusanto, “The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation”, pp. 125–29, on which this section is based.
34. Ibid., p. 125. It seems unlikely that most of them were persuaded by members of Beppan, as Nugroho claims. According to Nugroho, those with a Muslim background were approached by Abdul Hamid Ono, the so-called Islamic expert in Beppan. Those with a non-Islamic background were approached by Yanagawa and his colleagues.
35. Ibid., p. 126.
36. Moersjid, “Pembawa Kenangan”, in Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Personal Testimonies and Public Images in Indonesia, Japan, and the Netherlands, edited by Remco Raben (Zwolle and Amsterdam: Waanders Publishers and Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 1999), pp. 87–88. Moersjid, who had attended a Muhammadiyah elementary school, was sixteen and in the middle of his third year at a MULO junior high school when the Japanese came. In late 1942 he was selected to attend an officers course in Japan but his family objected. Instead, he joined the second Peta intake in Bogor. Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, 26 April 1999.
38. Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia, p. 228.
39. Nugroho, “The Peta Army”, p. 128. Nugroho went on to become the head of the Indonesian Army history department. He was later appointed rector of the University of Indonesia and then Minister of Education under Soeharto.
42. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho.”
43. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 84.
44. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.
46. Princelings and other young aristocrats of the two royal courts of Solo were well represented in the Peta officer corps, with no fewer than ten signing up. The two royal courts of Yogyakarta were represented hardly at all, and what representation there was came from the Pakualaman.

Four members of the Sunanate of Surakarta (Solo) joined—or, in one case, nearly joined—the Peta. They were G.P.H. Poerbonagoro, a Breda graduate and former KNIL officer who was to have joined a daidancho course, only to withdraw; G.P.H. Djatikusumo, a former cadet at the KNIL Reserve Officers Training Corps (CORO) in Bandung who became a chudancho; R.M. Subroto Kusmardjo, who became a Yugeki shodancho; and R.M. Sukandar Tjokronegoro, a chudancho who became a senior officer at TNI headquarters in Yogya. As we
have seen, Djatikusumo had been offered a place at the Royal Military Academy in Breda. He had turned it down because, as an officer in the Dutch army, he would have had to swear an oath of loyalty to the Dutch Queen “and that is too difficult.” Interview, Lieutenant General Djatikusumo, Jakarta, 9 March 1981.

Sukandar had been expelled from the HBS senior high school in Malang after a clash with a Dutch teacher who is said to have hated pribumis; he finished senior high school in Jakarta. Later, he took a ship to Japan, where he studied economics. When the war broke out, he joined a Japanese army officers’ school and graduated as a first lieutenant (chui). He landed at Kragen, East Java, with the Japanese invasion force. When the Peta was established, he was transferred to that body as a chudancho and was posted to Bogor, where he served as a staff officer. He was later assigned to the Yugekai in Malang, where he played an active role in forming the Untung Suropati Division. He became deputy chief of staff of the TNI under Lieutenant General Oerip Soemohardjo. He died, as did Oerip, in 1948.

Seven members of the Mangkunegaran joined the Peta. They were: the future Mangkunegoro VIII, K.P.H. Hamidjojo Saroso, who became a chudancho; his younger brother, K.P.H. Hamidjojo Santoso, who became a shodancho; and five grandsons of Mangkunegoro VI—R.M. Jonosewojo Handayaningrat (“Piet”) (shodancho), R.M. Jono Hatmodjo (“Molly”) (shodancho), R.M. Ronokusumo (Yugeki shodancho and later chudancho), R.M. Ronopuspito (Yugeki shodancho), and R.M. Ronopradopo (Yugeki shodancho). Written communication, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, 20 May 2002, and Siapa Dia?, p. 155. I am not aware of any members of the Yogyakarta Kraton who became Peta officers. As far as I know, only one member of the Pakualaman, K.R.M.T. Soemyarsono, joined the Peta. Reflecting on this phenomenon, Djatikusumo said that one group of cadets had come from the bangsawan (nobility). “What is bangsawan? The bluebloods! The Tjakraningrats from Madura. Mangkunegoro, with his younger brother. And us. Not from Yogya! Very strange!” Asked why this was so, he replied, “I don’t know!” Interview, Lieutenant General Djatikusumo, Jakarta, 9 March 1981.

By this time, it has been noted, the word priyayi was being used in such a loose manner that even a postal clerk could describe himself as low priyayi, allowing him to bask in the glow of a term still tinged with connotations of aristocracy. In the 1940s, there was not much of a nobility left on Java. Many of these priyayi were simply children of officials, “quite petty bourgeois but with typical aristocratic pretensions.” Benedict Anderson, personal communication.

Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, 1 September 1998. Purbo’s suggestion that 70 to 80 per cent of the shodancho cadets were from a
priyayi background fits broadly with the findings of a 1977 study. In a sample of 124 ex-Peta officers, Nugroho Notookusanto found that fifty-nine out of eighty-four of the shodanchos were from a priyayi background. However, thirty-eight of them were from the low priyayi, a category that included men whose fathers were train conductors, pawnshop keepers, and NCOs; nineteen were from the “middle” priyayi and two from the “grand” priyayi. There was one member of the nobility, and twenty-four commoners. See Nugroho, “The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation”, p. 122. According to Major General Moersjid, more than half the Peta platoon commanders were the sons of government officials. Interview, General Moersjid, Jakarta, 8 May 2000. Moersjid was a member of the second shodancho intake in 1944, together with Widodo, who later became Army Chief of Staff; Supardjo Rustam, who became Interior Minister; and Daryatmo, who became Speaker of the People’s Deliberative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). Some shodancho cadets were the sons of aristocrats and entitled to call themselves Raden Mas. Some others were the grandsons of aristocrats and in a position to call themselves Raden. Most chose not to use these titles as a gesture to the new spirit of egalitarianism that came with the revolution.

49. The correlation between social status and education was not automatic, of course. A man such as Djatikusumo, a son of Pakubuwono X of Solo, might have received a sound Dutch education, in Java and in the Netherlands. But many Kraton princelings had little education.

50. As noted earlier, the Dutch-run high schools were the HBS and the AMS. Under the Japanese, these schools were replaced by the Sekolah Menengah Tinggi (Higher Middle School), in which the language of instruction was Indonesian. Below that was the Sekolah Menengah Pertama (Lower Middle School), which replaced the MULO junior high schools.

51. A non-Western education was by no means an impediment to a successful post-war military career. Muchlas Rowi, a pesantren student who trained as a company commander, became a successful battalion commander in the post-war Untung Suropati Division in Malang. In the early 1950s he took private Dutch-language classes in the afternoons and evenings so that he would be able to attend lectures given by officers of the Dutch Military Mission. Muchlas Rowi retired as a major general.

52. Interviews, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, 31 July 2002, and 8 July 2009. Almost all of the cadets had some knowledge of the Japanese language, the high-school students having studied it for two hours a day for the previous eighteen months.

53. Some of the Indonesians liked to say in later years that they had identified not with the white men in the books, as their Dutch school friends are said to have done, but with the Native American chief, a man “oppressed” by Europeans.
As it happens, the Germans themselves identified with Winnetou, who was seen by his creator as a “truly noble man.” “Winnetou,” the magazine Der Spiegel noted in 2006, “is the quintessential German national hero, a paragon of virtue, a nature freak, a romantic, a pacifist at heart, but in a world at war he is the best warrior, alert, strong, sure.” See Michael Kimmelman, “In Germany, Wild for Winnetou”, New York Times, 12 September 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/arts/design/12karl.html (accessed 17 July 2009).

54. This sketch of the intellectual horizons of those who had reached senior high school and university is drawn from J.D. Legge, Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta, Monograph Series, Publication No. 68 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1988), pp. 76–77. Legge is writing about the young intellectuals associated with Sjahrir, a privileged, unique and well-educated group. But his study gives a sense of an intellectual environment that would not have been foreign to some Peta cadets, particularly those at the chudancho level.

55. Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, 8 May 2000. Moersjid, it is true, had some reason to dislike Soeharto. When Soeharto came to power, Moersjid was arrested and jailed for more than three years, with no charges ever filed. At the time, his only “crime” appeared to be his unwavering loyalty to President Sukarno. Moersjid and Soeharto had clashed on at least two occasions in the early 1960s, however. In 1961, when Moersjid was the Assistant for Operations and Soeharto the Commander of the Army General Reserve Corps (Caduad), Moersjid blocked Soeharto’s attempts to have the battalions that had been earmarked for Caduad duties in the event of an emergency put under his immediate command. In 1962, when Soeharto, who was head of the Mandala command for the liberation of West New Guinea, sought to bypass both Moersjid, who was by then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, and Major General Soeprapto, the Deputy for Administration, Moersjid brought him into line.

57. Ibid., and Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 89.
58. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 14 April 1998.

12. “Don’t make them too strong!”
1. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 85.
4. Ibid. See also Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 88.
5. Captain Yamazaki Hajime, who was later to head the Planning Department for the Guidance of the Java Volunteer Defence Force (Giyugun Shidobu), although formally he was only the number-three man in that organization, has left an example of how difficult it was to translate Japanese military texts into Indonesian: “It took almost a month before we agreed on the translation of such basic terms as heishi (soldier). We didn’t want to use soldaat because it was Dutch, the enemy language. Kesatria sounded as archaic as mononofu in Japanese. After much discussion, we settled on prajurit. But even that didn’t seem just right. Prajurit sounded a little outdated, like samurai in Japanese.” Yamazaki Hajime, Kita-ni minami-ni [Northward, Southward] (published privately by Yamazaki in Takasaki, Gunma Prefecture, 1977), pp. 80–81.


7. See Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 37.


11. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, pp. 132–33.


15. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”. It is possible Soeharto did not begin sumo training until he returned to Bogor some five months later, when Yanagawa was the commanding officer.

16. Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao, October 1980, on which this paragraph draws.

17. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 89.


19. Ibid.


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22. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”.


25. Soeharto, who set out on his first official trip abroad at 7:30 a.m. on the day after he had been sworn in as full president, went directly from the airport to the Imperial Palace, where he was received in audience by the Emperor. In what seems an odd omission, the published presidential diary makes no reference to any meetings with Hirohito. It does mention that on his next stopover, in Cambodia, Soeharto met Prince Sihanouk, who had stood down as King to become head of the government but who later resumed the role of Head of State. See G. Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Team [sic] Dokumentasi Presiden RI, Jejak Langkah Pak Harto, 28 Maret 1968–23 Maret 1973 (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), pp. 5–9.


27. Before his visit to Japan, Soeharto had asked to meet Tsuchiya “to thank him for the service he gave during the war.” Japan Times, May 26, 1968, quoting a Kyodo report. Tsuchiya, who was then fifty, said he remembered Soeharto as an alert man full of vigour.

On a subsequent visit to Japan, in 1975, Soeharto was to meet five former second lieutenants—Kobayashi Yasuo, Urawa Shizuo, Fukuoka Masao, Nakamoto Yoshiyuki and Morimoto Takeshi—who had been instructors at Bogor in 1943–44. In the event, the Japanese Foreign Ministry invited only the first two men to a meeting with Soeharto at the Imperial Hotel. Fukuoka, “a very modest man” who had accompanied his former comrades to the hotel, waited in the next room when they went in to see the President. Hearing that he was there, Soeharto invited him to join them. Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, February 1, 1999, and Mainichi Daily News, July 9, 1975.

28. Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao in an interview with Ruth McVey, October 1980. At the time of Soeharto’s visit, Tsuchiya was working for the Nissan Motor Company.

29. Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, 3 February 1999.


31. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 1 September 1998.

32. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 10 September 1998.

33. Morimoto, Jawa boei giiyugun-shi, p. 90.

34. Ibid.

35. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 4 April 1998.


37. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 1 September 1998.

40. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.
41. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 1 September 1998.
43. Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, 29 April 1999.
44. Interview, Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, 1 September 1998. Purbo made the point, however, that his company commander, First Lieutenant Shindo Kazuma, a veteran of the war in China, did not slap his charges. Written communication, 1 March 2009.
45. Interview, General Widodo, Jakarta, 17 November 1981. Widodo was in the second intake at Bogor.
46. Interview, Moersjid, 8 May 2000.
47. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 21 January 1999.
48. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”.
50. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”.
52. Interview, General Soemitro, Jakarta, 18 July 1981. Although Soemitro made an explicit link between his behaviour and his Japanese training, he was always ready to acknowledge that he had got into a lot of fights at school. Speaking once about General Benny Moerdani, Soemitro described him admiringly as “a fighting animal.”
54. Personal communication, General Benny Moerdani, Yogyakarta, 3 July 1980. In an interview four days later, General Nasution confirmed that Surono was inclined to hit people from time to time.
57. Interviews, Colonel Alex Kawilarang, Jakarta, 25 July 1995 and 31 August 1998. Kawilarang, who was Soeharto’s commanding officer, had gone to the docks to farewell the brigade. Seeing Soeharto strike Suparman, he shouted out to him to stop.
58. Robert Cribb, written communication, 1 June and 3 June 2020.
60. Interview, Nasution, Jakarta, 2 March 1981.
See Erwiza Erman, “Generalized Violence: A Case Study of the Ombilin Coal Mines, 1892–1996”, in Roots of Violence, pp. 105–31, and Budi Agustono, “Violence on North Sumatra’s Plantations”, in Roots of Violence, pp. 133–41. It might be argued that Ombilin should not be cited as an example. It was an extreme. As Cribb notes, the hierarchical distance between guards and prisoners was much greater than that between overseers and labourers, which was in turn greater than that between NCOs and recruits. It is not clear whether the punishments on the North Sumatran estates were customary or whether they were one-off.

Henk Schulte Nordholt, written communication, 28 May 2020.

I am indebted to Robert Cribb for making this point.

Interview, Purbo Suwondo, 1 September 1998. Buka means subordinate. Shoaku means “to be in control of.”

Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 12 June 2003.

Interview Morimoto Takeshi, Tokyo, 1 February 1999.

General Soemitro, personal communication. See also Ramadhan, K.H., Soemitro: Dari Pangdam Mulawarman Sampai Pangkopkamtib, p. 35.

Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 89.

Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.

Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 92.

Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.

Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 92.

Interview, Soemyarsono, Jakarta, 24 April 2000. This Soedjono is not to be confused with Sudjono Humardani, a Central Java financial affairs officer whom Soeharto came to know in the mid-1950s.

Two of the sixteen had reached technical college, two had reached teacher’s college, and another two had reached senior high school.

Aristocratic families did not become Catholics, with a few rare exceptions. But two of Soeharto’s five Catholic battalion commanders were from the court of the Pakualaman.

Interview, Dayino, Jakarta, 3 February 2000.

For details, see Imelda Bachtiar, ed., Catatan Jenderal Pranoto Reksosamodra: Dari RTM Boedi Oetomo Sampai Nirbaya (Jakarta: Kompas, 2014), p. 34. Before World War II, the Muhammadiyah worked hard to modernize Indonesian education.

Interview, Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta, 8 January 2013.

Interview, Haryasudirja, 31 January 2000.

Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 19.

Soeharto’s claim has puzzled former Peta colleagues. Soemyarsono, who was in the same shodancho training platoon as Soeharto and Pranoto Reksosamodra, was adamant that there was only one Pranoto in that platoon: Pranoto
Reksosamodra. Interview, Soemyarsono, 23 February 2001. That claim is supported by Colonel Soepardio, the former deputy head of the Military History Division of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Written communication, Colonel Soepardio, 21 May 2002. Pranoto makes it clear in his memoirs that he was on the same shodancho course as Soeharto and that he went on to serve, as did Soeharto, as a platoon commander in the 1st Battalion in Wates. Later, he was on the same chudancho course as Soeharto. See Pranoto Reksosamodra, Memoar Mayor Jenderal Raden Pranoto Reksosamodra (Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2002), pp. 58–59, and Bachtar, ed., Catatan Jenderal Pranoto Reksosamodra, pp. 38–39.

82. In the 1960s and 1970s, Bardosono, by then a brigadier general, was given important positions both at Bina Graha, the presidential office block in Jakarta, and at the powerful Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), while doubling as the general chairman of the All-Indonesia Soccer Association. Bardosono’s appointment to the latter job was to bring him national attention. Bardosono had been “handpicked by Soeharto [and] was also a practising mystic.” See Hamish McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia (Melbourne: Fontana Books, 1980), p. 239. In 1977, during a soccer scandal in which Indonesian team managers allegedly paid bribes to opposing players during a preliminary World Cup regional tournament in Singapore, Bardosono returned to Jakarta “flourishing a Buddha statuette, which he claimed had been placed by the Thai team behind the Indonesian goal to exert a powerful attractive force on the ball.”

83. Although Yani attended high school in West Java, he was from Banyumas in southwestern Central Java. As noted earlier, Banyumas appears to have come within the “catchment area” of Captain Yanagawa, who was responsible for recruiting and training officer cadets from West Java.

84. If, as seems likely, Yani was in Yanagawa’s training company, then Sarwo Edhie may have been in that company too.


89. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999.

90. Ibid.

91. Interview, Soemyarsono, 2 February 2000.


93. Ibid.
94. Written communication, Colonel Soepardio, 21 May 2002.
95. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 94.
96. Ibid.
98. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 95.
100. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 95.
103. Interview, Major General Moersjijd, Jakarta, 8 May 2000.
104. Interview, Alwin Nurdin, Jakarta, 14 April 1998.
105. “Document taken from 16 Army HQ”, p. 4. Some recruits, it is true, had found the training and the punishment impossibly hard, and had applied for a discharge. However, they were “talked into staying by strong persuasion.” The Japanese reminded them of “the situation of their motherland” and of the heavy future responsibility of the younger generation. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 89.
106. Harada was the commanding officer of the Sixteenth Army until April 1945. After the war, he was brought before an Australian war-crimes tribunal for his role in the summary execution of three Royal Australian Air Force flight sergeants at Tanjung Priok in February 1945. He was found guilty and hanged in 1947.

13. “Soeharto was a cautious man”
1. If General MacArthur’s forces in Australia were to seize Timor, the Japanese reasoned, it would take “only one night” for them to reach Java. In view of
that, the Sixteenth Army had to be ready with sufficient force to defend the coastal regions of East Java. Looking back, Colonel Miyamoto said he should have realized, on his arrival in Java in April 1944, that there would be no counter-attack from Australia. Only in about March 1945, as the Americans moved on Okinawa, 350 miles southwest of Japan, did he and his fellow planners finally realize there would be no attack on Java from Australia. See Miyamoto, “Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi”, pp. 195–217.

3. Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, 1 February 1999.
4. Japanese Beach Defences in South East Asia, Directorate of Combined Operations, Headquarters India Command, New Delhi, 11 April 1945, TNA: PRO WO 203/3671 58604. In early 1944, it is true, Japanese beach defences were not as elaborate as those recommended in the August 1944 “Essentials of Island Defence.”

5. It has generally been thought that 200,000 to 500,000 *romusha* were put to work on military construction sites outside their own areas. See, for example, Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 13; and Cribb, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 408. However, Sato Shigeru has argued that historians have tended to underestimate the magnitude of *romusha* recruitment because they have focused primarily on those who were sent overseas. Sato argues that the mobilization programme involved “many millions” of people. See Shigeru Sato, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, pp. 154–200.

6. See, for example, Nugroho Notsusanto, *The Revolt Against the Japanese of a Peta Battalion in Blitar, February 14, 1945* (Jakarta: Centre for Armed Forces History, Department of Defence and Security, 1974). This theme is emphasized in a diorama at the Peta Museum in the grounds of the former Peta training depot in Bogor.

7. Morimoto Takeshi, *Jawa boei giyugun-shi*, p. 397, and *Memoar Mayor Jenderal Raden Pranoto Reksosamodra*, p. 61. Pranoto, who was stationed for a time in Wates, said that after the Proclamation he became the secretary of former *daidancho* Sunjoyo Purbokusumo.

9. Ibid.
10. Personal communication, Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, Jakarta.
12. Raden Sutomo, who was in charge of the battalion’s financial affairs, was made chief of supply at the Defence Ministry in May 1946, with the rank of major general. Selo Adji, the commander of the 3rd Company, later became a regimental commander in Yogyakarta.
and dates given in these two accounts vary. Yanagawa told Allied interrogators there were 20 battalion commander cadets, 81 company commander cadets and 780 platoon commander cadets. The new intake of shodancho cadets, he said, began their training on 10 April, with the chudancho cadets starting on 10 May and the daidancho cadets on 10 June. All three training courses finished on 10 August. Morimoto writes that the company commanders course began on 1 April and ended on 10 August. If Morimoto is correct, Soeharto would have spent more than four months on the company commanders course, not three months. This would be in keeping with Soeharto’s claim that the course lasted four months.

17. As part of the overhaul, the Training Centre (Renseitai) had been renamed the Education Corps (Kyoiku-tai).
20. Ibid.
22. According to one account, Yanagawa had taken back “photographic negatives plus research materials and reports.” While in Japan, he made a vain attempt to find thirty Japanese “for secret-service work in Beppan in connection with Chinese affairs.” Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt II, p. 1. What Yanagawa actually took back, it seems clear, was his propaganda film “Calling Australia.” Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, 29 May 2002.
23. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, 2 February 1999. Yanagawa was promoted to captain on 1 December 1944. See Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt II, p. 1. This promotion, said Tsuchiya, “led him to mistakenly believe that he was also number one among the Japanese living in Bogor. He became arrogant.” Tsuchiya seems to have erred on the timing of Yanagawa’s promotion, however. It came through the day after he completed his stint as the commanding officer at the Bogor centre—so any perceived arrogance cannot be attributed to that promotion.
25. For details, see Yanagawa Motoshige, Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui, pp. 146–56. In November 1944, it was decided that Maruzaki should return to Japan “owing to his illness.” With his departure, Tsuchiya took over as the head of Beppan. The trouble-making Takagi was shunted off to the Peta battalion in Bojonegoro, East Java. See Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt II, pp. 3 and 8. Maruzaki’s illness cannot have been too serious. Back in Japan, he
was promoted to major and went to work in the Izumi (Spring) Unit, which was “to wage campaigns of assassination and terror against the Allied troops and Japanese collaborators.” He was later transferred to Korea. Mercado, *The Shadow Warriors of Nakano*, pp. 127 and 160.

28. Morimoto interview, 1 February 1999. In his book, Morimoto says “it is assumed” that Soeharto attended the third company commanders’ course, in September 1944. The assumption is incorrect. Indonesian colleagues insist he was a member of the second intake.
29. The Peta flag was designed on the basis that it should not resemble the Indonesian flag, should look similar to the Japanese military flag and should incorporate the Islamic crescent and star. Tsuchiya Kiso, personal communication. Benda has suggested that the aim was to express “the desired identification of Japan’s war with a Holy War for the defence of Indonesian Islam against the Christian, imperialist West.” See Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 141. Retired Peta officers claim that an Indonesian, Moetakat Hoerip, suggested a flag with twenty rays, reflecting the essence of Javanese philosophy and religion and a large star. What the Japanese produced was a flag with sixteen rays and a small star. Colonel Miyamoto is said to have confirmed that the sixteen rays represented the Japanese Sixteenth Army. See Purbo Suwondo, ed., *Peta: Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air Di Jawa dan Sumatera 1942–1945*, p. 223.
31. He had spent seventeen of his twenty-one months in the KNIL in training establishments and only four months on attachment to a battalion. He had spent five of his first ten months in the Peta in training establishments.
32. The disparities were somewhat less, of course, in the case of those platoon commanders who, like Soeharto, had also been selected for a company commanders’ course, and in the case of those men who had begun their military training in 1944, when the courses were longer. But even here, Soeharto was a long way ahead; he still had more than four times as much training as the platoon or company commanders who had attended either a longer course or two separate courses.
36. Miyamoto, “Jawa shusen shori-ki”, in The Japanese Experience, p. 223. Colonel Miyamoto, it will be recalled, had arrived in Java in April 1944. At that time, he was staff officer in charge of supply (koho sanbo), with responsibility, inter alia, for distributing arms and munitions to the Peta battalions. By 1945 he had been promoted to staff officer for operations (sakusen sanbo), under Colonel Obana Yoshimasa, the senior staff officer (kokyu sanbo). As Obana was often ill, Miyamoto served, in effect, as the key planning officer of the Sixteenth Army. Miyamoto Shizuo, reply given in response to written questions from the author, 25 May 1999.


40. For an account of Japanese thinking, see “Report of Interrogation of Tadashi Maeda, Rear-admiral, in Struiswijk jail near Batavia, on the 1st and 10th August 1946.”

41. A week or so earlier, at the end of August, Tokyo had advised the Sixteenth Army that this declaration was to be made. See Item 1 of Javint 3134/3 of 4 March 1946. “Taken from Capt Nakamura Hiroshi. Table of stages in the realisation of the plan for an Indonesian Independence Movement, Item 1 of a file, dated 12 Dec 45, on ‘Record of Progress of the Independence Movement’, prepared by 16 Army Mil Adm.” NIOD coll. 400, no. 594.


43. “Notification regarding the Measures Ensuing from the Proclamation of Admission of the Independence of the East Indies”, 7 September 1944, NIOD no. 005913-14, cited in Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, p. 108. It has not been possible to ascertain the new NIOD file number.

44. Miyamoto, “Jawa shusen shori-ki”, in The Japanese Experience, p. 225. As noted earlier, the heiho were rear echelon troops (koho butai).

45. “Supplementary explanation of armed parties in Java under Japanese mil. adm.”, in “Document taken from 16 Army HQ”, p. 4. There is nothing to indicate who wrote this study. However, the sentiments expressed, not least the scepticism about the wisdom of relying on the Peta, suggest that the author could well have been Miyamoto.

47. See “Explanations Regarding all Kinds of Armed Bodies”, p. 5.
48. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, 29 May 2002. In a similar vein, Purbo Suwondo said he and his fellow Peta officers in Malang did not hear anything about future motor transport, artillery or armoured units. Written communication, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, 9 March 2009.
50. The full name of the organization, which, Yanagawa later said, “doesn’t make sense deliberately,” was Jawa Boei Giyugun Tokusetsu Yugekitai I Go Kinmutai (Special Guerrilla Force No. 1 Task Force). Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, 1 February 1999. The Yugekitai had no organic relation to the Peta but was established by and controlled by Beppan officers. Until the Allies landed, it was to concentrate on intelligence work. Personal communication, Purbo Suwondo, 5 March 2009. For further details about the Yugekitai, see “The Organization of the ‘I GO’ Task Force”, Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt III, pp. 1–4. See also Hasuda Tatsuo in an interview with Ruth McVey, Tokyo, 23 October 1980. McVey Archive.
51. Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt II, p. 2, and interview, Purbo Suwondo, 1 September 1998. Yugekitai training was totally different from Peta training and in many ways more difficult. Yugeki were given automatic rifles and other arms and were trained especially for night action. They were taught not only how to use but also how to repair all kinds of weapons, and how to live on their own and make decisions individually rather than as a unit. They were trained in clandestine operations (boryaku) and in collecting information from kampung residents. Members of the force wore dark blue civilian clothing (the clothing was supposed to be black, but there was no black dye) and were allowed to grow their hair long, which helped them blend in with the population. (Yanagawa had a major fight about that with more senior officers before he got permission, “pointing out that it was unrealistic to require people who were going to melt into the countryside to crop their hair in the Japanese military fashion.”) Because it was crucial to keep the Yugekitai a secret so that the Allies would not roll it up right away, its existence was not known to other units. Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao in an interview with Ruth McVey, Osaka, October 1980, and Yanagawa interview with McVey, Jakarta, 13 November 1980. See also Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt III, p. 3. Yanagawa, who took the most talented Indonesian officers who had trained in Tangerang and Bogor to act as instructors, ranked the Yugekitai as the best of the Japanese-trained Indonesian units. The West Java headquarters was in Lembang. The headquarters for Central Java was in Salatiga and the one for East Java in Malang. Some graduates of the third shodancho course were also recruited into the Yugekitai. According to Yanagawa, the Yugeki officers “were generally people of the education and status of schoolteachers.”
52. There were 49 shodancho from West Java, and they went on to train 230 other young men from their home region. The figures for Central Java were about 52 and 180 and for East Java about 57 and 200. Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt III, pp. 1–2. The Yugekitai officers were graduates of the Tangerang asrama or the Peta training courses in Bogor; those who were not, did not become more than NCO’s. Tsuchiya Kiso in an interview with Ruth McVey, October 1980.


54. The Japanese had their Planning Department for the Guidance of the Java Volunteer Defence Force (Giyugun Shidobu) in Jakarta. They also had two regional offices (Giyugun Shitsu) to take care of matters concerning the volunteer army, one attached to the Japanese forces in the eastern half of Java (Tobu boeitai), the other attached to the forces in the western part of the island (Seibu boeitai). But the growing size of the Peta was creating difficulties for the staff at the regional offices. It was also creating difficulties for the sections (Giyugun Gakari) in charge of the Peta in each of the various Japanese battalions. The fact that there were sixty-six Peta battalions on Java and only eight Japanese ones suggests that a typical Japanese battalion may have been responsible for about eight Peta battalions.

55. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 232. Duties that had been covered by the Giyugun Shitsu and by the battalions’ Giyugun Gakari were expanded, solidified and transferred to the Chikutai Shireibu.

56. Each Chikutai Shireibu consisted of six departments—general affairs, education, intelligence, weapons, finance and medical. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 231. As such, they were responsible for the bookkeeping, distribution of food and weapons, training programme, and the relationship between the Japanese instructors attached to each battalion and the senior Indonesian officers in those battalions. Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, 1 February 1999.

57. Interview, Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, 20 February 1999. For further details, see “Document taken from 16 Army HQ”, p. 3.

58. On 17 May 1945, a fourth Chikutai Shireibu was created. With this, the number of battalions that each Shireibu was responsible for was reduced to between eleven and twenty-two.


60. Miyamoto, “Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi”, p. 206.

61. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 231.


63. Interview, Morimoto, 1 February 1999. See also Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 20.

64. Interview, Morimoto, 1 February 1999.

65. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, Mishima, 2 February 1999.

67. Teramoto Masashi in an interview conducted by Yamaoka Yasuko on behalf of the author, Inba-mura, Chiba Prefecture, 12 February 1999. See also Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 234. Soeharto was, of course, a chudancho, not a shodancho, by this time. Responding to Teramoto’s claim that he was astounded by Soeharto’s rise to the presidency, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo not only hurried to the latter’s defence but gave expression to a lingering resentment towards a certain kind of Japanese. The observation, he said, was a typically “arrogant and uncivilised statement of a low-class Japanese NCO vis-à-vis a better educated and higher-class Peta officer, still considered as a genjumin [native; a discriminatory Japanese word, like the Dutch inlander, for pribumis].… I think … Pak Harto as president was much better than Prime Minister … Tojo during the war.” Purbo Suwondo, written communication, 9 March 2009.


70. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 148, and Nugroho, “The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation”, p. 174. Junior officers were answerable only to their battalion commanders, and those battalion commanders, jealous of their rights and privileges, were sometimes unwilling to take much direction from Japanese liaison officers.

71. Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979), p. 151, cited in Sato, War, Nationalism and Peasants, p. 262. It might be more accurate to say that in many areas the food allowance declined. There seem to have been no food-related problems, for example, for those serving in the Yugekitai in Malang, which was considered a prosperous area.

72. Sato, War, Nationalism and Peasants, p. 76.


74. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, 2 September 1997.

75. Interview, Lieutenant General Kemal Idris, Jakarta, 8 September 1997.

76. For details, see EIPW, pp. 590–91, from which this account is taken.


78. Soeharto, “Watashi no Rirekisho”.

83. Interview, Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, Jakarta, 28 May 2009. Sukotjo’s wife, Sri Koestijah Nunek Sukotjo, had been a good friend of Suprijadi before the war. Personal communication, Sri Koestijah, Jakarta, 18 August 2009, and Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, 8 March 2009. After the Blitar revolt, the Kenpeitai called in Koestijah’s two sisters and threatened them in an attempt to extract information.
84. Personal communication, Sri Koestijah, 18 August 2009.
85. Interview, Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, 12 May 2009. According to another source, Suprijadi attended the MOSVIA in Jakarta. Interview, Colonel Soepardio, Bogor, 10 September 1998. Sukotjo appears to be a more reliable source on this point.
87. The claim that the Japanese killed Suprijadi’s brother was made by Major General Sukotjo, Jakarta, 11 January 2013. A graduate of a Japanese-run Senior Seamanship School (Sekolah Pelayaran Tinggi, SPT), Haryono is said to have been beaten for insubordination while serving on a Japanese ship. Sukotjo said he was told of these matters by one of Suprijadi’s younger half-brothers.
88. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies, p. 150.
89. See report by Captain Yamazaki Hajime, quoted in Miyamoto, “Jawa shusen shori-ki”, p. 227.
90. One of the few officers not to join the revolt was the battalion commander, Surachmad, who had been the wedana (district chief) in Blitar under the Dutch. It has been claimed that Surachmad warned the Japanese military shidokan (supervising officer) that Suprijadi and his associates were planning to rebel. For details of that allegation, see Soeryana, “Blitar: The Changing of the Guard”, in Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java 1942–1945, p. 307, and translator’s footnote, pp. 320–21. See also Jacques Leclerc, “Afterword: The Masked Hero”, in Local Opposition and
Underground Resistance, pp. 328–30. Former Peta officers confirm that Surachmad remained a daidancho until the end of the war, which might seem odd in the circumstances. But they reject the charge that Surachmad betrayed his own men by alerting the Japanese to the plot. The uprising, they argue, came as a surprise to the Japanese. They also reject the claim that Surachmad escaped punishment. They say that he was, in fact, beaten by the Japanese. Personal communication, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, 8 August 2012, and Major General Soetarto Sigit, Jakarta, 14 January 2013. After the Proclamation, Surachmad became a TNI regimental commander in Kediri. It was a company from one of Surachmad’s battalions that captured and shot the revolutionary leader Tan Malaka in 1949. For further details about the Blitar affair, see Soedianto Sastromodjo and Aboelkahar, TKR Divisi VII Untung Suropati Malang-Besuki 1945–1948 (Malang: UM Press, 2000), pp. 42–48. According to Soeryana, whose name is sometimes given as “Soerjono”, Surachmad had been a member of the pre-war Dutch political police.

91. The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra (Selections from The Authentic History of the Kenpeitai [Nihon Kenpei Seishi] by the National Federation of Kenpeitai Veterans' Associations [Zenkoku Kenyukai Rengokai Hensan Iinkai], translated by Barbara Gifford Shimer and Guy Hobbs (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Publication no. 65, Cornell University, 1986), p. 43.


93. Interview, Colonel Miyamoto, 4 February 1999.

94. Ibid.

95. This was the first and last operating order given to the Yugekitai.


97. That, at least, is how the Indonesians tell the story. See Nugroho Notosusanto, The Revolt Against the Japanese of a Peta Battalion in Blitar, pp. 22–23.

98. Yanagawa told Allied interrogators after the war that the Japanese units sent to Blitar “failed to arrest the leader.” According to Sukotjo, the Japanese admitted later that they captured and killed Suprijadi on the first day of the revolt. Yanagawa “Statement”, 14 December 1945, Pt III, p. 3, and Sukotjo interview, Jakarta, June 29, 2010.

99. Miyamoto Shizuo, Jawa shusen shori-ki, p. 21. Translation by Yamaoka Yasuko. In The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945, the translator has made a small but crucial mistake, failing to pick up “haragamae ga dekihajimetee ita” in line 9 of p. 21 of the Miyamoto book. As a result, the phrase is translated there as “I regarded the Giyugun…."

100. See, for example, Nugroho Notosusanto, “The Peta Army During the Japanese


102. Ibid., p. 227.


105. In April 1945, several sergeants in a Peta company at Gumilir, three miles north of Cilacap, attacked and killed a Japanese corporal. No Peta officers took part and the company commander, Toeloes Soebroto, who was away at the time, was spared. The Japanese asked Sudirman, the Peta battalion commander in Banyumas, to go to Gumilir, to help deal with the problem. Interview, Brigadier General Abimanyu, Jakarta, 7 March 1982. Abimanyu was a company commander in a nearby battalion.

In mid-1945, the 1st Company of the 4th Battalion, which was guarding three hydroelectric plants in the area of Pangalengan, a mountain resort town to the south of Bandung, rebelled against two Japanese instructors attached to the company. Two platoons then made what is described as an abortive attempt to defect to the mountains. Subsequently, the Indonesian company sergeant-major struck a Japanese officer-instructor. Some time later, the Japanese officer slapped the company medic, “taking the already tense and emotional situation to its climax”. Acting on orders from their company sergeant major, two Indonesians soldiers killed a certain Sergeant Hara and attempted to kill a Second Lieutenant Yamamoto. Yamamoto managed to escape by motorcycle. Retribution was swift and thorough. The Japanese beheaded an Indonesian officer, two NCOs and two soldiers. Others were tortured by the Kenpeitai. See Tim Perumus, “Peristiwa Pemberontakan Peta di Cileunca Pangalengan, Bandung Selatan, Jawa Barat”, in *Peta: Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air Di Jawa dan Sumatera 1942–1945*, pp. 175–91, and Purbo S. Suwondo, “The genesis of the Indonesian National Army and some political implications”. Paper prepared for a seminar at the Institute of Netherlands History and The Royal Society of Historians of the Netherlands at The Hague, 27–29 March 1996, p. 21. See also *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia*, p. 205.

106. Interview, Major General Soetarto Sigit, Jakarta, 14 January 2013. Even so, this was to prove a tense and difficult time for Soetarto. Suprijadi’s father was
married to a younger sister of Soetarto’s mother. Suspecting that Soetarto was involved in the Blitar affair, the Kenpeitai in Ponorogo came to interrogate him. Soetarto was lucky: there were three Japanese officers stationed with his battalion; they liked him and spoke up for him.

108. Morimoto, *Jawa boei giyugun-shi*, p. 595. Brebeg may be a different spelling of Berbeg, a town about five miles south of Nganjuk.
109. Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, Tokyo, 1 February 1999.
110. Interview, Colonel Miyamoto, 20 February 1999. See also “Miyamoto no hanashi”, pp. 195–217.

14. “Why did they choose Soeharto?”
   2. Ibid.
   4. According to Morimoto, Soeharto was put in charge of retraining the Second Company of the Blitar battalion. Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, 1 February 1999.
   5. Interview, Morimoto, 1 February 1999.
   6. Ibid.
   9. Ibid.
   15. Ibid. Yanagawa himself never seemed to work up much enthusiasm for Hizbullah. “I was rather busy with my own work in Bandung,” he told Allied interrogators, “so I used to go to this training camp every other week.”
   18. Drea, *Japan’s Imperial Army*, p. 248, citing Japanese sources. Herbert Bix, the author of a major study of Emperor Hirohito, writes that an estimated 94,000 to 120,000 Japanese soldiers and 150,000 to 170,000 non-combatants were killed...


23. Translation of interrogation of Vice (sic) Admiral Maeda Tadashi, Batavia, 9 November 1946, NIOD coll. 400, no. 718, and Shigeru Sato, “The Peta”, *EIPW*, pp. 132–46, at p. 139. See also undated “translation of the Report of Maeda” that was made in reply to two questions put to him by Allied interrogators. NIOD coll. 400, no. 336. The two Maeda documents provide ample confirmation that the Japanese intended to fight in East Java as well as West Java, a development that has sometimes been ignored or glossed over. Maeda’s rank is given incorrectly in the first of these documents: as noted earlier, he was a rear admiral.


28. “Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi”, pp. 195–217; and Miyamoto, “Jawa shusen shori-ki”, in *The Japanese Experience*, p. 231, from which much of the material in this and the following paragraph is drawn.


30. The Japanese also had a factory that could produce 175 tons of gunpowder a month and 50,000 hand grenades. Miyamoto, “Jawa shusen shori-ki”, in *The Japanese Experience*, pp. 231–32.


32. There were another three Peta battalions on Bali.


36. The Supreme War Council, which had held its first meeting on 19 August
1944, brought together the service chiefs of staff, the Prime Minister and the War Minister. Drea, *Japan’s Imperial Army*, pp. 240–41.

37. “To: Chiefs of Staff 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet and 10th Area Fleet. Information Resident Naval Officer Batavia [Rear Admiral Maeda]. From: Bureau of Military Affairs.” 172127 July 1945. This signal was intercepted and read by code-breakers at the joint US Navy-Royal Australian Navy Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL). For details, see “translated messages from FRUMEL records dealing with the genesis of Indonesian ‘independence’” in “Translated [Imperial Japanese Navy] messages from FRUMEL records.” Commonwealth Record Series B5555, Defence Signals Directorate, Translations of Cypher Messages, 1945–1946, National Archives of Australia, Victorian Archives Centre [hereafter: CRS B5555, DSD, TCM, 1945–1946, NAA, VAC], File No. 6, p. 6. This file is stamped “Top Secret”. Others are stamped “Top Secret ULTRA.” The Sixteenth Army received the same order from Tokyo, by way of Saigon and Singapore. The army was just about to “start” such a committee when Japan surrendered. See “Interrogation of Maj. Gen. Nishimura Otoshi”, 31 May–6 June 1946, p. 4, and Nishimura, 10 April 1947, reply to questionnaire. From mid-1941, information gleaned from decrypts of high-grade Japanese Navy and Army codes, and from other sources, was given the codename “ULTRA.”

38. The Southern Area Army had announced the planned formation of this committee four days earlier, on 3 August. See “Independence for the East Indies”, 3 August 1945, message from Chief of Staff, 2nd Expeditionary Fleet, CRS B5555, DSD, TCM, 1945–46, NAA, VAC, File No. 6, p. 6(a).


40. Major General Nishimura, 10 April 1947, reply to questionnaire, p. 15.


42. For a good account of the process, on which this section is based, see Nugroho, “The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation”, pp. 197–98.


46. The number of Peta officers is derived from figures given in the Yanagawa “Statement”, Pt I, pp. 6–7; Pt II, pp. 3–6, and 8; Pt III, pp. 1–2.
47. Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, 14 April 1998.

**Glossary and Abbreviations**