PART I
Emerging Regional Security
“Architecture” has become the latest buzzword in Asian security politics. The staggering growth in regional multilateralism which began during the 1990s has given rise to a burgeoning scholarship employing this terminology. Policymakers too have embraced the architectural metaphor. Yet despite this ubiquitous usage, little effort seems to have been expended to define explicitly what “security architecture” actually means. As a consequence, various scholars and practitioners of Asian security have ended up employing one and the same descriptor, but often with reference to quite different forms, dimensions, and configurations of cooperative activity.

This chapter seeks to redress that shortcoming. It begins by reviewing the ways in which various scholars have employed “security architecture” and by highlighting the contradictions that their often imprecise applications have created. It also examines the differing manner in which the region’s incumbent “security architects” — the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — have constructed and utilized the term. The chapter then proposes a definition of “security architecture” that is sufficiently ecumenical to appeal to scholars and practitioners alike, while at the same time rigorous and nuanced enough to exhibit genuine conceptual substance and regional specificity. A concluding section discusses the benefits of employing this new definition. It is proposed that this new definition
will contribute to the advancement of knowledge by allowing scholars to communicate more effectively with one another; that it will help to bridge the gap between the so-called academic and policy worlds by facilitating meaningful dialogue between them; and, most importantly, that it will assist in establishing clear criteria for ascertaining what “security architecture” actually exists in the Asian region.

SCHOLARLY APPLICATIONS

The term “security architecture” grew in popularity during the early 1990s, largely as a result of the Cold War’s termination. The demise of the Soviet Union transformed global strategic politics, giving rise to the establishment of indigenous order-building initiatives in those two theatres which had been so central in the superpower stalemate — Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Perhaps due to the historical legacy of America’s role as what Hanns Maull terms the “master builder” of Western European security following the Second World War, the logic and applicability of the term “architecture” to post-Cold War Europe was apparent.¹ The concept was applied explicitly to early post-Cold War efforts to broaden existing European institutions (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the European Union [EU]) by co-opting new member countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and from Western Europe itself.²

The earliest attempts to apply the idea of “security architecture” to Asia were consistent with these European developments. In 1991, at the advent of the post-Cold War era, the-then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker wrote — on the pages of the prominent American journal *Foreign Affairs* — about an “emerging architecture for a Pacific Community”.³ Indeed, Baker’s article echoed the language he used in two earlier, oft-cited speeches outlining the George Bush Snr. administration’s vision for a new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic community.⁴ Leading scholars of Asian security have since readily embraced the term. Analysing security developments in East Asia since the ending of the Cold War, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, for instance, have contemplated how best to understand “security architecture” in this part of the world, while also considering what may be gleaned from the study of East Asia’s security architecture itself.⁵ Rosemary Foot has examined the contribution of the United Nations to Asia-Pacific “security architecture”.⁶ More recently, Amitav Acharya has written of “the emerging regional architecture of world politics”.⁷

The popularity of its usage notwithstanding, little effort seems to have been expended to defining explicitly what the term “security architecture” actually
means. Instead, there appears to exist at least several clusters of assumptions as to what the term connotes. None of these assumed understandings, however, hold up to closer scrutiny due to a series of common anomalies.

First, different pride of place is afforded to the economic and security dimensions of regional architecture. Some, for instance, refer to an overarching regional or institutional “architecture”, but do not clearly distinguish between its economic and security components. Others specify an overarching regional architecture, but see it as comprising two distinct economic and security “pillars” or “legs”. Yet another perspective views trade and security arrangements as distinct components of a broader Asian institutional architecture, but also considers the “strategic interaction” between them. Last, but not least, a number of analysts refer to the Asian security architecture as a separate and largely distinct construct.

Second, “security architecture” is often employed as one and the same term, but with reference to quite different “layers” or “levels” of collaborative security arrangements. As the preceding paragraph suggests, the term can be used in a broad sense, to describe the overarching architecture across an entire region. The question of where such boundaries can and should be drawn geographically, however, remains unclear. Some refer, for instance, to an “Asia-Pacific security architecture”, some to an “Asian security architecture”, whilst others refer to an “East Asian security architecture”. In many regards, this trend could be seen as reflecting the contested nature of the concept of Asia itself.

Compounding this problem, however, some scholars assume the existence of “architectures” within the overarching regional security architecture. David Shambaugh, for instance, suggests that “the U.S.-led [bilateral alliance] security system remains the predominant regional architecture across Asia”. Yet Shambaugh also goes on to refer to an emerging “multilateral architecture that is based on a series of increasingly shared norms (about interstate relations and security)” and suggests that regional security architecture can be likened to a “mosaic” comprising of “different layers that address different aspects of regional security”. Adding to the confusion, scholars seem unable to agree as to whether the architectural terminology should be employed in the plural or the singular sense. Highlighting this tension, Nick Bisley’s recent contribution to the National Bureau of Asian Research’s annual Strategic Asia series is entitled “Asian Security Architectures”, whilst Bisley refers to a “Asian Security Architecture” in the singular throughout the piece.

Finally, “security architecture” is also often used interchangeably with other terms. Some scholars, for instance, have used the term “architecture” interchangeably with that of “framework”. Maull employs the term
interchangeably with what he considers the more “appropriate” descriptor “security arrangements”. Along similar lines, while referring to the U.S.-led alliance “system” as “the predominant regional security architecture across Asia”, Shambaugh also depicts an Asia-Pacific security architecture that is embedded within an imprecisely defined Asian regional “system”. In so doing, he would appear to have blurred the distinction between the terms “architecture” and “system” to the point where they become almost indistinguishable.

THE PRACTICE OF REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

As with scholars of Asian security, ambiguity and imprecision is equally apparent when practitioners refer to regional security architecture. To demonstrate, this section of the chapter examines how the region’s two most established “security architects” — the United States and ASEAN — have presented and utilized the terminology. As will become apparent, the discrepancies which often emerge when these “security architects” invoke the metaphor is not simply a product of their competing architectural visions. Rather, the fact that they each continue to present such inconsistent depictions of regional “security architecture” also suggests that these discrepancies are but another manifestation of the lack of clarity surrounding the concept.

The first area of ambiguity relates to the question of what actually constitutes regional “security architecture?” In line with the structure that America erected during the 1950s — the so-called San Francisco System of bilateral alliances, named in honour of the city where it originated as part of the Japanese peace treaty — U.S. policymakers have been relatively steadfast in depicting this set of alliance relationships as forming the core of any regional “security architecture”. Alluding directly to the architectural metaphor, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for instance, recently described the U.S. alliance system as the “cornerstone” of peace and security in Asia. Consistent with this, Secretary of State Baker’s much earlier characterization of an “emerging architecture for a Pacific Community” depicts:

[a] fan spread wide, with its base in North America and radiating west across the Pacific. The central support is the U.S.-Japan alliance, the key connection for the security structure and the new Pacific partnership we are seeking. To the north, one spoke represents our alliance with the Republic of Korea. To the south, others extend to our treaty allies — the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries of the Philippines and Thailand. Further south a spoke extends to Australia — an important, staunch economic, political and security partner. Connecting these
spokes is the fabric of shared economic interests now given form by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process.19

Beyond the centrality assigned to this system, however, U.S. policymakers have offered very little else in terms of explicating the key components of regional “security architecture”. While Baker’s characterization demonstrates that Washington is clearly open to the possibility that multilateral institutions can also form part of such a structure, their role is overwhelmingly depicted as supplementary to America’s Asian alliances. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte more recently put it, “We recognize that the structures for peace and security are not as developed in Asia as they could become. We also realize that a multilateral structure that adds value to the diplomacy and security cooperation among the powers of the Asia-Pacific, including the United States, would be of great benefit to the region.”20

American enthusiasm for ad hoc multilateral processes — such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Six-Party Talks — as components of regional “security architecture” appears to have been greater. As Negroponte goes on to observe, “one idea to which we are giving serious thought is the potential to use the six-party talks, in particular the working group on Northeast Asian peace and security, as the beginning of a more lasting structure for peace and security in Northeast Asia…[T]hat might be the right time to elaborate this idea of a broader multilateral structure for security in Asia”.21 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill (who is also the chief U.S. negotiator at the Six-Party Talks) have also put forward this idea. Indeed, the so-called “Five-plus-five” group (another informal process comprising each of the six party members minus North Korea, but also including Australia, Canada, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the Philippines) which Secretary Rice attempted to convene in late September 2006 during an impasse in the Six-Party Talks may offer some initial insight as to what such a structure might ultimately look like.22

This American tendency to privilege alliances and more informal multilateral processes as key components of regional “security architecture” stands in stark contrast to the composite elements of such a structure as described by senior ASEAN officials. Their depictions typically afford pride of place to formal multilateral institutions — namely ASEAN-led processes such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). As Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong put it during his keynote address at the 2006 Shangri-La Dialogue “the changing economic patterns in East Asia will create a new regional architecture of cooperation…a new framework of regional cooperation that reflects the growing intra-regional
trade, investment and people linkages is emerging. One manifestation is the East Asia Summit”. This emphasis on formal institutions was also recently reflected in the Chairman’s statement from the 13th ASEAN Summit which applauded “relentless efforts to enhance peace and security in the region through active cooperation and consultations in forums such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Transnational Crime and ASEAN Regional Forum” and which noted “the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting’s aspiration to establish a robust, effective, open and inclusive regional security architecture, which would enhance regional peace and security”.24

Like scholars, however, policymakers have been unable to settle on precisely which geographic demarcation to employ when referring to regional “security architecture”. Unlike scholars, however, the central issue for practitioners in this second area of ambiguity is essentially a political one, and relates to the degree of inclusiveness and/or exclusivity which any such structure should permit. For geographical reasons which are largely self-evident, U.S. policymakers for example, have traditionally advocated an “open” and “inclusive” regional “security architecture” and have, therefore, preferred the broader “Asia-Pacific” designation. As a recent Congressional Research Service report addressing the subject of regional architecture puts it “the United States would like for Asian institutions to straddle the Pacific Ocean rather than stopping at the international date line in the Pacific”.25 Somewhat paradoxically, however, U.S. officials have increasingly taken towards referring to “Asian security architecture” — as reflected most prominently in the title of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s address to the June 2006 Shangri-La Dialogue.26 Despite emphasizing the importance of “inclusive, multinational institutions and activities” during the course of his speech, Rumsfeld’s reference to a distinctly “Asian” security architecture ran counter to America’s traditional trans-Pacific focus and thereby implicitly excluded the United States for reasons of geography.

Similar confusion is evident in the statements of senior ASEAN officials. As the aforementioned statement from the 13th ASEAN Summit makes clear, ASEAN officially supports a regional “security architecture” that is open and inclusive. In practice, however, intramural tensions persist in ASEAN over the question of whether this formula or a more narrowly conceived “East Asian security architecture” is preferable. This cleavage was most evident in the lead up to the inaugural East Asia Summit of December 2005, when Malaysia (along with China) advocated a more distinctive and exclusive “East Asian” arrangement, while its ASEAN partners, Indonesia and Singapore (along with Japan) reportedly pushed for a more open and inclusive grouping which
incorporated Australia, India, and New Zealand. \textsuperscript{27} Such tensions become apparent when ASEAN policymakers employ the architectural metaphor, such as when Singaporean Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong made the following remarks during a speech to the 2005 Asia Society conference:

How do we fold the US into the emerging East Asian architecture, just as we have melded India, Australia and New Zealand into the East Asia Summit? An East Asian architecture that does not have the US as one of its pillars would be an unstable structure. \textsuperscript{28}

A third area of uncertainty surrounding the use by practitioners of the term “security architecture” relates to the “purpose” or “function” of such a structure. U.S. policymakers, for instance, conceive of regional “security architecture” in highly material terms. Their judgements as to its utility and future viability are overwhelmingly centred upon the “outcomes” it is able to produce, particularly in the area of crisis management. The aforementioned Congressional Research Service report is indicative of this tendency. In its terms, “regional security meetings tend to be attended by foreign affairs ministers or their representatives rather than by defense chiefs, and they often result in ‘talk and photo-ops’ rather than in actual problem solving or confidence building”. The report then goes on to call for a political/security structure for Asia “that is less process-oriented (meetings) and more directed towards functions and achieving concrete results”. This is namely because Asia “still is rife with nationalism and power rivalries operating in a 20\textsuperscript{th} century fashion with interstate conflicts and territorial disputes flaring up on occasion”. \textsuperscript{29}

ASEAN officials, by contrast, tend to present regional “security architecture” more as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. From their perspective, the \textit{process} of building a “security architecture” is much more important than the tangible outcomes which any such structure might initially be expected to produce. This is because the sense of trust generated and the communal norms and understandings established by virtue of this process might eventually even negate the need for a formal “security architecture”. For this reason, ASEAN countries have tended to base their architectural-building efforts around so-called non-traditional security issues such as infectious disease, terrorism, transnational crime, and disaster relief/mitigation. This is not only because these kinds of trans-border challenges are increasingly pressing and potentially affect the region as a whole, but also because they tend not to raise the same level of sensitivity that more traditional security issues are apt to generate. In the words of a recent report produced under the
It would be easy to dismiss these disparities in the presentation and use of the term “security architecture” as a product of the competing “architectural visions” advanced by the region’s two most established “security architects”. Yet the fact that these disparities are evident within as well as between American and ASEAN policy circles makes this argument difficult to sustain. Such intra-mural differences are exposed most vividly in the statements of U.S. officials referring to the (supposed) regional security architecture’s current state of development. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for instance, suggests that the American alliance system has been the “cornerstone” of Asia’s security architecture “for more than a generation”.

Employing almost identical terminology, his counterpart Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte explicitly states that these alliances “have been for generations, and remain today, the cornerstone of peace and security in Asia”. By contrast, Gates’ predecessor, Secretary Rumsfeld, only one year earlier spoke of “Asia’s Emerging Security Architecture”, implying that such a structure had yet to materialize.

The disparities identified in the construction and utilization of the term “security architecture” — by both scholars and practitioners alike — are, therefore, more than mere reflections of competing architectural visions or blueprints. They are almost certainly also a product of the fact that so little effort seems to have been expended to define explicitly what the term “security architecture” actually means, thereby leading to its imprecise usage. Some might argue, of course, that it is precisely the flexibility offered by the concept of “security architecture” which has appealed to practitioners who, for political reasons, might regard it as advantageous to retain at least some definitional ambiguity surrounding the term. The persistence of ambiguity around such a central analytical concept is highly problematic from an intellectual perspective, however, given the importance of conceptual clarity to scholarly communication and the advancement of knowledge.

**DEFINING REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

In attempting to resolve this dilemma, the first component of our proposed definition relates to how the term is used. We contend that “security architecture” should only ever be employed in an overarching, macro-analytical sense. It should not, in other words, be used interchangeably with...
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other descriptors such as “institutions”, arrangements, “networks”, or even “systems”. Nor should these ever be referred to as “architectures” by themselves. Certainly such terms can be used to describe the various components which come together to comprise an overarching “security architecture”. However, our contention is that “architecture” should always be seen as presiding over these specific components conceptually. This, of course, should not prevent one from contemplating alternative security “architectures” — meaning competing architectural pathways or visions. However, once the “tipping point” is reached when one of those contending paths or visions prevails and is thereby implemented, we maintain that the term should thereafter only ever be used in the singular and never in the plural sense.

Second, our definition of “security architecture” requires that the term be used with reference to a clearly delineated and largely self-contained geographical area. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of extraregional powers contributing directly to the regional “security architecture” in question. In the European context, for instance, the United States plays an integral role in that region’s “security architecture” through its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this respect, the inclusive/exclusive dichotomy which scholars and practitioners so frequently utilize when invoking the architectural metaphor essentially misses the point. That said, we would argue that to speak of regional “security architecture” without referring to a particular geographical referent point also constitutes a misnomer. As Buzan and Waever put it “any coherent regionalist approach to security must start by drawing clear distinctions between what constitutes the regional level and what constitutes the levels on either side of it”. To do otherwise is akin to conceiving of a building without walls or other similar supporting structures to draw on the architectural metaphor.

Third, we propose that the term “security architecture” should only be used with reference to a coherent, unifying structure. Like the real-world practice of architecture itself — the art or science of designing and constructing buildings — we posit that “security architecture” should embody a sense of order and coherence. This aspect of our definition is partially concerned with how the various components of “security architecture” are arranged. For instance, an orderly collaborative structure which minimizes duplication and overlap — qualities which we would argue are central to any genuine “security architecture” — will not only exhibit greater elegance in design, but is also likely to be more efficient in practice. Absolutely central to this issue of performance, of course, is how the various components of the “security architecture” relate to one another. This latter dimension is particularly important because one of the defining features of any “security
architecture”, we would argue, lies in its capacity to produce synergistic effects. By this we refer to the interrelationships between the architecture's various components and their ability to produce desirable overall properties that would not naturally occur in the absence of that interaction. In other words, we see “security architecture” as being something much more than simply the sum of its parts.

Fourth, we propose that “security architecture” should be, or at the very least, should appear to be, the product of “intelligent design”. This requirement that “security architecture” be as (or as if) the result of a conscious act could be interpreted as rigidly implying a structure that is meticulously planned and the work of a single “master builder”. While our definition certainly accommodates such a potentiality, we also recognize that the process of architecture building is not always inherently neat and tidy. Our definition, therefore, leaves open the possibility that “security architecture” can emerge from the work of two or more competing architects. We also acknowledge that “security architecture” can evolve from disparate parts to become a coherent whole and that it can conceivably emerge as much by default as by “intelligent design”. That said, the aforementioned characteristics of order and coherence which our proposed definition also imposes requires that any emergent structure needs, at the very least, to appear as though it were the product of a conscious act in order to constitute “security architecture” in any genuine sense of the term.

Fifth, we also posit that the term “security architecture” should only be used with reference to a structure that embodies purpose in terms of addressing functional needs. The range of functions that “security architecture” might conceivably perform — including collective defence, collective security, crisis management, and the protection of members against non-military security challenges — is virtually limitless. Under the terms of our definition, it is possible that the composite elements of “security architecture” might interact in such a way that collectively and coherently contributes to only one of these overarching objectives. It is also foreseeable that a range of different functions may be assigned to various components of the architecture — a division of labour known as “functional differentiation”. Moreover, our definition does not overlook the possibility that the purpose and function of “security architecture” can evolve over time, both as a consequence of changing internal architectural preferences, or in response to significant shifts in the regional and/or global strategic environment. Nevertheless, we maintain that “security architecture” cannot exist simply for “security architecture’s” sake, and that the embodiment of purpose ought to be regarded as an indispensable feature of any structure to which the terminology is legitimately applied.
Sixth, although the purpose or function of “security architecture” ought to be security related, this does not mean that its various components need necessarily be limited to security mechanisms. This observation is especially pertinent to the Asian region, where understandings of security have tended to be comprehensive and where economic institutions are so often used for security ends. The APEC process, for example, is ostensibly a vehicle for trade facilitation, but began with an oblique security function — that of “enmeshing” and “tying down” the region’s great powers — and has taken on additional security functions as it has matured. Likewise, the second track Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), which was the progenitor of APEC, was designed to perform similar “socializing” functions that went well beyond the economic realm. Indeed, during the early 1990s PECC’s institutional model was directly transplanted onto the newly-established Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which arguably now stands as the region’s pre- eminent second track forum for security dialogue. Hence, while we maintain the value of referring to “security architecture” as a separate and largely distinct construct, the nature of the economics-security nexus in Asia is such that it makes little sense to conceive of any such structure as composing of discrete economic and security “pillars” or “legs”, nor does it seem viable to exclude economic processes from consideration in cases (such as APEC) where their core functions are evidently also security related.

Finally, it ought to be clear from the foregoing analysis that the term “security architecture” should not be used merely as a shorthand description for the totality of multilateral institutions and activities in any given region. To be sure, institutions are a necessary ingredient in any genuine “security architecture”. These are certainly in no short supply in this part of the world given the startling growth in Asian multilateral activity which has occurred since the beginning of the 1990s. Notwithstanding speculation that this burgeoning multilateralism forms the basis of a nascent or “emerging” security architecture, however, the definition which we propose suggests that “security architecture” is at once both something more and something less than the sum of this region’s security institutions. It is something less because of the requirements of order, coherence, structural unity, and “intelligent design” that our proposed definition imposes — it is, of course, virtually impossible for each of these features to be genuinely present in a structure comprising several hundred individual components. At the same time, however, the synergistic qualities and the embodiment of purpose and function that our definition also necessitates means that, both in material and in normative terms, a genuine “security architecture” must necessarily constitute much more than simply the sum of its parts.
Towards Asian Security Architecture?

Against those criteria, it cannot be said that authentic Asian “security architecture” currently exists. For a variety of reasons, nor can it be considered inevitable that it will necessarily materialize in the foreseeable future. First, definitions of what does or should constitute “region” in this part of the world remain fluid and highly contested. Efforts to circumvent this problem by referring to subregional “security architecture” — as has been suggested in the case of Northeast Asia — are unhelpful, in our view, given the high level of economic and strategic interdependence which is such a defining feature of security politics right across Asia. Likewise, although geographic location does not necessarily determine the capacity of a state to contribute to a region’s security architecture, we also regard the notion of an exclusive East Asian security architecture as highly problematic by virtue of the very deep engagement of a number of extra-regional players — namely the United States, Russia and, increasingly, India. Relaxing the definitional parameters still further to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region provides one obvious solution to this latter problem. However, this proposition in turn is likely to be highly unpalatable to China, particularly as its economic and strategic weight in Asia continues to increase. Quite where the boundaries are drawn around any future regional “security architecture”, therefore, remains to be seen. Unless and until this critical issue is resolved, however, we would argue that regional “security architecture”, in the true sense of the terminology, simply cannot exist.

Second, this problem of geographical delineation is likely to be compounded by the growing number of aspiring regional “security architects”. As the volume of regional security institutions and activities has grown, so too has the number of actors seeking to participate in shaping their design and future development. Since the late 1990s — flowing from its apparent embrace of multilateralism — China has played a leading role in the establishment of a number of high profile regional institutions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Boao Forum for Asia, and NEAT. India too has become an increasingly involved and accepted player in such leading mechanisms as the EAS and the SCO, and as a preferred political partner of ASEAN. As its economic and strategic weight continues to grow, India’s willingness and potential ability to further influence and shape the design of any emergent regional “security architecture” will also increase. ASEAN remains an established “security architect” and is now moving to embody its earlier (1976) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) into a more comprehensive ASEAN Charter that not only envisions how its
member states will shape their own intrastate relations, but also how they will condition outside powers to relate to them collectively. All of this stands in marked contrast to the Cold War period, during which time the United States was very much regarded as the “master builder” of whatever regional security architecture could be said to exist. Indeed, concerns are now rising in Washington that its once firm “architectural” monopoly in the region may be dissipating. In this increasingly crowded field, however, there can be no single successor to that mantle, rendering the establishment of any meaningful consensus amongst the region’s “security architects” — over such issues as architectural function and purpose — increasingly complex and potentially elusive.

Third, this proliferation of “security architects” has, in turn, exacerbated the problem of institutional “overcrowding” in the region. According to one recent estimate, more than 100 channels for security dialogue now exist at the official (Track 1) level, including such leading regional security institutions as the ARF, the SCO, and the EAS which, despite its predominantly economic focus, still has the potential to emerge over time as an influential regional security mechanism. More ad hoc, but still substantial, multilateral initiatives have also been undertaken regarding specific issues such as the Six-Party Talks concerning security on the Korean peninsula. The growth in institutions and dialogues at the unofficial (or Track 2) level has been even more profound, with more than 200 such channels now estimated to exist. Predictably enough, as institutions elbow for attention and relevance in this increasingly crowded field — often by seizing upon the most visible and contentious issues of the moment — their agendas are exhibiting an increasing degree of overlap. This duplication is most apparent in the case of APEC and the EAS.

Purists might argue that there is little reason for concern here and that there can be no such thing as “too much talk” on any issue of pressing concern. Pragmatists would assert that this trend towards duplication will remain deeply entrenched due to the “phenomenon called ‘institutional stickiness’ — in layman’s terms, the tendency of organisations to resist doing themselves out of a job”. From an architectural standpoint, however, this “hyper-institutionalism” remains problematic in that it essentially does nothing more than generate an over-abundance of groupings without reconciling the countervailing national interests their members bring to the table. If so, the requirements such as “coherence”, “structural unity”, “purpose and function”, and “intelligent design” which our proposed definition of “security architecture” calls for simply cannot be met. Instead, all that will exist is merely an amalgam of loosely constructed networks that come and go as issues change.
Finally, the extent to which as yet unresolved countervailing national interests have perpetuated this problem of “institutional stickiness” should not be underestimated. Thus far, the multiplicity of multilateral institutions and activities in Asia has actually afforded the region’s great powers, in particular, the option of using these mechanisms as instruments of competitive influence. Occasionally these regional heavyweights will square off against one another within institutional settings, as occurred between China and Japan at the inaugural EAS. Yet, more often than not, the broad menu of choice allows the region’s great powers to make their presence felt within those institutions with which they feel most comfortable, and with which they have the most influence — Beijing in ASEAN+3 and the SCO; Moscow in the SCO; Washington in APEC and through its own ad hoc mechanisms such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Proliferation Security Initiative; and Tokyo through the ARF and, increasingly, the EAS as it strives to check China’s growing influence in the ASEAN+3 process. In short, this remains one of the great ironies of the remarkable growth in regional multilateral institutions and activities which has occurred since the beginning of the 1990s: that their emergence has raised as many problems as it has potentially addressed in terms of forging architectural consensus and establishing viable regional “security architecture”.

CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Critics of the definition we propose in this article might argue that our conception of “security architecture” is unduly rigid and thereby not well suited to the dynamics of the highly variegated Asian region. The Australian strategic observer Allan Gyngell, for instance, posits that “the multiplicity of visions of the region and the variety of functional needs that must be accommodated” are such that “the Asia Pacific has never been headed towards the goal of a comprehensive European-like arrangement: its history and geography are of a very different order”. There is certainly merit to this observation. However, Gyngell’s contiguous assertion that “the Asia-Pacific region has too many regional organisations, yet they still cannot do all the things we require of them” illustrates all too well the need for a more disciplined architectural ideal embodying the characteristics assigned within our definition: regional specificity, coherence, structural unity, synergy, “intelligent design”, purpose, and relevance.

If what we regard as Asian “security architecture” in any genuine sense of that terminology proves unattainable, does the definition provided in this chapter amount to nothing other than a largely self-indulgent semantic
exercise? For the following three reasons, we propose that its contribution is more than that. First, our definition promises to facilitate more effective scholarly communication. As this chapter has demonstrated, scholars of Asian security continue to employ the architectural metaphor with reference to quite different forms, dimensions, and configurations of cooperative activity. Because “architecture” in ordinary language is a concept laden with multiple (and often contested) meanings, this situation is understandable, if somewhat impractical. The definitional ambiguity it has created, however, has spawned a growing debate over the relevance and utility of the terminology. As David Baldwin observes “the advancement of knowledge depends on the ability of scholars to communicate with one another; and clear concepts seem to help”.42 The adoption of our proposed definition by scholars of Asian security will, we hope, contribute towards such knowledge advancement.

Second, our definition should also facilitate more effective interaction between scholars and practitioners of Asian security. The fact that the concept of “security architecture” has become so deeply embedded in academic and policy discourse should be reason alone for retaining it and for privileging it over competing terminologies. The “gap” between the so-called “worlds” of academia and policymaking has traditionally been such a difficult one to bridge, with issues of language and terminology often tending to reinforce differences between the two.43 To be sure, the flexibility surrounding the usage of “security architecture” will almost certainly still appeal to some practitioners of Asian security who, for political reasons, regard it as advantageous to retain at least some of the term’s definitional ambiguity.

Yet policy elites may still find cause to employ the definition of “security architecture” which we advocate for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the conception of “security architecture” as we have developed it here appropriately highlights that policy approaches and mechanisms can be fashioned to modify existing security structures effectively to meet evolving security challenges. At the same time, we have also sought to retain the bland and at least superficially non-threatening connotations associated with the “security architecture” concept — relative, at least, to terms with a more definitive ring such as “arrangements” or “systems” — which can and often do generate an image of structural legitimization that can facilitate regional security cooperation. From the perspective of the policymakers, the policies derived and the acts committed under “architectural” auspices can at least be rationalized as undertaken for the “greater good” of Asian populaces.

Third, and most importantly, the definition we propose establishes clear criteria for ascertaining what (if any) “security architecture” actually exists in the Asian region. As this chapter has demonstrated, some scholars
and practitioners of Asian security speak of an emerging or nascent regional “security architecture”, whereas others refer to a structure that is already firmly in place. In so doing, these two groups are essentially talking past one another. Moreover, given the judgment of this chapter that there is actually no Asian “security architecture” yet to speak of, coupled with the proposition that one may not even emerge in the foreseeable future, these two groups of analysts risk becoming like the loyal Ministers in Hans Christian Andersen’s famous fairy tale — *The Emperor’s New Clothes* — who praised the illusory garments of the naked emperor standing before them. The definition we propose not only safeguards against this embarrassing potentiality. It also provides a clear yardstick for deciphering if, and when, authentic regional “security architecture” actually comes into being.

Our intention in establishing such criteria is not to set the bar so high as to make the realization of regional “security architecture” unattainable. Indeed, we would argue that the need for viable “security architecture” in Asia is currently more pressing than ever. The future of American power and how it will be applied in this region is becoming more ambiguous. Yet widely-trumpeted Asian collective institutional norms have thus far failed to take precedence over the sovereign prerogative motivations of Asian states. Meanwhile, the strategic environment in this part of the world is becoming more demanding and complex as the persistence of traditional security concerns — such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, regional flashpoints, and the prospects of a destabilizing arms race — has been complicated by the increasing range of non-traditional security challenges, including international terrorism, environmental issues, and disease-based threats. Moreover, as the continuing North Korean nuclear crisis and the plight of a perpetually starving North Korean population demonstrate, there is also a growing awareness of the interdependence between these traditional and non-traditional security agendas.

In the final analysis, this environment promises to generate a myriad of crises requiring transboundary policy management in both the traditional and non-traditional sectors. Yet unless and until scholars and practitioners of Asian security are first able to agree on what they actually mean by the term “security architecture”, the urgent task of devising and implementing an effective region-wide structure to cope with this highly fluid and treacherous strategic environment is likely to be fraught with difficulty. It is therefore hoped that the definition of “security architecture” put forward here might offer a basis for such a consensus and, in the process, serve as a useful “building block” for regional security.
Notes

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in San Francisco, March 2008 and excerpts of it also appeared in a chapter the two authors contributed to Bates Gill and Michael Green (eds.), Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). We are grateful for the comments from participants at the ISA event.


2 See, for example, “Declaration on Peace and Cooperation” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC]) (“The Rome Declaration”), Rome, 8 November 1991.


11 See, for example, Desmond Ball, “Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific: Official


21 Ibid.


31 US Fed News, “Defense Secretary Gates Delivers Speech at Sophia University”.

32 Negroponte, “Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Symposium” [emphasis added].

33 Rumsfeld, “The United States and Asia’s Emerging Security Architecture”.

34 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, p. 27.


38 See, for example, Ralph A. Cossa, “East Asia Community-Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board”, Pacific Forum CSIS Issues & Insights 7, no. 17 (October 2007).


41 Ibid, p. 8.
