would reduce the time they need for catching up economically with other countries by fifty to seventy-five years on average. According to Jianping Zhang and Duojiong Zha (Chapter 5), energy market integration between China and ASEAN should focus on electricity trade, power plant construction and the operation of plants and grids. This would require trade facilitation, infrastructure development and large-scale finance. However, Tilak K. Doshi and Neil Sebastian D’Souza (Chapter 6) argue that Asia does not need regional integration to tackle the “Asian premium” — an extra charge that Asian countries allegedly pay for their Middle Eastern oil imports. Their investigation revealed that the premium did not actually exist during 2007 to 2009.

Using a computable general equilibrium model, Satoshi Kojima and Anindya Bhattacharya (Chapter 7) argue that the removal of energy subsidies could reduce energy demand and output. Despite this, the net economic effect would be positive, as resources can be reallocated to other sectors. In his analysis of gas market integration (Chapter 8), Yanrui Wu finds deep regional differences in gas usage, trade and reform of institutional structures — all of which impede regional integration. Using simulations of competitive gas markets, Youngho Chang and Yanfei Li (Chapter 9) add that, in the future, more of Asia’s gas supply should come from regional sources such as Myanmar and Russia, in order to reduce transport costs. Asia’s new pipeline and LNG natural gas infrastructure, which is set to become operational by 2020, would produce welfare gains and diversify supplies.

Although the chapters of this volume — authored mostly by economists — could better engage with literature from other related disciplines, it contains remarkable insights that others will benefit from, especially with respect to its framework and rich findings.

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Teresita Cruz-del Rosario scrupulously analyses development policy from the perspective of “the state and the advocate” via seven interesting case studies across Asia. She defines the “advocate” as “non-state actors, coalitions of actors and advocates who seek to influence public policy” (pp. 5–6). Rosario argues that the developmental role of the state remains central in public policy formulation and implementation, while “in an age of expanded citizen participation and access to technology, policy-making has likewise moved beyond the confines of the state alone” (p. 5). The theme of the book, therefore, is about the state and the advocate facilitating developmental policy. Her comprehensive case studies include both positive and negative examples: hydropower development in Laos; agrarian reform and the commercial log ban in the Philippines; Chinese developmental aid in Asia; economic cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS); social insurance for foreign domestic workers in Sri Lanka; and Myanmar’s well-known economic transformation. Rosario portrays the complexity of development policy coalitions in Asia, touching on the fundamental issues of the developmental state, policy coalition and regionalism for Asian countries — mechanisms aimed at providing inclusive development.

Assessing state capability in Asia is a complex task because of the debate about the merits and demerits of authoritarian power. While a strong state is capable of both promoting and impeding development, a weak state might find it difficult to effectively implement development policies, and might also be manipulated by internal or external political forces. Thus, good governance requires both good policies and effective implementation. Conflicting examples of developmental states in Asia — authoritarian, democratic and hybrid
— further confuse our vision, let alone their long-questioned replicability. An effective state is not necessarily authoritarian, although authoritarianism could indeed streamline processes in developmental states. The dominant role of the state in economic development, as in China’s case, is a key feature of the developmental state. More crucially, a developmental state capable of cooperating with the advocate might eventually accelerate democratic transformation. Yet, as Rosario states, the “democratic developmental state is at best an ideal vision that is difficult to achieve” (p. 252) at present. Instead, civil society organizations can practise effective policy coalition by constantly cooperating with the developmental state and its power actors at all levels, as in Rosario’s case study of Laos. The core of political transition is about adjusting the power balance between emergent and dominant interest groups. Using the cases of the Philippines, Laos and Myanmar, Rosario emphasizes the importance of timing and the ability of the advocates in widening political opportunities.

The case studies of the Philippines are particularly interesting because the advocate’s “failure” to cooperate with existing political power structures nurtured a “pluralistic culture” — a situation arguably better for future policy coalitions. Conversely, Laos’ hydropower project and Myanmar’s ongoing transformation are instances of successful policy coalitions that failed to make political structures more open and transparent. However, although cooperation with international power actors — including international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the media — could “cushion the harsh effects of repression and serve to provide spaces” (pp. 255–56) in the Laos and Myanmar cases, their involvement is controversial. This is because the “universal values” and “institutional panaceas” that follow these international actors do not always facilitate economic development or serve the common interests of the people.

China’s rise and the 2008–09 global financial crisis have hastened a new round of debate about the developmental state. Neoliberals have claimed that the developmental state has withered, however, it has merely transformed into a more sophisticated capital and markets — what has been described as the “post-Washington consensus” (Stiglitz 2008). Therefore, unlike what the neoliberal view might claim, analysing China’s developmental state is not outdated; Rosario’s book provides a solid argument for the existence of such a developmental state in Asia. She also analyses China’s use of economic investments to strengthen bilateral relations across the region, especially its growing development assistance and investments abroad.

Rosario’s careful analysis of case studies at different stages of development provides an overarching understanding of development policy coalitions. The book’s greatest contribution is to string these distinct cases together, to illustrate both the positive and negative experiences of striving for inclusive development in an Asian context. However, strong external influences from international NGOs, the media and major countries like the United States, Japan and India — either via international cooperation, investments or aid — are too significant to overlook. For instance, the book neglects the role of Japan’s Nippon Foundation in providing large aid support to ethnic groups in Myanmar to facilitate democratization. As was mentioned before, it is also difficult to judge whether all this help is good for the local community and for “harmonious democratization” as claimed, because the developmental goals of international organizations are not necessarily suited to local conditions. Despite these oversights, The State and the Advocate offers a vivid account of Asia’s experiences with political coalitions for public policy researchers and students.

REFERENCE


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