The Religious Geography of Thailand’s Malay Southern Provinces: Revisiting the Impact of South Asian and Middle Eastern Transnational Islamic Movements

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This article describes changes in the ‘religious geography’ of Thailand’s Malay-dominated southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat since the 1960s. These have been led by a range of religious entrepreneurs returning to these parts of southern Thailand from the Middle East and South Asia. We begin by conceptualizing local Islamic diversity in ways that move beyond binaries such as the new and old schools (kaum muda–kaum tua) and accept that the vast majority of Malays in southern Thailand remain conservative, rural traditionalists. We provide relevant details about the background, overseas educational influences and the forms of religious activism pursued by leaders of local modernist, reformist and revivalist religious franchises. We also point out the different strategies pursued by these religious entrepreneurs and that the operational centres for many of these movements are located in Yala. This article argues that Middle Eastern influences in southern Thailand have been exaggerated, while South Asian influences have been overlooked, and that the Malaysian State of Kelantan has played an important role in diversifying the religious geography of these southern provinces.

Keywords: Transnational Islamic movements, Islam in Thailand, Pattani, Patani, Tablighi Jama’at, Salafi, southern Thailand.

John Bowen’s *Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society* (1993) is widely acknowledged as one of the most compelling accounts of traditionalist-reformist polemics. Readers
of this classic ethnography of Southeast Asian Islam possessing no or limited direct first-hand contact with Southeast Asian Muslim communities should be forgiven for failing to recognize the combination of cognitive dissonance and emotional trauma involved in the confessional politics in Aceh that Bowen meticulously describes.\footnote{Aspects of Islam’s political organization and religious rhetoric in southern Thailand may differ from other parts of Southeast Asia, but the form that local Islamic diversity has taken in recent decades resembles the portrait provided by historians and anthropologists working in Indonesia and Malaysia.\footnote{Specifically, the vast majority of Malays in southern Thailand continue to align themselves with the customary Islam of the Shafi’i School, primarily influenced by the Mecca-based Patani School from the early nineteenth century.\footnote{Nevertheless, since the late 1960s, the traditionalist monopoly on what Nile Green has called “religious firms” in the local “religious economy” has been extensively affected by a range of transnational Islamic movements originating from both South Asia and the Middle East (2015, pp. 11–13, 18–22). In this article, we describe how the ‘religious geography’ of present-day Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat has been impacted by the cumulative effect of the religious and political activism of these relatively recent arrivals.}}\footnote{The first of this article’s two substantive sections offers a threefold conceptualization of the region’s religious geography since the establishment of the transnational Islamic movements in southern Thailand in the 1960s. By doing so, we have taken seriously the (light-hearted) quip offered by the late William Roff, that scholars of Southeast Asian Islam should temper their enthusiasm for taxonomy. Like taxidermy, this should only be performed on the dead. Those insisting on doing so should be forgiven, provided that their noble \textit{niat}, or intention, is to “reduce to descriptive and analytical order” from a range of complex phenomena associated with the translation of a major religious system into often drastically different Southeast Asian cultural milieus (Roff 1985, p. 8). The \textit{niat} of the first of this article’s two sections is to establish clarity about what we intend by the terms ‘traditionalist’, ‘revivalist’ and ‘reformist’ and—to a lesser
extent—‘modernist’. We have other reasons for referring to Roff. It strikes us as deeply ironic that it was Roff’s work that popularized the distinction between *kaum muda–kaum tua* (new school–old school). We question whether Roff intended for this binary to become one of the common ways of conceptualizing local Islamic diversity. While rejecting the contemporary utility of Southeast Asian Muslims being neatly divided between ‘old’ and ‘new’ schools, we have no intention of replacing this binary with a three-part typology. We have referred to the religious entrepreneurs adopting and adapting ideas encountered elsewhere over this period as both revivalists and reformists for a number of reasons. Most scholars sharing our interest in Muslim Southeast Asia conceptualize Islamic diversity in this way, the most recent of whom is Azhar Ibrahim (2014). More importantly, by sandwiching the ‘ideal types’ of revivalists between traditionalists and reformists, we wish to bring into focus the presence of a spectrum between conservative traditionalists and radical reformists. Revivalism denotes a constituency primarily concerned with religious practice broad enough to attract both members of progressive traditionalists and liberal reformists.

This first section lays the foundation for the second, which summarizes the contributions of three personalities who led the introduction and establishment of transnational movements locally. These are Abdullah Chinarong (hereafter Loh India, b. 1931), Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya (b. 1950) and Dr Haydar Ali. We provide relevant details about the activist agendas and standard operating procedures of the movements under their leadership, point out where they differ, and discuss areas of commonality. These are summarized in Figure 1, which includes details about the educational and ideological sojourn of Nik Abdul Aziz bin Haji Nik Mat, whose range of religious and political activism in neighbouring Kelantan had an impact on Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.

The inclusion of a range of South Asian and Middle Eastern movements in this comparative study permits us to make two arguments. The first is that, in Thailand’s Deep South, South Asian movements have been just as influential—if not more so—as those
with direct ideological and financial links to the Middle East. The second is easier to miss: attentiveness to where—and when—modernists, reformists and revivalists locally established themselves suggests that their success can be attributed to their cumulative impact.

A number of caveats and limitations need to be presented and explained. Our emphasis here is on Malay-majority southern Thailand, which means that the religious geography of Songkhla and Satun (in which Malay-speaking Muslims are a minority) and the southern Thai-speaking Upper South (between northern Satun/Songkhla and Nakhon Si Thammarat) will not be included. We add that developments among the Thai-speaking Muslims of Central and Northern Thailand will be dealt with in future publications. We have also limited ourselves to transnational Islamic movements active in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from the late 1960s, which precludes discussing the legacy of Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (1895–1954).

The Religious Geography of Malay-Majority Southern Thailand

What exactly do the labels ‘traditionalism’, ‘reformism’ and ‘revivalism’ denote? Specialists in Southeast Asian Islam such as...
Ronald Lukens-Bull refer to the two major variants of Sunni Islam in Indonesia as ‘classicalist’ and ‘reformist’. Lukens-Bull notes that these are sometimes referred to as “traditionalist” and “modernist” (2005, p. 14). While we prefer the term ‘reformists’ (over ‘modernists’), Imtiyaz Yusuf refers to “puritan” reformists (2007, pp. 10–11). The vast majority of Malays in Malay-dominated Pattani, Yala and Narathiwats are traditionalists perpetuating a Malay form of customary Islam characterized by ritual elements that reformists allege too closely resemble pre-Islamic polytheism (*shirk* in Arabic) and/or reprehensible innovations (*bid’ah* in Arabic). Bilingual Malay traditionalists refer to themselves as *kanaat kaw* (in Thai), *kaum tuo* (in Patani Malay, from *kaum tuo*), or *orae turut orae tuo* (those who follow the old people in Patani Malay). They are also (derogatively) referred to by reformists as *ahl bid’ah* (the innovators in Arabic).

What are some of these innovations? Rural traditionalists continue to employ the services of village shamans (*bomo* in Patani Malay). Although since the 1980s the vitality and visibility of traditional Malay performing arts such as *silat* (martial arts), *ma’yong* (dance drama) and *wayang kulit* (shadow puppetry) have diminished, these are present wherever traditionalists have remained a numerical majority. Any one of the following may also indicate a Muslim’s traditionalist orientation: the use of prayer beads (*tasbih* in Arabic) rather than keeping count of litanies on one’s knuckles; the adherence to a special prayer called *qunut* during dawn prayers; the patronage or attendance of *mawlid* feasts commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad; or ‘making merit’ for the deceased through posthumous feasts and vigils (lasting seven, ten, or forty days) over the grave (Joll 2011, pp. 84–85, 110–14, 144–49; Joll 2014, p. 8).

The form of traditionalism among Malay Muslims in the southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat has undergone a number of significant changes since the late 1930s. As such, they consider themselves better Muslims than previous generations and compare themselves favourably to Muslims in neighbouring Malaysia. While local traditionalists are proud of such advances, ‘reformists’ consider these religious reforms inadequate. Bilingual reformists in
southern Thailand may refer to themselves as *kanaat mai* (in Thai), *kaum mudo* (in Patani Malay), or *ahl sunnah* (those following the example of the prophet in Arabic). Traditionalists refer to their critics as *orae ngaji mudo* (those following the new teaching in Patani Malay), Wahabis, or *orae brao* (people from Brao in Patani Malay). The former is an intentionally derogatory term; the latter demonstrates the importance of the village of Brao (located fifteen kilometres from Pattani) as the most important conduit for reformist activism. We note that the terms *salafis* and *salafiyyah* are only occasional employed by those who have completed their education in Islamic studies.9

Reformists in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat might numerically be a minority, but their influence on religious practice is bolstered by the large numbers of educated urban Muslim professionals who find traditionalist *taqlid* (blind following in Arabic) unpalatable. Despite objections by Syed Farid Alatas about the inadequacies of comparisons between Salafism and Protestantism, the latter is best referred to as a movement or theological method (*manhaj* in Arabic) (2007, p. 515).10 The term *salafis* emphasizes the authoritative example of the *salaf al-salih* (venerable ancestors in Arabic) of seventh-century Arabia—namely, the Prophet Muhammad, the four rightly guided caliphs and the generation after them—and mentoring (*mulazamah* in Arabic) by Middle Eastern leaders. References to the *salafiyyah* as an organization are avoided, implying as it does Islam as being anything other than perfect. Over and above the eradication of *bid’ah*, another aspect of what we have referred to as the Salafiyyah method, is *ijtihad* (independent interpretation in Arabic) over *taqlid*. Traditionalists assert that the door of *ijtihad* has long closed and that the safest path is to follow the “outlines of interpretation set forth by classical scholars”, while reformists insist that (properly qualified) scholars are obliged to “perform *ijtihad* at all times” (Lukens-Bull 2005, p. 16). Southern Thailand’s modern reformists are part of a movement born of the amalgamation in the 1920s of the revivalist Hanbalites of the Arabian Peninsula (the Wahhabiyyah) and the reformist activism of Rashid Rida, which drew from all four
**madhhab** (school of Islamic jurisprudence), which Mark Sedgwick refers to as neo-Salafism (Sedgwick 2005, p. 232). As is well known, the Wahhabiyyah refers to the alliance in the late 1700s between the political revolutionary Muhammad Ibn Saud (d. 1765) and a religious reformer, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787), who had been inspired by Ibn Taymiyya (Haj 2002, pp. 334, 340–42). After a series of victories in the early nineteenth century, including occupations of Mecca (1803) and Medina (1805), Wahhabiyyah forces were defeated in 1818 by an Egyptian viceroy sent by the Ottoman Caliph. What is the relationship between Islamic reformism and modernism? Are they synonymous?

We argue that the agenda of modernists differs from that of the Wahhabiyyah described above. Islamic modernism sought to respond to the deplorable subjugation of Muslims in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia by Western colonial powers in the mid to late nineteenth century. Advocates of modernism established institutions such as “schools that combined Islamic education with modern pedagogies; newspapers that carried modernist Islamic ideas across continents; theatres, museums, novels and other cultural forms that were adapted from European models” (Kurzman 2004, p. 456). Prominent modernists include Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–98) and Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), the latter being the most influential. In 1895, he became a member of the administrative board for al-Azhar University, before becoming a member of Egypt’s Legislative Council and the grand mufti of Egypt, in 1899. Together with his student and protégé Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), ‘Abduh disseminated modernist thinking through the publication *al-Manar* (The Lighthouse), which was established and edited by Rida, beginning in 1898. *Al-Manar* inspired Jawi publications such as *al-Imam* (The Leader), which was published in Singapore between 1906 and 1908 (Azyumardi 1999, pp. 145–53). One of *al-Imam*’s goals was the dissemination of the reformist agenda of *al-Manar* in the Malay world, as demonstrated by the fact that many of its (sometimes elaborate) articles were Malay translations of articles.
from *al-Manar*. With a circulation that peaked at five thousand, *al-Imam* was the most widely read journal in the Malay world before the Second World War (Laffan 2010, p. 24).

In addition to the traditionalists and reformists, a ‘revivalist’ constituency also exists in southern provinces that are overwhelmingly Malay. We argue that ‘revivalism’ is the most appropriate term to describe the South Asian missionary movement, the Tablighi Jama’at. Active members of the Tablighi Jama’at are easily identified by their white robes (*thawb* in Urdu) and long turbans (*saraban* in Standard Malay). Some also wear black eyeliner, which is regarded as *sunnah* (the personal practice of the Prophet). Joseph Liow describes the Tablighi Jama’at in southern Thailand as mobile, decentralized and transnational. At the time that Liow conducted his fieldwork, he quantified the extent of their local network by mentioning connections with 800 mosques, where 127 *halaqah* (study circles in Arabic) were held. Furthermore, approximately 21 mosques had organized *khuruj* (mission trips in Arabic) through individual councils (*shura*) that vet candidates (Liow 2009a, p. 197). These *khuruj* (ranging from three days to four months) visit local districts but may also travel overseas. The emphasis by the Tablighi Jama’at on sustained face-to-face contact with Muslim communities in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat is not the only reason for its success. In addition to being avowedly apolitical, this movement avoids religious controversies, which distinguishes them from local reformists. This has permitted the Tablighi Jama’at to make inroads among both traditionalists and reformists. To be more specific, the former is attracted by the emphasis on the local revival of Islamic practice. Another factor that we argue has contributed to the success of the Tablighi Jama’at is the massive pool of unemployed or underemployed young Malay males, as their involvement significantly bolsters their personal cultural capital. Having described the characteristics of modern-day traditionalism, reformism and revivalism in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, we now delineate the personalities and processes through which these South Asian and Middle Eastern Islamic movements were able to influence the local religious geography.
Local Promoters of South Asian and Middle Eastern Islamic Movements

Among the many empirical holes that Muhammad Ilyas Yahprang’s doctoral dissertation on Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya’s local influence in southern Thailand plugs is a profile of Ustadh Abdullah Chinarong (b. 1931), who was active in Yala two decades before Lutfi’s relocation to Brao from Saudi Arabia. Chinarong was given the nickname ‘Loh India’ after returning from six years of study in northern India’s Deoband Seminary. Earlier, he had studied under the tutelage of local scholars (including Haji Sulong), moving on to Madrasah Ahmadiyyah, located a short distance from Kota Bharu in the northeastern Malayan state of Kelantan. Three years later, he arrived at Deoband Seminary, where he spent nine years (Yahprang 2014, p. 109). It is worth pointing out that Loh India arrived five years after the hugely influential chief minister of Kelantan and spiritual advisor of the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), Nik Aziz (1931–2015) (Riddell 2009, pp. 178–79). In 1968, Loh India returned to the province of Yala, where he began teaching at two of its largest private Islamic schools, becoming a vocal critic of aspects of Malay traditionalism (Yahprang 2014, p. 110). After five years, Loh India joined Yala’s Education Development Centre as a civil servant. This move increased the freedom with which he could articulate concerns about the inconsistencies of local customary Islam with the Qu’ran and the Hadith. He regularly preached on Sunday morning. However, he chose Yala City Hall over the central mosque where Lutfi would eventually become a regular fixture. Yahprang comments that those who attended Loh India’s lectures included “civil servants, college and university lecturers, private company workers, businessmen, [and] university students” (Yahprang 2014, p. 121). His involvement in education and his following among Malay university students eventually evolved into his role as mentor to Muslim youth movements that emulated the Egyptian Ikhwan al Muslimūn and Jama‘at-i-Islami of Pakistan (Yahprang 2014, p. 113).
Meanwhile, the Saudi-educated Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya has long been acknowledged as the most influential articulator of reformist activism in present-day southern Thailand. Lutfi’s local influence is due to his Arabic language credentials, Saudi education and status as the founding rector of Al-Fatoni University. He continues to benefit from the cultural capital of his pedigree as a babo, a local term denoting the owner of a traditional pondok, analogous to Javanese kyai. Well before the establishment of Thailand’s first private Islamic university, Lutfi’s family had established Bamrong Islam Witthaya School, situated in the village of Brao fifteen kilometres south of Pattani. Under the leadership of his father, Babo Abdurrahman Japakiya, this was one of a number of traditionalist pondok schools—referring to the huts that students build around the house of the babo—that were registered as private Islamic schools, where the Thai national curriculum was taught alongside the elements of a traditional Islamic education that Patani’s pondok schools were famous for. Under Lutfi’s leadership, Bamrong Islam has functioned as the principal conduit of Saudi-style reformism in southern Thailand. As noted above, the importance of Brao is exemplified by Wahhabis routinely being referred to locally as ore brao (people from Brao in Patani Malay).

Many assessments have been made of the Saudi-style Salafism propagated by Lutfi since his return to Pattani in early 1990. He is a vocal opponent of violent separatism. Not only was he the first to refute the Jihadi manual Berjihad di Pattani (Jihad in Patani), but he was also the only one to do so using the Malay language. Intriguingly, refutations by Thai Islamic authorities written in Thai followed from Lutfi’s pronouncements. Although Lutfi has called on the Thai state to recognize Malay-Islamic identity, he is in active dialogue with, and supportive of, the Thai state. He has served as a member of the National Reconciliation Commission (RCC), was appointed to the Senate following the 2006 coup, and has been an advisor to the royally appointed Chularajamontri, or Islamic spiritual leader, who represents Thailand’s Muslim community in the government. There is no consensus on whether Lutfi advocates
what Hasan Hanafi has described as conservative or modernizing branches of Salafism (Liow 2009b, p. 120). Imtiyaz Yusuf describes Lutfi as encouraging “rigid literalism, intolerance toward differences, insularism, supremacist psychology, restriction of women’s movements, opposition to rationalism, and a hostile attitude towards artistic expression”, leading Islam in southern Thailand to become increasingly Arabicized, affecting the local religious lexicon and attire (including the full-faced niqāb worn by women) and increasing gender segregation (Yusuf 2007, pp. 10, 12). Liow disagrees, arguing that despite being a graduate of ‘Wahhabi’ institutions in Saudi Arabia, most of Lutfi’s influences are not conventional Wahhabi ideologies (2009c, pp. 90, 113–20).17 According to Liow, Lutfi is “at once reformist, modernist, and fundamentalist” (2009c, p. 180). By acknowledging the limitations of traditional Islamic education, he is a reformist. His modernist credentials relate to his willingness to teach non-religious subjects that help Muslims face the complexities of globalization and Thai modernity. Finally, by locating “Islam, and in particular the Qur’an and sunnah, at the heart of [an] understanding of modern knowledge”, he might be referred to (albeit inadequately) as a fundamentalist (Liow 2009c, p. 180).

Farish Noor’s meticulous reconstruction of the arrival of the Tablighi Jama’at in Kelantan and Malay-dominated southern Thailand argues for the role of bilingual, locally generated South Asian communities (Noor 2007, 2009). The presence of these diasporic networks permitted the first wave of South Asian Tablighi missionaries to remain on familiar territory, which greatly assisted the speed of their entry into Southeast Asia. In the overwhelmingly Malay locales of Kelantan, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, the liminal status of these South Asians helped bridge the gap between global and local Islams (Noor 2007, p. 9). The most important personality in this process was a medical doctor from Kelantan, Dr Haydar Ali. He was born into a family that had settled in northeastern Malaya as cloth merchants during British colonial rule. His father’s business network extended to these three southern provinces, where he had contributed to the construction of Pakistani mosques in Sungai Kolok (Narathiwat) and
Pattani’s provincial capital. In 1974, Ali and his brothers introduced the Tablighi Jama’at in Kelantan. Soon after, Masjid Lundang became their first markaz (centre in Urdu). Three years later, an operational base was set up at Masjid Muhammadiyah in the border town of Sungai Kolok in the Thai province of Narathiwat. In their first khuruj to Yala, they met members of the Pakistani (mainly Pashtun) community at the Pakistani mosque, all of whom were nationalized Thai citizens and had already established the Tabligh there.¹⁸

The Pakistani mosque in Yala continued to serve as the base of the Tablighi until the construction of the 1.5-acre Masjid al-Nur. Commonly referred to simply as markaz besar, or the big centre, this is the largest Tablighi markaz in Southeast Asia, and the fourth largest in the world (Noor 2009, pp. 9, 11). During the often violent late 1970s and early 1980s, the Tablighi Jama’at established itself in bases throughout Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Their position was sufficiently consolidated by the time improvements in the security situation in the mid-1980s permitted them to expand further.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the impact of South Asian and Middle Eastern transnational Islamic movements on the religious geography in the Malay-dominated provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat has sought to do more than merely replace a binary with a three or four-part typology. After five decades of revivalist, reformist and modernist activism, most Malays in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat are still best described as traditionalists. Nevertheless, traditionalists no longer maintain a monopoly in what Nile Green has described as the “religious economy” (2015, pp. 7–16). While past analyses of Islamic diversity in southern Thailand have paid insufficient attention to the role of South Asian transnational Islamic movements, we have pointed out that the Deobandi alumnus Loh India returned to southern Thailand before Lutfi, and that the arrival of the Tablighi Jama’at roughly corresponded with Lutfi’s return from Saudi Arabia. South Asian influence is one of the ways these three border provinces
have been influenced by religious developments in the Malay state of Kelantan, where another Deobandi alumnus served as the chief minister for many years.

We not only argue that Middle Eastern influences have been overemphasized, but that the transnational movements we have described had a cumulative impact on the religious geography of southern Thailand. A range of religious entrepreneurs might have raised awareness about some local traditions that needed reform, but we argue that the success of Lutfi can be explained by his having built on his predecessor’s portfolio of activism. Loh India regularly taught at Yala City Hall on Sunday mornings. Later, Lutfi preached at Yala’s central mosque (again, on Sunday morning). Differences in location are emblematic of other ways in which these two diverged. The local influence of Lutfi’s family was related to their ownership of a large private Islamic school. As such, they are members of local religious elites. By contrast, Loh India became a civil servant after having come to conclusions about the constraints of teaching in local Islamic schools. Following Loh India’s example, Tablighi activists engaged Malay constituencies possessing minimal contact.
with Lutfi’s operational bases in either Brao or at al-Fatoni University. Lutfi appears to have concluded that the form of Salafism he wished to promote required solid operational bases—all of which his Middle Eastern sponsors would have been happy to fund. These included co-opting existing Islamic institutions and the establishment of new ones. Other examples of this top-down (and capital-intensive) approach to religious change include the funding of Salafi charities concerned with the elimination of local practices viewed as shirk (idolatry in Arabic) or bid’ah.

Assertions that reliance on real estate represents the most important difference in the standard operating procedures of local Salafis and Tablighis are questionable given that the Tablighi Jama’at built a huge operational base in Yala. Other areas of divergence include reformists being most active in Muslim-majority contexts, while the Tablighi Jama’at has emphasized activism where Muslims are a religious minority (such as India). More importantly, the local success of the Tablighi Jama’at can be attributed to its massive pool of self-funded Muslims who volunteer their time. As grass-roots activists, the Tablighi Jama’at has impacted the local religious geography through face-to-face contact with Muslim communities—most of which are rural, and traditionalist. Their success can also be attributed to a policy of avoiding the confrontational approaches associated with local Salafis. This explains Lutfi’s success among southern Thailand’s urban middle-class constituency, whose careers and lifestyles are less compatible with the standard operating procedures of the Tablighi Jama’at. Particularly since the 1990s, the presence of both Saudi-style Salafism and the South Asian revivalism of Tablighi Jama’at have been mutually beneficial. Muslims concerned with the compatibility of traditionalist formulations to modern life have more than one alternative to follow.

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NOTES


3. Mecca’s Patani School has been analysed in Bradley (2016, pp. 1–137) and Malek (2018, pp. 6–189).

4. Notable exceptions to the overemphasis on Middle Eastern influence include Liow (2009a, pp. 189–208), Horstmann (2009, pp. 35–52) and Horstmann (2007, pp. 26–40). For case studies of interactions between South and Southeast Asia, see Feener and Sevea (2009).

5. Those interested in Haji Sulong should consult Hayimasae (2002), Liow (2010, pp. 29–58) and Ockey (2011, pp. 89–119). Between the mid-1930s
and mid-1950s, the ideological template for Haji Sulong’s programme of educational and political modernization and religious reform closely resembled that of the Patani school of Sheikh Ahmad al-Fatani, described in Rahimmula (1990, pp. 182–342). It is important to mention the local role played by Sheikh Ahmad’s Kelantan-based disciple Tok Kenali; see Salleh (1974, pp. 87–100).


9. This is derived from Salaf al-Salih (venerable ancestors in Arabic) of seventh-century Arabia; namely, the Prophet Muhammad and the four rightly guided caliphs.


12. After the death of Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida’s modernist agenda was eclipsed by his growing concern with religious reform, leading him to join forces with the new rulers of Mecca and Medina following their 1924 victory. This was one of a number of developments that took place in this tumultuous decade after the demise of the Ottoman Empire following the end of the First World War. Particularly following Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of economic power and concerns to counter resurgent Shi’ism in the 1970s, the broader-based Salafism of Rashid Rida is widely viewed to have been eclipsed by the Saudi-style Salafiyya-based movement. For a brief summary of Rashid Rida’s career, refer to Soage (2008, pp. 1–23).


14. Alexander Horstmann (2007, p. 111) has argued that the approach adopted by the Tabligh Jama’at in the Malay Deep South and in Nakhon Si Thammarat, located in the southern Thai-speaking Upper South, centrally involved the eradication of customary practices of Hindu origin.

15. Lutfi has a doctorate in comparative Islamic jurisprudence from the Islamic University of al-Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud in Riyadh, a master’s in comparative Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh in Arabic) from the same institution,
and a bachelor’s degree in religious principles (usuluddin in Arabic) from Madinah University.

16. The following have provided the most comprehensive summary of changes in Islamic education in southern Thailand: Liow (2009b), Liow (2009c), Liow (2010) and Madmarn (1990).

17. Liow claims that the most important of these was Shaykh Sa’id Hawwa, Lutfi’s Syrian lecturer, tutor, and supervisor. Lutfi’s doctrinal inclinations are also complex. His doctoral dissertation argues for the importance of time, space and context when applying precepts of Islamic law.


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