PART 1

Understanding Beijing’s Policy
Chapter 1

THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE OVERSEAS

China and India, the world’s most populous countries, have huge overseas populations. Nevertheless, it is the Chinese overseas who have long been a focus of attention owing to the important role they have played, their links to China, and China’s policies towards them. And, that focus has become sharper since China’s rise and its efforts to use the Chinese overseas as social, political, and economic capital. Moreover, Beijing's leaders perceive that the Chinese overseas are crucial for the realization of the “China Dream”. This chapter will deal briefly with two important developments linked to China’s changing policy towards the Chinese overseas: the rise of China and the recent massive waves of Chinese migration to both the developed and developing countries.

This study attempts to address the following questions: Why and when did Beijing’s policy towards the Chinese overseas change? What are the factors that contributed to this change? Which are the countries in Southeast Asia that still have strong anti-Chinese feelings and where major anti-Chinese violence
has continued to occur? What are the factors that contribute to anti-Chinese feelings and violence? Did Beijing go out of its way to protect the Chinese overseas who were affected by past outbreaks of violence? Why has Beijing adopted a differentiated approach in dealing with the Chinese domiciled in different countries? Does Beijing still differentiate between Chinese nationals and foreign citizens of Chinese descent? How have the Chinese overseas reacted to China’s new policy? What have been the responses of the countries that host these Chinese?

Beijing’s responses to anti-Chinese violence and anti-Chinese sentiments in selected countries in Southeast Asia and beyond since the end of the twentieth century would give us a clear understanding of Beijing’s policy towards the countries in question. This study presents examples from four Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Myanmar), two Pacific Island countries (Solomon Islands and Tonga) and three countries in Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Libya, and Yemen).

As Beijing’s policy towards the Chinese overseas has also been the product of its responses to internal events and needs, six internal developments have been selected for this study: the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, the Beijing-initiated World Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs Conference, Beijing’s so-called Huayi Card, its “One Belt One Road” Strategy, and the development of Chinese soft power.

From these presentations, one would be able to appreciate some changes in Beijing’s policy towards the Chinese overseas. These changes have occurred amidst China’s rise as an economic heavyweight, which has made Beijing more confident than
in the past and allowed its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to spread their wings across the world.

**TERMINOLOGY**

Several terms have been used in this study to refer to the Chinese overseas. These terms need to be explained to avoid confusion. The term “overseas Chinese” is used to refer to *huaqiao* (华侨), or Chinese nationals overseas, while the term “Chinese overseas”, coined by Professor Wang Gungwu, refers to the Chinese outside China regardless of nationality, comparable to the Chinese term *haiwai huaren* (海外华人). The term “ethnic Chinese” refers to the Chinese overseas, mainly foreign nationals, more or less comparable to *huaren* (华人) in Chinese. But *huaren* in the PRC refers only to those Chinese who have become citizens of foreign countries, even though in Southeast Asian usage its flexible use often allows for the inclusion of some *huaqiao* who have been in Southeast Asia for a long period of time. The term *huayi* (华裔) literally means the descendants of Chinese, referring to foreign citizens of Chinese origin, but, in China, it often refers to those Chinese who have lost their Chinese culture.

For the purposes of this study, the term “Chinese overseas” will be used to mean the Chinese outside China. This is used as a general and inclusive term to include Chinese nationals overseas and foreign citizens of Chinese descent. Chinese terms such as *huaqiao*, *huaren* and *huayi* can be placed under the category of the Chinese overseas. In short, all Chinese outside China regardless of their citizenship and culture are termed “Chinese overseas”. Nevertheless, occasionally
the term “overseas Chinese” is still used to mean *huaqiao* in a specific context.

It should be noted that after the rise of China, the term *huaqiao* or overseas Chinese is often used by China to include Chinese workers who work either for China’s SOEs or for non-Chinese companies. These workers are particularly large in number in Africa and the Middle East. In fact, they are transient and different from the traditional concept of *huaqiao* as they would return to China after finishing their contracts. Nevertheless, they are considered migrant workers and are often classified by China as part of the “overseas Chinese”.

As explained at the beginning, the PRC has attached particular meanings to each of the Chinese terms mentioned above. *Huaqiao* and *huaren* have legal connotations while *huayi* has both legal and cultural connotations. Nevertheless, the leadership of the PRC in the twenty-first century has a tendency to put *huaqiao huaren* together, blurring their nationality distinction and referring to them as *qiaobao* (侨胞, Chinese compatriots overseas). *Huayi* is occasionally included in this group. This blurring of citizenship is done when the leadership feels that it is in the interest of China. It is hoped that the reader will appreciate the nuances that the various terms reflect.

It should be noted that the terms “Chinese overseas” and “overseas Chinese” exclude the Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.

The number of Chinese overseas, although sizeable, has been difficult to determine with certainty. This difficulty is due to a number of factors. First, it is difficult to define a Chinese in the Southeast Asian context. Many Chinese have been
indigenized, as reflected in their names. Second, many governments, such as that of pre-Suharto Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, do not have “ethnic Chinese” as a category in their censuses. Even if they do, those of Chinese descent may not identify themselves as “Chinese”. Third, it is difficult to know the precise number of new Chinese migrants as many governments do not provide such information. Therefore, with the possible exception of some Western countries, the numbers of Chinese overseas that are available are merely estimates or educated guesses; there are no authoritative counts.

The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas

The world witnessed the rise of China towards the end of the last century. Prior to that, China was a weak country, ideologically strong but lacking in real state power. Apart from exporting its revolutionary ideology to small movements overseas, China’s ability to exert meaningful influence was limited to its immediate borders. Even the three wars in which Beijing was involved — the Korean War in 1950–53, the Sino-Indian War in 1962, and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 — were all waged in its immediate neighbourhood; the Chinese military had never been sent to fight beyond its immediate borders. It is true that China provided some third world countries with economic aid but the amounts involved were small and not comparable to the aid dispensed by the developed countries. The only exception was China’s aid to North Korea and North Vietnam during their wars against Western powers. But, again, these are neighbouring states.

However, China has undergone massive transformation since the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping launched his open
door policy. He introduced market reforms, industrialization and export-oriented manufacturing. Domestically, China’s rapid economic growth translated to significant poverty alleviation and improvements in living standards. Today, China has become a major economic, political, and military power. The rise of China, or more correctly, the resurgence of China became perceptible by the beginning of the twenty-first century. By the year 2000 China felt strong economically as it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and proposed a Free Trade Zone with ASEAN. China also played a responsible role as a major power in the international economic regime by not devaluing the Renminbi in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98.

China has today become not only the “world’s factory”, manufacturing goods for export worldwide, but also an aspiring banker seeking to provide funds for infrastructural investment in Asia and beyond. In 2014, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to rival, if not the World Bank, at least the Asian Development Bank. China’s foreign reserves have increased tremendously, enabling it to purchase vast quantities of American bonds, indirectly sustaining the American economy. Moreover, the presence of China’s SOEs has become palpable in many regions, especially Africa and the Middle East as China seeks to exploit natural resources abroad.

In other signs of its growing strength and confidence, China organized the prestigious 2008 Olympic Games and successfully held major international conferences. Moreover, it has started to develop soft power by, among other things, promoting the learning of the Chinese language through the establishment of Confucius Institutes around the world.
Observers have argued that China perceives itself as a new major power, and would like to be recognized by the world, including the United States, as such; it would like to play a role in the international arena as a major power, if not a great power.

As China grows in political and economic power, its policy towards the Chinese overseas has also changed. It has gradually abandoned its earlier practice of differentiating between huaqiao (Chinese nationals overseas) and huaren (foreign citizens of Chinese descent). In fact, as late as 1998, when Indonesia was in the throes of anti-Chinese riots, Beijing was still restrained in protecting Chinese Indonesians as they were citizens of Indonesia and hence no more within China’s jurisdiction. The abandonment of this “hands off” policy subsequently was probably due to several factors: the rapid rise of China and the surge in the number of Chinese migrating since the end of the last century might have caused the leadership in Beijing to reconsider its position towards the Chinese overseas.

**NEW WAVES OF CHINESE MIGRATION**

After the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping in 1977, a new wave of Chinese migration from the mainland took place. The new migrants or *xin yimin* (新移民) are different from the earlier Chinese migrants in at least four aspects: their destinations, quality, geographic origins, and the nature of their migration. In terms of destination, in the past, Chinese migrants usually headed for the developing countries, especially Southeast Asia. However, about 80 per cent of new migrants have migrated to the developed countries, including the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and Singapore. Only about 20 per cent migrated to the
developing countries (especially Southeast Asia).5

The quality of the new migrants differs from that of the
old ones. The new migrants are usually better educated than
the earlier migrants. Many not only possess skills but also
capital. In contrast, the earlier migrants were mainly poor and
uneducated.

In terms of geographic origins, unlike in the past, when
Chinese migrants came largely from the southern provinces,
the new migrants hail from a wider cross-section of the country.
One can therefore argue that the recent wave of migration is a
nation-wide phenomenon. In addition, some Southeast Asian
Chinese have migrated to other developed countries, but their
number appears to be much smaller than that of mainland
xin yimin.

According to Zhuang Guotu, at the end of the 1990s there
were about 6 million of xin yimin, mainly in the West rather
than Southeast Asia (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2), but by 2007–8 the
number of xin yimin had risen to 7–8 million.6

The nature of the new migrants is less “permanent” than
previous waves of migrants. Owing to poor education and low
social mobility, coupled with China’s poverty then, the earlier
migrants were more likely to remain in their adopted countries
and eventually integrate into local society. In contrast, some
among the new migrants who are less successful in their
adopted lands have chosen either to return to China, now that
the country is richer and offers greater opportunities, or seek
their fortunes in third countries. Some new Chinese migrants
in the West are keen to reap the benefits of the two worlds
and have urged China to revive its dual nationality law for the
Chinese overseas.
### TABLE 1.1
**Number of Chinese New Migrants in Developed Countries**

(unit: in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>Over 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,585.5</td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>5,180</td>
<td>5,630+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 1.2
**Number of Chinese New Migrants in Southeast Asia**

(unit: in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>As of 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>100–120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>100–150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>200–300?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>10?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>150–200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>200–250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>200–300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>50–100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many new migrants are less well integrated into their adopted countries as the ease of communication and transportation in today’s globalized world allows them to maintain their links with their country of birth and retain a migrant mentality. At the same time, some host societies are not too receptive of new migrants, causing the latter to feel unwelcome. This failure or inability to integrate into their host societies serves to perpetuate the old stereotype of “once a Chinese, always a Chinese”.

There are various reasons why new migrants find it difficult to integrate into local society but China’s policy towards the Chinese overseas is a crucial factor in their indigenization or otherwise. If China encourages full integration for the new migrants, it is more likely that new migrants would feel obliged to do so; otherwise, they may retain their migrant mentalities.

When speaking of Chinese new migrants, the focus is usually on those who have migrated to Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asia; not much attention has been given to those who have moved to the Middle East and Africa. Also, labour migrants have often been ignored. According to one estimate, there were about 4 million Chinese labourers across the world. This figure has not been verified and may be inflated. However, with a labour surplus in China, it is logical to assume that many Chinese have gone overseas to work as labourers.

Labour migration was one of the major characteristics of Chinese migration in the nineteenth century. It was known as the “huagong (华工) pattern” or “coolie pattern” of migration. Wang Gungwu argues that this pattern “derived from the migration of large numbers of coolie labour, normally men of peasant origin, landless labourers and the urban poor.”
Labour migration has recurred in the twenty-first century and is known as laogong yimin (劳工移民). But this recent wave of labour migration differs from the historical pattern of labour migration in several aspects. One difference is that the new labour migrants are hired by China’s SOEs. These SOEs operate in many resource-rich but politically unstable countries, for instance, those in the Middle East and Africa. When there was turbulence in some of these countries, the SOEs were usually affected and their Chinese labourers had to be evacuated.

Chinese labourers often work in Chinese companies involved in the building of railroads, real estate development, factories, as well as in mining and oil exploration. Strictly speaking, they are not migrants but “guest workers”. They are often isolated from the local society. Usually they are obliged to leave when their projects are completed. These “overseas Chinese” are Chinese nationals and should not be counted alongside actual migrants who intend to stay and make a living in their newly-adopted lands. A mainland China scholar has argued that these labour migrants do not belong to the category of “permanent migrants” although some of them remain in the country in question indefinitely. Nevertheless, the “guest workers” or “contract workers” are different from regular migrants. However, Beijing often classifies them as part of the “overseas Chinese”, as seen in the case of Libya.

**THE CHANGING CHINESE OVERSEAS SOCIETY**

New Chinese migrants have had a major impact on the nature of the “overseas Chinese” society, especially in the developed countries of North America and Europe, and in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (see Table 1.1). Whereas the ethnic
Chinese communities in these countries used to be small and fairly well integrated into their host societies, in a short period of time, these communities have been transformed into immigrant communities again owing to the influx of new migrants. The increase in the number of new migrants in these countries ranges from 3 times to 22 times. For instance, in the United States, there were only 806,000 Chinese migrants in 1981, but by 1999 the number had risen to over 2,830,000; in the United Kingdom, the numbers were 91,000 in 1981 and more than 250,000 in 1999; in Italy, 3,500 in 1981 and 70,000 in 1999; and, in Japan, 60,000 in 1981 and 250,000 in 1999.

The number of new migrants in Southeast Asia is not known. From Table 1.2, which is based on estimates, the number would seem to be quite significant. Nevertheless, as the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, with the possible exception of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, are long established and better integrated into their host societies, it seems that the arrival of new Chinese migrants has not had the effect of transforming these communities into the migrant communities they once were.

Many of the new Chinese migrants are better educated than previous waves of migrants and some are wealthy and have been active in the local socio-political scene. This is especially obvious in the West, where the prevailing liberal political systems are conducive to their political participation. In contrast, new Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia are generally less politically active as the political systems tend to be less liberal and where ethnic-tension between Chinese and non-Chinese remains.

Many new migrants still have connections with China and maintain contact with the Chinese embassies where they reside. This means the Chinese government could influence their behaviours, which could adversely affect the relationship between China and their host countries.
NEW CHINESE MIGRANTS AND BUSINESS

There are quite a few studies on how new Chinese migrants in the West, such as Canada and the United States, have adapted to their new lands, and the results show that the process has not been smooth. However, there are few studies on the new migrants’ venture into business in their newly-adopted lands to determine how successful they have been. From the sketchy information available, it appears that few new Chinese migrants have become major business figures in their new countries.

In the past few years China has encouraged and invited Chinese overseas entrepreneurs to visit and help in China’s economic transformation and development, including the establishment of economic relations with other countries. For instance, at the second session of China’s 12th People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2014, some new migrants were invited as observers. Later, interviews with three of the successful “overseas Chinese” entrepreneurs who attended the meeting were carried in Chinese online media. These three were: Xie Chongtong of Thailand, Yi Rubo of California, USA, and Li Wenzhong of Argentina. Below are their brief biographies.

Xie Chongtong (谢崇通) was born in China and received a university education there. In 1991 he went to Thailand to start his information technology business as there was not much competition in this industry from among the Chinese migrants in the country then. He gradually emerged as a giant in the industry and established the Thai Star Chinese Computer Group (泰国星华电脑集团公司) and served as its chairman. He was also the deputy chairman of Thailand’s “Committee for Fostering the Unification of China” (泰国中国统一促进会). It seems that
he established a family in Thailand, and his son later went to the United States to study. Xie may have become a Thai citizen. He maintains closed links with China and was instrumental in helping a Chinese company win a contract to build Thailand’s high speed train.¹²

Yi Rubo (易如波) was born in China. He began to harbour the idea of going overseas in 1992 when he was still at university. After graduation, he moved to California, where he chose to invest in the property industry in Los Angeles. Initially, his business was small, but gradually he was able to establish a large company. It is not disclosed how he got rich and who his clients are. It is possible that he serves mainland Chinese who seek property in California. Yi Rubo is now chairman of the board of Zhong Ang Real Estate Group (中昂地产集团董事长) and deputy chairman of the US-Chinese Real Estate Businessmen’s Association (美国华商会常务副主席). It is not known whether he is still holding a Chinese passport.¹³

Li Wenzhong (李文忠) was born in China and educated as a Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) doctor. In 1988 he established a private TCM hospital in Beijing. He wanted to go overseas to invest and eventually selected Argentina. There, he initially established a TCM clinic. As TCM was not popular in Argentina, he had difficulties getting accepted. However, after making countless efforts, he eventually received recognition by the local Chinese community. Li is now an adviser to the Federation of Ethnic Chinese Enterprises in Argentina (阿根廷华人企业联合会) and chairman of the board of the Li Feng Medical Group (阿根廷李丰药业集团董事长). He has been a frequent visitor to China. It is possible that he has become a citizen of Argentina, having resided there for twenty years.¹⁴
A highly successful xin yimin businessman who was not included in the interviews is Zhong Shengjian (钟声坚) of Singapore.\textsuperscript{15} He was born in Guangdong in 1958. Not much is known about his education and life in China. He moved to Singapore in 1988 at the age of 30 and established Yanlord Land Holdings (仁恒置地), specializing in real estate. In 1993 he started building luxury apartments in Shanghai and Nanjing and became a successful businessman. He later also worked with other companies in China to invest in the paper manufacturing business and in household equipment manufacturing business. But his main business remains in property. In 2006, Yanlord Land Holdings was listed on the Singapore stock market. Zhong was identified as the seventh richest man in Singapore in 2010, with a total wealth of US$1.6 billion.\textsuperscript{16} He was formerly deputy president of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and was in charge of raising funds for the Singapore Chinese Cultural Centre.

The above four new migrants were all adults when they left China. At least three of them also received university education in China and one of them was already an established TCM doctor before migrating. Initially, three of them had some difficulties integrating into their host societies but they managed to stay on. Yet, their relationship with China was strong and their businesses still have close links with the country. In the interviews, the three interviewees enthusiastically expressed their desire to work for the economic interest of China.

The earlier migrants and their descendants appear to have been more successful in business in their adopted lands as they have been there longer than the new migrants and are hence
better established. This is particularly the case among Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the new Chinese migrants are more successful in doing business in China as they are more familiar with the situation in their native land.

The ethnic Chinese have played an important role in Southeast Asia. They dominate commerce and the business sector and form the economic elite in all of the Southeast Asian countries. Some observers exaggerate the position of the Southeast Asian Chinese, arguing that they dominate the Southeast Asian economies. But no one can deny that ethnic Chinese, or Southeast Asians of Chinese descent, do indeed play crucial roles in the Southeast Asian economies. From Beijing's perspective, the wealth of the ethnic Chinese (or what it considers the Chinese overseas) and their crucial roles in the local economies would be valuable for China as it becomes a global economic and political heavyweight. Thus the Chinese in Southeast Asia have become targets of Beijing's changing policy on the Chinese overseas, introduced after China’s phenomenal economic success.

**XI JINPING’S “CHINA DREAM” AND THE CHINESE OVERSEAS**

Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao as the general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012 and president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since March 2013. It appears that President Xi is more dynamic than previous presidents of the PRC. Once he came to power, he proposed the so-called “China Dream” (中国梦), that is, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing 中华民族的伟大复兴)”. He first mentioned his “China Dream” in November 2012 during a “Rejuvenation
Exhibition” and later officially proposed it at the 12th National People’s Congress (17 March 2013):

To realize a moderately prosperous society, to build a strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious and modern socialist state, to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, these are the China Dream…that is the glorious tradition tirelessly pursued by our forefathers…. To realize the China Dream, we must coalesce for China’s strength; that is, the strength of the great unity among the people of all ethnic groups (各族人民). The China Dream is the dream of our nation and of every Chinese national (每个中国人)……

Initially, Xi included only “various ethnic groups” in China and “every Chinese national” in this “China Dream”. However, in 2014, after he proposed his “One Belt One Road” Strategy (later, “Strategy” was changed to “Initiative” in the official English translation) to connect China and the world, he defined the sons and daughters of China (Zhonghua Ernü 中华儿女) to mean both Chinese in mainland China and the Chinese overseas. In the speech that he made at the 7th Conference of the World Federation of Huaqiao Huaren Associations on 7 June 2014, he said:

A united Chinese nation is the common root of the sons and daughters of China within and outside China; the rich Chinese culture is the common soul of the sons and daughters of China; to realize the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the common dream of the sons and daughters of China. Common roots make us deeply rooted, a common soul makes us remember each other, a common dream makes us have one heart; we will be able to jointly write a new chapter in the development of the Chinese nation.
He further noted:

There are tens of millions of Chinese overseas compatriots (haiwai qiaobao 海外侨胞), all of whom are members of one big Chinese family (Zhonghua da jiating 中华大家庭). For a long time, overseas Chinese, generation after generation, inherited the excellent tradition of the Chinese nation: they did not forget their fatherland, they did not forget their ancestral province, they did not forget that in their body there is Chinese blood, [therefore] they have enthusiastically supported the Chinese revolution, China’s construction, and the reform of China. They are making important contributions to the development of the Chinese nation and fostering the peaceful unification between mainland China and Taiwan and fostering close and friendly cooperation between the Chinese people and the people of other countries. The people of China will always remember the contribution of our Chinese compatriots overseas.20

Against this background, it is easy to understand why there has been an attempt on the part of Beijing to woo the Chinese overseas to work for the national interest of China.

Notes

1. The term “Chinese overseas” is used to mean ethnic Chinese outside China regardless of nationality. It is different from “overseas Chinese”, which refers to China’s nationals overseas. For a detailed explanation, see “Terminology” in this chapter.


3. For a detailed discussion of these terms and their usage, see Leo Suryadinata, ed., Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 2–4.
4. For a brief study of the AIIB, see Stuart Larkin, “China’s ‘Great Leap Outward’: The AIIB in context”, *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 27 (9 June 2015); and his “Multiple Challenges for the AIIB”, *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 33 (2 July 2015).


11. I have tried to look for information on the other new migrant attendees but to no avail.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


20. Ibid.