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## Introduction

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Integration in Singapore is becoming increasingly important. While this may sound like a truism today, it certainly was not the case when Singapore was thrust into modernity under the auspices of the East India Company in 1819. Established as a trading port, and later as part of the Straits Settlements Crown Colony in 1867, the island began to see a steady stream of immigrants from South China and South India arrive onto its shores. As indentured labourers, small traders, and farmers escaping droughts, these Chinese and Indian immigrants added another socio-economic layer to the existing network of activities of the Orang Laut, Javanese, and Bugis that had long connected the island to the rest of the Malay World prior to Stamford Raffles' arrival. Integration was not a priority for the colonial administration. Preferring clear and distinct communal divisions, these ethnic communities were, over time, allotted different living quarters near the mouth of the river. Intermediaries from these ethnic communities were appointed to represent collective interests and concerns to the colonial government. Key institutions such as clan associations, guild houses, *kongsis* and temples for the Chinese community, and Hindu associations, merchant groups, and temples for the Indian community served as constellations for their respective cultural universes (Trocki 1990; Rai 2014) from which these communities formed their collective identities. Naturally there was everyday intermingling between the ethnic communities in shared public spaces while economic and business relationships were forged across ethnic divides in the marketplace. However, because there was no overarching common identity and because of the desire for many of these Chinese sojourners to return to their homeland, the idea of social integration in which different social groups incorporate themselves into the existing social structure to function cohesively so as to achieve the collectively desired outcomes was just not in the air.

Integration ceased to be an abstract concept upon separation from Malaysia in 1965. The island's multicultural character made it necessary for Singapore's first-generation leaders to find an equilibrium between two ideological positions. On one hand is the belief that the "nation" is only meaningful because it is made up of local communities. Implicit in this belief are the principles that the cultural and ethnic rights of a community are inalienable and that it is incumbent on the state to protect and accommodate such rights. On the other is the belief that the concept of the nation takes primacy over all local interests. The interests of local communities, be they religious, ethnic, or class, need to be suspended occasionally to allow national interest to transcend identity politics. Indeed, the success of Singapore's integration efforts over fifty years since independence has depended on seeking an equilibrium between these two positions.

Chasing this equilibrium between national and communal interests has required vigilance and sensitivity. This is because the perennial challenges of race, language, and religion do not always present themselves in the flesh. They may be guised in all manner of disputes, lying just under the surface only to emerge when conflicts are poorly managed. The burning of incense paper or the indiscriminate parking of vehicles on Friday afternoons may appear to be innocuous acts but in Singapore they are loaded with racial and religious meanings. When Singaporeans learn to accommodate these moments of inconvenience they are, by extension, learning to integrate with communities of different races and religions. It may be appropriate to understand what exactly we mean by "integration". A typical functionalist perspective would define integration as a system in which different groups understand their social and economic roles, work in tandem with each other, and contribute to the greater whole whereby the success of the integrative process is measured by how well society functions as a unit or as an economy (Hamilton 1992). Such a perspective, however, has been criticized as too operational or mechanical in its approach, and thus unable to account for the conflict and social negotiations which invariably take place in multicultural settings (Treviño 2001). Others, in attempting to redefine "integration" for an era of global immigration, have called for the assimilation of new immigrant groups and minorities into society (Alba and Nee 1997). The assumption here is that "assimilation has diminished cultural differences that once served to signal ethnic membership to others and to sustain ethnic solidarity" (*ibid.*, p. 841). This has certainly not been Singapore's experience. It is highly unlikely that the country's ethnic minorities will accept an assimilationist model because it goes against Singapore's multicultural ethos. Furthermore, with large numbers

of lower and higher skilled workers who are transitional in nature, such an assimilationist definition of integration is not practical for Singapore. The most conventional model of integration for Singapore was articulated by then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong who offered the image of four overlapping circles. According to PM Goh (1999),

The four circles, each representing a community, will never totally overlap to become a stack of four circles. But they are closely linked to one another, forming a clover leaf pattern. This overlapping circles approach to building a nation and common identity is diametrically opposite the melting-pot approach. The melting-pot approach would have meant absorption of the minority communities by the majority community. Our Chinese have no wish to force Malays, Indians, Eurasians and others to speak, dress and eat like them. Nor would the other races want to be like them. The overlapping circles approach maximizes our common ground but retain each race's separate identity.

This overlapping circle model is not too dissimilar to the "salad bowl" model in which there is intermingling and mixing of different groups but each retaining their character, unlike the "melting pot" model of America that requires assimilation (Yang 2000). Singapore's idealized integration may thus be described as a society in which different groups and communities interact regularly and readily for the common good, choosing to highlight their shared characteristics and values while de-emphasizing their differences in order that society at large may reap the benefits of pluralism; meanwhile retaining their separate identities, norms, and ways of life in which cultural boundaries and the Other must always be treated with respect.

Generally speaking, Singapore has had to deal with different integration challenges over four periods in its post-independence history. These different challenges have been shaped by the particular economic, political and socio-cultural milieu of the time. To be clear, these periods are not neatly bound and distinct from each other. These challenges are not limited to these periods but continue to test the integration process even today. Instead, these periods are marked out to demonstrate that distinct challenges become more pronounced and pressing under particular socio-political economic conditions.

During the first period, roughly from 1965 to the end of the 1980s, the main obstacles to the integration of the local population were, as mentioned above, race and religion, and they continue to be so. The country's problematic merger with Malaysia from 1963 to 1965 and the 1964 racial

riots were key moments that underlined the importance of integrating a pluralistic migrant society. The three main ethnic groups were the Chinese, many of whom divided themselves up into dialect groups, the Malays who were drawn from different parts of the Malay World, and the Indians who were from various parts of South India. These communities spoke in a variety of languages including English, Mandarin, Chinese dialects, Malay, and Tamil. Underpinning these ethnic and linguistic diversity were religions such as Christianity, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, Sikhism, just to name a few. From this pluralism the postcolonial state proceeded to construct the national myths of multiculturalism and meritocracy as both principled and practical means to forge a coherent national community. Integration was not left to chance but carefully facilitated by decisive state intervention. Only four official languages were recognized; Chinese dialects were banned from local media with Mandarin promoted as the “mother tongue” of all ethnic Chinese, while the state effectively homogenized ethnic complexity with its “CMIO” categorization of the population. The ethnic quota on public housing later ensured that ethnic groups were evenly distributed across the island. All these have had a streamlining effect on Singapore society. This reductionist approach to cultural complexity allowed diverse interests to be shaped and crystallized for more efficient administration. Such a reductionist approach has suited the nation-building project over the years.

The second period from the early 1990s to early 2000s was a time when class distinction emerged as a key obstacle to integration alongside race and religion. The Singapore middle class had come into its own during the 1980s and had begun to display signs of conspicuous consumption in the 1990s. Pithy phrases like “the 5 Cs” (cash, condominium, car, credit card, and country club) encapsulated the relentless drive to achieve class distinction and societal recognition. This drive for class distinction amongst Singaporeans was in tandem with the country’s journey towards global city status as the government sought to relax regulations in several sectors such as banking and the arts in order to be an attractive node in the network of global cities. Regionally, the decade also sparkled with exuberant economic growth in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. This growth saw the beginnings of a regional middle class that defined a “Southeast Asian modernity” through its particular political consciousness, consumption patterns and relations with the state until the Asian Financial Crisis came along in 1997 (Robison and Goodman 1996). Nevertheless, in the case of Singapore, class politics had by then become such a common feature in everyday life that it became a fecund theme for local films and dramas. Class differentiation

also entered political discourse with then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong popularized the terms “heartlander” (to denote the “average” Singaporean who lived in public housing) and the “cosmopolitan” (to denote higher income and globally minded Singaporeans) as a means of simplifying and, indeed caricaturing, the complex class politics that was entrenching itself society. After all, the drive to become a vibrant and culturally exciting global city was fuelled by the need to attract highly talented foreigners to work in the country while retaining globally mobile Singaporeans who may be tempted by greener pastures elsewhere. Over the years the economic maturity of society has resulted in the self-renewal of class which, in turn, has led to the hardening of class strata. Income inequality has created different economic worlds in Singapore prompting commentators to assert that class has now replaced race and religion as the most divisive fault line in the country today (*Channel News Asia*, 1 October 2018).

The period from the early 2000s to 2011 saw tensions between locals and foreigners as the most pressing challenge to integration. In the bid to take advantage of favourable global economic conditions, the government had adopted liberal immigration policies to encourage both cheap labour and skilled talent to work and live in Singapore. From 2000 to 2010, the percentage of permanent residents increased from 7 per cent to 11 per cent, while “non-resident” foreigners working and living in Singapore rose from 19 per cent to 25 per cent (see Koh, Soon, and Yap 2015). Unfortunately, this steady influx of foreigners was not matched by existing infrastructure in the areas of public housing and transport. Trains and buses were constantly overcrowded, resulting in frequent breakdowns. Private property prices skyrocketed while the limited availability of public housing triggered anxiety and resentment within the local population, particularly amongst young families in the lower and middle-class strata. Unsurprisingly, anti-foreigner sentiments began to surface. Such sentiments were a heady mix of class resentment and racism (see Tan 2015; Lim 2015; Chong 2015). Singaporeans vented their anger at the 2011 General Elections which saw the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) winning their lowest share of the popular vote since independence. At stake was not just the occasional vitriol spewed at Indian nationals who were perceived to be overrepresented in the banking and financial industry or at Filipino nationals in the service industry but the greater global city project. With national survival so intimately tied to globalization, how could the country afford to be perceived as anti-foreigner by the rest of world? With typical responsiveness, the government took immediate steps to tweak the offending policies. Quotas on foreign workers were tightened, the public transportation system was overhauled and

received a large injection of state investment. Meanwhile public housing was no longer built only when there was demand but in anticipation of demand in order to avoid long waiting times. The decisiveness of government action succeeded in lowering the temperature of anti-foreigner sentiments to the point of insignificance when the general elections was next held in 2015. However, this is not to say that local-foreigner integration is no longer an issue. Non-residents in Singapore have increased from 1.63 million in 2015 to 1.68 million in 2019, with citizens increasing only from 3.38 million to 3.5 million during the same period (*Channel News Asia*, 25 September 2019). Coupled with dipping number of Singaporean marriages and the population's low fertility rate which fell to 1.14 in 2018 (*Today*, 25 September 2019), Singaporeans are living cheek and jowl with foreigners, and it would not take much for anti-foreigner anxieties to be aroused once again.

The period from 2011 to the present can be argued to have been marked by increased complexity. Not only do race, religion, class and foreigners continue to be clear and present fault lines in Singapore, they are now influenced by cultural and political developments on these issues in other societies. How we speak about race and racism, for example, is now informed by the cultural and political vocabularies from elsewhere. Take for instance the Preeti and Subhas saga. In July 2019, Preeti Nair, a social media personality popularly known as “Preetipls”, and her brother, Subhas Nair, a local rapper, were reprimanded for making a profanity-laced rap video. In the video entitled “K. Muthusamy” the duo rapped about how “Chinese people always out there f\*\*king it up” and that “No matter who we choose, the Chinese man win” [*sic*]. The government's response to the rap video was swift. Law and Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam said that the video “crosses the line” and that it “insults Chinese Singaporeans with vulgarities” (*Straits Times*, 31 July 2019). The siblings were made to apologize though not without first issuing a spoof apology (*Channel News Asia*, 2 August 2019). The siblings had made the video in response to a print advertisement by NETS, an e-payment platform in which local Chinese actor, Dennis Chew, portrayed a Malay woman in tudung; an Indian man; and cross-dressed as a Chinese woman, to presumably show that people from different walks of life could use e-payment. The Nair siblings' rap video accused Chew of “brownfacing” himself with visibly darker skin to portray an Indian character. “Brownfacing”, of course, is a local derivation of the American experience of “blackfacing” which dates back to nineteenth century minstrel shows where white actors painted themselves with black polish to mimic African-Americans. However, blackfacing is not merely the act of impersonation. It is the purposeful

and calculated physical and cultural caricature of African-Americans as lazy, dim-witted, and ultimately, undeserving of equal treatment or rights; thus echoing historical justifications for slavery (Johnson 2012). Hence blackfacing is not just about darkening one's skin but, more potently, the specifically racist agenda for doing so.

In juxtaposing Chew's "brownfacing" with the American "blackfacing" experience, local commentators were drawing moral equivalency between the ethnic minority experience in Singapore and the African-American experience in America. This moral equivalency was never explicitly argued by commenters but, rather, implicitly suggested by placing the Singapore ethnic minority experience and the African-American experience side-by-side and pointing to the act of darkening one's face as a shared experience (Lim 2019). This way moral equivalence could be drawn without any overt comparison of trauma. While "blackfacing" is clearly racist because it is the purposeful caricature of African-Americans, it is unclear if Chew's impersonation of the Indian man or Malay woman was done to mock or caricature the ethnic minorities. His impersonations did not come with exaggerated gestures such as Indian headshaking or embellished Malay accent for comic relief; and if they had, the advertisement could be rightfully deemed racist. Certainly, the "brownfacing" advertisement can be justifiably criticized for being lazy and gimmicky for using a well-known impersonator to portray different ethnic groups instead of, say, ethnic minority celebrities to do the job. To be sure, there needs to be a local conversation over the implications of "brownfacing" in Singapore, and why it is deemed offensive by ethnic minorities but to associate it with "blackfacing" in America is not the way to kick-start it.

Another example of adopting foreign vocabularies is the growing popularity of the term "Chinese privilege" in Singapore (*Straits Times*, 15 February 2018). Generally speaking, the term is used to describe the obvious and hidden advantages enjoyed exclusively by the Chinese majority vis-à-vis other ethnic minorities. As yet, it is a vaguely defined concept though this has not prevent it from being bandied about freely. Some see it as the predominance of Mandarin, the array of Chinese cuisine available, and not being discriminated against for jobs (Wee 2017), while others "define Chinese privilege similarly to white privilege" (Sangeetha Thanapal, quoted in Tan 2017). As with "blackfacing", American terminology is used to frame local experience. In America, the term "white privilege" gained popularity in the field of education and was used to connote the "unacknowledged privilege" of white men such that "much of their oppressiveness was unconscious" (McIntosh 1992, p. 31). Since then the concept of "white

privilege” has been criticized for simplifying white racial identity, indulging in confessional politics, and not addressing systemic injustices (Lensmire et al. 2013). Likewise, “Chinese privilege” is a clumsy concept because it makes no distinction between different types of privilege such as economic or political. It also makes no distinction between privileges enjoyed by majority communities in all societies, and privileges that stem specifically from being from a particular ethnic community. Furthermore, because it is an “unconscious oppression,” “Chinese privilege” is an accusation that can be levelled at any Chinese individual by virtue of his or her ethnicity. In turn, this Chinese individual will have to confess his or her “unacknowledged privilege”—something that members of the Chinese underclass or working class will find incongruent to their own everyday experience.

Terms like “brownfacing” and “Chinese privilege” demonstrate that integration in Singapore is increasingly influenced by cultural politics elsewhere. The appropriation of such terms may, in some cases, offer new ways of looking at age-old issues such as Chinese chauvinism or casual racism by bringing to bear the experience of other societies. Indeed, there are three reasons why the appropriation of these terms are becoming more commonplace. First and foremost is the connectivity that the Internet offers. This connectivity ensures that identity politics in different parts of the world, particularly Western societies such as the United States in which such politics are most developed, are well known across the globe. Secondly, this connectivity allows for moral empathy to develop across boundaries. People of different cultures and histories may identify with each other by virtue of their shared experience of injustice, exploitation, or persecution. Such moral empathy is especially forthcoming for identity politics that revolve around ethnic minorities and sexual orientation, thus encouraging the adoption of vocabularies, responses, and solutions. Thirdly, using such well-known terms helps to draw attention to local agenda. Local activists or scholars may leverage on such terms to lend some novelty or creativity to their causes. Nevertheless, there are clear pitfalls for the uncritical appropriation of such terms. As critical concepts, these terms are designed to describe politically and historically specific struggles and injustices. As such, there is always the danger of Singaporeans assuming moral equivalence between “blackfacing” and “brownfacing” or “White privilege” and “Chinese privilege”, thus resulting in a skewed reading of the local situation or arousing disproportionate indignation and anger. It is clear that issues of race, language, religion, class, and immigration will not be going away anytime soon. The adoption of vocabularies and identity politics from elsewhere may either elucidate or muddy these issues, depending on

whether activists and commentators are judicious enough with the specific politics and histories of their borrowed concepts.

This book is divided into four parts to cover the different types of challenges to integration in contemporary Singapore. The first part, entitled “Religious Communities”, delves into issues that have arisen from within the Muslim and Christian communities in Singapore. Joseph Liow provides a broad introduction to the cultural and religious diversities on the island. Liow begins with a useful historical overview to underline why religious and ethnic harmony have been so jealously guarded by the state, and proceeds to offer key events that have shaped the policies and regulations that now govern ethnic and religious relations. He concludes by noting that while such policies and regulations may have their critics, they are necessary a necessary feature of a small multicultural society. Terence Chong’s chapter looks at Christian activism and public morality in Singapore. He asserts that Christian activism only began in earnest after 1990s when the government began to liberalize not just the banking and financial sectors, but also the arts and entertainment industry in order to turn the island into a culturally vibrant global city. The need to attract global talent and to dissuade globally mobile Singaporeans from immigrating to greener pastures made it necessary, among other things, to relax censorship regulations and allow more risqué forms of entertainment, much to the dismay of religious conservatives. Another turning point came in the 2007 parliamentary debate in which Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong observed that the government would only lead on issues like the economy, technology, education, but when it came to moral values, “we will let others take the lead, we will stay one step behind the front line of change”. Both conservatives and liberals alike took this as their cue to become more vocal when it came to championing their causes lest they allow themselves to be outflanked by other groups. Chong goes on to look at public expressions of Christian identity and suggests how these may unfold in a multicultural society. Norshahril Saat’s chapter examines rising piety amongst Singaporean Muslims. He begins by observing that there have been signs of increased religiosity amongst Malay-Muslims. He asserts that the spectre of terrorism and national security has loomed large over the local Malay-Muslim community and this has, in fact, eclipsed instances of non-violent extremism. Norshahril argues that while the Malay-Muslim community rightfully condemns all types of religion-inspired violence, this alone is not proof of the community’s moderate character or ability to integrate. Instead, he contends that participation in communal activities or sharing perspectives on key national issues are just as important for

integration. For example, while a Muslim may reject violence as a means to an end, what if the same Muslim similarly rejects secularism or the principle of a secular state? What if Muslims reject terrorism but also believe that Islam is a better alternative to secular governance and that the Islamic concept of *shura* is superior to democracy? Norshahril tackles these difficult questions and concludes that there “is reason for concern over the Malay-Muslim community’s ability to integrate into broader society” because the expression of its religious beliefs among some remain strong, resulting the desire for differentiation.

The second part—National and Ethnic Communities—covers integration issues from an ethnic perspective. Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Fang Yu Foo’s chapter looks at “new” Chinese immigrants in Singapore and their reception from “local” Singaporeans. They note that PRC immigrants who came to Singapore in the 1990s were more willing to work at integrating with the local-born Chinese Singaporean community, while those who came later in the 2000s were less likely to do so, preferring to live and work amongst themselves. However, both sets of PRC immigrants were less likely to integrate with the rest of multicultural Singapore because of their perceived inability to converse fluently in English. In addition to linguistic barriers, Ho and Fang found that vocation and class have emerged as obstacles for the integration of PRC immigrants and non-Chinese Singaporeans, and conclude that this may lead to the social alienation of the latter.

Walid Jumblatt Abdullah looks at the state of integration between the Malay community and the rest of society. Walid begins by addressing the so-called “Malay problem” that sees the community lag behind the rest in terms of education and income, and proceeds to unpack the obstacles to integration. Among other things, he notes that the position of Singapore Malays is influenced by the fact that they are a minority in the country and a majority in the region. This has ensured that the government makes special accommodation for the community such as recognizing the community’s indigenous status and making Malay the country’s the national language. However, the spectre of Islamic extremism in the region has also meant that the community feels that it is under scrutiny. As such, Walid asserts that some in the community feel, on the one hand, infantilized because of their position vis-à-vis other ethnic communities, while on the other, constantly under suspicion for their religious affiliation.

In her chapter, Laavanya Kathiravelu delves into the relationship between new Indian immigrants or non-resident Indians (NRIs) and broader Singaporean society. She argues that the friction between NRIs and the rest of society is not indicative of any deep-rooted racism within

Singapore because of the country's multiethnic make up and its recent immigrant history. Instead, the cause of this friction is down to class and notions of civilizational heritage. Laavanya notes that not only do NRIs generally belong to the higher income professional class, thus measuring favourably against local-born Indians, these NRIs also believe that Singaporean Indians have lost touch with their heritage and culture. This in turn has sparked resentment amongst Singaporean Indians. Laavanya concludes that more spaces for intermingling must be carved out for mutual understanding to emerge.

The third part is "Political Divides and a Divided Polity" which provides readers with an overview of the political and ideological issues that are running through contemporary Singapore. It is taken for granted that the economic maturing of society will usher in greater political and ideological pluralism. The higher income and educational levels enjoyed by the polity, as well as its broader cosmopolitan outlook nurtured through wider travel and exposure to different norms have laid the grounds for this pluralism to emerge. Whether this pluralism is manifested in the desire for greater political party contestation; personal freedoms such as human rights or freedom of expression; or cultural values regarding sexual orientation, it is clear that this pluralism is here to stay. Equally clear is that this pluralism will come into conflict with conservative communities who may believe in the continued importance of the dominant one-party state. Such communities may value the concept of a traditional family unit and believe in the merits of trading the unpredictability of political contestation for stability. The larger question then is how Singapore society will achieve a grand *modus vivendi* to accommodate the pluralistic and conservative impulses in society without sacrificing national cohesion and civility.

Daniel P.S. Goh's chapter looks at how protest and the so-called "culture war" have developed in Singapore. Using examples from politics and the arts, Goh observes that opposition politicians and artists who adopted non-established modes of engagement such as street protests and forum theatre, respectively, were often met with state suspicion. However, he notes that the Singapore state is a responsive one, constantly assessing and adapting to such modes of engagement, resulting in more comprehensive regulations and policing. On the culture war front, Goh notes that groups such as the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) community have learned to adopt the vocabulary of conservative groups. Instead of demanding greater personal freedoms or calling for rights, the LGBT community is calling for greater inclusivity, respect, but most radically, declaring their love for the "family" unit.

Kenneth Paul Tan's chapter examines political inclusion and the state of the PAP. Tan asserts that while the ruling party has been successful in its dominance, it will need to embrace diversity to be a "big tent" party in order to remain relevant. This means drawing talent from more diverse corners of society lest it indulges in group think and old formulas. He cites four broad factors for the PAP's success—performance legitimacy; moral authority; electoral advantage; and the fear factor—and argues that there are other developing issues that need to be monitored. They include an overly rigid style of pragmatism that discourages risk-taking and creativity, the unintended consequences of a singular interpretation of "meritocracy", and the rise of populism.

In his chapter, Ja Ian Chong surveys one of the more pressing issues of our time—the ideological attraction that China holds for sections of the Singapore Chinese community. China's economic rise has been accompanied by the lengthening of its geopolitical reach, in part, through various forms of engagement with Chinese overseas who are now citizens of nation-states in the region. Chong notes how the United Front Work Department has made clear its intentions of reaching out to Chinese overseas to advance China's interests. Chong observes that profound implications for Singapore's foreign policy are but one of the many complications that may arise from China's allure for Singaporean Chinese. For example, Malaysia and Indonesia, both with histories of anti-Chinese sentiment, may view Singapore as a "Chinese fifth column", and thus impact bilateral relations as well as the country's domestic multicultural complexion.

The final part in this volume is entitled "Diverging Economic Worlds". As the title implies, the part looks at how the economic and material circumstances for different communities are deviating, and what this means for integration in Singapore. Irene Y.H. Ng's chapter looks at the issue of income inequality and the ideological factors that surround the phenomena. She begins by observing that Singapore does not fare too badly in the Gini index compared other developed countries. However, this is because of government tax and transfers; without which local income inequality will remain high. Ng proceeds to identify the government's stance against welfare policies for handouts to improve personal economic well-being and its corresponding emphasis on self-resilience as ideological narratives which shape the debate over income inequality in Singapore. Ng concludes by offering two scenarios. On one hand, if Singaporeans decide to tackle social inequality seriously, then a comprehensive ideological review of many of our main institutions will be needed. On the other, if we accept inequality as part of life, then we will see such social and economic inequalities as

unavoidable consequences of the economic model of development we have chosen for ourselves.

Gillian Koh, Tan Ern Ser, and Vincent Chua focus their chapter on the Singapore middle class. They observe how middle-class anxiety was been one of the unintended consequences of rapid economic growth. The combination of rising cost, stagnating incomes, and ever-expensive markers of material affluence, young Singaporeans from the 1990s have long feared that they may not be able to enjoy the trappings of middle-class success. With an array of data, the authors suggest that even older Singaporeans already in the middle class may feel insecure over the possibility of falling behind their peers. This group would be senior PMETs (professionals, managers, executives and technicians) who would have been most vulnerable to global recessions and economic restructuring. Koh, Tan and Chua conclude that if left to market forces and non-state intervention, Singapore's middle class will shrink. The result of which will be the erosion of social solidarity and egalitarianism.

Leong Chan-Hoong and Yvonne Yap examine one of the most iconic markers of integration in Singapore—public housing. The Housing and Development Board (HDB), set up in 1960, provides homes to over 80 per cent of the population. However, by 1989, there were signs of ethnic enclaves emerging with certain ethnic groups found to be clustering together. The Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) was introduced to impose a quota on the maximum number of households from the same ethnic background at the block and neighbourhood. While not without unintended consequences such as impacting ethnic minority sellers negatively, the policy has been responsible for preventing ethnic enclaves from forming and is recognized as a signature policy when it comes to managing integration. Thirty years after the EIP there are now signs of different types of segregation emerging. Using housing data Leong and Yap show that different neighbourhoods are becoming more exclusive because high-income earners are converging there. In addition, these neighbourhoods such as Tanglin, Bukit Timah, Novena, Marine Parade and Bishan are more likely to have families who speak English frequently at home. The icing on the cake is the clustering of prestigious and desirable schools in these areas. Leong and Yap conclude that the key challenge to public housing is no longer ethnic integration but class segregation.

The final chapter in this book, penned by Kalyani K. Mehta, deals with the need to better integrate Singapore's rapidly ageing community into the rest of society. Addressing the stress endured by caregivers from caring for the elderly, the anxiety from the elderly in navigating an increasingly

cyberconnected world, and their need for emotional and physical attention, Mehta assesses the array of policies that address the elderly from home to workplace. In light of the increasing elderly population, Mehta concludes that the challenges will only become more acute unless we change the way we see the elderly and create more age-inclusive spaces.

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