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CHANGING INDONESIA: An Introduction

Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, has as its national motto “Unity in Diversity.” In 2010, Indonesia stood as the world’s fourth most populous country after China, India and the United States, with 237.6 million people. This archipelagic country contributed 3.5 per cent to the world’s population in the same year. Its relative contribution to the world population will be stable at around 3.4–3.5 per cent until 2050. According to the median variant of the United Nations estimate (2013), Indonesia’s population will continue to grow, reaching 300 million in 2033.

The future demographics of Indonesia are likely to be very different from today’s pattern, just as the current situation varies markedly from the past. Indonesians are increasingly living longer and having fewer children. Benefiting from the ease and advancement of transportation and information technology, Indonesians are increasingly more mobile, venturing into a wider labour market both within and outside Indonesia.

Indonesia has nearly completed its first demographic transition, from both high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality rates. The end of the first demographic transition is marked by the “replacement” level of
fertility, which is the number of children a couple has that are needed to replace themselves. Population experts believe that the replacement level is reached when the fertility rate is about 2.1. However, Espenshade, Guzman and Westoff (2003) argue that the replacement rate does not occur at that rate, but relates instead to the mortality rate.\(^1\)

The onset of the replacement level of fertility has further implications for the ethnic composition of a population. If the replacement level can be maintained for about forty years, the population will stabilize with zero growth. However, in many cases, this is not a reality. Some regions can easily fall into below replacement fertility for so long as to threaten the population with extinction. For instance, Japan and Germany are depopulating in this way.

Some provinces in Indonesia such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Bali have already completed their first demographic and are now in the second demographic transition, where the fertility rate is below the replacement level. As Lesthaeghe (1991) argues, under the regime of the second demographic transition, marriage is no longer universal, occurs at older ages and can be childless. There are higher-order needs on individualization, self-actualization and a rising awareness of human rights. An ageing population and a shortage of young workers are two other features in the second demographic transition.

In the meantime, a rising population mobility, with its varying patterns and levels of intensity, means that there are and will increasingly be greater interaction amongst peoples of different backgrounds such as ethnic and racial groups, religious groups, nationalities and languages. As a result, marriages involving peoples of different backgrounds will be likely to occur more often in Indonesia. Cultural assimilation amongst these different backgrounds will also create new group identities for people.

Alongside a persistent below-replacement level of fertility and acceleration in population mobility, Coleman (2006) examined what he called the third demographic transition: the transformation of ethnic composition. Indonesia has also experienced this third transition, especially at sub-national levels, and has witnessed how it can change quickly. At the same time, the democratization process and decentralization that started in 1998 in Indonesia has brought rising ethnic awareness and ethno-based politics in many parts of Indonesia.

Therefore, these demographic and political transitions have resulted in an emerging need to better understand the ethnic composition of Indonesia. This book aims to contribute to that need.
CONTINUATION AND DEEPER EXPANSION

The study of Indonesian ethno-demographic data sets began with *Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape* (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003), a pioneering work on ethno-demography (demography of ethnicity) in Indonesia. This pioneering work was the first publication on the demography of ethnic groups in Indonesia after the removal of a political taboo that restricted the collection and analysis of data on ethnicity in Indonesia in 2000. Although Indonesia is one of the world’s most ethnically diverse nations, the recognition of ethnic groups used to be de-emphasized for the sake of nation building and identity. That book was written based on the publication of ethnic information from the 2000 population census by the Badan Pusat Statistik, Indonesia (hereafter the BPS) in 2001.

The book was prepared in a user-friendly manner, making statistics on ethnicity easily accessible to all. It outlined and described Indonesia’s ethnic composition both as a whole country and within each of its provinces. The study succeeded in presenting a more comprehensive picture of all ethnic groups. It also discussed an important “foreign” minority, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Therefore, Hugo (2003) commented that this book has long been awaited by many Indonesianists. The book was later translated into Bahasa Indonesia and published by the LP3ES in the same year.

Furthermore, the calculation and description of ethnicity at district levels were made available to the public and presented as part of the analysis in *Indonesian Electoral Behaviour: A Statistical Perspective* (Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004). The delineation of ethnic groups was limited to the Javanese vs. the non-Javanese, showing the number and percentage of Javanese in each district in Indonesia, as well as the geographical distribution of the Javanese at the district level. The Javanese group is the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, comprising about 40 per cent of Indonesia’s population.

The book also contributed to statistics on religion at the district level. Because Islam has the largest number of followers in Indonesia, comprising about 86 per cent of Indonesia’s population, the analysis was limited to Muslims versus non-Muslims. Similar to the way ethnic groups were defined, the book also presented the number and percentage of Muslims in each district, as well as the geographical distribution of Muslims by district in Indonesia.

Along with other social and economic variables such as GDP per capita, education, migration and urbanization, the statistics obtained on
ethnicity and religion were used as predictors of electoral behaviour in 1999. The book was also the first to depict such a regression analysis of ethnicity and religion on electoral behaviour controlled by certain social and economic variables.

The three authors and many others have acknowledged some caveats concerning the 2000 population census (Hull 2001; Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003, and McDonald 2014). However, despite its limitations, the 2000 population census has provided a significant breakthrough for the understanding of ethnicity in Indonesia. Therefore, after the two aforementioned publications, two of the authors (Ananta and Arifin) continued their study of ethnicity in Indonesia using the 2000 population census. Ananta, Arifin and Bakhtiar (2005) examined the ageing population, fertility and mortality amongst the five largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. They also revised their calculation of the Malay population from their pioneering work of 2003. As a consequence, the second work had a different rank for Malays as is later discussed in this present book for comparison with the 2010 result.

Furthermore, Ananta (2006) related population mobility with changing ethnic composition and conflicts, particularly for the Province of the Riau Archipelago. The statistics on ethnic composition at the provincial level was also carried out in the Province of Aceh, taking into account the variation amongst districts (Ananta, Arifin and Hadumoan 2007). Using the 2005 Intercensal Population Survey, Ananta, Arifin and Bakhtiar (2008) updated the statistics on the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and also compiled the statistics for two other “foreign” minorities, the Indian and the Arab groups. They also examined certain socio-economic conditions amongst the Chinese Indonesians and compared these to other ethnic groups in the Province of the Riau Archipelago.

Since then, opportunities to understand ethnicity in Indonesia have been greatly widened as the 2010 population census continued to collect information on ethnicity. This current book is a demographic study on ethnicity, mostly relying on the tabulation provided by the BPS based on the complete data set of the 2010 population census, which makes the statistics more reliable than the use of the subset data.² As detailed in Chapter 2, the information on ethnicity was collected for 236,728,379 individuals, a huge data set.

To some extent, the present study is a continuation from the earlier pioneering work and its subsequent studies using the 2000 population
census. It is also an expansion of the analysis of ethnicity in the archipelago, taking into account a more comprehensive ethnic classification. The coded data set of ethnicity in the 2010 population census is still relatively raw, giving freedom to researchers to make their own classification of ethnic groups. This freedom for researchers to work on the coded data sets is one of the rich qualities of the Indonesian population census, particularly with respect to its statistics on ethnicity.

As religion and language are two of the ethnic markers, this book expands its analysis to include these as well. It attempts to answer the question on the pattern of religions of a particular ethnic group and the languages spoken daily at home. Such analyses are two other novelties of the present book.

**OBJECTIVES**

This book has four objectives. The first is to produce a new comprehensive classification of ethnic groups, what we like to call the “New Classification”. This New Classification is expected to better capture the rich diversity of ethnicity in Indonesia, especially at the provincial and district levels, although the present book limits itself to the provincial level. It also seeks to improve the classification so that it will be a better, more useful and easier foundation for anybody who wants to understand statistics on ethnicity in Indonesia from the published data and/or raw coded data set. The New Classification is thus an important prerequisite for any study on ethnicity using the statistics from the 2010 census. It will also be useful for future data collection on ethnicity, including the 2015 intercensal population survey (SUPAS) and 2020 Population Census. The coding scheme of the New Classification could also be applied to other national surveys, such as the Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey (SDKI) and the annual National Social and Economic Survey (SUSENAS). Furthermore, looking just at the New Classification alone, the reader can already glimpse something of the richness of Indonesia’s ethnic diversity.

The second objective is to report on the ethnic composition in Indonesia and in each of the thirty-three provinces using the New Classification. A more in-depth study is focused on the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia, already covering 84.9 per cent of the total number of Indonesian citizens living in Indonesia in 2010.
The third is to evaluate the dynamics of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2000–2010, and the fourth is to examine the religions and languages of each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups.

With these objectives, the book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the concept of ethnicity, the quantitative measurement of ethnicity, the data we are using and the problems we face in classifying the ethnic groups. In Chapter 3 we discuss the New Classification, including the way we produce it and its significance. The list of ethnic groups in the New Classification itself is expected to be able to provide some information on Indonesia’s ethnic diversity. It is supplemented by the code for each group to facilitate easy reference for whoever wants to study ethnicity from the coded raw data set. The discussions in Chapter 3 and end of Chapter 2 are also expected to contribute some new insights on Indonesia’s ethnicity.

With the New Classification, we have created and examined the ranking of ethnic groups in Indonesia as a whole and in each of the thirty-three provinces in Chapter 4. The provincial ethnic compositions are to show the multi-ethnicity of Indonesia’s population across the provinces. We present the provinces according to the extent of their ethnic homogeneity.

We further elaborate each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Chapter 5. Amongst other things, we focus the discussion on the age-sex structure of each ethnic group and where they live. Chapter 6 analyses the dynamics of ethnic composition during 2000–2010, with some references to the 1930 census. The statistics for the 2000 and 1930 censuses are based on the pioneering work in 2003 of Ananta, Arifin and Bakhtiar (2005).

The religions and languages of each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups are discussed in Chapter 7. These new statistics on the religions and languages of each ethnic group are expected to provide the first quantitative information on religion and language of ethnic groups in Indonesia.

Finally, the present book is very timely, because of both the rising importance of ethnicity in Indonesia’s social, economic and political development as well as the availability of the rich data set from the 2010 population census. This book is also expected to trigger further studies, using the rich raw data set of the 2000 and 2010 population censuses. Amongst the many possible important studies, we recommend more in-depth studies on the relationship between ethnic groups, religious followers and groups of language speakers. These studies can also be
expanded to understand their educational, employment and urban-rural patterns.

This book should also be beneficial for policymakers, helping to make them aware that Indonesia has a large number of ethnic groups that will interact more frequently with one another. On one hand, this great diversity can be used to trigger social and political instability. Therefore, wise policies should be made to minimize unnecessary conflicts and make the huge variety of ethnic groups with their different religions and languages one of the elements that makes Indonesia so culturally rich.

The following sections in this chapter elaborate on the concept of the third demographic transition, which will help to place the discussion on ethnicity in the overall theoretical context of demographic changes. It is followed by a section describing recent and future challenges for Indonesia’s population, providing a background in understanding ethnicity in Indonesia. Finally, it discusses the role of politics in providing data on ethnicity in Indonesia.

THE THIRD DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

Initially, this feature was called the “demographic revolution”, coined by French demographer Adolphe Landry in the seminal publication La Revolution Demographique, published in Paris in 1934. It was then reformulated as the “demographic transition” by American demographer Frank W. Notestein (1945). Kingsley Davis (1963) joined this work in establishing the foundation of the theory of demographic transition.

In essence, the theory of demographic transition attempts to describe a general pattern of demographic changes a country may experience. It states that initially a country experiences a level of demographic equilibrium (with very low population growth or no growth at all) because of both high fertility and mortality rates. Then, a decline in mortality precedes that in fertility, contributing to a high population growth rate. Ultimately, the fertility rate declines. Finally, both mortality and fertility are very low. Again, at this stage, population growth is very low. This process, from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates, was called the demographic transition.

The real process may not be as smooth as is depicted by this theory. Nevertheless, it is a way to describe demographic changes caused by declining fertility and mortality rates.
One weakness of this “demographic transition” was that it did not take into account changes in population mobility, one of the three components of demographic change. Then, in the 1970s, Wilbur Zelinsky (1971) examined stages of internal population mobility (mobility within a country). In the 1990s, Ronald Skeldon (1990) improved Zelinsky’s concept. However, both Zelinsky and Skeldon only briefly examined international population mobility and its connection with the stages of internal population mobility. Others, such as C.W. Stahl and R.T. Appleyard (1992) developed a separate theory of stages of international population mobility. Their framework related changes in international population mobility to the international movement of capital. It is disappointing that there has been no attempt to combine the demographic transition, internal population mobility transition and international population mobility transition into one unifying framework.

Meanwhile, in the 1980s, Van de Kaa (2002) created another term, the “second demographic transition”. He refers to the demographic transition pioneered by Landry and reformulated by Notestein and Davis as the “first demographic transition”. Van de Kaa described replacement-level fertility as the end of the first demographic transition. After that, when fertility and mortality levels are below the replacement level, the population is in the second demographic transition. The fertility level is usually fluctuating. During this period, there will be new norms regarding individual behaviour and the family, with a rising appreciation of individual aspirations and needs. At this stage, it is not easy to bring about social engineering.

Then, David Coleman (2006) argued that what he called the “third demographic transition” had emerged. During the second demographic transition, with an intense interrelationship between ageing and migration, we have another demographic transition. This is related to a fast change in ethnic composition because of rising population mobility, particularly the inflow of population with different ethnic and religious groups. The rapid change in ethnic composition in a given population can create potential social, economic and political conflicts.

Indonesia has seen all of these transitions too in their demographic trajectories. At the national level, Indonesia has almost completed its first demographic transition. Moreover, some provinces have completed their first demographic transition and are now in their second demographic transition. The patterns of internal and international population mobility have also become more complex.
As a result, Indonesia may also experience the third demographic transition, when changing ethnic composition becomes an increasingly important demographic phenomenon in Indonesia. Although the change will have wide social, economic and political implications, few studies have been done on the ethnic composition of population and its possible changes in Indonesia.

CHALLENGES FROM INDONESIA’S POPULATION

The fertility rate has declined from around six children per woman in the 1960s to about 2.4 in 2010. In some regions, the fertility rate has been even below the replacement level. Mortality has also declined. Life expectancy rose from around forty-five in the 1960s to around seventy in 2010. The Indonesian population has also been more mobile since the 1960s and travelling greater distances. A much greater number of foreigners has also come to reside in or visit Indonesia too, either for work, studies or tourism.

Indonesia faces three mega-demographic trends. The first is that Indonesia’s huge population will continue to grow, although the fertility rate as one of the key drivers of the population growth declined rapidly before 2000 and remained stable after that. The continued population growth is the so-called “population momentum”, a result of the rise in the size of the reproductive-age population, although with each woman bearing fewer children, between two and three only. With the smaller number of children, a woman may have more opportunities to increase the quality of both hers and her children’s lives. She can also have more time to pursue a career outside the household. The quality of life of the population may then continue to grow.

Recently, Indonesia’s population size has been seen as contributing to a large lucrative market and strong production base in Southeast Asia. With the fact that its economy has been rising fast too, Indonesia is tipped to be one of the global economic powerhouses in the near future.

The second mega-demographic trend is the ageing population. As fertility has been relatively low, the ageing population will soon become a very important development issue in Indonesia. Indeed in some regions in Indonesia, the ageing population has become a serious issue. As is shown later in Chapter 5, some ethnic groups such as the Javanese, Madurese, Balinese and Chinese have been ageing faster than other ethnic groups.
The third mega-demographic trend is the changing pattern of population mobility in Indonesia. More mobile Indonesians equipped with better transportation and high technology will make Indonesians more connected to one another and to other people from outside Indonesia. Indonesians will increasingly be meeting more people from other ethnic groups, other religions, cultural backgrounds, and people speaking other languages, including people from other countries. There have been and will be more marriages between people from different groups and cultural assimilation in Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia is joining the globalization process. Another important factor is that since 1998, Indonesia has decentralized the country by giving district leaders more power, resulting in local ethnic politics becoming more prominent.

These demographic shifts are occurring alongside many other rapid social and economic changes, including changes in ethnic composition, transforming the lives of Indonesians. As Indonesia is a country with a huge number of ethnic groups, spread unevenly, the rising contact of people from different groups may create social and political conflicts. However, wisely managed, this contact will become an asset for Indonesia, enriching the culture and maturing Indonesian democracy.

Nevertheless, despite its richness, Indonesia’s multi-ethnicity is still not well understood, partly due to the lack of statistics on ethnicity. The mapping of ethnicity in Indonesia is still limited and to some extent distorted when it comes to the estimates of particular ethnic groups, such as the Chinese. Therefore, ethnic composition in Indonesia becomes an important aspect to better understand Indonesia’s economic, social and political dynamics.

POLITICS AND STATISTICS ON ETHNICITY

The limited availability of statistics on ethnicity in Indonesia has mostly been because of former political policies in Indonesia. The governments in both the Old Order era (1945–67) and the New Order era (1967–98) held the view that knowing the “truth” about ethnic composition could result in social and political instability. Therefore, no data on ethnicity were collected during these two eras. The only statistics on ethnicity came from the 1930 population census, conducted during the colonial era. Many analyses at the national level taking into account ethnic composition were simply based on extrapolation from the 1930 data and, at best, were educated guesses. These analyses were often influenced by the bias
of the analysts themselves. Some tried to understand ethnicity by using language as a proxy. For instance, in the 1980 and 1990 population censuses, the information on ethnicity included questions on language, both the mother tongue and languages spoken daily at home.

On the other hand, the government’s attitude to ethnicity was different from its views of religion. The government was not afraid to know the truth about the composition of followers of the various religions. The question of which religion a person belongs to has been included in all population censuses, although this is only limited to the six officially recognized religions. This is in contrast to what happens in some countries with the world’s most advanced and modern statistical systems. As described by Eberstadt and Shah (2012), the American government explicitly forbids the US Bureau of Census from collecting data on religion. A similar situation is found in much of the European Union, the Russian Federation and other more developed regions.

With the change into a reforming, democratizing era since 1998, the government’s attitude towards the truth about ethnic composition has also changed. It encourages knowledge of the actual ethnic composition of the country and is not afraid of possible social and political instability ensuing therefrom. During the government of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the BPS made a breakthrough by inserting a question on ethnicity in its 2000 population census. Therefore, after a break of seventy years, Indonesia began to collect statistics on ethnicity. The 2000 population census deleted the question on language and continued collecting data on religion.

With the 2000 census, Indonesia was only nine years behind the United Kingdom with regard to the census question on ethnic groups. The 1991 population census saw the first census question on ethnicity in the United Kingdom. This ethnic question was first proposed in 1981 but was not allowed on the basis of political security (Akinwale 2005).

The 2010 population census continued to collect data on ethnicity and religion. A new feature in the 2010 population was the inclusion of a question on language daily spoken at home. As a result, in addition to religion, the 2010 population census is endowed with very rich information linking ethnicity on one hand and religion and language on the other. Furthermore, the 2010 population census collected many more questions than the 2000 population census did, allowing much richer analyses of ethnic identities as related to many variables such as education, health and employment.
When the statistics on ethnicity based on the 2000 population census were published, they triggered unhappiness amongst the Dayak community as the size of the Dayak population seemed to be highly underestimated. The group felt that their true proportion had not been recognized by the state. In fact, this was due to the way the ethnic group was presented, without making an aggregation of the Dayak sub-ethnic groups. For instance, the publication of ethnic groups in West Kalimantan in 2000 presented the Kendayan, Darat and Pesaguan Dayak ethnic groups as the fourth, sixth and eighth largest ethnic groups (BPS, 2001a), and these numbers were lower than that of the ethnic Javanese migrants who were reported as the third largest in the province. But, when combined, the Dayak groups together formed the largest ethnic group in West Kalimantan. This percentage could actually have been larger if all other sub-groups of Dayak in addition to these three named had been combined. In fact, the same caveat of the 2000 publication on ethnic groups was applied to other ethnic groups with a number of sub-groups such as the Malays, Batak, Javanese and Sundanese, amongst others. The 2000 data opened up new opportunities to study and understand ethnicity in Indonesia.

The unhappiness of the Dayak over their statistics has been wisely managed. Their objections brought about a valuable lesson to help improve the publication on ethnic composition in the latest 2010 population census.

As with the 2000 population census, the BPS also published the data on ethnicity, shown on “Tabel Jenis Suku Bangsa Indonesia/Table of Ethnic Groups in Indonesia” (BPS, 2011a). It is what we call the “Initial Classification” of ethnic categories based on the 2010 census. All ethnic response categories were aggregated into thirty-one smaller groups (BPS 2011a). Amongst these, some categories have been put in a group. An example is “Ethnic Groups from East Nusa Tenggara”, which lumps all ethnic groups in the Province of East Nusa Tenggara into one group, whereas in fact the province has many distinctive ethnic groups. Due to this grouping, the ethnic composition in the Province of East Nusa Tenggara only differentiates the population amongst ethnic migrants and “local ethnic groups”. The local multi-ethnicity was hidden under the group of “Ethnic Groups from East Nusa Tenggara”.

Moreover, the Initial Classification has many other issues that need to be improved to make the statistics on ethnicity more meaningful and accessible
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at the regional level. Therefore, a revision of the Initial Classification is needed to enrich our understanding of ethnicity in Indonesia and anticipate the rising ethnic politics in this period of decentralization in Indonesia.

Therefore, we need the New Classification to achieve a more comprehensive and accurate delineation of ethnic groups in Indonesia.

TWO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATISTICS IN INDONESIA

The first recommendation is on the coding of ethnic categories. The study in this book has reclassified the 1,331 coded categories into more than six hundred ethnic groups in the New Classification as presented in Appendix 1. The classification was created from a combination of a thorough examination of statistics on ethnicity collected by the BPS, literature review and local expertise. Importantly, the classification does not change the original coded raw data set at all, preserving the freedom for other users to work with alternative classifications. This work is possible because the BPS has minimized its effort to group the ethnic categories found from the field.

However, during the coding, the BPS combined several categories into one coded category. Examples are two complicated cases of Ayfat versus Arfak (both with origins in Papua) and Toraja versus Kaili (both with origins in Sulawesi). Ayfat and Arfak are actually two different ethnic groups that have been wrongly lumped under one category. Similarly, Toraja and Kaili are two separate ethnic groups, but both come under the same code. Consequently, we cannot separate the number of population of the Ayfat from the Arfak or the Toraja from the Kaili.

Therefore, the BPS is recommended to continue collecting ethnic categories without trying to amalgamate the existing categories. Moreover, they should envision revising and disaggregating them to make more opportunities to classify them.

The BPS expands users’ freedom by not making any grouping of ethnic categories at all and letting the researchers make their own groupings. The freedom given to researchers will make the subsequent data much more meaningful.

The second recommendation is on future data collection. As there will be more interaction of peoples from different backgrounds, there will be an increasing number of people who may identify themselves with more than
one ethnic group. Consequently, future data collection on ethnicity should allow a respondent to mention more than one ethnic group. Furthermore, the censuses/surveys should also put “Indonesian” as one of the options to answer the question on ethnicity. The term “Indonesian” provides an answer for those who are “confused” about their ethnic identities.

In the current question on religion, one of the options to answer is “others”. Nevertheless, there is no information what “others” means. Future censuses/surveys should record what “others” means. It is perhaps a local religion, another world religion or no religion at all. As a democratizing country, Indonesia should not be afraid to know the truth about religions in Indonesia, although Indonesia officially only recognizes six distinct religions.

If social science is to deal effectively with the actual beliefs and behaviours of citizens, future censuses/surveys will need to include more specific questions on belief, including more detailed codes on the *aliran* (sect) and the rich variety of animistic, spiritualistic and sectarian groups found across Indonesia. The respondent should be encouraged to record whatever *aliran* he/she believes in, whether as a manifestation of an “official religion” or an expression of spirituality irrespective of deity. The availability of such information will enrich our understanding of the spread of religious persuasions in Indonesia, although it also means another big challenge for demographers and other social scientists to classify religions and their *aliran*.

These two lessons will also be beneficial for whoever collects and codes information on ethnicity in Indonesia.

**A MAJOR AND SIGNIFICANT ETHNO-DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY IN INDONESIA**

This book is expected to make a major and important contribution to ethno-demography (demography on ethnicity) in Indonesia, mostly based on the raw data of the 2010 population census. The information provided in this book is crucial and up to date and is not available elsewhere. Therefore, the statistics produced and presented in this book can be an important reference for whoever needs information on demography, ethnicity, religion or languages in Indonesia.

This work on ethno-demography is also aimed at enriching anthropological and sociological studies on ethnicity in Indonesia. All future
analyses on Indonesia’s ethnicity, both quantitative and qualitative, can further improve the quality of ethno-demographic studies of Indonesia.

Finally, the BPS should continue conducting its population census with 100 per cent enumeration, as it will provide a much more accurate set of statistics on Indonesia’s population, particularly at lower administrative levels, such as the district. Information on ethnicity, along with religion and language, should continue to be collected in the population censuses/surveys, as Indonesia is already in the process of the third demographic transition — a process towards a rapid change in ethnic composition of population, especially at sub-national levels. Yet, we still need to further improve the questionnaire and coding, as recommended earlier.

Notes

1. Espenshade, Guzman and Westoff (2003) argued that the replacement level of fertility cannot be assumed to always occur when the TFR equals to 2.1. Their study found that the replacement level of fertility ranges from as low as 2.05 for Réunion to as high as 3.43 in Sierra Leone. The range is also different between developed and developing countries, where in developed countries the replacement level of fertility ranges between 1.4 and 2.1; and in developing countries, the rates are higher than 2.2 but below 3.5.

2. Therefore, the coverage of the data is different from that of the IPUMS’s data collection. The IPUMS has a collection of micro-data of a series of population censuses from many countries, but the data is only a subset with a 10 per cent sample from the original data.

3. A detailed discussion on Indonesia’s mega-demographic trends is available in Arifin and Ananta (2013).

4. See discussion on this issue in Skinner (1963) and Suryadinata (2005).

5. The 1961 population census was the first census after Indonesian independence (1949). It collected information on religion, with the following options to answer the question: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and other Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, Confucianism and Others (including those with no religion). Yet the statistics on religion were not published for the public until 1971. Before the 2010 population census, there were only five official religions, as is later discussed in Chapter 7.