Section I

The 2006 Military Coup: Impact on the Thai Political Landscape
In the evening of 19 September 2006, the military staged the eighteenth coup since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, overthrowing the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. Although Thailand adopted a democratic model of governance to replace the ancien régime, the military has impossibly dominated the Thai political space throughout the past eighty years. It has worked intimately with the monarchy in cultivating a particular kind of politics whereby civilian governments are kept vulnerable, or face the possibility of being toppled should they pose a menace to the power position of the traditional elite. Under these conditions, coups were therefore not uncommon, especially as a tool to undermine a strong civilian government. The military’s political intervention has become part of Thai political culture. Often, there have been attempts on the part of the military to legitimize the coups as a moral instrument in the riddance of immoral civilian regimes. From 2001 to 2006, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra enjoyed electoral popularity, and thus managed to firmly consolidate his grip on power. He won two landslide elections,
in 2001 and 2005, becoming the only prime minister who had ever served a full four-year term in Thai history. But his intensifying political strength gravely worried the traditional elite. They perceived him as a threat to their long-held political influence. With political interests in jeopardy, and in exercising the old trick, the traditional elite removed the Thaksin regime with the bluntest of tools; a military coup. They accused Thaksin of displaying disrespect for the King and committing corruption, among other things. These accusations served to justify the unlawful coup as a necessity to punish the fraudulent government of Thaksin. A large number of middle-class Bangkok residents came out to lend their support for the coup; they were seen offering food and flowers to Thai soldiers who seized power on that ill-fated night. Tanks which rolled onto the streets were decorated with yellow ribbons — the colour that represents the Thai monarchy. A sense of jubilation was felt in the Thai capital, a rather strange sentiment in a country known as the “Land of the Free”.

But as it turned out, this time, the effects of the coup were different. The coup that was meant to protect the political interests of the military and to safeguard the royal prerogatives gave birth to an anti-establishment movement whose members identify themselves in red shirts. That coup, initially staged to solidify the monarchy’s position in politics, also stirred up an anti-monarchy reaction among many Thais. They became aware of the extent to which the monarchy had long been actively involved in politics, with the backing of the army, despite its confined role under the constitution. While other studies tend to concentrate on Thaksin’s authoritarian behaviour and his corrupt policies as the root causes of the Thai crisis, this book, based on the above context, argues that the Thai establishment, which comprises of the monarchy, the military, the judges and their defenders, has played a large part in instigating and deepening the political conflict and that blaming Thaksin alone would be immeasurably misleading. Not just Thaksin, but the Thai monarch is an equally divisive figure. More importantly, the royal institution itself has increasingly become estranged with the ongoing democratization. In fact, it has acted as an obstacle to the country’s democratic development. As political scientist Thitinan Pongsudhirak succinctly said, “In Thailand, there is more monarchy among the democrats than there is democracy among the monarchists.” Such a statement suggested a stark incompatibility between the royal and the democratic institutions. The military, in the meantime, has continued to take advantage from the crisis it created, and at times
exploit the monarchy, in order to ensure its position in politics, with the support of the royalists. The ongoing southern crisis and the Thai conflict with Cambodia have provided the military a much-needed legitimacy for its continued domination of security policy which has been greatly independent from that of a series of Thaksin-backed governments.

But first, it is imperative to briefly discuss the nature of Thai politics over the past years. Duncan McCargo argued that the best way to understand Thai politics was to look at it through political networks. And the most influential network has been the network monarchy with King Bhumibol Adulyadej situating on top of the political structure. The real driving force behind the network monarchy however, is not the King. It has been General Prem Tinsulanonda, former prime minister and now President of the Privy Council. Thus, the King is not the only component of the network monarchy; it includes various actors within the Thai establishment. Network monarchy has functioned both as a powerful interest group as well as a separate political entity outside the parliamentary system. Despite having no position within the formal political system, network monarchy has effectively controlled the fate of Thai politics because of the intimate association it has with the King and the support from the army. Network monarchy was actively in operation throughout critical periods in Thai history, ranging from the Cold War when the threat of communism was imminent to the post-Cold War era during which the diminishing role of the military in domestic and foreign policies and the expansion of the middle class began to contest the monopoly of power in the hands of the traditional elite. Thus, as Thaksin strolled to the premiership in 2001 with overwhelming confidence and an indisputable electoral triumph, he threatened to recast the old political equation long dominated by the network monarchy. The result of this was the 2006 military coup. In this book, it adopts McCargo’s concept to explain the interconnection between members of the Thai establishment subsumed within this network monarchy and their need to maintain their power position even when their behaviour has severely deepened the political crisis.

Perceiving that Thaksin was scheming to construct his own network with mass support made possible by his populist policies, self-proclaimed royalists, in the name of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), embarked on a plot to overthrow Thaksin in 2005 by creating a situation of ungovernability so as to invite the military to intervene in politics. The PAD employed royal symbols as part of its campaign, successfully
polarizing society by cooperating with the network monarchy to attack political enemies. It erected a protective wall against Thaksin encapsulated within the notion of the King as the ultimate moral ruler of the country. Slogans propagated by the PAD like “Fight for the King” and “Loyalty to the Chakri Party” (Chakri is the name of the current dynasty) signified the network monarchy’s consent to the removal of Thaksin from power by extra-constitutional means. There are at least three incidents that indicate the continued active involvement in Thai politics of the country’s monarchy: the coup-makers’ meeting with the King on the night of the coup — apparently to seek the royal approval of the coup; the Queen’s attendance at a funeral of a yellow-shirt member, Angkhana “Nong Bo” Radappanyawut, in October 2008, and; the exclusive interview of Princess Chulabhorn with Woody Milintachinda, a talk-show host, in April 2011 in which she openly condemned the red shirts for the deepening crisis which greatly affected the health of the King. Such open intervention in politics suggested a sense of desperation among people close to the monarchy. But such practices of indiscreet political intervention went against the usual modus operandi of the network monarchy, that of operating mostly behind the scenes. And this surely was responsible for the rise of anti-monarchy sentiment and as a result the rapid decline of the royal reverence which had been carefully built up over past decades.

Instead of stepping back from politics to re-establish their authority, the network monarchy and its defenders have chosen to further permeate themselves into the political mess in response to the continued challenges from their opponents. This was particularly evident after Samak Sundaravej, a Thaksin crony, won the election in December 2007 replacing the military regime of General Surayud Chulanont. Just when the traditional elite thought that they had eliminated Thaksin and his political stooges by a military coup, they were proven wrong. The premiership of Samak tremendously irritated the royalists and the supporters of the network monarchy. They sought to discredit Samak and his successor Somchai Wongsawat, also Thaksin’s brother-in-law, by creating a conflict with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple, as well as using the Thai court to end their premiership. In the case of Samak, the dispute with Cambodia failed to destabilize his government. But in the end, Samak was forced to step down by the Constitutional Court which considered his appearance on the television as a celebrity chef while serving as prime minister as a case of conflict of interest. Next, to oust Somchai, the PAD seized Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang Airports in late November 2008, virtually
closing down Thailand from the outside world for about a week. At the occupied airports, the PAD members held the portraits of the King and Queen while shouting, “Somchai, Get Out!” Shortly after that, Somchai had to resign at the order of the Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of the executive members of his People’s Power Party (PPP) committed electoral fraud.

Meanwhile, hyper-royalism had taken root and it proliferated into other social units, including in the entertainment industry. Just three days before the deadly crackdown on the red-shirt protesters at Rachaprasong intersection, famous actor Pongpat Wachirabanchong, upon collecting his best actor accolade at the Nataraja awards on 16 May 2010, delivered his acceptance. It was perceived to be the fiercest defence of the monarchy in public and reflected the general attempt to initiate a new discourse of Thailand as an exclusive place for monarchists. He said,

This is an award I received for playing a father role. I would like to seek your permission now to talk about our father (the King of Thailand) briefly. A father is a pillar to a house (which he meant “Thailand”). My house is very big. We have many people living together. Since I was born, this house was very beautiful and homely. For it to be like this, the ancestors of our father lost sweat and blood and sacrificed their lives to be able to build this house. Up to this point, this father is still working tirelessly to look after this house and to care for the happiness of anyone under this roof. If someone is angry at another, whoever, and then passed that anger down to our father, hate our father, insult our father, and have thoughts about chasing our father out of this house, I would have to walk up to that person and say, if you hate our father, and do not love our father anymore, you should leave, because this is our father’s house, because this is our father’s kingdom. I love our King. I believe that everyone here loves our King too. We are the same colour. This crown on my head I bestow for the King. Thank you.³

Such a discourse of the country being an exclusive place for monarchists has become popular and authoritative, being repeatedly referred to by defenders of the network monarchy to justify their actions and policies against their opponents, even when those actions and policies are incompatible with democratic principles. At the height of the campaign to amend the draconian _lèse-majesté_ law by a group of young law professors — Nitirat — at Thammasat University, Army Chief General Prayuth Chanocha, a confidant of the Queen, harshly condemned the young professors and asked them to “leave Thailand” because every Thai was
supposed to love the King. Prayuth also said, “Will Nitirat be tolerable if their parents were insulted by others?”

The social alienation of those with different political opinions and attitudes has indeed pulled the King from his subjects and intensified a sense of resentment which now represents a source of anti-monarchy sentiment in Thailand. Seven years after the coup, the debate over whether the monarchy should readjust itself for the sake of its own survival in a new climate of political openness has become more vigorous as well as divisive. Some hyper-royalists never hide their aspiration to take Thailand back to the old days under absolute monarchy, as Sondhi Limthongkul, a core PAD leader, famously said, “Let’s return power to the King. His Majesty is a Dhammaraja King. This is the only way we can prevent Thailand from falling into becoming a failed state.”

But in another reality in rural areas, most residents who lent their support to both Thaksin and the red shirts explicitly detest the political involvement of the network monarchy. Many removed the portraits of the King and Queen which once adorned the walls in many households. It seems that monarchists are the ones who breed anti-monarchists.

Unfortunately, there are no signs of the network monarchy’s willingness to negotiate with democracy. To counter growing critical views of the monarchy, powerful royalists have exploited the lèse-majesté law as a direct weapon. Lèse-majesté, or the crime of injury to royalty, is defined by Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, which states that defamatory, insulting or threatening comments about the King, Queen, Heir-Apparent and Regent are punishable by three to fifteen years in prison. Charges against Thais are usually grave and the investigation and prosecution process is by nature opaque. With King Bhumibol’s frail health signalling the autumn of his reign, the royalists have launched an ever more aggressive campaign against critics of the monarchy. Prosecution has become more pervasive, virtually against anyone. The manipulation of the lèse-majesté law has severely impacted the human rights cause. In retrospect, cases of lèse-majesté have multiplied since the last coup. In 2005, 33 charges came before the Court of First Instance, which later handed down 18 decisions in these cases. By 2007, the number of charges increased almost fourfold to 126. This number jumped to 164 in 2009, and then tripled to 478 cases in 2010. The most dramatic increases occurred under the Democrat Party-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, which adopted a royalist line strongly backed by the military. Under the current Yingluck Shinawatra government, the cases going to the court have gone up slightly, but they may have been
initiated during the last government. The number of recent high-profile cases underscores the misuse of lèse-majesté law in the name of defending the monarchy and the display of loyalty of the government for the royal institution. The arrest of a sixty-two-year-old Thai-Chinese man, Amphon Tangnoppakul, also known as Akong (or grandfather) who was sentenced to twenty years in prison, shocked Thai society. He allegedly sent four text messages insulting the Queen. Amphon always maintained his innocence. He died in prison of terminal cancer on 8 May 2012 after several requests for bail were turned down before being sentenced by the Thai court.

Joe Gordon, or Lerpong Wichaikhammat, a Thai-born American, was jailed for two-and-a-half years in Thailand after posting online excerpts from a banned book, The King Never Smiles authored by Paul Handley, while living in the United States. The U.S. government criticized the lèse-majesté law, but was taken aback by the response of Thai hyper-royalists, who called for the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador to Bangkok. More staggering, Abhinya Sawatvarakorn, nicknamed Kantoop, or “Joss Stick”, a nineteen-year-old student at Thammasat University, could be charged with a lèse-majesté violation over comments she made on Facebook years ago. Kantoop was accused of committing lèse-majesté in April 2009 while she was still in high school. She would be one of the youngest ever to be charged under the law, and has already undergone a catalog of social punishments. For example, she was reportedly refused admission into Silpakorn University, where some professors painted her as an anti-monarchist. She also had a shoe thrown at her by a student at the esteemed Thammasat University, where she currently studies, and has been forced to change her name to avoid being recognized — and possibly attacked. Also, the case against Chiranuch Premchaiporn, director of the on-line newspaper Prachatai.com on the grounds that she allowed Web-board comments with lèse-majesté content, is still pending. Chiranuch was among three female journalists who won the 2011 Courage in Journalism Award given by the International Women’s Media Foundation. At the same time as the arrests have continued, the glorification of King Bhumibol has been religiously carried out by royalists as a way of legitimizing the overpowering royal influence on politics and demoralizing the anti-monarchy elements.

The 2006 coup that was staged amid joy among many Bangkok residents — some even calling it a “good coup” — has turned out to be disastrous to the position of key members of the network monarchy, including the King and the military. More devastatingly, it has caused a tremendous impact on
the country’s democratization process which has to be slowed down owing to the continuing face-offs between the pro-monarchy and pro-democracy groups as well as between those who support the shift of the political order and those who prefer to conserve the status quo. The coup has revealed the ugly reality in Thai politics in which the long domination of power in the hands of the traditional elite using illegitimate tools to eliminate successive elected governments has refused to subside. As members of society have become more conscious about the unfair distribution of power, they have begun to fight back to defend their rights and more importantly the spirit of democracy. As the monarchy has defended its political territory, the military has worked indefatigably in tandem to maintain its footprint in politics. The consistent interference in policy by the current army chief is testimony of the typical attitude that prevails among top royalist generals; they have sought to exploit the monarchy in order to sustain their own political advantages. This explains why the military always claims that it is in its duty to protect the monarchy just as it is protecting Thailand’s national security. Yet, the direct political involvement of the military has greatly alleviated the professionalism and the corporateness of the army. But military-monarchy relations can sometime be volatile. This is because the network monarchy possesses its own particular clients in the army. Accordingly, it has caused disintegration within the military. The case of the “watermelon soldiers” — green only on the uniform but red at heart — indicates serious disunity of the army. The last coup partly brought about this split; some of the soldiers came from the poorest regions in Thailand where the elite’s control of power did not benefit them and their families. My own conversations with a number of military officers confirmed that not all soldiers are fond of the monarchy.

So, what did the 2006 coup tell us? It tells us that the crux of the Thai crisis is far more severe and much wider in scope than we previously thought. The network monarchy is surely not the victim in the protracted political conflict. Rather, it represents both a root cause and a factor that has made the political situation more fragile. The coup has instigated more unjust uses of the lèse-majesté law, and in the process, led to more political prisoners. This unswervingly worsened the human rights condition in the kingdom. With the looming end of the current reign, more questions are being asked, including those about the future of Thailand without the supposedly benevolent King, the competency and legitimacy of his successor, the survival of the monarchy as an institution, and the future role
of the military. It might be seen as a harrowing close of the Bhumibol reign — for the King to witness the waning royal institution — the institution that he had constructed throughout his lifetime by working personally with a series of despotic regimes and corrupt Western governments. The coup has also shredded the military into pieces, turning generals into desperate royalists who continue to live on the monarchical institution and political crises, as seen in the case of the conflict in the restive south, in order to survive. Moreover, the coup produced a unique phenomenon in Thailand, the so-called “colour-coded politics”. The emergence of the yellow- and red-shirt movements has certainly complicated the Thai crisis. It unveiled another aspect of Thai politics in which non-state actors came to influence and manipulate the political process on a larger scale. The PAD and its yellow-shirt supporters transformed themselves into hyper-royalists and extreme nationalists. Domestically, they expressed their nostalgia for the absolute monarchy. Externally, they demanded a war with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear conflict not only to discredit the Thaksin faction (because of Thaksin’s cosy ties with the Cambodian leadership) but also to prove that they were more Thai than their nemeses. On the other hand, the coming to the scene of the red shirts is not unexpected. As emphasized earlier, not all members of the red-shirt movement are supporters of Thaksin. Many of them are simply pro-democracy. But the fact that there remains an inexorable association between the red shirts and Thaksin and the outstanding allegation against them over the arson attack (against the Central World Department Store in Bangkok supposedly in response to the state’s brutal crackdown in May 2010) has become their inevitable stigma. Briefly put, the red shirts have been held hostage by Thaksin and the conflict he has with the traditional elite. This pro-Thaksin image has been lumped together with another image of being an anti-monarchy movement. Thus, there is a limit on what the red shirts can do without being accused by their opponents and misjudged by the society.

Thailand has suffered from a legitimacy crisis which was first ignited by the 2006 military coup. I am proud of this collection of essays by leading experts in Thai studies who contributed their views on the effects of the coup on Thailand’s political landscape. This volume is a product of an international conference titled “Five Years after the Military Coup: Thailand’s Political Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall”, organized by Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), on 19 September 2011, marking exactly the fifth commemoration of the
The 2006 coup. I am grateful for the unfailing support for this project of Ambassador K. Kesavapany, then director of ISEAS. The conference was well received by the Singaporean public, international media, as well as participants from different countries mostly in the Southeast Asian region. The primary aim of the conference was to discuss the lessons learnt, and not learnt, from the coup, to explore Thai political developments, the role of the key players — the military, the monarchy, the yellow shirts, the red shirts — and to investigate issues that generated the legitimacy crises in Thailand, including the southern conflict and Thai-Cambodian relations. The conference highlighted the dramatic state of Thai politics which was both ironic and brutal. Undoubtedly, Thailand has produced the longest-running soap opera in the whole of Southeast Asia. The Thai crisis has offered all sorts of incredible, and somewhat disturbing, tales, ranging from deadly crackdowns, plotted assassinations, war with a neighbour, irredentism and separatism, rainbow politics, foreign leaders evacuating via a hotel’s roof, international airport occupations, House of Government intrusions, two prime ministers being removed through judicial coups, a former prime minister becoming a fugitive, more people being arrested for lèse-majesté, thousands of websites being closed down, an army chief acting as if he was a prime minister — and then, issues related to the monarchy — the anxiety over the succession, the anti-monarchy movement, the political domination of the Privy Council, the self-politicization of the monarchy to the many dark secrets within the royal family.

This book is divided into four sections: first, lessons learnt from the coup; second, defending the old political consensus: the military and monarchy; third, new political discourse and the emergence of the yellows and reds, and; fourth, crises of legitimacy — south of Thailand and Thai-Cambodian conflict. Apart from this introductory chapter, Federico Ferrara summarized key political developments in the post-coup period. In his opinion, the seven years since the coup have exposed the fatal flaws of Thailand’s “formal democracy with the King above the constitution”. The coup set in motion a series of events that plunged the country into unprecedented political instability and prolonged civil strife. The actions necessary for the removal of Thaksin and his proxies gave rise to a severe crisis of legitimacy marked by a hitherto unseen measure of resentment for the network monarchy that would have been unthinkable just seven years ago. Indeed, the political crisis that has gripped Thailand for the last seven years could be said to be the expression of the cleavage that has variously
defined political struggles since the days of the absolute monarchy — the conflict over whether sovereignty, or “constituent power”, rests with the people or the King. Chapters by James Ockey, Thongchai Winichakul and David Streckfuss deal with the role of the network monarchy in the Thai crisis. Ockey argues that the coup of 2006 was a part of the military yearning to consolidate the position of the network monarchy. But it also unveiled the struggle within the military to survive under a new political climate brought about by the Thaksin regime. When the military leadership is itself so politicized, the struggle within the military also becomes political. This struggle has partly driven violence within society in the post-coup period.

As for the role of the monarchy, the 2006 coup and its subsequent political crisis is the consequence of many deep holes into which Thailand has dug itself for many years before the coup. Instead of the institutionalization of a political system with less interference by the monarchy, royalist democracy has hindered such institutionalization of democracy and headed in the opposite direction, once again, for the purpose of defending the network monarchy. Royal democracy is an oxymoron that is unstable and essentially anti-democratic. Thongchai emphasized that the many achievements of King Bhumibol will not be transferable to the next monarch. And this will surely represent a major challenge for the network monarchy. Streckfuss’s chapter looks into the increasing cases of lèse-majesté. He discusses extensively the extent to which the rule of law in Thailand has been shattered within an entrenched culture of impunity; and in this, the lèse-majesté law has thrived as never before. As a surviving remnant of absolute monarchy and a living legacy of military dictatorship, lèse-majesté is an expression of “the state of the exception” under which the rule of law and democratic accountability has no role. In the current political context, lèse-majesté is a perfect, yet brutal, tool in undermining opponents of the network monarchy.

In the third section, two major themes are examined: the colour-coded politics and the emergence of the new middle-income peasant class. These are quintessential factors which either help empower or weaken the network monarchy. Michael Nelson argues that it is too soon to write an “obituary” for the yellow-shirt PAD. The group’s strength may have declined in the past year; but the Thai crisis has been portrayed as a crisis triggered by Thaksin. The fact that Thaksin is very much pulling the strings behind the scenes may allow the yellow shirts to return. The
societal infrastructure and its political culture out of which the PAD arose in interaction with their perception of the “Thaksin regime” are still there. They might well produce another round of political opposition — with or without the PAD — if their relationship with the Yingluck government seriously deteriorates. On the contrary, as Nick Nostitz reiterated, the red shirts, born out of the 2006 coup, have grown in strength. Now that Yingluck is in power, the government may help elevate the role and status of the reds to become a more important stakeholder in politics. But doubts have also grown whether the Yingluck government is really interested in promoting that role of the red shirts if this would further jeopardize its relations with the Thai establishment. Andrew Walker focuses mainly on the question of whether peasant politics in Thailand is civil. He then states that the answer is straightforward: no. Peasant politics in Thailand is not civil if it is judged by many of the established standards which define contemporary civil society, especially its institutionalization and relative autonomy from the state. Rather, Walker prefers to describe Thailand’s modern peasantry as being involved in an active political society in which the primary desire is to draw state power into local circuits of exchange by means of diverse, informal and pragmatic relationships. The 2006 coup attempted to negate the influence of this non-civil rural politics. It was a failed attempt because it was impossible to reverse the powerful economic, social and political developments that have been unfolding over the past fifty years. Such developments have long been denied by the Thai establishment which continues to portray the economy, society and politics as somewhat underdeveloped. In order to understand Thailand’s tumultuous politics over the past seven years, it is necessary to understand the politics of Thailand’s new peasantry.

The last two chapters discuss issues that led to the legitimacy crises in Thailand. In Marc Askew’s chapter, despite the adoption of a more politically correct rhetoric by the Surayud administration, the post-coup years saw more stringent security arrangements and increases in military force in the region, a spike in violence from 2006 to 2007, and a transfer of blame for continuing violence from Thaksin to the military and post-coup civilian governments. In the context of the rising civil conflict between anti- and pro-Thaksin forces during 2008–10, Askew elaborates that one simplistic explanation for persisting southern violence and lack of decisive progress has been based on the thesis of “government distraction”. A popular argument to explain the persistence of the violence over this
period of profound national conflict has been to claim that governments have been “distracted” from attending fully to the southern crisis. This would appear to be fallacious and too simplistic. Certainly, the increase of the military’s presence in the deep south after the 2006 coup does not necessarily mean the increase of legitimacy on the part of the Thai security forces. In fact, it has led to a question of legitimacy of the military regarding its inability to solve the conflict in the three southern provinces.

As for the last chapter, I as the author write that in the context of Thai-Cambodian relations, the military’s domination of foreign policy is not a new phenomenon. Clearly, the Thai army exploited the Cambodian border conflict to preserve its hegemony in Thai politics: it indicated an increasingly agonized state of Thai domestic politics from which the military refused to withdraw itself. Numerous clashes provided much-needed opportunity for the Thai military and its defenders within the network monarchy to take full control of foreign policy vis-à-vis Cambodia.

In this final paragraph, I would like to express my sincere thanks to all the contributors for their unfailing commitment. My thanks also go, once again, to Ambassador K. Kesavapany, then ISEAS Director, current director Ambassador Tan Chin Tiong, and the ISEAS Publications Unit for making this manuscript now a publication that will make a contribution to Thai studies, as well as to esteemed moderators (during the conference in September 2011) — Charnvit Kasetsiri, Michael Montesano and the late Pattana Kitiarsa. I wish to thank Nick Potts and Amy V.R. Lugg for editing the first draft of this manuscript. I am appreciative of the generous support from the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, at Kyoto University, which has allowed me to complete this book following my move from Singapore’s ISEAS to Kyoto. Finally, I take all the responsibility for any mistakes in this publication.

Notes

4. “Prayuth Yontham Nitirat Thondairuemai Thookkhondhawha Por Mae Pee
Yat Pee Nong” [Prayuth Asked Nitirat if They will be Okay if their Fathers, Mothers, Relatives, Brothers and Sisters were Insulted], Kloomsue Prachachon [Group of People’s Media], 6 February 2012 <http://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=18&ved=0CHUQFjAHoAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tfn5.info%2Fboard%2Findex.php%3Ftopic%3D34663.0&ei=nRSt-eZDKHPmAWu-qm7DA&usg=AFQjCNGiOuOyyyeWpHOKSyvjauwgs-EK5w> (accessed 11 May 2012).


7. Interview with a number of unnamed military officers, Nakhon Nayok, Thailand, December 2011.

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