lead to a relationship which would help modify the influence of the United States in both Asia and Europe. Some of the chapters are rather eloquent statements about the political views of a particular country; this is especially the case with the contribution by Zhao Gancheng, whose main point is that no amount of ASEM activity can be successful without taking into account the emergence of China as a world power with great regional impact even at the present time.

The quality of the contributions varies considerably. The section on politicians' views is a mere set of general considerations on the importance of ASEM and carries no real analytical value. In the more conceptual subsections, I found the following contributions to be quite worthwhile: “Getting Serious about Asia-Europe Security Cooperation”, by Dong-Ik Shin and Gerald Segal; “Developing the Business Relationship between Asia and Europe: Trends and Challenges”, by Tetsundo Iwakuni; and “The Future of the ASEM Process: Who, How, Why, and What”, by Jurgen Ruland. Ruland’s piece is the best of the lot and offers valid analysis of the question of who should be members of the process, how ASEM should function, and which objectives can reasonably be achieved. The statement on China’s view has already been mentioned. There are also useful “how to” chapters on the impact of the global information society and combating corruption.

As indicated, there are some real shortcomings in this volume, but some valuable contributions as well. The book therefore is best suited as a supplement to more detailed and analytical works on this important topic.

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This highly theoretical work seeks to examine the nature of global politics at the end of the century through an exposition of the nature of domestic and international coalitions. Essentially, Solingen divides the world into two arch-type coalitions: “internationalist” and “statist-
nationalist”. The proposition is that the latter are more prone to conflict with both fellow “nationalist coalitions” and “internationalist coalitions” alike. Ultimately, this book is a critique of neo-realism and Solingen seeks to show that “internationalism” has fundamentally altered the nature of relations between states. The strength of Solingen’s work is the detailed way in which the author is able to explain domestic sources of foreign policy, and the discussion of convergence between internationalism and democratic peace theory. While one might question the binary categorization of coalitions as conforming strictly to international or statist-nationalist strategies, this study does point to an important explanation of peaceful relations and conflict within international relations. However, all “coalitions” which oppose internationalism are inherently labelled as “statist-nationalist” and/or “confessional”, but there is no concession to socialist/dependency critiques of internationalism, which are inherently assumed by the author to be statist in practice. Solingen is at times quite sanguine about the dominance of internationalism in international relations, but recognizes that this process is not irreversible, with reservations expressed about internationalist coalitions’ ability to “distribute the spoils of reform”. However, no recommendations are forthcoming about how neo-classical economics may be ameliorated to rise above the narrowly defined self-interest that seems to concern the author.

This study concludes that while democracy has been a useful precursor to peace, it is important to realize that this coincides primarily with the industrialized world’s “zone of peace”. Even in the context of the developing world, the author points out, “internationalizers” have altered the nature of international relations for the better. The author’s qualifier is that internationalists with a democratic base are far stronger in terms of domestic political legitimacy than those with an authoritarian base. While both democracy and internationalism are viewed as concepts reinforcing the creation of a more stable world order, essentially “internationalizers” are credited with having greater influence. Economic liberalization is seen as the “engine of peacemaking”.

To contextualize the theoretical framework, the author uses three case studies, called “The Empirics”, which are the Southern Cone of South America, the Middle East, and the Korean peninsula. The strength of this survey is that it demonstrates the effect of domestic coalitions on foreign policy outcomes. These case studies further serve as a critique of neo-realism but may be guilty of putting up a straw-man argument. Did international relations in the Cold War era really “ignore the domestic prism” as is claimed? Solingen states that neo-realism cannot account for the absence of war in the Korean peninsula since the 1950s.
The author's assessment of the Korean peninsula may, however, be unduly optimistic, as this situation still represents one of the most potentially serious threats to world security. The absence of war since 1950 does not mean the absence of conflict on the peninsula. North Korea's "co-operation" can easily be explained in realist terms, namely, that North Korea's reluctant acquiescence to international rules and norms is the result of power politics.

Curiously, a short section on ASEAN (pp. 248-51) appears under the chapter heading "The Korean Peninsula". This section illustrates that for broad theoretical works, the devil is sometimes found in the detail. Solingen confuses ASEAN as an organization and ASEAN as a region, and unconsciously jumps between definitions. The failed ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) project is cited as evidence of economic integration! That ASEAN was primarily a diplomatic community, uninterested in economic integration until the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, seems to have escaped the author's attention, the export orientation of the member states of ASEAN notwithstanding. The author's conclusion that neorealism does not explain the emergence of ASEAN becomes questionable in this light. Even though ASEAN may have modified some foreign policy outcomes, it remains a vehicle that represents the self-interest of the member states.

In conclusion, the dyad presented in this volume is a somewhat useful way to understand the nature of international relations in the post-Cold War world. However, like Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis, it may be just one lens with which to view the world. Generalities inevitably invite exceptions that may not fit the rubric. Dividing the world into two arch-types is certainly one way of assessing international conflict among many other frameworks. An important question is: can the majority of states be strictly classified as being either "internationalist" or "statist"? Perhaps a continuum may better explain how states position themselves, rather than a dyad. In the final analysis, despite the difficulties of interpretation, particularly with some of the case studies, this remains a sophisticated theoretical interpretation of internationalism at the end of the century and seeks to bridge some gaps. Most usefully, it seeks to establish the linkages between democratic peace theory and internationalism.

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